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2Summary
This thesis analyses the temporal logic that informs the shift from Fordism to 
post-Fordism, a highly influential narrative for understanding how developments 
in technology affect the body in western nation-states from the late nineteenth 
century to the present.
The thesis reads this shift as a history of touch and bodily mobility. First,
I study the techniques of factory management known as Taylorism, which 
provided the basis for the Fordist socioeconomic system. Taylorized Fordism, I 
show, made working bodies touch technological objects in order to time, 
represent, and control bodily movements. However, I argue that Taylorized 
Fordist techniques organize bodies into a space of tactility, which is not the same 
as invoking Fordism as a predictable system of domination.
Second, I discuss socio-historical accounts that outline the reasons for 
Fordism’s eventual failure and replacement, all of which emphasize bodily 
flexibility as the quality that determines a post-Fordist time. I consider the fate of 
Taylorism in Fordism’s ostensible demise, by explicating the subtlety with which 
Taylorism is superseded by the more flexible practice of ergonomics.
Third, I conduct a philosophical analysis of what it means for bodies to be 
affected by post-Fordist changes in technological objects, most prominently the 
transition towards digital media. I refute the notion of a post-Fordist digital age, 
by arguing that Taylorized Fordism can be interpreted as a model of digital 
bodily function that persists uncomfortably in the present.
The thesis concludes by arguing for the significance of touching tactile 
technological objects -  and tactile technological bodies making contact with one 
another -  in ways that produce stasis, rigidity, and hardness -  Fordist qualities 
that are unfairly subordinated in a post-Fordist temporal frame. I call these 
relations ‘queer Fordism’, whereby a technological body’s activity is not 
contemporaneous with a presumed Fordist-to-post-Fordist continuum.
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6Introduction
This thesis draws attention to unexplored relations between bodies, technological 
developments, and artefacts in technologically affected lives. I will argue that the 
qualities brought to light by these relations -  namely touch, mobility, and 
flexibility -  are significant in ways that have not been central to critical theories 
and histories of technological embodiment. I will also claim that these relations 
and their attendant qualities have a history, which relates closely to the shift from 
Fordism to post-Fordism -  a highly significant and influential narrative for 
understanding technological development in western nation-states from the late 
nineteenth century to the present. However, I will show that interpreting the shift 
from Fordism to post-Fordism as generative of these relations both reveals and 
disrupts the logic of temporal succession and advancement which, I argue, not 
only underpins the Fordist-to-post-Fordist narrative but also profoundly informs 
the ways in which scholars and historians have represented technological 
development to make claims about bodily movement, bodily change, bodies in 
society, and critical theory.
In chapter 1 ,1 study the rhetoric of Taylorist work management, which 
was a crucial precursor to Fordist processes of production and consumption. I 
explain the very specific techniques by which Taylorism and Taylorized Fordism 
brought together bodies and machine technologies in order to time, represent and 
control bodily movement, and I consider the writings of cultural critics and 
political philosophers who variously argued in favour of the Fordist system at the 
time of its implementation. I argue for the significance of cultural critic Walter 
Benjamin’s claim that Taylorized Fordist techniques organize bodies into a space
7of tactility, which is not the same as invoking Fordism as a predictable system of 
domination. The second half of the chapter expands on the significance of this 
claim by considering the often overlooked agential possibilities of Fordism’s key 
notion: automobility.
Chapter 2 engages with the events surrounding the advent of post- 
Fordism. I discuss socio-historical accounts that outline the socio-economic and 
cultural-political reasons for Fordism’s eventual failure and replacement, all of 
which emphasize technological and bodily flexibility as the qualities that 
distinguish a post-Fordist time. I consider the fate of Taylorism in Fordism’s 
ostensible demise, by explicating the subtlety with which Taylorism is 
superseded by the more flexibly adaptive practice of ergonomics within the 
rhetoric of physiology. I expand on this particular analysis to make the chapter’s 
two main arguments: namely, that the same social histories which damn the 
presumed cultural shift to flexibility nonetheless need to be flexible enough to 
keep up with that shift, and that social history erroneously tries to fit the history 
of twentieth-century feminism into a Fordist-to-post-Fordist temporal frame.
In chapter 3 ,1 move into a philosophical analysis of what it means for 
bodies to be affected by post-Fordist changes in technological objects, most 
prominently the widespread transition towards digital media.1 Drawing on the
1 The question of whether we can distinguish between ‘old media’ and ‘new 
media’ is important to my thesis, particularly in chapters 3 and 4, but I am more 
interested in whether we can make a definite distinction between Fordism and 
post-Fordism -  a question that incorporates issues of film, broadcasting, and 
Internet technologies but which also frames issues of bodily function, 
philosophies of movement and relation, and the question of what critical theory 
should do, which arguably are outside the scope of media studies. Technologies 
scholar Joanna Zylinska asserts that new media ‘always carries a trace of “the 
old’” : similarly, I argue that the novelty of the digital electronic technologies that 
signify ‘post-Fordism’ is put into doubt by long-standing philosophical issues 
that have more in common with the ways in which Taylorized Fordism organized
8work of scholars within the critical field of cybernetics, I refute the notion of a 
post-Fordist digital age that radically changes how bodies move and 
communicate, by arguing that bodies are always already digital. My argument is 
problematized by contemporary cultural theorists who claim that when a body is 
affected technologically, it enters an analogue model of representation, which is 
closely related to the digital but more attuned to the fluid bodily movements and 
dynamism that a theory of digitization always misses. Simultaneously, these 
scholars present this analogue model as a solution to the problem of cultural 
theory’s repetitiveness in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries. In 
response to these assertions, I appropriate philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s theory 
of the digital in order to argue that Taylorized Fordism can be interpreted as a 
philosophy of digital bodily function that persists uncomfortably in the present, 
commenting on the reductive succession logic that informs the analogue’s 
currency and privileged status.
Chapter 4 presents an alternative account of bodily movement in 
contemporary technological society. Building on my claims for a temporally 
stubborn model of digital bodily function, I argue for the significance of making 
contact with technological objects -  and technological bodies making contact 
with one another -  in ways that produce stasis, place fixity, and hardness, 
qualities that I think are unfairly subordinated within cultural studies of 
telecommunication. I explicate the ways in which cultural theorists of ‘new’ 
technologies equate contact between bodies and digital media with the movement 
and transformation of a body outside of its control. This equation, I will show, is 
premised on a theory of tactility that disqualifies certain types of bodily relation
bodies technologically. See Joanna Zylinska, Bioethics in the Age o f New Media 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2009), p. xi.
9from taking place in a present time of transience and global connectivity. 
Engaging in more detail with the implications of invoking tactility within a 
technological context, I argue that reaching those bodies that have been excluded 
and displaced by the valorization of tactile fluidity over fixity is a matter of 
reaching the virtual, which must not be conflated with getting to a more 
technologically advanced or post-Fordist time and place.
Before I begin the opening chapter, I want to explain anecdotally how 
touch and mobility play a crucial role in my own technological life, and why this 
matters within a Fordist-to-post-Fordist framework.
I am tactless when operating technological objects, whether a car, a 
computer, or most electronic and motorized devices. I like and am comfortable 
touching and generally examining these objects before they have been started, 
switched on, or powered to do whatever it is they are supposed to do, but as soon 
as they become live I enjoy their company less, because my actions seem out of 
sync with the control commands that form the basis of these objects’ moving 
properties. That is, I feel that the technological object and myself are moving in 
different times and places. I can explain this feeling by recounting a scenario in 
which I am regularly situated. I am typing in a word-processing application or 
browsing the World Wide Web on my (almost obsolete) home computer, when 
the computer suddenly freezes and crashes. A multi-coloured wheel icon then 
appears on the computer screen -  replacing the cursor that no longer responds to 
my manipulation of the mouse -  and spins continuously while I await a response 
from the applications and operating system. Nothing happens. While we can 
validly assert that the computer has stopped working (or has stopped working 
properly) at this point, this assertion becomes problematic when we consider that
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the computer has not stopped moving: the colour wheel continues to spin, I can 
hear a whirring coming from the machine, and can feel the vibrations on my 
computer desk that correspond with this sound, despite being unable to access 
the computer’s desktop.
In other words, my encounter with the machine remains a site of activity 
-  the machine and myself are both moving -  but it is now felt as an awkward 
asynchrony. I respond to the computer’s delay by increasing the frequency with 
which I click its mouse or press its keyboard, and the computer, ignorant of my 
extra touches, continues to vibrate and display the wheel icon, which, we recall, 
was the computer’s response to an action that I carried out many moments ago. 
Owing to these extra touches, in one sense I am closer to or more involved with 
the computer than ever before, yet we remain irreconcilably mobile, staying in 
places of variable speed and motion that cross and overlap but do not join. Of 
course there are technical reasons for this occurrence. Those with expertise in 
computing, however, will view these moments as unfortunate interludes in the 
interface, which call for some definite action to be taken to re-establish as soon 
as possible a meaningful connection between machine and user, whereas I want 
to claim that these moments -  no matter how brief they are -  instance a meeting 
(or non-meeting) that is technologically significant. In this scenario, when I make 
contact with a technological artefact that is active, its activity does not welcome 
me into a co-ordinative synthesis where the artefact’s movements become an 
extension of my own. I am moved away from a place and time simultaneous with 
that of the machine, even though I am still spending time and making contact 
with it.
I also feel out of time with critical debates in the humanities and social 
sciences that take interactions between the body and digital media devices as 
their object of study. Frustration is produced because these debates seem too 
excited about or have consistently high expectations for these developments. 
‘With the advent of fast personal computers, digital television, and high 
bandwidth cable [...] networks, so-called post-industrial societies stand ready for 
a yet deeper voyage into the “permanently ephemeral’” , argues technologies 
scholar Michael Benedikt, writing in the early 1990s -  the period in which 
widespread personal computer ownership, coupled with the promise of global 
communications technologies, gave rise to a critical fascination with the 
possibilities of a techno- or cyber-cultural near future.2 Benedikt is certain of the 
reliability of the technological developments he invokes, citing their perpetual 
availability to consistently transport bodies into an electronically-enabled, 
networked space of many fast-moving, transitory connections and 
communications. But I cannot reconcile this assertion with the indifferent 
relations that often characterize my time spent with machines and technological 
objects, particularly with my inefficient, irregular computer, which indicates that 
it would rather remain active without me, or allows me to remain in its company 
as long I do not expect its activity to take me anywhere. It is therefore common 
for me to feel out of place when researching the topic in which I am nonetheless 
most interested.
Feminist critic Elizabeth Grosz argues that there are predominantly two 
types of technologies scholar in a current time of widespread, general-purpose
2 Michael Benedikt, ‘Cyberspace: First Steps’, in The Cybercultures Reader, ed. 
by David Bell and Barbara M. Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 29-44 
(p. 35).
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computerization and electronic media. ‘On the one hand’, Grosz claims, ‘are the 
technophiles [...] who see in this technology the key to new spaces, new 
identities, and new relations, in short, new worlds, open and available, tailored to 
one’s individual predilections and tastes’.3 The other group, argues Grosz, 
comprises ‘nostalgic Luddites yearning for days gone by’, who ‘may lament the 
replacement of face-to-face contact with connections established only through 
electronic mediation’.4 Both groups are ‘equally stringent and [...] equally 
naive’, Grosz asserts, because their respective idealization and revulsion of 
contemporary electronic technologies shares the assumption that these 
technologies, for better or worse, represent a major historical break with previous 
modes of human contact and communication.5 Grosz refuses this assumption, on 
the grounds that new technological objects instead allow for a renewed 
engagement with important philosophical questions of time, space, and relation, 
the existence of which significantly predates the latest innovations in electronics 
and telecommunications.
This thesis will similarly claim that technological relations are formed in 
contemporary society which are not reducible to a chronology of epochal rupture. 
Grosz and I both seek to locate ourselves outside the technophile/Luddite 
opposition in order to argue for complex activities that this opposition cannot 
capture. Indeed, this opposition is insufficient to describe my asynchrony with 
technological objects and technologies scholarship. These experiences and 
encounters are not indicative of technophilia as Grosz defines it, because they are
3 Elizabeth Grosz, ‘Cyberspace, Virtuality, and the Real: Some Architectural 
Reflections’, in Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 75-89 (pp. 76-77).
4 ‘Virtuality’, p. 77.
5 ‘Virtuality’, p. 76.
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premised on technology’s failings rather than an investment in technology’s 
endless power and capabilities, although my fascination with -  and willingness to 
dwell on -  these failures does reference an abnormal liking of things 
technological. These asynchronous relations equally resist Grosz’s notion of 
Ludditism, because while I often scold and swear at the computer (or curse at the 
cursor) for its stubborn slowness, the Luddites want no interaction with the 
innovations by which they are surrounded, whereas I always return to touching 
and feeling my machine without reply, and am compelled to read (and write 
about my experiences of reading) techno-cultural accounts that I know are likely 
to leave my hopes unfulfilled.
In this thesis I will theorize developments in technology from neither of 
the dominant positions Grosz identifies, but this does not mean that Grosz and 
myself posit technological development in exactly the same way. For example, 
Grosz gives a brief allusion to the role of technological objects in her day-to-day 
life: ‘I must confess that I don’t know much about computers. But I know that I 
like them. I like them not simply because they are incredibly convenient labor- 
saving tools (I would like my vacuum cleaner if the same were true of it, though 
in fact we have merely a passing familiarity)’.6 Grosz asserts that she has a 
passing familiarity with her vacuum cleaner -  that is, she is barely close or 
friendly with a technological object that nevertheless needs to be held, pushed, 
and pressed for any amount of time in which it is operated. The movements of 
Grosz and this electronic device pass each other, which links compellingly to my 
earlier description of being in a relational place via a missing simultaneity with 
the technological object in one’s company. Grosz distinguishes this relationship
6 ‘Virtuality’, p. 78.
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from the affinity she has with her computer -  she likes the computer because it 
does more than the purely utilitarian cleaning device -  but her fondness for the 
computer is nonetheless coextensive with the risk of appearing irrelevant to those 
scholars whose critical approaches have become hegemonic. Grosz feels that she 
‘must confess’ to her non-knowledge of computer function, which is a pre­
emptive acknowledgement that her assertion of simply liking (rather than 
celebrating, fearing, idealizing, or reviling) computers places her outside of the 
technophile/Luddite positions from which digital and telecommunicative 
innovation has traditionally been theorized.
Grosz goes on to privilege the computer in the remainder of her essay; 
indeed, the labour-saving vacuum cleaner is not mentioned again after this 
instant. There is an implication here that while the computer’s capacities for 
Internet connectivity and simulation are not as revolutionary as we might think, 
these capacities nevertheless engage us with critical issues in ways that are 
beyond our boring, repetitive, single-purpose or one-dimensional artefacts. My 
point, however, is that the relations Grosz has with the computer and the vacuum 
cleaner are more similar than Grosz realizes. Contact with both enacts a 
confrontation with the unremarkable: Grosz and the vacuum cleaner are put into 
a relation through indifference, and Grosz can say no more than that she likes the 
computer despite being compelled or addicted to using it.71 argue that this 
contact opens an interpretative space for alternatively questioning the 
implications of contacting and communicating technologically. Grosz’s own 
assertions come under scrutiny in this space. For example, is Grosz suggesting 
partly that the restricted, repetitive activity of the hard working cleaning device
7 Grosz discusses addiction to computer use in ‘Virtuality’, p. 19.
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reduces this technological object to its material components (such as plastic and 
wire as opposed to Internet and simulation)? Is this why she dislikes the device -  
because it is more a hard immutable shell than a sophisticatedly circuited portal 
to a variety of other spaces? Does Grosz’s passing familiarity not reinstate a 
mind/body dualism (which Grosz says has structured body-computer interaction 
in technophilia and Ludditism), whereby Grosz becomes the multiply mobile 
computer, or intelligent processor, burdened by and always ready to take flight 
from something too enmeshed in the matter with which it left the factory? Or 
perhaps Grosz’s comments are important simply for demonstrating that the most 
powerful, interactive and exciting of innovations can be discussed alongside the 
dullest, most uninviting and unnoticeable technological objects, which might 
enable us to advance a critique based on glimpsing aspects of the latter in the 
former.
Grosz does not elaborate on these questions and possibilities after 
implicitly introducing them. In other words, Grosz’s article misses the 
opportunity to construct a position that subverts, or complexifies, the conceptual 
pair to which Grosz cannot relate. Thus, even after Grosz’s important essay -  in 
which Grosz indicates that the technophile/Luddite opposition is not universally 
explanatory -  there appear to be no categories, other than ‘technophile’ and 
‘Luddite’, for understanding relations with technological objects. There is a 
danger, then, that my encounters will be read as a form of Ludditsm. But I 
strongly reject this potential interpretation. To be asynchronous in the way I have 
described does not mean simply having bad feelings towards the technological 
objects with which one lives. Instead, it is an affective state that reveals as 
meaningful the mundane ihoments that punctuate time spent technologically:
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these moments seem to be resistant to interpretation not only in Ludditism and 
technophilia but in critical attempts, such as Grosz’s, to move away from these 
stances. Further, in my opinion, technological development covers both the 
always-already-technological function of bodies and any artefact with which the 
body comes into contact.
As I have intimated, the historical narrative that I use these asynchronous 
relations to critique begins in the late nineteenth century. This period saw the 
development of techniques -  known collectively as Taylorism -  for measuring 
and determining the separate movements made by a human body at work 
(predominantly with machines or in machine environments) in any given amount 
of time. These methods of technologically appointing a body, fixing it to a 
standardized set of discrete, calibrated movements, played a key role in the 
implementation of early-to-mid-twentieth-century industrial mass production and 
consumption -  commonly referred to as Fordism -  which unavoidably linked
o
technology to the control and domination of western societies. My main critical 
appraisal in this thesis, though, is of the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism. This 
is an event narrated primarily in social history and cultural geography, and 
describes the change, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, from one type of 
capitalist system to another. It also -  and in the context of this thesis, more 
importantly -  incorporates the many changes in technological objects, society, 
work relations, and bodily mobility that were corollary to this shift.
The Fordist-to-post-Fordist shift is an important framework for
understanding how we reached the technological present. Yet I find Fordism-to-
post-Fordism a highly problematic narrative, because it is premised on 
 <---------
81 clarify my use of the terms ‘technology’ and ‘machine’ in the opening stages 
of chapter 1.
technological change but does not comment on the specific developments and 
concepts by which it is motivated. We learn very little from this narrative about 
the meaning of notions such as automobility, computerization, the digital, and 
information technology, even though the narrative regularly invokes these 
notions to demonstrate that we live in a time much different to that of the first 
half of the twentieth century. Moreover, the narrative is based on technological 
intimacy -  bodies being materially and representationally brought together with 
machines and electronics across time -  but rarely offers a close reading or 
localized example of these processes in action, preferring instead to proclaim, in 
my opinion always over-abstractly and reductively, that technological 
development corresponds with a change in the means by which bodies are 
oppressed. Of course, as a social history, Fordism-to-post-Fordism is concerned 
primarily with tracking the movements of capital accumulation rather than with 
explicating the broader philosophical implications of technological development. 
It could be argued therefore that this periodizing account is of limited relevance 
to cultural theorists and philosophers who wish to study the rhetoric, 
representational strategies, and bodily affects of a technological existence. 
However, I argue that the Fordist-to-post-Fordist shift does have critical and 
philosophical value, precisely because of its failure to address matters of body- 
technology interaction in any detail. In other words, rather than rejecting the 
narrative on the basis of my asynchrony with it, I argue that feeling out of time 
can be the basis for remaining with the Fordist-to-post-Fordist framework, which 
in turn adds a greater historical and political significance to an experience that I 
have thus far introduced anecdotally.
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The Fordist-to-post-Fordist shift can be read as a history of place fixity 
and displacement. In Fordism, one is appointed to a position or role in the 
workforce, which corresponds with being appointed to a place in the 
mechanized, automated factory. (Fordism was founded upon the Ford Motor 
Company’s simplified, standardized processes of automobile assembly in the 
early twentieth century.) In this place, one carries out the same set of machine 
assembly tasks continuously throughout the working day. Place and 
repetitiveness characterize Fordist activity, in which one is always making 
contact with, and is always in the company of, artefacts and automated 
machinery. Furthermore, in Fordism this activity anchors and co-ordinates the 
movements of capital, domestic life, and leisure time, as well as the use of 
products in these spheres. Grosz’s vacuum cleaner is Fordist.
In post-Fordism, however, the factory loses its central status within 
western nation-states amid globalization, forcing bodies to take on the qualities 
of adaptability and flexibility that this new societal structure requires. To be an 
eligible subject of post-Fordism, one must move adaptively between the many 
different jobs that one might hold at the same time, the majority of which are 
unlikely to be in the manufacturing or hard industry sector. Jobs in all sectors 
rely on computers, which have also become widely owned consumer durables, 
facilitating global communications networks that significantly alter the 
experience of time and space: one instantaneously makes contact with others 
transnationally, in a space with no clearly defined location and co-ordinates, and 
one’s actions at work are subject to the changing calculations and decisions 
relayed instantly across a management hierarchy. In these senses we can say that 
post-Fordism signifies terhporariness as a social dominant, whereby one is
19
unable to remain in place for any sustained period of time. Grosz’s computer is 
post-Fordist.
These links are useful for broaching the key issues that ‘Fordism’ and 
‘post-Fordism’ designate, but the Fordist-to-post-Fordist framework is 
meaningful in a much more complex sense, not only as a history of place fixity 
and placelessness but as a history of failure and unreliable connections. As I 
proceed to study in greater depth the technological concepts and developments to 
which the Fordist-to-post-Fordist narrative tentatively introduces us, we will 
discover that technological change and activity cannot be reduced to the logic of 
temporal succession that the formulation ‘Fordist-to-post-Fordist’ implies.
Indeed, I will demonstrate that an explication of critical concepts such as 
automobility, digitization, computerization, and virtuality reveals a series of 
deferrals, failed attempts to move decisively into the future, and an inability to 
separate technologically ‘old’ place fixity from technologically ‘current’ 
placelessness. I want to show that it is possible, in the post-Fordist present, to be 
in a time and place that feels Fordist, or which is related experientially to the 
qualities and activities that the Fordist-to-post-Fordist narrative consigns to an 
obsolete epoch. It is not enough for a social historian to proclaim, or for a scholar 
of any critical discipline to assume, that we are now living in a post-Fordist time. 
Feeling Fordist in the present does not mean turning away from a history whose 
logic of forward movement and technological advancement remains intact. 
Instead, it refers to a body’s re-appointment to a different place within this 
history, where a body’s activity is not contemporaneous with the ways in which 
this history unfolds. Dwelling with a crashing computer exemplifies this. In
20
short, it is possible in this place to question whether the shift from Fordism to 
post-Fordism ever fully and properly happened.
21
1: Hard Working Bodies
This chapter establishes the key historical developments in the West’s 
intelligibility of movement that emerged alongside significant changes in the 
organization of work practices within western nation-states. The starting points 
of this thesis are the factory environments of late-nineteenth- and early- 
twentieth-century America, and the rhetoric of industrial management -  the 
discipline of time and motion study that determined what took place in these 
spaces.
I choose to begin the thesis in the factories of this particular time because 
I wish to underscore the significance of industrial management as a philosophy 
of movement. Industrial management, I will demonstrate, made the significant 
assertion that the activity of the factory -  which, importantly within the context 
of my research, included bodies continually coming into contact with 
technological objects and artefacts -  provides the occasion for discovering 
hitherto unnoticed bodily movements, and thus for multiplying the possibilities 
for action. Concerned as it was with the organization of bodies at work, industrial 
management used these possibilities to create a more efficient workplace, and to 
more effectively control the bodies in the spaces it was surveying. Industrial 
management’s methods and principles remain highly important to any discussion 
of interaction between bodies and technologies, and underlie the majority of 
issues explored in this thesis. I will use this chapter, though, to claim that one of 
industrial management’s most significant achievements was its revelation that 
bodies are hard working. Industrial management is important, I will argue, 
because it asserts that a hard working body is not necessarily the same as a body
that strenuously labours. In other words, while industrial management sought to 
increase labour productivity and employee exploitation, this was not its only 
purpose: it also sought to define the eligible body as that which functions 
properly, and did so through representational strategies that we can call 
hardening -  the breaking down or freezing of bodies into many discrete 
movements, which were then put together as evidence of what a body was 
capable of doing in any given time frame.
I begin this chapter by giving another name to the processes I have thus 
far only schematically outlined. The industrial management techniques that I 
have been discussing are known as Taylorism. I will provide a more detailed 
analysis of Taylorist procedures, highlighting the particular motives and logics 
that inform Taylorism’s determination of proper bodily function. I will then chart 
Taylorism’s centrality to the formation of Fordism, the socioeconomic system 
that dominated western nation-states throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century. I discuss Fordism as a system by which bodily movements are 
controlled, but I also explicate the work of cultural critic Walter Benjamin to 
argue that it is possible to theorize Fordism as something other than an order of 
domination. I conclude by analysing at length one of Fordism’s key concepts: 
automobility. I will claim that all bodies under Fordism are automobiles, and I 
take issue with a particular social history that cites Fordism as a disappointing 
period of the past in which human action and machine action should have been 
but were not separated.
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Body-Machines
The term ‘body-machine’ is central to this thesis, and I must explain my use of 
the term before proceeding. A body-machine, as I define it and will elaborate in 
many different ways throughout this thesis, is a system of co-ordinative 
components that move in relation to one another. A body-machine is formed by a 
domain of knowledge in which bodies and machines share, and are posited 
according to, the same model of proper function or timely movement/operation.1 
‘Body-machine’ thus serves as a theoretical framework for studying the (always 
technologically affected) movements that a body makes in time in order to be 
intelligible. The ‘body’ in ‘body-machine’ does not simply represent the human: 
equally it signifies social bodies, theoretical bodies, artefactual bodies, and the 
spaces in which humans use and interact with technological objects. In 
subsequent sections and chapters, I will explicate not only the body-machine of 
human bodily function and the body-machine of machine function, but also, 
among many others, the body-machines of Taylorism, Fordism and post- 
Fordism, the body-machine of feminism, the body-machine of theory, and the 
body-machines of car use and computer use. While I give this theoretical model 
many different historical situations, my eventual aim in this thesis is to 
demonstrate that body-machine discourse undoes ideas of temporal advancement 
premised on successive technological developments.
I am not the first to articulate a theory through the hyphenation of body 
and machine. Literary scholar Mark Seltzer has theorized a technological field of
1 As we will see in chapter 3 ,1 am indebted to the critical discipline of 
cybernetics for the specific notion of ‘machine’ that I use throughout this thesis.
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intelligibility that he calls ‘the body-machine complex’.2 For Seltzer, the body- 
machine complex describes ‘how persons, bodies, and technologies are made and 
represented in tum-of-the-century American culture and beyond: [...] the 
“discovery” that bodies and persons are things that can be made and its 
implications’. Seltzer locates his research within the context of ‘the control 
revolution’, the period ‘from the 1870s to the 1930s’ in which the emergence of 
machine technologies, and machine methods of manufacturing associated with 
mass production, mass consumption, and standardization, engendered ‘a 
rethinking of [...] processes of representation [...] as production, and the 
understanding of production as processing, programming, and systematic 
communication’.4 For Seltzer, the ‘complex’ of which the discovery of bodily 
artefactuality is an effect concerns the shifting, unstable (or, as Seltzer claims, 
‘unnatural’) position of ‘nature’ in a culture whose representational strategies 
were profoundly affected by the advent of these machine methods.5 In a 
‘machine culture’, Seltzer argues, the concept of nature is bound up with the 
machine processes in which bodies are immersed: the body continues to be 
posited as that which has natural properties and capacities, but only to the extent 
that what counts as natural has intersected with and shifted within discourses of
2 Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 
p. 3.
Bodies and Machines, p. 3.
4 Bodies and Machines, p. 159. In the following section, I explicate Taylorism as 
a key aspect of the machine culture that Seltzer invokes. While the control 
revolution is an important precursor to the Taylorist notion of ‘inspection’ that I 
will discuss, it is outside the scope of my thesis. My concern in the following 
section is with the invocation of Taylorism as a major historical point in which 
bodies were redrawn within body-machine discourse. For a detailed account of 
the control revolution, see James R. Beninger, The Control Revolution: 
Technological and Economic Origins o f the Information Society (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986).
5 Bodies and Machines, p. 155.
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machine technology.6 The key implication of Seltzer’s study -  which we will
consider in more detail when I critically appraise Taylorism -  is that the raw,
given physicality of bodies cannot command or precede machines, because the
intelligibility of bodily movement and machine processes are coextensive,
regardless of whether a natural, living body and a lifeless machine are opposed as
an effect of this schema. A lifeless machine, Seltzer suggests, is represented
according to a domain of intelligibility in which ‘machine’ or, more specifically,
‘body-machine’, determines the parameters of the living and the inert.
A more recent example of technologized bodily knowledge is provided
by gender and sexualities theorist Nikki Sullivan. Sullivan’s research is based on
the notion of ‘somatechnics’, which she explains in the following passage:
This term [somatechnics] was recently coined in an attempt to articulate 
[...] the always-already technologised character of bodily formation and 
transformation, and the necessarily material (or enfleshed) character of 
technology. The term somatechnics thus aims to supplant the logic of the 
‘and’, suggesting that modes and practices of corporeality are always- 
already, and without exception, in-relation and in-process: they 
necessarily transect and/or transgress what dominant logic conceives as 
hermetically sealed categories (of practice, embodiment, being, and so 
on).7
Sullivan understands technology not as something made by and for human 
bodies, but as a constitutive and creative network of relations and processual 
activity, in which the body is always already in a state of modification. In other 
words, Sullivan argues that having a body is way of modifying the world in turn. 
Every example of bodily life, Sullivan suggests, is an effect of a culturally 
specific configuration of ‘conceptions of, debates around, and questions about’ 
how technology affects bodies, which ‘are themselves technologies that shape
6 Bodies and Machines, p., 152.
7 Nikki Sullivan, ‘Transsomatechnics and the Matter of “Genital Modifications’” , 
Australian Feminist Studies, 24:60 (2009), 275-286 (p. 276).
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corporeality at the most profound level’.8 Thus, for Sullivan, this technical 
(modificatory) discursivity has always been the means for instantiating 
categories such as the human, the machine, and the body. Moreover, the different 
ways in which technical/discursive relations come together to constitute 
subjectivities across time reveals the instability, and transformativity, of these 
categories at the very moments in which these categories are formed.9 The notion 
of somatechnics is important, then, because it demonstrates that bodies are 
always already technological, and also because it emphasizes, to a much greater 
extent than Seltzer’s theorization, that this always-already status resists a logic of 
temporal succession and historical specificity. In other words, we do not have to 
wait for some developments or innovations in technology to succeed others, 
Sullivan suggests, or do not have to study a specific period in which 
technological development or innovation took place, in order to represent bodies 
as technological bodies.
While I acknowledge and take inspiration from Sullivan’s more sustained 
engagement with technology as a generalizable and constitutive condition, I will 
in fact align more closely with Seltzer’s approach in this thesis, because I am 
studying a different kind of technological body than the ever-changing, dynamic,
8 Nikki Sullivan, ‘The Somatechnics of Intersexuality’, GLQ, 15:2 (2009), 313- 
327 (p. 314).
9 Sullivan calls this ‘tracing the specificity of particular modes and practices of 
bodily (un)becoming thus invoked, and of troubling their alleged essence, their 
separateness and/ or self-sameness’ (‘Transsomatechnics’, p. 276). Joanna 
Zylinska gives a similar account of technology: ‘[t]he Greek etymology of the 
term “technology,” in which one can hear echoes of both art and craft, brings to 
the fore the productivity of the technical relation, which sets up, or creates, the 
human in the world by differentiating the human from his or her constitutive 
surroundings -  tools, language, memory, environment. This relation between 
human and technology is posited here as originary, although it acquires specific 
cultural inscriptions in different historical periods’ (Bioethics, p. xii). I discuss 
the differentiation of human from environment in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
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and fluid complex that Sullivan emphasizes. Sullivan argues that ‘technologies 
are never simply “machinic” as they so often appear to be in the popular 
imagination. Rather, technes are epistemic’.10 Machines are not the same as 
technologies, Sullivan asserts, and the conflation of the two results in a 
misunderstanding of technology in terms of its wider implications for bodily life. 
For Sullivan here, machines are the descriptive and very specific content of 
technology discussed commonsensically, whereas technology is that which 
enables us to posit machines in the first place (and which enables the 
differentiation of a human ‘us’ from the machines, tools, and artefacts in our 
surrounding environments). As long as machines and technologies are conflated, 
Sullivan implies, machines constitute -  to borrow a phrase from sexualities 
scholar Elizabeth Freeman -  a ‘temporal drag’ on technics, or detract from the 
dynamism of (and slow down or set back our engagement with, and 
understanding of) a body of knowledge whose technicity (both temporally and 
spatially) moves beyond the predictability and narrowness of a 
machine/technology/body association.11 I agree completely with Sullivan that
10 ‘Transsomatechnics’, p. 314. Techne refers to the Greek etymology that 
Zylinska describes, and underscores Sullivan’s use o f ‘technics’. For more on 
technology in terms of technics, see Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The 
Fault o f  Epimetheus, trans. by Richard Beardsworth and George Collins 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), and Stiegler, ‘Technics of Decision: 
An Interview with Peter Hallward’, trans. by Sean Gaston, Angelaki, 8:2 (2003), 
151-168.1 discuss Stiegler in chapter 3 of this thesis, but in relation to the digital 
rather than the technical.
11 See Elizabeth Freeman, ‘Packing History, Count(er)ing Generations’, New 
Literary History, 31 (2000), 727-744 (p. 728). Freeman invokes ‘temporal drag’ 
within the context of sexuality studies rather than technology, but Freeman’s 
association of the term ‘drag’ with ‘retrogression, delay, and the pull of the past 
upon the present’ can be used to draw out the implications of machines or the 
machinic in Sullivan’s essay (‘Packing’, p. 728). In Sullivan’s description, when 
it is not being pulled back, by a machine/technology conflation, technics moves 
beyond the machinic in a temporal sense, because technics is irreducible to its 
specific historical contexts; in a spatial sense, because it applies to more aspects
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simultaneously invoking ‘machine’ and ‘technology’ can be reductive. However, 
I want to exploit and appropriate the connotations of predictability and regularity 
that ‘machine’ calls forth here, to demonstrate how a critical engagement with 
the machinic in fact enables us to comprehend technology in its philosophical- 
theoretical sense. In other words, I will argue that the machinic can indeed be 
epistemic: ‘body-machine’ can offer an alternative approach to understanding the 
ways in which technology creates bodily knowledges.12 I proceed, then, by 
analysing Taylorism as a significant historical example of body-machine 
formation.
Taylorism: Representation as Work/Working Out
Mechanical engineer Frederick W. Taylor was an important participant in the 
discursive reconfiguration of the relationship between, and the meaning of, 
bodies, machine technologies, and work in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth- 
century industrial America and beyond. Taylor’s essay ‘Principles of Scientific 
Management’ proposed new methods for improving the efficiency of factory
Ilabour. Through the implementation of various techniques of representation
of bodily action than the machinic does; and in another temporal sense, in that 
Sullivan posits somatechnics as a means of distinguishing historically reductive 
and (by now) repetitive notions of technology from recent accounts that 
recognize technology’s epistemological significance.
12 Significantly, Sullivan does not consider cybernetics when making this claim 
and when formulating somatechnics. As I will explicate in chapter 3, cybernetics 
neither claims that humans are machinic, nor adds a pre-existent category 
‘human’ to a pre-existent category ‘machine’. Instead, cybernetics demonstrates 
that machines are body-machines -  machines (and/or bodies) cannot be posited 
apart from a model of inter-and intra-communicative function that underscores 
the impossibility of making a definitive distinction between the human and the 
machinic.
13 Frederick W. Taylor, ‘The Principles of Scientific Management’, in Scientific 
Management (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 30-144. Taylor’s 
principles influenced work management practices in western Europe, particularly
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into the factory environment, including photographic and written records of 
observation that were themselves constantly overseen and updated, Taylorist 
organization painstakingly broke down the physical motions of each worker, and 
calibrated these gestures to maximize the efficiency of each working body 
undertaking each factory job. Taylorist techniques of observation, measurement, 
and timing established a standardized set of simplified bodily motions required to 
complete any job satisfactorily.14 If workers performed these calibrated motions, 
then the time taken to complete each individual job was reduced, which in turn 
increased labour productivity. The Taylorized working body thus worked not 
only in terms of labour, but in terms of functioning properly: the properly 
functioning body, or a temporally-specific set of gestures and attributes, is the 
measure of corporeal intelligibility in Taylorist management.
France, and were taken up in eastern Europe by Joseph Stalin in the formative 
years of the Soviet Union. See Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, 
trans. by Constance Storrs (New York: Pitman, 1987), pp. xi, 66, 69; and Peter 
Wollen, ‘Cinema/ Americanism/ The Robot’, in Modernity and Mass Culture, 
ed. by James Naremore and Patrick Bratlinger (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 42-70 (pp. 44-47). While it is important to 
note Taylor’s influence, I am more interested in Taylor’s principles themselves 
and how they shaped human contact and action with technology.
14 I say that Taylor ‘participated’ in the reconfiguration of bodies and machines, 
because Taylor was not the only pioneer of methods for breaking down 
individual bodily movements. Photographer Eadward Muybridge devised 
innovative and highly influential processes of motion-capture in the late 
nineteenth century, whereby he used a camera to record the normally 
imperceptible movements of humans and animals. See Eadward Muybridge, The 
Human Figure in Motion (New York: Dover, 1955). Taylor also had notable 
contemporaries within the field of Scientific Management, namely Frank and 
Lillian Gilbreth, whose management and motion-study business used methods of 
determining bodily efficiency that were partly based on but not identical to 
Taylor’s. See Frank B. Gilbreth, Primer o f Scientific Management (New York: 
Elibron, 2005). I focus on Taylorism, however, because my thesis is concerned 
with critiquing the shift frpm a Fordist society to a post-Fordist society, and as 
we will see in what follows and in subsequent chapters, a knowledge of 
Taylorism is crucial to understanding the meaning of Fordism.
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In ‘Principles’, Taylor recounts his management and systematization of
an American bicycle ball bearing factory, in order to demonstrate the efficacy of
his time and motion study of working bodies. Out of ‘the twenty or more
operations used in making steel balls’ in the factory, ‘perhaps the most
important’, Taylor asserts, ‘was that of inspecting them after final polishing so as
to remove all fire-cracked or otherwise imperfect balls before boxing’.15 Before
detailing the activity of the ball bearing factory, Taylor explains the specific
qualities needed to be an inspector in a factory under his systematization, and the
measures taken to determine these qualities. The suitability of a worker to the
Taylorist workplace is established by determining beforehand what Taylor calls
‘the “personal coefficient” of the man [sic] tested’:
This is done by suddenly bringing some object, the letter A or B for 
instance, within the range of vision of the subject, who, at the instant he 
[sic] recognizes the letter has to do some definite thing, such as to press a 
particular electric button. The time which elapses from the instant the 
letter comes into view until the subject presses the button is accurately 
recorded by a delicate scientific instrument. [...] Some individuals are 
bom with unusually quick powers of perception accompanied by quick 
responsive action. With some the message is almost instantly transmitted 
from the eye to the brain, and the brain equally quickly responds by 
sending the proper message to the hand. Men [sic] of this type are said to 
have a low ‘personal coefficient’.16
A ‘low personal coefficient’ is the measure by which bodily knowledge is 
determined in Taylor’s rhetoric, which positions the body between a symbiotic 
enmeshment with technology and a reassertion of the human capacity to harness 
technology. The body is represented above as a series of terminals or 
workstations that can be isolated in order to assess the most efficient means of
 — ----------------------------- 5—
15 ‘Principles’, p. 86.
16 ‘Principles’, p. 89. Emphasis in original.
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transmitting a message.17 Brain, eye and hand are each figured as workers 
completing specific tasks, machine-like, in a required timeframe along a 
systematized, Taylorized labour programme. In other words, the body’s 
intelligibility is produced by its contact with the electric button of the personal 
coefficient test, which is simultaneous with the enactment of a body-machine 
complex. From this perspective the Taylorist body-machine indicates the 
discursive co-dependence of body and technology, without implying the mastery 
of one over the other.
However, Taylor’s figuration of the brain and sense organs as 
systematized work terminals is distinctly hierarchized. Taylor’s explanation of 
the personal coefficient test is premised on the subordination of hand to eye.
Even though the personal coefficient test attempts to close the distance between 
bodily functions through mechanistic calibration, it is still a means of perfecting 
a temporality in which hand follows eye, movement follows perception, and 
body follows mind: in the passage above Taylor asserts the primacy of the eye on 
account of its closer proximity to the brain, which for Taylor justifies the need
1 ftfor it to be the first stage in message transmission. The presence of the body is 
announced in Taylorism only after the privileged eye-brain transmission has 
taken place: only once a purely optical space has been established. When Taylor 
describes above the process of ‘bringing some object [...] within the range of 
vision of the subject, who, the instant he [sic] recognizes [it] has to do some
171 borrow the notion of the ‘terminal’ from film theorist Scott Bukatman’s 
Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Post-Modern Science Fiction (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 1993). For Bukatman, ‘terminal’ refers to 
the end of traditional notions of identity within technologized nation-states, and 
to the new subjectivities constituted by the increasing co-dependence of humans 
and new technologies.
181 discuss the bodily transmission of messages and information at greater length 
in chapter 3 of this thesis.
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definite thing’, recognition certifies the seamlessness between and the primacy of 
seeing and knowing: seeing serves to ground knowing, and this process appears 
to be a precondition of bodily awareness in Taylorism. In other words, the optical 
mind space supported by the seeing-knowing dyad appears to establish the 
conditions for what the body can do: the body is prompted into a definite action 
by the eye-brain relationship that began the mechanistic transmission Taylor 
describes.19 The body works or functions like and as a machine, but only insofar 
as this coextensive body-machine intelligibility is taken to be apprehended, or 
‘worked out’, in a purely optical space, where ‘body’ designates the mind- 
determined eligible shapes or contours this body-machine symbiosis can take in 
order to continue using technology over time. Working out here references the 
rational, masterful harnessing of technologies specifically for what can be done 
with them. The most machine-like and technologically redrawn bodies in 
Taylor’s rhetoric, the ball bearing factory workers, are redrawn in this way 
according to a temporal logic which implies that for the body to matter -  to be 
intelligible and eligible, or to count as an intelligible body -  it must ‘possess the 
quality of quick perception followed by quick action’.
19 The implications of Taylor’s description of the body positioned at the personal 
coefficient test can, I argue, apply to the notion of the body positioned at a 
computer station clicking a mouse. The mouse-clicking body, like the personal 
coefficient body that presses the electric button, supports a theorization of a 
conjunctive synthesis of body and machine parts, but can equally support a 
disembodied invocation whereby engagement with the computer screen is 
assumed to take place in a primarily optical space, where the hand on the mouse 
follows the eye immersed in the space of the screen. For a further discussion and 
critique of disembodied accounts of mouse clicking, see J. Macgregor Wise, ‘An 
Immense and Unexpected Field of Action’, Cultural Studies, 18:2/3 (2004), 424- 
442 (pp. 434-435). I return to the issue of mouse clicking, and to the body 
stationed at the computer screen, in the final chapter of this thesis.
20 ‘Principles’, p. 90. My qmphasis. I invoke ‘matter’ here in accordance with 
Judith Butler’s assertion of the term’s reflexivity in relation to the processes of 
bodily intelligibility: ‘to be material means to materialize, where the principle of
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This logic of work/working out extends into Taylor’s description of the 
work process itself. After explaining how the personal coefficient test determined 
those eligible to work in the ball bearing factory, Taylor recounts the measures 
he took to ensure that the specifically selected, calibrated bodies continued to 
function as efficiently throughout each working day. As I have stated, Taylor 
isolates the work of ‘inspecting’ the ball bearings as the most important task 
carried out in the workplace under his systematization.21 The factory girls inspect 
each steel ball bearing for imperfections, which for Taylor is a far more 
important task than one based on brute force, because it enables a more detailed 
demonstration of Scientific Management. Put simply, inspection, in Taylorist 
terms, leads to a greater understanding of how the body functions.
But, as I also asserted above, inspection does not merely refer to the work 
carried out by the body on the factory floor: it more importantly refers to the 
ways in which the concept of work is bound up with the processes of 
representing bodies and technologies. Taylor describes how to ensure the 
continuing efficiency of the machinic, functioning body, he introduced a measure 
called ‘over-inspection’, in order to ‘make it impossible for [the ball bearing
99inspectors] to slight their work without being found out’. As Taylor continues 
to explicate the programme of over-inspection, it is clear that he is articulating 
not a top-down method of coercion, but the closing of the distance between work 
and its representation:
that materialization is precisely what “matters” about that body, its very 
intelligibility. In this sense, to know the significance of something is to know 
how and why it matters, where “to matter” means at once “to materialize” and 
“to mean’” . See Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits o f  
“Sex” (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), p. 32.
21 ‘Principles’, p. 86.
22 ‘Principles’, p. 90.
34
Each one of four of the most trustworthy girls was given each day a lot of 
balls to inspect which had been examined the day before by one of the 
regular inspectors; the number identifying the lot to be over-inspected 
having been changed by the foreman so that none of the over-inspectors 
knew whose work they were examining. In addition to this one of the lots 
inspected by the four over-inspectors was examined on the following day 
by the chief inspector, selected on account of her especial accuracy and 
integrity. An effective expedient was adopted for checking the honesty 
and accuracy of the over-inspection. Every two or three days a lot of balls 
was especially prepared by the foreman, who counted out a definite 
number of perfect balls, and added a recorded number of defective balls 
of each kind [...] An accurate daily record was kept both as to the 
quantity and quality of the work done in order to guard against any 
personal prejudice on the part of the foreman.23
A compulsion to represent the work process, signified by inspection, spreads 
throughout the workplace to the point that the representation of the work process 
is indistinguishable from the work process itself. The ‘regular’ workers, whose 
job is to inspect the steel ball bearings, are inspected by the over-inspectors, who 
are inspected by the chief inspector, who is inspected by the foreman, who is 
inspected by the ‘accurate’ -  and therefore perpetually inspected -  daily record. 
Taylor’s rhetoric of inspection instances a crucial rethinking of the work process, 
whereby work does not merely involve representing and inspecting, but is 
representing and inspecting. There is not simply a body that inspects at work: 
rather, inspection, or the seemingly never-ending process of representing work, is 
constitutive of the body and the different ways in which the body functions in a 
machine culture. The ability to make reference to a distinctly physical or natural 
bodily aspect within the work process is problematized here, because it is only 
through what Seltzer terms ‘ [t]his potentially infinite regress in the work of 
looking and sorting’, the forms of representation that redraw the ‘natural’ body in
 .-----
23 ‘Principles’, pp. 90-91. Seltzer briefly discusses Taylorist work as 
representation in Bodies and Machines, p. 159.
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body-machine discourse, that the body can be accessed.24 Body-machines are 
sorted, are set parameters and have their contours apprehended, within a space of 
looking that, as I demonstrated in Taylor’s personal coefficient test, is 
determined as being primarily optical.
Thus, Taylorism’s renegotiation of the body as body-machine not only 
posits the working body as a site of labour but as a site of mechanical function, 
where the line between living and non-living is redrawn. The Taylorist body is 
not like a machine, but is a machine or a component of factory machinery.
Within the context of Taylorism, then, ‘body-machine’ signifies contact between 
human bodies and technologies, in terms of both the surrounding of bodies by 
machinery in a technological space (in this case, the surrounding and positioning 
of bodies by the machinery of the factory), and the touching or manipulation by 
bodies of the machine components and artefacts that are moved around this space 
(that is, the operating of machinery and the assembling of whatever is being 
made and/or inspected in the factory). ‘Body-machine’ here also references the 
way in which, under industrial management, this contact reveals that bodies are 
as artefactual or constructed as the technological things by which they are 
accompanied. Taylorism uses the activity of the workplace as an opportunity to 
make bodies according to criteria of eligibility that it has determined in advance, 
by calibrating its multifarious recordings (representations) of bodily activity, and 
permitting bodies into a technological space on the basis of their fidelity to the 
movements it had already put together.
24 Bodies and Machines, p. 221 n. 25.
251 return to the issue of bodies, technologies, and things in the final chapter of 
this thesis. When Seltzer claims that the body-machine complex is significant ‘in 
tum-of-the-century American culture and beyond’, he invokes ‘beyond’ in a 
temporal rather than a spatial sense, which distinguishes this assertion from my
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So far this section has focused on how in Taylorism, hard work signifies 
the calibration and systematization of physical effort, the determination of a 
model of function in which bodies must act as machines in order to operate 
machines. However, there are other connotations of hardness that are equally 
important to Taylorism’s representation of bodies, and I must clarify these 
meanings before proceeding. It is unclear at this point whether we should 
conceive of Taylorist body-machines as having a hardness that equates to a rigid 
solidity. Because Taylorism is based on motion-capture and calibration, it seems 
logical to assume that in Taylorism a hard working body is hard because, as I 
asserted in the introduction to this chapter, it has been frozen by this regime of 
representation, and has had its range of motion severely restricted by those 
techniques of stoppage and segmentation that aim to hone its machine-like 
efficiency.
But this assumption is inaccurate because Taylorism in fact required its 
body-machines to move continuously. In none of the passages of Taylorist 
rhetoric in this section do the body and technology stop. The personal coefficient 
test measures individual response times in order to determine who, at the
earlier statement that Taylorism influenced body-machine relations in other 
countries. For Seltzer, the body-machine complex has had a profound but largely 
unacknowledged influence on the approaches of contemporary cultural theory. 
Seltzer argues that when theory posits the cultural constructedness of bodies 
against the intelligibility of a body’s natural properties -  the propagation of a 
notion Seltzer calls ‘the unnaturalness of nature’ -  it does not progressively break 
with prior conceptions of bodily movement, but rather repeats the methodologies 
found in industrial management {Bodies and Machines, p. 155). The body- 
machine complex may indeed naturalize certain ideas about what constitutes an 
eligible body, Seltzer suggests -  and later in the chapter I will show how 
Taylorism achieves this -  but it nevertheless constructs this eligible form, 
partaking in the discourses of artefactual bodily constructedness that were 
prevalent in the machine culture in question. See Bodies and Machines, pp. 155- 
157.1 discuss the relationship between theory, nature, technology, and the body 
at greater length in chapter 3 of this thesis.
appropriate moment, can activate or do something with technology without 
waiting, and these select bodies then proceed to the factory floor to comprise the 
tireless Taylorist workforce. Ball bearing inspection is framed by a never-ending 
procedure of organization, in which metal spheres are constantly picked up, put 
down, and -  if they pass their inspection for hardness and smoothness -  are 
passed on to another department where they are fitted to a machine (a bicycle) 
that will move them to a number of spaces outside the workplace. Hands and 
writing tools also enter into this arrangement of constancy, in the production of 
the written record that oversees this activity.
Thus, in Taylorism, bodies are broken down so that they, and the 
materials with which these bodies come into contact, can be kept in motion. 
Taylorism uses procedures of stoppage to eliminate the possibility of fixity that it 
cannot countenance. Scientific Management is based on reducing the time taken 
to finish a job, to complete an action -  which in Taylorism equates to a 
movement with something technological -  so that another action can be made, 
and therefore its representations of body-machines are simultaneously 
representations of fluidity, not rigidity. This is a very particular type of fluidity, 
however: in Taylorism, the continuous movement of bodies, machines, and 
technological objects is bound up with planning and direction. In other words, 
Taylorism keeps bodies moving in order to harness technology for future 
purposes: Taylorism captures, times, and segments movements not only to ensure 
that bodies and machine components are never motionless when proximate, but 
also in an attempt to control the potentially unruly qualities upon which its
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representational strategy relies: namely physical activity, speed, and processual 
change.26
These qualities are not automatically conducive to systematization -  
physical activity can refer to any number of voluntary and involuntary actions; 
speed is defined as much by increase as it is by the determination of a rate -  and 
Taylorism brings bodies and machines into contact to materialize its principle of 
predetermined continuousness and transformation. In other words, when 
Taylorism represents bodies, it assumes to have captured planning, direction, and 
motivation in the discrete bodily movements it makes visible and measurable.27 
Seltzer calls this machine culture’s ‘dream of directed and nonstop flow’, an 
ideal whereby bodies and technologies move infinitely in unison, ‘channelling’ 
that which naturally tends towards an uncontrolled fluidity.28 We can thus 
summarize by stating that while hardness is crucial to Taylorism, it is not 
antithetical to movement within the Taylorist logic: hardness does not describe 
the making-rigid of movement in a machine culture. Instead, Taylorism, as a 
philosophy of movement, is concerned with regulating the fluidity of flow; it
76 See Bodies and Machines, p. 166.
77 Seltzer asserts that the effect of Taylorist time-motion management ‘is to 
transform interior states, such as seeing, thinking, planning, and feeling, into 
visible and measurable movements of the body’ (.Bodies and Machines, p. 166). I 
discuss the measurement and calibration of bodily feeling in chapter 3 of this 
thesis.
Bodies and Machines, p. 164. Seltzer discusses the notion of channelling 
within early-twentieth-century discourses of civil engineering: ‘the channeling of 
“floodlike forces” describes at once the regulation of bodily flows and identities 
and the work of civil engineering. I have in mind here the range of tum-of-the- 
century work that includes, for instance, the culture-work of channelling, bridge- 
building, and canalization’ (ibid). For Seltzer, civil engineering is premised on 
the continuous movement of bodies and machines through ‘natural processes and 
landscapes’, and represents technology in order to naturalize male 
purposefulness: engineering, Seltzer claims, posits ‘the transcendence of “the 
natural” and “the female” both, [...] the transcendence of a female/nature, 
identified with liquid interiors and flows’ (ibid).
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hardens fluidity to the point that all aspects of life in a machine age are plotted as 
a knowable and progressive trajectory.
Fordism
Fordism is the major period of economic and social restructuring that took place 
in early-twentieth-century America and which subsequently spread throughout 
western nation-states, fully implementing the Taylorist principles of 
standardization, calibration, measurement, and timing into a way of life.29 
Fordism transferred the calibrated bodies of Taylorism into a far greater and 
more elaborately co-ordinated system of mass production, in which standardized 
movements became components in the manufacturing of standardized objects. As 
film theorist Peter Wollen explains, the Fordist factory system incorporated the 
Taylorist workforce into 4 a hierarchy of standardized segmented and 
subsegmented [machine] parts, all interchangeable, plus a parallel hierarchy of 
machine tools (themselves made up from standardized parts) which both formed 
and assembled the parts into the finished product’, and into ‘a continuous, 
sequential assembly line, with a tempo determined by time and work studies, 
which transferred the parts through the whole process, designed so that the 
worker never had to move, even to stoop to pick something up’.30 The finished
For a detailed study of Fordism as a way of life, see Martha Banta, Taylored 
Lives: Narrative Productions in the Age o f Taylor, Veblen, and Ford (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 125-140.
30 Wollen, ‘Cinema’, p. 43. Wollen should provide some clarification here 
regarding the movement of the Fordist worker. It is incorrect to claim that the 
Fordist body ‘never had to move’: as I have explained, the Taylorist body that 
Fordism appropriated is only intelligible as flow; a body in complete stasis is 
meaningless within time-motion studies. A more accurate assertion is that the 
Fordist factory body moved continuously while remaining in place on the 
assembly line. Movement in place is central to my thesis; we will begin to see the 
importance of this notion in the concluding stages of this chapter.
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product of this simplified process of formation and assembly symbolized the 
Fordist ethos of making technology accessible and comprehensible to the masses. 
In its formative years in the 1920s, Fordism ‘provided one standard and constant 
manufactured object’, the Model T automobile, which was designed specifically 
for function and was made in one colour only.31 The Fordist factory, composed 
of ‘both human and mechanical parts’, released mobile machinery among the 
working classes on the condition that accessible machines carried no marks of 
excess and luxury. These measures did not mean that Fordism delimited the 
mobility of its principal object. The Fordist car was a product of absolute control, 
but Fordism reduced what could be done with the automobile by reducing the 
automobile to movement. Fordism was founded on making a machine with a 
barely noticeable exterior, a machine that did not invite admiring glances or 
touches: the quintessential Fordist object was to be experienced as continuous 
purpose and usefulness, movement perpetuating the endeavour of the factory 
worker.
Fordism’s system of mass production enabled Taylorist time management 
and work principles to become more effectively realized not only productively 
but also socially. Cultural geographer and historian David Harvey outlines the 
social implications of Fordism’s implementation:
The symbolic initiation date of Fordism must, surely, be 1914, when
Henry Ford introduced his five-dollar, eight-hour day as recompense for
31 ‘Cinema’, p. 43.
32 Ibid. Henry Ford, industrialist and pioneer of Fordist production, comments on 
the Model T’s design and production in his autobiography: ‘I thought that it was 
up to me as the designer to make the car so completely simple that no one could 
fail to understand it. [...] We made no provision for the purely “pleasure car.”
We were just as much a pleasure car as any other car on the market, but we gave 
no attention to purely luxury features. [...] We did not make the pleasure appeal. 
We never have. [...] we showed that a motor car was a utility’. See Henry Ford, 
My Life and Work (London: Filiquarian, 2006), pp. 80, 75, 63.
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workers manning the automated car-assembly line he had established a 
year before at Dearborn, Michigan. [...] The purpose of the five-dollar, 
eight-hour day was only in part to secure worker compliance with the 
discipline required to work the highly productive assembly-line system. It 
was coincidentally meant to provide workers with sufficient income and 
leisure time to consume the mass-produced products the corporations 
were about to turn out in ever vaster quantities.33
Thus, Fordism demanded that Taylorist principles extended beyond the 
workplace and into the home and public life. For the body to keep in time with 
the demands of the Fordist factory of mass production, it must, according to 
Fordism, behave like a machine outside of working hours in order to be fit for the 
following day’s labour on the continuous assembly line. To support this 
implementation, Henry Ford deployed a team of social workers into the homes of 
his workers to ensure that the workers’ domestic conduct, and consumption of 
products, was as calibrated as their conduct on the factory floor. In his 
autobiography, Ford recounts his creation of a ‘Social Department’ to maintain 
standards of hygiene, marital discipline, and general self-control among 
assemblers: Ford explains that his factory workers received a higher wage ‘on 
conditions. The man and his home had to come up to certain standards of 
cleanliness and citizenship. [...] It was expected that in order to receive the
David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins 
o f Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 125-126. For Harvey,
Fordism as an effective, fully implemented capitalist system dates from 1914 to 
1973, but can be read as the realization of major industrial developments 
implemented throughout the nineteenth century. Harvey argues that Fordism 
became ‘less [...] a mere system of mass production and more [...] a total way of 
life’ after World War II (Condition, p. 135). I discuss post-war Fordism later in 
this chapter, but it is still possible at this stage to call Fordism a way of life, 
because Fordism from its inception was an exponentiation of Taylorist principles 
into spaces outside the factory. Harvey points out that Fordism was ‘[s]low to 
develop outside the United States before 1939’, and that it did not automatically 
and singularly transfer to other industrialized nations after World War II 
(Condition, p. 136). Within the context of this thesis, though, it matters only that 
Fordism did eventually spread to multiple nations in the first half of the twentieth 
century.
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bonus married men should live with and take proper care of their families’.34 
Here we see the gendered and sexual logic of Ford’s model of social 
organization: Ford overlooks female machine work (the type exemplified by 
Taylor’s ball bearing girls) by assuming the maleness of his employees, and sees 
the routine of the heterosexual family as being crucial to the tempo of the 
segmented production process.
It was not only Ford who promulgated these requirements for social 
restructuring. In his Prison Notebooks, political philosopher Antonio Gramsci 
discusses the mechanization of everyday life devised by Taylorism and 
implemented by Fordism.35 Gramsci claims that Fordist production signals the 
inexorable demise of the skilled craftsman and the intellectual capacities 
demanded of that position, but that Fordism also provides the conditions for a 
progressive reorganization of the working class. For Gramsci, although the 
mechanization of the body at first appears to be a coercive means of anti- 
intellectualizing against which workforces must struggle, mechanization’s 
extension outside of the workplace in fact provides the discipline needed to enact 
the proletariat’s wholesale rationalization: ‘It seems possible to reply that the
34 Life, p. 146. Ideas of race and ethnicity also informed Ford’s deployment of 
social workers. It is important to note that a large number of Fordist assemblers 
were immigrant employees, and Ford used the socialization programme to 
propagate notions of uncivilized ‘foreign’ others. Ford comments on the need to 
‘break up the evil custom among many of the foreign workers of taking in 
boarders -  of regarding their homes as something to make money out of rather 
than as a place to live in’ (ibid). This aspect of Ford’s socialization programme is 
discussed by Harvey in Condition: ‘in 1916, Ford sent an army of social workers 
into the homes of his “privileged” (and largely immigrant) workers to ensure that 
the “new man” of mass production had the right kind of moral probity, family 
life, and capacity for prudent (i.e. non-alcoholic) and “rational” consumption to 
live up to corporate needs and expectations’ {Condition, p. 126).
35 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1971).
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Ford method is rational, that is, that it should be generalized; but that a long 
process is needed for this, during which a change must take place in social 
conditions and in the way of life and habits of individuals [...] A forced selection 
will inevitably take place; a part of the old working class will be pitilessly 
eliminated from the world of labour’.36 Gramsci is claiming that any failure on 
the part of the working class movement will be attributed to those sections of the 
working class that were unable to keep in time with mechanized temporality. 
Untimely progress is inconceivable for Gramsci, because the untimely is the 
irrational remnant of a former working class that an efficient, machine-like 
working class can surmount in a mechanized Fordist temporality structuring all 
conditions of society. Gramsci’s valorization of Fordist machine time is based on 
the assumption that the now-pervasively implemented machine efficiency of 
everyday life will install a robotically precise heterosexual temporality. Gramsci 
asserts that this temporal frame is needed to maintain a new working class shorn 
of excess in the Fordist era: ‘It might seem that in this way [of a Fordist way of 
life] the sexual function has been mechanized, but in reality we are dealing with 
the growth of a new form of sexual union [...] The exaltation of passion cannot 
be reconciled with the timed movements of productive motions connected with 
the most perfected automatism’.37 Gramsci therefore argues in favour of Fordism 
here because, in his view, Fordism can produce a mechanically efficient working 
class that is as rational -  as logically programmed -  as a regularly serviced 
machine. Indeed, ‘service’ is a productive metaphor of body-machine discourse.
36 Prison, pp. 312, 303.
37 Prison, p. 305. Peter Wollen discusses Gramsci’s valorization of Fordist time 
and importantly comment^ on Gramsci’s gendered rhetoric, whereby the ‘fully 
perfected automatism’ is premised on the properly functioning body of the ‘new 
(assumed-to-be-male) worker’ of Fordism (‘Cinema’, p. 45).
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The term ‘service’ demonstrates how representations of bodies are bound up with
how bodies are represented working with machines and like machines, which
intersects with the term’s use as a verb for intercourse to reveal the logic of
Gramsci’s rational temporality. For Gramsci, within the mechanized Fordist time
that services everyday life, the serviced (assumed to be male) worker services
machinery and machine components for eight hours, then returns home to service
the domestic-bound female who, by being serviced and, as a useful component of
mechanized time, has in turn serviced the (male) worker by assisting the
reproduction of the working day, which is required for the continued drive and
purposefulness of the (male, assumed to be heterosexual) working class.
The Fordist imperative to avoid excess is elaborated on by cultural
anthropologist Emily Martin. Martin acknowledges the types of body that
necessarily constitute any positing of a Fordist temporality, describing what she
terms ‘the Fordist body’ and the ways in which this body affects ‘imagery in
reproductive biology’:
Men continuously produce wonderfully astonishing quantities of highly 
valued sperm, women produce eggs and babies (though neither 
efficiently) and, when they are not doing this, either produce scrap 
(menstruation) or undergo a complete breakdown of central control 
(menopause). The models that confer order are hierarchical pyramids 
with the brain firmly located at the top and the other organs ranged 
below. The body’s products all flow out over the edge of the body, 
through one orifice or another, into the outside world. Steady, regular 
output is prized above all, preferably over the entire life span, as 
exemplified by the production of sperm.38
Martin’s assertion that Fordist body-machines are represented according to 
‘hierarchical pyramids’ is significant, because it reveals the implications of 
gender and sexuality that inform the logic of directed flow outlined in the
\
38 Emily Martin, ‘The End of the Body?’, American Ethnologist, 19 (1992), 121- 
140 (pp. 121-122).
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previous section. For Martin, efficient Fordist production is modelled on the 
male body as the exemplar of continuously controlled activity. At one with the 
co-ordinated assembly line, in this imagery the male body keeps moving via 
central control commands that regulate and direct its fluid deposits. The brain 
determines/orders the mass production of a single product, sperm, whose quality 
never fluctuates; the imputed longevity of this production is paramount to the 
maintenance of male privilege in the rhetoric Martin studies; sperm is ‘highly 
valued’ as the key to creation, a valuation that posits male production as the vital 
cause of all future activity. The representation of sperm is used to equate 
maleness with a continuousness that keeps shape, a bodily form that flows 
insofar as its fluidity is managed. The female is subordinated by Fordist bodily 
imagery, Martin asserts, because its flow of productivity is seen as insufficient to 
the demands of a society based on (re)productive regularity: the female is that 
which sporadically overflows with a fluid substance that cannot be put to use, or 
is that which undergoes a transformation too far, one that ceases flow entirely. 
Martin’s argument complicates the notion that the Taylorized Fordist body is 
worked out by a logic of disembodiment. In Martin’s model of Fordist biology, 
embodiment is achieved through disembodiment: body and machine are brought 
together as a means of transcending a ‘natural’ femaleness that is presented as
- I Q
uncontrollably bodily.
Not all writings on Taylorist Fordism can be categorized as either naively 
celebrating Fordism’s hard working body, in the case of Gramsci, or rigorously 
critiquing this body as an effect of a powerful (and powerfully gendered)
39 The Fordist body is thus  ^another example of the attempted naturalization of 
male control as discussed by Seltzer -  machine culture’s use of motion study to 
transcend a ‘Nature’ constructed as disorganized.
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representational regime of control, in the case of Martin. The hard working body 
is a crucial figure in Walter Benjamin’s classic essay ‘The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction’.40 Originally published in 1936, ‘Work of Art’ 
is a seminal treatise on the cultural implications of early Taylorist Fordism. 
Benjamin discusses the advent of Fordism in the light of similar changes that had 
been taking place within the film industry since 1913, whereby film studios 
gained centralized control over the distrubution and screening of their products, 
and implemented standardized systems of production based on job specialization 
and consistent and efficient output41 Benjamin argues in favour of standardized 
cinema but not on the basis of its mass commodification: rather, Benjamin draws 
on Taylorist rhetoric to claim that industrialized film is capable of mobilizing the 
masses by providing them with a critical consciousness.
The comparison between Taylorized Fordist working practices and the 
technical aspects of cinema is understandable: both are based on recording 
movement; indeed, the term cinema is derived from the Greek kinesis. Benjamin 
moves beyond this basic association, however, by equating a screen actor being 
filmed with a worker having a personal coefficient test. For Benjamin, because 
the screen actor performs to a camera instead of an immediately present public
40 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, 
in Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, 2nd edn (London: 
Fontana Press, 1992), pp. 211-243.
41 Post-1913 changes to the film industry are marked by the establishment of 
major film studios that formed unprecedented relationships with other media, 
which enabled these studios to disseminate information about their latest, 
precisely timed releases into the public via multi-platform advertising. From this 
period, the major film studios worked like Fordist factories, constantly managing 
and controlling the publicity of their stars, creative content, and creative staff, 
and attempting to own as many aspects of the production process of their films as 
possible. These changes gave rise to classic Hollywood cinema. For an 
introduction to these develppments, see Critical Dictionary o f Film and 
Television, ed. by Roberta Pearson and Philip Simpson (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 181.
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audience, and because the actor’s movements are meticulously broken down by 
the camera’s ever-shifting positions and are recalibrated by editing techniques, 
the film in its completion ‘comprises certain factors of movement which are in 
reality those of the camera, not to mention special camera angles, close-ups, etc. 
Hence, the performance of the actor is subjected to a series of optical tests’.42 
Moreover, Benjamin asserts, when audience members view the film, they 
identify with the techniques by which the on-screen body is tested rather than 
with the actor in person, and subsequently become over-inspectors themselves: 
‘The film actor lacks the opportunity of the stage actor to adjust to the audience 
during his performance [...] This permits the audience to take the position of a 
critic, without experiencing any contact with the actor. [...] Consequently the 
audience takes the position of the camera; its approach is that of testing’.43 Thus, 
the camera’s inspection of the moving body is over-inspected by the film 
audience, which simultaneously tests/critiques that which appears on screen.
This discussion exemplifies Benjamin’s argument for mass 
industrialization, whereby the machine technology of film enables Taylorist 
principles to be taken up as the basis for participatory, mass action in response to 
exploitative class relations. Film is the ‘most powerful agent’ of mass mechanical 
reproduction, Benjamin argues, because it brings the ‘liquidation’ of the 
bourgeois aura of authenticity that has traditionally framed the work of art; the
42 ‘Work’, p. 222.
43 Ibid. Benjamin makes explicit the link between movie-making and coefficient 
testing within Fordist time: ‘The expansion of the field of the testable which 
mechanical equipment brings about for the actor corresponds to the extraordinary 
expansion of the field of the testable brought about for the individual through 
economic conditions. Thus, vocational aptitude tests become constantly more 
important. What matters in, these tests are segmental performances of the 
individual. The film shot and the vocational aptitude test are taken before a 
committee of experts’ (‘Work’, p. 239 n. 10).
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cameraman’s assembly and re-assembly of segmented movements offers the
public ‘precisely because of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with
mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment’.44 In
other words, film’s reproduction of bodily movement through Taylorist
systematization -  a reproduction that makes every individual a
critic/tester/inspector -  and the status of film itself as a mass-produced art object,
present in many locations simultaneously, obliterates the distance between a
work of art and its audience. For Benjamin, the ability in film to make identical
copies of the same art object -  copies that contain bodily movements copied for
mass inspection -  shows the potential for mechanical reproduction to involve art
in widespread political change, because these processes always already put into
question the qualities of originality and scarcity that enable the ruling classes to
determine artistic value.45
Consider the following passage, which further underscores Benjamin’s
fascination with Taylorist techniques:
of a screened behaviour item which is neatly brought out in a certain 
situation, like a muscle of a body, it is difficult to say which is more 
fascinating, its artistic value or its value for science. [...] By close-ups of 
the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by 
exploring commonplace milieus under the ingenious guidance of the 
camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the 
necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it assures us of an 
immense and unexpected field of action. Our taverns and our 
metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad 
stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then 
came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the 
tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and
44‘Work’, pp. 215,227.
45 The ‘copy’ for Benjamin is that which designates a closeness between working 
body and technological object, whereas the ‘original’ refers to an image that is 
dissociated from the time of the machine and which demands studied 
contemplation from afar. See Wollen, ‘Cinema’, p. 55.
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debris, we calmly and adventurously go travelling. With the close-up, 
space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended.46
Here film is presented as Scientific Management; Benjamin acknowledges that 
the mechanical reproduction of art is bound up with Taylorism’s pictorial and 
written calibrations of separated, discontinuous bodily positions. But in 
Benjamin’s version of Scientific Management, subjects are provided with the 
conditions for outmanoeuvring their oppression and manipulation within working 
life where the home and modes of transport are extensions of the meticulously 
timed, concentrated workplace. The camera focuses on segmented movements 
within movements, according to Benjamin, movements made in ‘the tenth of a 
second’ which, by being isolated by the camera as having taken place, proliferate 
the possibilities of originally singular actions when reassembled into the 
completed film. This focus reveals entirely new levels of activity, Benjamin 
suggests, which can be appropriated to explore alternative, politically progressive 
ways of living in an age of mass production.47 This does not imply a departure
46 ‘Work’, p. 229.
47 To reiterate, Benjamin’s essay is not a valorization of Hollywood cinema. The 
post-1913 changes provide an important historical context within which to 
consider ‘Work of Art’, but Benjamin is more interested in the political 
possibilities of film’s technological aspects than the economic structure of film 
studios. Benjamin indeed warns against the ‘cult of the movie star, fostered by 
the money of the film industry’, claiming that celebrity ‘preserves not the unique 
aura of the person but the “spell of the personality,” the phony spell of a 
commodity’ (‘Work’, p. 224). ‘Under these circumstances’, Benjamin argues, 
‘the film industry is trying hard to spur the interest of the masses through 
illusion-promoting spectacles and dubious speculations’ (‘Work’, p. 226). 
Benjamin favours the films of the Soviet Union, on the grounds that ‘work itself 
is given a voice’ in these productions: ‘the players whom we meet in Russian 
films are not actors in our sense but people who portray themselves -  and 
primarily in their own work processes’ (‘Work’, pp. 225, 226. Emphasis in 
original). 1936 saw the release of Charlie Chaplin’s film Modern Times, which 
does not assimilate into Benjamin’s theorizations, because it exemplifies the use 
of film to comment on andvcritique the Taylorized Fordist system. In Modern 
Times, Chaplin is unable to adapt to the routinized movements of the assembly 
line. Chaplin cannot stop repeating the same work-related actions, which drives
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from the temporality of the assembly line, however. On the contrary, for 
Benjamin movement out of factory space is enacted by the factory time of film. 
The film’s subversion of a seemingly restrictive, singularly efficient 
socioeconomic system enacts an automobility; the regular/regulated temporality 
of Ford’s assembly line extends into Benjamin’s alternative society, in that 
bodies are moved ‘calmly’ en masse over the Fordist space that the camera has 
expanded and opened for a greater number of actions. These bodies survey a type 
of industrial ruin -  the destruction of Fordism lived one way -  from the 
multiplicity of discontinuous positions that mechanical art has uncovered for 
these bodies. Benjamin’s evocation of ‘far-flung ruins and debris’, then, does 
not indicate his resistance to, or wish to see the ruination of, Fordist 
industrialization. Instead Benjamin, like Gramsci, favours widespread 
mechanization on the basis that it is ultimately beneficial for mass movement.
Again echoing Gramsci, Benjamin is not critical of the worker’s 
standardization or de-skilling in the systematized factory. Indeed, Benjamin’s 
automobility is premised on the body that works hard according to Taylorist 
principles. In the following passage, Benjamin explains how the demands of 
Fordism reconfigure bodily function into a new sensory schema, which he calls 
‘tactile appropriation’. Film prepares bodies for this shift, Benjamin explains, in 
which bodies remain Taylorist but do not inspect optically:
him to insanity, causing Chaplin to throw himself into the factory machinery.
This contact results in Chaplin himself being turned into an assembly device 
{Modern Times. Dir. by Charles Chaplin. Warner Home Video. 2006). Also see 
Wollen, ‘Cinema’, p.44. Although we can distinguish Modern Times from 
Benjamin’s discussion of film, I will shortly explain that Benjamin’s approach 
does in fact provide the opportunity to critique Fordism, despite initially 
appearing to uncritically accept and celebrate it.
4 ‘The one best way’ is anvinfamous phrase of Taylor’s, referring to Taylor’s 
belief that time-motion studies can reveal a single, harmonious state of 
coexistence between workers and managers. See Banta, Taylored, p. 4.
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Tactile appropriation is accomplished not so much by attention as by 
habit. [...] For the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at 
the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means, that is, by 
contemplation, alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, under the 
guidance of tactile appropriation. The distracted person, too, can form 
habits. More, the ability to master certain tasks in a state of distraction 
proves that their solution has become a matter of habit. [...] Reception in 
a state of distraction [...] finds in the film its true means of exercise. The 
film with its shock effect meets this mode of reception halfway. The film 
makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the 
public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies 
this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an 
absent-minded one.49
Here Benjamin explains how the hard, unskilled work of the factory body 
involves repeatedly touching and manipulating the identical objects that are 
constantly brought within one’s range at regular intervals. Benjamin’s emphasis 
on the tactile is significant: while the Taylorized Fordist task of inspection 
initially suggests a collective optical examination, in which hand and finger work 
is secondary to -  and merely supportive of -  a fixed, uninterrupted gaze at 
machine components, Benjamin interprets inspection as a reversal of this 
process. For Benjamin, inspection is not mastered through attention; the timed 
conveyer belt serially jolts or ‘shocks’ factory bodies into the action of touching 
whatever is put in front of them; each interval does not demand a renewed effort 
of mind or rapt intellectual prowess, argues Benjamin, because the workers will 
gradually perfect a set means of automatically touching and feeling their way 
around each task’s completion.50
Benjamin represents Taylorized Fordist workers perpetually moving in a 
state of distraction, or automobility -  moving in a particular way without 
thinking -  while they accomplish their repetitive inspections on time and without
49 ‘Work’, pp. 233-234.
50 The notion of the task is more significant in the following chapter of this 
thesis, particularly for the way in which ‘task’ becomes dissociated from 
repetition in the texts I analyse.
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fail; hard working bodies are thus already critics out of habit, Benjamin implies. 
Cinema both prepares us for these impending technological and bodily changes, 
and informs us of the democratizing effects of remaining with these changes in 
the long term; the discontinuous shots comprising a film, (re)assembled or 
retouched copies o f ‘original’ bodily movements, similarly shock the viewing 
public, Benjamin asserts, in that film offers the masses a form of escapism by 
which they distractedly examine/critique/participate in (or come into contact 
with) the sequences unfolding before them.51 To an extent Benjamin’s rhetoric is 
as prescriptive as that of Scientific Management. Benjamin works out a type of 
non-excessive, hard working body eligible to move with the mechanical age; 
note his fascination with ‘neatly brought out’ bodily lines and borders that echoes 
Gramsci’s approval of the masses being shorn of excess in the Fordist era.52 
However, Benjamin’s advocacy of tactile appropriation reconfigures Taylor’s 
method of determining eligible bodily intelligibility. Benjamin’s conviction that 
Fordism will progress -  will work out -  via a collection of tactile shocks and 
feelings indicates that his theory of bodily function is not determined in the 
primarily optical space that Taylor establishes.
51 There is thus another point to be made about Benjamin’s notion of the copy 
and the original: the copy is tactile, close enough to be touched and manipulated, 
whereas the original is optical, always to be looked at, distanced from those who 
study it with absorbed contemplation. See Wollen, ‘Cinema’, p. 55 .1 return to 
the issue of touch, tactility, and technological objects in the final chapter of this 
thesis.
52 Wollen gives a persuasive account of Benjamin and Gramsci, citing their 
commonality in ‘looking for a new kind of psycho-physical complex in the 
worker’ (‘Cinema’, p. 56). Wollen makes an important distinction between the 
fragment and the segment in Benjamin, stating that the fragment is ‘the waste 
products of the economy’ and that the segment is ‘the detail isolated for scientific 
analysis’ (‘Cinema’, p. 58). For Wollen, Benjamin is fascinated with the segment 
in ‘Work’ and thus, like Gr^smci, accepts Taylorized Fordist technology with a 
minimal degree of criticism. I contest this latter argument in the closing stages of 
this chapter.
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It is more difficult, though, to relate Benjamin’s theory to Emily Martin’s 
discussion of the gendered and sexual implications that are bound up with the 
Fordist body’s representation. We have seen how these implications are 
perpetuated in Gramsci’s text. Gender and sexuality do not feature in ‘Work of 
Art’, however, and a logical inference would be to assume Benjamin’s support of 
Gramsci’s ‘rational’ Fordist subject, on account of the similarities that already 
exist between both authors’ writings on Fordism. But this is not how I think we 
should read Benjamin in this context. In Benjamin, Fordism is felt in bodies as a 
speed-up that jars, an instruction to complete tasks at a pace for which the body 
is not quite ready; these shocks occur before any purposeful action is taken in 
Fordist time, and in any case are the basis upon which purposeful action is 
gradually achieved. Thus, we should not be concerned with aligning 
Benjamin’s framework and Martin’s critical agenda, because Benjamin’s essay 
can in fact be used to critique Martin: Benjamin’s argument for feeling Fordism, 
where ‘feeling’ references a strange sensation that forces the hand to lead while 
the mind wanders, questions the inevitability of Martin’s pyramidal model. If 
bodies were as controlled by Fordism as Martin claims, they would not have 
experienced this stubborn, incongruous sense of unpreparedness in speeding up,
53 Put simply, Benjamin maintains that the shock-effect of film conditions the 
body for a technologized society based on a series of shocks. It is important to 
note here that Fordism was not the first time in which bodily shocks followed 
technological advancement. Benjamin inherits theories of trauma formulated in 
the nineteenth century amid the popularization of rail travel. See Roger 
Luckhurst, ‘Traumaculture’, New Formations, 50 (2003), 28-47 (p. 34). 
Luckhurst explains how ‘trauma’ was posited in this period as the name for 
disorders of the nervous system without obvious external bodily injuries 
following high-speed train crashes. Most notable, Luckhurst asserts, was the 
emergence in the 1860s of a condition called ‘railway spine’, which ‘implied that 
the repeated physical shocks of travel might induce cerebral injury’ 
(‘Traumaculture’, p. 34). We can therefore interpret railway spine as another 
body-machine formation or complex that is out of time or not controlled by the 
speed-up of innovation.
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and I favour Benjamin’s model because it provides a concretely -  but not 
deterministically -  bodily account of how hard working bodies moved, instead of 
making assembly line temporality metaphorize for a societal structure whose 
order is never interrupted.
Automobility and For(war)dist Time
Benjamin’s belief in Fordism is based on the dynamics of mass production. 
Although he posits the experience of being ‘at the movies’ as a key means of 
understanding the integration of bodies and machines amid Fordist automation, 
in Benjamin’s terms the cinema audience views the film as a mass of workers, 
moving and sensing as they would if stationed collectively at the factory 
conveyor belt. Thus for Benjamin, the consumption of film tells us that factory 
production techniques are the most important feature of the Fordist 
socioeconomic system. However, Fordism had changed significantly by the time 
Benjamin wrote ‘Work of Art’. As Harvey asserts, the five dollar, eight hour day 
introduced by Ford in 1914 provided workers with more leisure time and higher 
wages, creating a vast number of new consumers for the ever increasing amount 
of durables to be produced on the assembly line in subsequent years. These 
measures were also introduced to compensate body-machines for the particular 
type of hard work demanded by the automated factory: the intensely repetitive 
jobs that workers needed to complete to remain contemporaneous with 
meticulously timed machinery. In late 1920s America, one consumer durable in 
particular emerged as the most suitable to enact the escapism sought by hard 
working bodies in the leisure time they were allocated. From this period 
onwards, automobility is associated not with the movement of the assembly line
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and the factory time of film, but with the movement of the Fordist factory’s 
principal product: the mass produced car, the consumption of which became 
synonymous with the idea of freedom from boredom and rigidity as the Fordist 
system expanded its model range beyond the basic Model T.54
Sociologist David Gartman explains the most important factors that 
informed the car’s affinity with escapism in Fordism’s new phase. It is worth 
citing Gartman at length in order to understand the car’s ‘escape function’ in this 
period:
The rectilinear, fragmental homogeneity of mass-produced cars was a 
symbol of the rigid, boring, heteronomous production process workers 
sought to escape. By molding the surface of these cars into the smooth, 
rounded, varied shapes of luxury cars, car stylists [...] covered over the 
offending reminders of work and allowed them to perform their escape 
function unobtrusively. [...] But auto consumers wanted their goods not 
merely to obscure work but also to fulfill needs denied them there. And 
one of the most important of these was individuality. The mass- 
production process reduced work to standardized, repetitive tasks with 
little room for the expression of personal uniqueness and difference. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, people subjected to this process sought to 
compensate in their consumption lives by buying goods that were 
individual and unique [...] Consequently, it became the policy of [...] 
mass producers to build many different types of cars to accommodate 
consumer demand for individuality [...] There were few differences of 
real quality between [these cars]. All were mass-produced [...] and the 
different makes shared some of the same components. But styling 
allowed automakers to differentiate these models and still meet the high- 
volume demands of mass production.55
Gartman is describing the time in which various aspects of styling were more 
fully integrated into Fordism to balance mass production with mass consumption. 
These included advertising, marketing, packaging, regular introductions of new 
car models, and the greater prominence of product designers within Fordist
54 For a book-length narration of the car’s cultural logic in relation to both 
Taylorism and Fordism, see Cotton Seiler, Republic o f Drivers: A Cultural 
History o f  Automobility in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008).
55 David Gartman, ‘Three Ages of the Automobile: The Cultural Logics of the 
Car’, Theory, Culture & Society, 21 (2004), 169-195 (p. 178).
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companies. Overseeing the processes of production, extra-Fordist styling 
departments offered the car as the best way of satisfying workers who, owing to 
the Fordist economy’s exponentiation, were provided with a newfound affluence 
on the condition that they worked harder than ever on the factory floor. As we 
see from Gartman’s rhetoric, in this emerging era of mass consumerism the car is 
represented as a type of hard working body -  practical, functional metal 
bodywork -  that is used by the hard working body of the factory employee in 
order to make factory time bearable. The Fordist car is a moulded surface or shell 
that, by resembling hand-crafted luxury models unaffordable to the masses, 
covers over exploitative working conditions, and whose components and 
adornments are infinitely interchanged to supply a fantasy of upward mobility to 
every worker. In other words, the singularly moulded car of Fordism is styled 
and restyled until it provides workers/consumers with a feeling of individuality, 
‘a sense of progress and mobility’, in a socioeconomic system that required these 
subjects to move uniformly in the workplace, and purchase products that had no 
qualitative differences whatsoever; ‘a society whose fundamental structure 
remained the same’.56 For Gartman, this process marks Fordism as ‘the era of
56 ‘Automobile’, p. 180. Roland Barthes comments on the shaping of the 
automobile in his essay ‘The New Citroen’, in Mythologies, trans. by Annette 
Lavers (London: Vintage, 2000), pp. 88-90. Originally published in 1957 
(although not translated into English until 1972), ‘The New Citroen’ provides a 
semiotic analysis of the Citroen DS, an innovative, futuristic-looking vehicle 
whose curvaceous appearance has influenced automobile design from the mid­
twentieth century to the present. Barthes argues that the moulded, rounded DS 
marks the beginning of the car’s transition into a ‘more object-like’ mythology 
(‘New’, p. 89). The DS enacts a ‘great tactile phase of discovery’, Barthes 
claims, in which consumers are compelled to touch the car’s interior and exterior 
in order to familiarize themselves with the product, testing the car for comfort as 
they would an instrument or utensil for the middle class home: ‘[the] bodywork, 
the lines of union are touched, the upholstery palpated, the seats tried, the doors 
caressed, the cushions fondled; before the wheel, one pretends to drive with 
one’s whole body’ (‘New’, p. 90). For Barthes, these touches signify a ‘kind of
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mass individuality’ within the history of western automobility.57 This era, 
Gartman states, is legitimated by reifying human attributes and needs, ‘providing 
consumers of all classes with the illusion of free choice between seemingly 
different goods, while beneath the surface the mass-production process levels the 
real qualitative differences between things as well as people’.58 In Gartman’s 
logic the Fordist car is the exemplar of this reifying function; it is a steel surface 
on wheels, making accessible a machine mobility that offers individual, 
uninhibited movement within leisure spaces that reproduce the worker’s 
exploitation in standardization.59
The Fordist era of mass consumption reached its apotheosis in America in 
the 1950s -  commonly referred to as Fordism’s ‘golden age’ -  as a result of a 
post-war economic boom.60 Gartman narrates this period as one of increased car 
styling amid unprecedented levels of consumer individualism: ‘Working-class 
consumers, anxious for symbols of their new prosperity, clamored for the look of 
individuality exemplified by the pricier makes. [...] Under competitive pressure 
to quickly bring prestigious traits to the lucrative lower market, [car] stylists
control exercised over motion’ (‘New’, p. 89), an appropriation and 
mediatization of an object for ‘petit-bourgeois advancement’ (‘New’, p. 90).
57 ‘Automobile’, p. 177.
58 ‘Automobile’, p. 181. Gartman’s account of Fordism -  and his account of 
Fordism as reifying -  is based on Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s theory 
of consumption and mass culture. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that 
consumption legitimates the class system by completely obscuring the real 
differences between classes; all consumers are put into relations with 
quantitatively differentiated products, and due to their essential artificiality and 
sameness, these relations cover over the qualitative differences and material 
conditions that structure society. Thus, class structure becomes reified; unequal 
relations of power become hidden behind commodified things. See Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic o f  Enlightenment (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1972).
59 Car consumption also makes the individual a property owner, thus 
distinguishing car automobjlity from the automobility of public transport.
60 For more on Fordism’s golden age or post-war years, see Wollen, ‘Cinema’, p. 
61, and Harvey, Condition, pp. 129 -140.
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abandoned incremental changes in the late 1950s and vied with one another by 
making bold innovations’.61 The innovations Gartman invokes consisted of 
carmakers adding significantly increased amounts of size, power, accessories, 
and luxury design features to cheaper models; design features signifying 
‘technological progress and escapism’.62 Gartman argues that the increased 
prosperity of the 1950s working class, combined with Fordist production systems 
newly strengthened after years of economic depression and war, enacted a time 
of ‘style wars’, in which one automaker would mould the bodies of its mass- 
produced cars into streamlined shapes, and accentuate these shapes by covering 
them with the hard shininess of chrome, only for other car companies to 
appropriate these features, usually by augmenting and then adding them to their 
own vehicle designs.63 Competition between designers gave rise to a process 
whereby particular styles were introduced directly into the lower market, 
eliminating the hierarchical system of the 1920s in which cheaper cars resembled 
luxury models. It was a time, Gartman asserts, in which car ‘bodies lengthened 
and chrome proliferated in an unprecedented orgy of automotive change’.64
61 ‘Automobile’, pp. 183-184.
62 ‘Automobile’, p. 183. For Gartman, the most important -  because most 
replicated -  design feature of this period was the ‘tail fin, a feature introduced on 
the 1948 Cadillac to borrow the connotations of technological progress and 
escapism associated with aeronautics’ (ibid).
63 ‘Automobile’, p. 183.
64 Ibid. Dick Hebdige provides an important study of Fordism’s golden age, 
articulating its impact in post-war Britain. See Dick Hebdige, Hiding in the 
Light: On Images and Things (London: Routledge, 1988). Hebdige calls the 
above process of automotive change ‘streamlining’ {Hiding, p. 72), in reference 
to metal ‘stamping technology that made it easier to produce curved forms’ 
{Hiding, p. 63) in car production, and to the quantitative differentiation processes 
that ‘streamlined’ the amount of vehicles available to consumers. Hebdige 
focuses on how the reshaping of the automobile in post-war consumer society 
‘acted as a catalyst for a cl^sh of values and interests’ between Europe and 
America, ‘which had been building up since the development in America in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century of mass production technology’: the
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In-keeping with his theory of car consumption as reification, Gartman
sees no opportunities for agency or subversive bodily acts in this period of
automotive shaping and reshaping. Fordist style wars did reshape gender
relations in the 1950s, Gartman argues, but only in the service of maintaining
mass individuality:
As the benefits of automobility became clear, more and more women 
took the wheel. By the post-Second World War era in America, the 
suburbanization of the population facilitated by the car also made it an 
essential tool for fulfilling women’s domestic role in the newly dispersed 
landscape. The suburban housewife who did not drive was a rarity. 
Further, as styling and beauty became the primary means of competition 
in an increasingly oligopolistic automotive market, it became difficult to 
maintain the notion that women alone were concerned with aesthetics. 
This did not mean that notions of automotive gender differences 
disappeared, just that they were redefined as quantitative rather than 
qualitative. [...] More accessories, brighter paint, more multi-coloured 
upholstery -  this was what women were thought to want. So the 
qualitative, social differences between the genders in power, occupation, 
opportunity were reified, reduced to merely different quantities of the 
same commodities so as to better capture them for the marketplace.65
Thus, women’s entry into post-war prosperity -  the upward (auto)mobility bound 
up with the consumption of the car -  is determined by the quantitative 
differentiation processes of Fordist production, Gartman argues.66 For Gartman,
streamlined car, Hebdige claims, ‘represented the concretisation in form of 
conflicts between’ American and European ‘definitions of legitimacy and taste. It 
was an object which invited strong reactions’ (.Hiding, p. 66. Emphasis in 
original). Hebdige comments positively on the car’s reactive exterior -  its 
activation of a transatlantic contest over the meaning of taste and legitimacy -  on 
the basis that the post-war Americanization of British culture enabled the 
formation of youth subcultures that resisted established cultural norms: ‘early 
fears about the homogenising influence of American culture were unfounded. 
Rather, American popular culture [...] offers a rich iconography, a set of 
symbols, objects and artefacts which can be assembled and re-assembled by 
different groups in a literally limitless number of combinations’ {Hiding, p. 74).
65 ‘Automobile’, pp. 182-183.
66 Gartman is referring to a significant period in the history of American machine 
work, in which a large number of female machine labourers returned to the 
domestic sphere in the 195Qs having worked in World War II factories 
throughout the 1940s, producing weapons and aircraft. This wartime female 
workforce was popularly represented by ‘Rosie the Riveter’, a cultural icon that
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this means that every woman’s car journey, no matter how individually styled, 
streamlined, or personalized each woman’s vehicle appears to be, is a trajectory 
bearing the timed regularity of factory machinery, and the boring sameness of 
movements and commodities made in this milieu. Suburban housewives’ 
traversals of a spatial expanse represent non-movements, Gartman explains, 
because they are expressions of gender prearrayed quantitatively for capital 
accumulation; these women buy into Fordist mobility via the consumption of 
products that confer individual identity by number (specifically a greater amount 
of features and accessories), but which are, in fact, exact replicas of one another 
beneath their multiply stylized surfaces. Subsequently, according to Gartman, 
these subjects assume the inertial repetitiveness borne by the Fordist car’s hard 
working body -  a process Gartman calls ‘identity in sheet metal’ -  and thus fail 
to collectively critique, or move progressively against, the gender inequalities 
underpinning a static way of life.67 Thus for Gartman, the continuous movement
appeared predominantly as a poster illustration of a female worker dressed in 
overalls and holding a riveter, or mechanical fastener. For more on Rosie the 
Riveter and women’s return to domesticity, see Marxist feminist Susan Willis’s 
essay ‘ Work(ing) Out’, in A Primer for Daily Life (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991), pp. 62-85. Willis argues that the role of the Fordist housewife, 
established in Fordism’s post-war boom, has participated in naturalizing a male 
relationship with machine production throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century, causing post-Fordist societies to forget women’s wartime appropriation 
of machinery: ‘Even if she works a forty-hour week, a woman will probably 
never be thought of as having anything to do with machinery other than labor- 
saving kitchen devices [...] and the family car’ (‘Working’, p. 73).
67 ‘Automobile’, p. 193.1 will return to the issue of whether technologized bodies 
move quantitatively or qualitatively in chapter 3 of this thesis. There is a much 
longer history of women and the car that is not mentioned in Gartman’s essay. Of 
course Gartman is referring specifically to Fordism, but Gartman’s argument 
nevertheless creates the impression that the post-war years brought women and 
cars together for the first time. Feminist historian Virginia Scharff shows that this 
was certainly not the case, in her book Taking the Wheel: Women and the 
Coming o f  the Motor Age (Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1992). Scharff notes that in ‘1899, Mrs. John Howell Phillips of Chicago 
established herself as the first American woman to receive a driver’s license’
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of Taylorized Fordism is futile, because it is incapable of producing change 
despite (and indeed because of) its constant changing of surface materials.
The most significant factor Gartman ascertains from these style wars is 
not their feminization of the lower car market, but their inadvertent contribution 
to Fordism’s eventual decline. Gartman explains that the insertion of styles 
directly into this market created ‘excesses’ o f ‘newness’, because streamlined 
designs were no longer controllably released downwards from luxury vehicles.68 
So many new styles -  each more outlandishly streamlined than its predecessor -  
were introduced at such an increased rate, says Gartman, that Fordism’s sign of 
free movement became mistrusted and parodied by the driving public: the car 
‘became a lightning rod for the growing discontents with the automotive 
excesses o f  1950s Fordism and ‘consumers were beginning to see through the 
aesthetic disguise of mass production’.69 Gartman ends his assessment of 
Fordism at this point, recalling it as a time of failure owing to style over 
substance, in which the process of car consumption this period inaugurated was 
bound eventually to reveal how oppressively boring and unchanging the Fordist
(Wheel, p. 25). For Scharff, the car ‘opened up the possibility of independent 
mobility for those who used it. Extending that potential to women meant both 
expanding the private sphere into the realm of transportation and, paradoxically, 
puncturing woman’s “sphere” by undermining the [...] notion that woman’s 
place was in the home’ (Wheel, pp. 24-25). Feminist and technologies scholar 
Anne Balsamo cites Scharff s indication of the first woman driver’s license 
record, claiming that it ‘suggests that women have been involved with the 
automobile (a “high-technology” at one point) from the beginning of its history’. 
See Anne Balsamo, Technologies o f  the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg 
Women (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 200 n. 1. 
Balsamo uses this point to articulate the technologically informed agency of her 
immigrant Grandmother in early-twentieth-century, industrial Chicago: 
‘Grandmother was an order clerk in a predominantly male warehouse; she did all 
the driving for the family, having learned to drive almost before she learned to 
speak English; her first car was a 1916 Model-T Ford equipped with a self­
starter’ (Technologies, p. 133).
68 ‘Automobile’. P. 184.
69 Ibid.
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life really was. It is only when individuals stop consuming streamlined Fordist 
cars, Gartman suggests, that some semblance of a critical consciousness is raised 
among the subjects of Fordism, albeit in a temporary form and as a result of 
industrial capitalism’s own failings, rather than being fashioned by these subjects 
themselves; post-war car consumption is a useful field of analysis, Gartman 
implies, only because it leads to an understanding of how Fordism ‘ultimately 
foundered due to the inability of this thing [the car] to satisfy human needs, to 
provide [...] autonomy in movement’.70 Fordism could have been wholly 
subverted (or ‘ended’), Gartman suggests, i f ‘humans’ had taken ‘the actions [...] 
to reclaim their fate from their own machines’ in or before this period.71 This is a 
particularly ambiguous claim, however; it is not clear whether Gartman wishes 
humans had simply destroyed all ‘things’ car-related in an act of neo-Ludditism, 
used machinery for alternative purposes, or sought other, more ‘human’, means 
of moving that were completely removed from automobility (as Gartman makes 
unequivocal throughout his essay, automobility is bound up with machine 
reification).72
70 ‘Automobile’, p. 193.1 say temporary agency here because Gartman sees 
Fordism as one of three stages of ‘automotive folly’ (‘Automobile’, p. 193) that 
have dialectically superseded one another from the late nineteenth century -  the 
moment the ‘automobile entered American society’ (‘Automobile’, p. 171) -  to 
the present. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Gartman argues, shortly after the 
style wars enabled consumers to glimpse, and critique, the sameness of the 
machines underlying Fordism’s streamlined disguises, a ‘new era of production, 
consumption and use’ emerged out of these struggles to ‘carry the automobile 
into the new millennium’ (‘Automobile’, p. 184). This new era, Gartman claims, 
represents not mass individuality’s demise but mass individuality’s 
‘transcendence into a higher form’ (‘Automobile’, p. 191). I explicate post- 
Fordism, and post-Fordist (auto)mobility, in the following chapter, although the 
car will not be central to my discussion.
71 Ibid.
72 Gartman is not alone in theorizing against automobility; 2006 saw the 
publication of a collection of essays debating the purpose of automobility in the
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We can question the tenability of Gartman’s alternate Fordism regardless 
of this confusion. Gartman does not realize the impossibility of this task after 
Taylorism. From Taylorism onwards one joins in the activity of work by 
representing it, and Gartman repeats this process: Gartman urges us to look again 
at Fordism having sorted human autonomy from machine automobility, but the 
work of looking and sorting requires that Gartman enter Taylorism’s infinite 
representational regress, which we know is based on the limited, routine bodily 
movements that he criticizes, and which underpinned the Fordist automation that 
he wishes had been revolutionized. Gartman necessarily takes up the position of 
the Taylorist overseer, then; he is at work, meaning that the autonomy of human 
action from machine function is far from certain in his rhetoric. The key point 
here is that I am not convinced Gartman proposes anything other than 
automobility as the process by which Fordism could have been overturned. 
Gartman argues that there is absolutely no agency created by consuming the car, 
suggesting instead that there is another way of mobilizing -  another ‘action’, 
vaguely referred to as ‘human’ -  that will automatically produce self- 
determination by revealing the ‘real [...] relations of class, gender and race’ 
concealed by automotive artifice.73 In other words, Gartman’s human mobility 
must always be automobility, because it achieves agency by adopting Taylorist 
principles; with the utmost efficiency, Gartman implies, human actions sort real 
relations from artificial relations, and sort meaningful axes of oppression from 
meaningless contact with steel and chrome. It is not a question of assessing
twenty-first century. See Against Automobility, ed. by Steffen Bohm et al.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) 
3 ‘Automobile’, p. 193. 
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whether or not Gartman moves away from automation, then; instead, we need to 
identify the type of automobility that frames Gartman’s history.
One consequence of Gartman’s sorting is that sexuality is excluded from 
the history of automobility. Gartman does not cite sexuality as one of the axes 
obscured by the car’s streamlined steel body; he briefly alludes to the sexual on 
two occasions in his essay, describing it as a ‘nonclass political’ identity formed 
in ‘the social movements of the [post-Fordist] 1960s’, and commenting on the 
car’s role in ‘the ascendancy of heterosexual marriage’ in Reagan-era America.74 
Gartman introduces the 1950s apotheosis of automotive change as an ‘orgy’, but 
he is describing the frenetic activity of designers and molten metal, and clearly 
sees no reason to make any connections between the car’s popularization, the 
car’s arrangement of bodies into an intimate space, and the sexual acts made 
possible by this intimacy.
It is a serious oversight to assume that sexuality did not inform Fordism’s 
golden age. Gay and Lesbian studies scholar Tim Retzloff underscores this point 
in his study of 1950s industrial, blue-collar Michigan.75 Retzloff articulates the 
significance of automobility in the car-manufacturing town of Flint, the 
‘birthplace’ of automotive firm General Motors, amid the post-war years of
7  f \prosperity signalled by widespread working-class car ownership. The post-war
74 ‘Automobile’, pp. 187, 190. The social movements of the 1960s were 
manifold, comprising civil rights protests, student uprisings, and second wave 
feminism. I discuss second wave feminism in the following chapter. For a 
detailed critique of the cultural politics of Reaganism, see Susan Jeffords, Hard 
Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994).
75 Tim Retzloff, ‘Cars and Bars: Assembling Gay Men in Postwar Flint, 
Michigan’, in Creating a Place for Ourselves: Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual 
Community Histories, ed. by Brett Beemyn (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 227- 
252.
76 ‘Cars’, p. 229.
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proliferation of steel and chrome was ‘exaggerated’ in Flint, Retzloff argues, 
because of the town’s affinity with American automobility; those who consumed 
the ‘wide range of differently priced’ cars in Flint were likely to be automobile 
assembly workers, and were in any case constituents of a ‘civic culture’ that 
‘celebrated’ the car as a symbol of progress and solidarity.77 ‘Not surprisingly’, 
says Retzloff, ‘the rate of car ownership in Flint was much higher’ than the U.S. 
average.78 But instead of reading Flint as the centre of artifice and reification, 
Retzloff points to the unprecedented opportunities afforded by this proliferation 
for the city’s sexual minorities to cruise -  to search for casual sex partners by 
car:
By the 1950s, despite persistent social policing, a distinct gay male 
culture had assembled in this Midwestern automotive center. Homosexual 
men, and bisexual men interested in homosexual encounters, met in 
locations marked as gay, locations largely determined and significantly 
shaped by privately owned motor vehicles. A homosexual milieu nearly 
invisible to heterosexual Flint took shape not only in newly accessible 
gay and semi-gay bars, but literally on the streets, in moving and parked 
cars. In forging a gay life in Flint, men [...] used the very product that 
they and their heterosexual coworkers manufactured.79
77 Ibid. The link between the car, progress, and solidarity in Flint was secured in 
part by the formation of United Auto Workers, a key union that negotiated higher 
wages for working class car assemblers before World War II. See ‘Cars’ p. 229.
78 ‘Cars’, p. 230.
70 ‘Cars’, p. 228. As Retzloff makes clear, social policing in Flint was an effect 
of ‘the virulent anticommunism’ of the mid-twentieth century McCarthy era, 
which was concurrent with ‘a powerful “breadwinner” ethic [dominating] 
American society which glorified traditional gender roles and stigmatized same- 
sex sexuality, with right-wing ideologues engineering a campaign to purge gays 
from the government, military, and public sphere’ (‘Cars’, pp. 230-231). Flint’s 
sexual subcultures are important to my critique of Gartman, but it is not only 
sexual minorities who sexualized the car. As Retzloff says, the car has always 
been sexualized by automakers and marketing personnel, and is an established 
site for heterosexual relations: ‘Sexualized since its inception, the automobile has 
long been acknowledged as a ready avenue for heterosexual passions’ (‘Cars’, p. 
235). The car and heterosexual dating are commonly represented together in 
popular culture, and one also thinks here of the drive-in movie theatre, which 
was especially popular in the 1950s. It is strange, then, for Gartman to narrate a
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Retzloff uses metaphors of car making -  assembling, shaping, and forging -  to 
demonstrate how, in the static regularity of mass production/mass consumption, 
newly accessible means of moving and stopping helped to communalize actions 
that were excluded from an industrial town’s mainstream spaces. For Retzloff, 
the hard working body of the car comes into contact with the hard working body 
of the factory employee in Fordism’s post-war stage, resulting in the creative 
reconfiguration of a production/consumption binary. Flint’s privately owned cars 
indeed may have borne traces of boring and inertial production processes; these 
vehicles were quantitatively differentiated versions of a product put together with 
standardized parts and procedures. For the subjects in Retzloff s study, driving 
the car restarts the Fordist production process, but this process creates body- 
machines that do not act as referents for workplace exploitation. Shaping, 
assembling, and forging are all implicated in the trajectories of those who 
participate in Flint’s gay male car cultures; in this sexually significant car 
consumption, bodies are shaped anew (that is, they become part of a sexual- 
technological space composed of metal, glass, rubber, textile, and flesh, all of 
which moves while suspended in mid-air); are assembled at the various locales or 
meeting places made available by a now popular mode of transport; and 
subsequently forge a community around the multiple acquaintances and fleeting 
contacts that converge on these places: forging here implies both creating and 
being shaped.80
century-long history of the car’s cultural logic without mentioning the 
importance of sexuality to the car’s meaning.
80 The ability to enter this form of sexual automobility was largely determined by 
gender, however. Gartman acknowledges that in 1950s Flint, car-enabled ‘gay 
space’ was ‘typically dominated by men’: ‘in a city with around-the-clock 
automobile production, it was not unusual to see cars on the street at all hours, 
and since the automobile was traditionally considered to be a male domain, gay
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Gartman’s criticism of Fordist ‘identity in sheet metal’ is put into 
question when we consider Retzloff s account. In Gartman, we recall, the hard 
shiny surface -  or bodywork -  of the 1950s Fordist car attracts the subject, 
becomes the basis for that subject to form an identity, or narrate a coherent sense 
of self, in a society modelled on replication, and in doing so conceals the 
exploitative relations underpinning the car’s production. But this one-way 
procedure of reification is never evident in the case studies Retzloff provides. For 
example, Retzloff documents the arrest in 1950 o f ‘P.M.’, a ‘twenty-five-year- 
old African-American auotoworker’ in Flint, for ‘having anonymous sex on the 
sofa-like seat of a parked Chevrolet coupe’ with another male.81 ‘The surviving 
details of the incident’, Retzloff continues, ‘suggest that P.M. [...] had 
appropriated the automobile for covertly acting on his sexual identity’: in this 
instance, ‘the painted steel body of the’ car was ‘intended to shield’ same-sex 
encounters ‘from social agents [...] who were hostile toward homosexuality’.82
The hard working body of the Fordist car certainly conceals here, but we 
can validly interpret this concealment as protection, a gesture of companionship, 
rather than the blocking of human acts of freedom. The car acts when it is acted
men driving at night would not be seen as suspect in the way that lesbians, as 
women, would. Gay men could thus use their male privilege to transgress the 
bounds of accepted sexuality’ (‘Cars’, p. 235). Lesbian cultures were present in 
Flint, Retzloff states, but these cultures converged on drinking bars and clubs 
rather than automobile consumption. I return to the issue of women and the 
factory in the following chapter. For another exploration of the sexual- 
technological space of car use, see J.G. Ballard’s 1971 novel Crash (New York: 
Picador, 2001).
81 ‘Cars’, pp. 228, 227.
82 ‘Cars’, p. 228
83 Retzloff s study can be read as a response to Marxist critic Herbert Marcuse’s 
scepticism of sexual automobility in his book One Dimensional Man (London: 
Sphere, 1968). Marcuse recpgnizes the industrially produced car as site of sexual 
significance, but argues that car sex is an effect of capitalism’s channelling and 
restriction of libido, the total available energy of the sexual instinct. For
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upon (‘appropriated’) by Flint’s gay and bisexual autoworkers; the car is privy to 
the humans’ sexual acts, indeed it supports these acts ergonomically and 
approvingly: a sofa-like seat, concealed by hard metal bodywork, accommodates 
positions of intimacy denied expression in Fordist space, and at these moments 
works to prevent human oppression, not inflict it.84 Indeed, these relations are 
configured in more ways than Retzloff realizes: they involve three participants 
rather than the human couples Retloff privileges, a point to which I will return 
shortly.
Retzloff importantly points out, however, that ‘the sense of privacy’ 
offered by the car ‘was often illusory’, because Flint’s homophobic social agents 
were aware of the car’s protective role in cruising cultures: the ‘Flint police 
routinely contested’ same-sex automobility, Retzloff asserts, ‘and most of the 
local arraignments [sic] for consensual sodomy and gross indecency’ in the area 
‘involved cars. [...] cars might have been a convenient vehicle for sex, but they
Marcuse, the car represents a cramped mechanical zone that prevents individuals 
from forming the more dynamic, transformative attachments that follow sexual 
contact in wild, unpredictable natural environments: ‘compare love-making in a 
meadow and in an automobile [...] In the former [...], the environment partakes 
of and invites libidinal cathexis and tends to be eroticized. In contrast, a 
mechanized environment seems to block such self-transcendence of libido. 
Impelled in the striving to extend the field of erotic gratification, libido becomes 
less “polymorphous,” less capable of eroticism beyond localized sexuality, and 
the latter is intensified’ {One, p. 70. Emphasis in original). In Retzloff, the car 
blocks encounters with homophobic social agents in order to facilitate new, 
technologically-mediated environments based on new ways of bringing together 
and moving between the places of the city.
84 Sexual automobility, or what Retzloff calls ‘auto-eroticism’ (‘Cars’, p. 235), in 
fact produces some of the ‘real relations’ that Gartman claims automobility 
destroys, particularly relations of class. Inter-class contact dominates Retzloff s 
case study: the car’s protected interior functioned as a site ‘for fleeting, risky, 
anonymous sex and provided opportunities for cross-class socializing, becoming 
a means for teachers to interact with autoworkers, salesmen with college 
students, and factory supervisors with grocery clerks’ (‘Cars’, p. 235). There is 
no reason to argue that thes^ relations were not real, other than to claim that these 
real relations were manufactured by human-car contact in quite complex ways in 
particular locales.
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did not shield gay men from danger. On the contrary, they often made them more 
vulnerable’.85 Albeit from very different perspectives, then, Retzloff and 
Gartman both argue that the car’s ability to conceal was ultimately limited. At 
each stage of their lives outside the factory, Gartman claims, Fordist cars carry 
their marks of quantitative differentiation, meaning that eventually, after subjects 
had driven their Fordist automobiles for some time, sameness was bound to show 
through the pretence of individual escapism and adventure, temporarily 
becoming open to critique before capitalism found another way of making the car 
channel its hegemony. It is this predictability that makes identity in sheet metal 
pointless in Gartman’s opinion. In Retzloff, though, identity in sheet metal is not 
a linear process that initially succeeds, becomes increasingly vulnerable, and then 
fails. The Flint autoworkers’ appropriations of the car were always affected by 
vulnerability : when the workers’ bodies entered the bodies of cars and enacted 
homosexual automobility, these body-machines did not automatically become 
self-determining agents; indeed, they were susceptible to being stopped and 
moved against their intentions, in the form of arrests, inspections, warnings, and
o /
other institutional procedures. Vulnerability did not bring the demise of these 
car cultures, however: same-sex auto-eroticism could take place only as a 
continuous openness to danger. The car intensified the precariousness of acting 
on a sense of self that was informed by same-sex relations, but for Flint’s gay
85 ‘Cars’, pp. 235, 236.
86 The notion of being affected by technology becomes more complex in chapters 
3 and 4, where I discuss the body and computer use. Retzloff cites cyberspace as 
an extension of automotive eroticism: ‘The entry of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people into bars, into automobiles, and more recently into cyberspace shows that 
stigmatized sexual groups have an uncanny ability to commandeer different 
kinds of spaces, quickly “queering” those sites to make them their own’ (‘Cars’, 
p. 244). My discussion of th\e World Wide Web in chapter 4 of this thesis will 
show that Retzloff s assertion of quick sexual-technological agency and 
appropriation is naively celebratory.
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and bisexual autoworkers, car automobility was the key means of community 
building in a society whose dominant constituents attempted to ‘purge gays from 
the public sphere’.87
Because these subjects risked their livelihoods to engage in auto­
eroticism, drawn to these machines despite their fallibility, we should reassess 
what it means to reference hardness in the context of Fordist bodies, 
technologies, consumption, and working practices. In non-normative sexual 
automobility, solid steel and chrome are two components of a vulnerable process. 
An inanimate, material hardness is retained in this body-machine configuration -  
the car’s forged bodywork subsists while the car is being driven -  but we cannot 
separate these densities of matter from auto-erotic practice and the mistreatment 
that often followed this practice. In other words, steel and chrome (and glass, and 
so on) are not inert properties that become meaningless once they give way to a 
struggle between dominant and oppressed, or give away the ineligible actions 
they house to the social agents of homophobia patrolling Fordist space. As I have 
said, there is no auto-eroticism without the automobile’s hard but fragile exterior; 
human bodies must enter this bodywork in order to partake in car cruising, 
meaning that when auto-eroticism is apprehended by social agents, the car’s 
surface is also given away as a conspirator in these ineligible intimacies. The 
surface does not merely cover activity; it is a part of this activity, an agent in a
n o
process never defined by concealment alone. We learn from Retzloff s account
87 ‘Cars’, p. 231. For more on the car’s capacity to move bodies affectively as 
well as mechanically, see Mimi Sheller, ‘Automotive Emotions: Feeling the 
Car’, Theory, Culture & Society, 21:4/5 (2004), 221-242, and Nigel Thrift, 
Driving in the City’, Theory, Culture & Society, 21:4/5 (2004), 41-59.
881 am not simply advocating a naive animism here: obviously the car was not 
interrogated, discriminated against, and subjected to violence and humiliation. 
But because it is a constitutive condition of sexual automobility, we cannot say
71
of cruising, moving, parking, and arresting that the bodily form of the car is as 
significant as the car’s capacity for freedom of movement; that there is more to 
car automobility than the wheel, or, more specifically, the escapism and freedom 
that the wheel symbolizes. In Retzloff s Fordist history, the hard working body 
names a conjunctive synthesis of flesh, car components, and Taylorist principles 
and practices (that is, life lived according to the time of the factory -  a point to 
which I will return shortly), in which neither human nor machine is 
deterministically appropriated. The moulded metal exterior indeed allows the car 
to ‘perform its escape function’, in Gartman’s words, but by joining this 
synthesis forged steel is both a protective means of escape and a porous liability, 
a second bodily surface that advances and sets back at the same time.89
I invoke Retzloff not to make particular claims about sexuality in 1950s 
America. While this is a highly important aspect of his research, I am more 
interested in what Retzloff s study implies about Taylorized Fordism as a time of 
technological and bodily change. For Gartman, the principal changes made in 
Fordism were to cars in post-war factories. As we have seen, Gartman implies
that the car is simply a lifeless material barrier between stigmatized sexual 
subjects and social agents.
89 Wollen argues that the Fordist factory is a space of signifiers, material shapes 
(of car components and regulated assembly line workers) whose meanings are 
deferred, whereas the car that leaves the factory is a signified, a fully intelligible 
product for a consumer: ‘Fordism introduces an industrial regime, for the worker, 
of pure signifiers. [...] The assembly line proceeds like an algorithm, carrying 
out a predetermined sequence of formalized instructions. Meaning is suspended 
until the process is completed and there is an output which can be interpreted -  in 
the case of the Ford factory, a fully assembled automobile with a meaning for its 
purchaser. Gramsci’s argument was that this very formalization, this reduction of 
work to a series of empty signifiers, made it possible to think about something 
else, left a space for other signifieds’ (‘Cinema’, p. 57). In Flint’s auto-eroticism, 
however, we see the fully assembled car operating at the level of the signifier; a 
material vehicle of meanings that exceed the car's stabilization within the binary 
relations of consumer/prodqct, subject/object, or active interpreter/passive 
artefact that Wollen posits. I problematize the relation between interpreter and 
artefact in chapter 4 of this thesis.
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that these changes were incommensurate with meaningful human transformation, 
because for Gartman human transformation is based on moving beyond the 
processes of production, consumption, and reification inaugurated by Fordism. I 
call the temporal frame of Gartman’s essay Forwardism. In this framework, 
technological developments from Fordism onwards are represented according to 
a succession-logic of forward movement and development. For example,
Gartman is concerned only that Fordist technologies were outmoded and 
replaced in the passage of time; he narrates Fordism only to support his general 
thesis that technology develops by exhausting itself and then regenerating into a 
later phase, and that because this regeneration perpetuates the same structures of 
domination, humans must collectively find a means of moving forward from this 
‘folly’, with or without automation.
The automotive intimacies in Flint -  in which a chance to determine 
one’s fate is worked by moving with machine automation, not away from it -  
allow us to see that Benjamin’s appraisal of factory time remains relevant after 
Fordism’s early stages, and provides a way of resisting the Forwardist logic. 
Fordist factory time is not revolutionized by the creativity of Flint’s hard 
working bodies. Flint’s non-normative agencies came not only from the 
automobility of the car, but also the automobility of the conveyer belt, to ‘subvert 
the societal norms which sought to deny’ gay and bisexual men ‘social and 
sexual outlets’.90 As if replicating the stop-start schedule of assembly line 
workers, gay cruising cultures were formed in Flint through the co-ordination of 
moving and parking, of being mobile and being stationary, and more negatively
90 ‘Cars’, p. 235.
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(although still necessarily), being moved on and being arrested.91 Contra 
Gartman, then, and to borrow from Benjamin, it was possible to ‘adventurously 
go travelling’ in Fordism -  to experience the new and uncharted by moving 
through spaces that automobility not only expanded but put into discreteness, 
separated into multiple unexplored places -  without summoning the effort to 
leave or overthrow this social system on account of its mechanical sameness and 
inertia. Retzloff does state that sexual automobility ‘provided an important 
escape from the tedium of the assembly line and the social expectations’ of
M
Fordism. But this escape from tedium was still closely tied to Fordist 
production processes; Flint’s ‘around the clock automobile production’ enabled 
sexual automobility to proceed without suspicion. Auto-eroticism was therefore 
factory time lived differently rather than an escape from Fordism.
This possibility is foreclosed by Gartman’s periodizing assertion that 
Fordism once happened and destroyed human relations, and his claim that the 
only meaningful action in Fordism is that which breaks with Fordist 
automobility, either by breaking contact with, or simply breaking, the machines 
perpetrating the work of mass culture. A key point underscored by Retzloff s 
research is that when studied as something other than a stage of capital 
domination, Fordism, or Fordist automobility, reports on the possibility of 
agential action and adventurous movement in breaking down: of getting 
somewhere by stoppage and segmentation. Fordist automobility is not reducible 
to Forwardism; the contacts in Flint’s subcultures were indeed fleeting, but they
91 Retzloff points out that besides ‘being a popular, mobile site for sexual 
activity, cars interacted dynamically with fixed spaces such as bars and other 
geographic landmarks’ in tfye Flint area (‘Cars’, p. 236).
2 ‘Cars’, p. 233.
93 ‘Cars’, p. 233.
resulted from a more general approach where one takes time to survey a 
technological space for the places it makes available, and where one multiplies 
the possibilities for action, by using these technologically-enabled places to form 
other kinds of relations in this space. Forwardism cannot tolerate this approach, 
because in its logic all places evidence Fordism’s stifling oppression of all 
meaningful bodily actions. In other words, Gartman surveys Fordist space, and 
the places he discovers in this space -  bodily activities always characterized as 
localized examples of capital domination — compel him to survey a subsequent 
space for signs of real relations and community-based action.
Benjamin’s model of automotive bodily function therefore persists 
despite the socioeconomic changes that suggest its unsuitability as an 
explanatory framework, and in the remaining chapters I will argue for the 
importance of seeing bodies broken down with technology in the decades 
following Fordist society’s demise. I want to advance even further into body- 
machine time whilst calmly, adventurously remaining in a Taylorized Fordist 
temporal frame, in order to discover alternative interactions between bodies and 
technologies that social histories -  and, we will see, critical debates in the 
humanities -  do not afford us the time to consider. Each of these interactions is 
based on some or all of the qualities that Gartman claims are antithetical to 
proper human conduct in technologized nation-states; namely stasis, inertia, 
exhaustion, and boredom; these are qualities that Gartman constructs as 
essentially Fordist and thus as the reasons for moving into another (potentially 
technology-free) technological time. Discovering these non-Forwardist 
movements will not be straightforward, though, because we must initially 
confront the social reality of Fordism’s supersession: it appears impossible to
continue living Fordism in the knowledge -  provided to us by social history -  
that Fordism was replaced by an alternative socioeconomic system over thirty 
years ago. The purpose of the following chapter is precisely to interrogate the 
taking-place of the Fordist-to-post-Fordist shift.
\
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2: Flexible Bodies
This chapter critiques the notion, which has widespread scholarly and popular 
currency, that meaningful bodies move flexibly after Fordism. I will study texts 
from disciplines similar to those considered in the previous chapter -  work 
management studies, social history, and cultural theories of the body and 
technology. But in the subsequent sections it will become clear that the texts I 
analyse in this chapter imply a widespread change in bodily function, one that 
distinguishes a current time and space of body-machines from a Taylorized 
Fordist time and space that is presented as being uninhabitable in the present. 
Flexibility is the attribute that marks this change. I use this chapter to map the 
discourses within which flexibility becomes defined as a distinctly non- 
Taylorized Fordist quality. More importantly, I will argue that these discourses 
limit our ability to understand the complexity with which body-machines have 
moved in a so-called post-Fordist era.
I do not use the term ‘ automobility’ in this chapter, and I must clarify this 
move before proceeding. In chapter 1 we saw that automobility is crucial to 
Fordist time, because it relates to the body’s inclusion within the timed, 
automated regularity of the factory assembly line, and to the automobile/car as 
the principal consumer durable that keeps bodies within a Fordist temporal frame 
when they are not immediately within the factory space. In this chapter, however, 
we will see that such a notion of automobility does not apply to a discussion of 
non-Taylorized Fordist time and qualities. This is because the idea of post- 
Fordism -  a notion with which flexibility is coextensive -  is based on the 
certainty that the time of the assembly line, and the production and consumption
of durables that supported the societal implementation of this temporality, no 
longer anchor the movements of bodies in western machine cultures and 
technologized societies. It is possible to consider flexibility as an example of 
automobility: indeed, one of my main points of analysis in this chapter is the 
claim, within physiology, that post-Fordism makes us aware of the human body’s 
innate biological capacity to move flexibly by itself, or autonomously. But I 
emphasize flexibility over automobility because even if we can theorize 
flexibility and automobility together, this theorization still implies a break with 
the Taylorized Fordist model of mobility that I have explicated, and I want to 
emphasize the ways in which flexibility signifies the obsolescence of this model.
The first half of this chapter links the temporal frame of flexibility with 
representations of post-Fordist changes in the meaning of work and technology, 
and also with the claim within social histories that only flexible movements are 
made in Fordism’s decline. The second half will consider the degree to which 
this concept of movement in Fordism’s obsolescence affects representations of 
feminist mobility in certain social histories, which argue that feminism only 
becomes meaningful as a movement in Fordism’s supersession.
Post-Fordism
A central topic of social history and socioeconomic theory from the early 1970s 
to the present, post-Fordism represents the unprecedented shift in work relations 
and in the degree and speed of technological innovation, alongside and through 
which newly established socioeconomic principles of acceleration, 
disorganization, and unpredictability signal the obsolescence of the Fordist way 
of life. These new principles both emerged out of and provided a means of
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overcoming the period of economic and cultural-political crisis that Fordism had 
fully entered by the early 1970s.1
From an economic perspective, the system of mass consumption that 
Fordism inaugurated eventually exceeded the coexistent Fordist principle of 
ordered and organized body-machine efficiency. The timed, regular mass 
consumption of mass-produced commodities is the structuring and mobilizing 
condition of Fordist society. But Fordism’s ethos of consumption had by the late 
1960s introduced a structural instability within Fordist society, whereby the 
demand for mass-produced products had waned on account of the widespread 
household ownership of consumer durables. Put simply, many households owned 
a car along with the many other products mass produced on the Fordist assembly 
line, but these products proved too durable for a Fordist way of life that 
demanded, as a corollary to mass production, the constant, reinvigorated
'y
consumption of products. Thus economically, after almost thirty post-war years 
Fordism undermined the urgency of consumption as a constitutive condition, 
because its durables lasted too long.
1 Among the most influential socioeconomic accounts of post-Fordism are, 
chronologically, Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society; Tomorrow’s Social 
History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society, trans. by 
Leonard F.X. Mayhem (New York: Random House, 1971); Daniel Bell, The 
Coming o f  Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: 
Basic, 1973); Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial 
Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984); Scott Lash and 
John Urry, The End o f Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); and 
Harvey, Condition. A notable contemporary addition to this collection of texts, 
while certainly not as influential, is Rob Latham, Consuming Youth: Vampires, 
Cyborgs, & the Culture o f Consumption (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002). I critique Latham’s text in this section’s introduction.
2 We saw this happen to the car -  Fordism’s principal consumer durable -  in the 
latter stages of the previous chapter: cars could not be reshaped quickly enough 
for the demands of post-war consumer society, prompting designs so 
outlandishly streamlined -  s q  overtly and parodically futuristic -  that consumers 
began to glimpse and critique the quantitative sameness/differentiation 
underlying this process.
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The corollary to Fordism’s impediment to the voracity of consumption 
was a widespread de-industrialization throughout western nation-states in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Technological innovation, in particular the rise of 
computerized technologies, participated in the establishment of an alternative, 
post-Fordist socioeconomic system that refigured the relationship between work 
and consumption. This alternative system can be read as a key factor in making 
consumption, as a metaphor, work again after the Fordist crisis -  the recentring 
of consumption as a metaphor for properly functioning and timely bodies. Within 
a post-Fordist way of life, bodies are kept on time and of time -  time is 
naturalized through being felt as a body that moves in specific ways -  not 
through factory-based organization and steady temporal oscillations between 
input and output, but, as David Harvey explains, through ‘flexibility with respect 
to labour processes, labour markets, products and patterns of consumption’.3
Harvey refers to the unprecedented ability of bodies to conquer space 
through new experiences of time, which are enabled by the onset of 
computerization, increased transnational travel, and the global flow of capital in 
Fordism’s decline.4 Fordist factories of mass production, once the exemplary
3 Condition, p. 147.
4 See Condition, p. 165.1 take issue with the supposed onset of computers in 
post-Fordism in chapter 3. An early description of post-industrial time as flexible 
is given by Piore and Sabel, who claim that a society based on industrial labour is 
giving way to an era of ‘flexible specialization’ (Second, p. 3). Claiming that 
‘machines are as much a mirror as the motor of social development’, Piore and 
Sabel argue for machine technologies based on mass production, standardized 
labour, and unskilled workers to ‘be modified, perhaps even discarded, if the 
chronic economic diseases of our time [the early 1980s] are to be cured’ (Second, 
p. 3). Piore and Sabel instead call for a modern-day socioeconomic adoption of 
the principles of nineteenth century industrial craftsmanship, in which ‘skill and 
flexible equipment’ produce ‘a wide and constantly changing assortment of 
goods for large but constantly shifting markets’ (Second, p. 3). It is important to 
note that the socio-cultural dominance of flexible movement did not suddenly 
appear after post-war Fordism. There was an early post-war report on academic
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signifier of bodily time within western nation-states, are relocated to third world 
nations as more fragmented, sub-contracting or temporary patterns of labour take 
precedence in western nation-states over the jobs for life that symbolized 
Fordism’s machine-serviced twenty-four hours. Whereas Fordism signifies the 
servicing of time by machines, post-Fordism signifies a temporal frame in which 
machines (of industry) are serviced by computer-enabled office spaces. In other 
words, ‘computer’ designates the privileged loci of time’s flexible domination of 
space via technological innovation. The notion of flexibility is thus paramount to 
post-Fordism: in post-Fordism, the temporality of Fordist production lines is 
subjected to the variable, constantly fluctuating decisions transmitted 
instantaneously from the computer terminals of retail service economies.5 The 
flexible temporality enabled by technological innovation also enables jobs that 
were previously integrated within the factory milieu, such as advertising and 
marketing, to separate and adapt into alternative industries that, Harvey argues, 
lead to ‘a shift of emphasis from production of goods (most of which, like knives 
and forks, have a substantial lifetime) to the production of events (such as 
spectacles that have an almost instantaneous turnover time)’.6
beliefs in bodily flexibility: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization’s document The Race Concept: Results o f an Inquiry 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1952). Originally issued in 1950, UNESCO’s report aims to 
disprove the scientific racial theories that had strongly influenced the policies of 
Nazism in previous decades. UNESCO posits a universal human subject who is 
naturally pliable or adaptable, as a means of responding to scientific racism’s 
attempts at fixing difference in physical characteristics: ‘The normal individual, 
irrespective of race, is essentially educable. It follows that his intellectual and 
moral life is largely conditioned by his training and by his physical and social 
environment’ {Race, p. 14).
5 See Harvey, Condition, pp. 156, 284.
6 Condition, p. 157.1 interrogate Harvey’s account of post-Fordism at length 
later in this chapter, but it is interesting to note here that Harvey invokes ‘knives 
and forks’ -  a key signifier of household life, the stability of which is crucial to 
Fordism’s socioeconomic efficiency -  in opposition to the production of lifeless
The decline of trade union power, a surge in female and racial and ethnic 
minority labour participation, and the emergence of counter-cultural movements 
mobilized away from the predominantly white male domain of union 
organization, including second wave feminism and civil rights movements, 
comprise the cultural-political perspective of Fordist time’s obsolescence.7 
Harvey, for example, synthesizes the ‘civil rights movement in the United States’ 
which ‘spilled over into a revolutionary rage that shook the inner cities’, and the 
‘surge of women into low-paying jobs’ which ‘was accompanied by an equally 
vigorous feminist movement’, with a ‘criticism of the blandness of the quality of 
life under a regime of standardized mass consumption’.8 Harvey’s attempt here 
to provide a commentary on Fordist time’s obsolescence, by connecting 
socioeconomic theory with cultural politics, is exemplary of his general
and ephemeral images as a way of critiquing life after Fordism. In short, Harvey 
suggests that stable politics is equated with the (gendered and sexual) stability 
and longevity of heterosexual domestic arrangements, whereby the regularity of 
body-machine time and the regularity of a laid table are bound up conceptually.
7 Second wave feminism will be discussed at length in the second half of this 
chapter. Harvey provides a useful explanation that connects the 1960s civil rights 
movement to the action taken by racial minorities in response to their 
disenfranchisement in post-war Fordist consumer society: ‘race, gender, and 
ethnicity often determined who had access to privileged employment and who 
did not. [...] Denied access to privileged work in mass production, large 
segments of the workforce were equally denied access to the much-touted joys of 
mass consumption. This was a sure formula for discontent. The civil rights 
movement in the United States spilled over into a revolutionary rage that shook 
the inner cities’ (Condition, p. 138). For a more detailed history of civil rights 
and non-white industrial workers, see Robert Cook, Sweet Land o f Liberty? The 
African-American Struggle for Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Longman, 1998), pp. 41, 54.
8 Condition, pp. 138, 139.1 frequently cite Harvey in this introductory section 
over the other cited social histories because Harvey, more than the other authors, 
wants to demonstrate how the cultural can be accounted for by socioeconomic 
transformations, whereas the other cited works concentrate more specifically on 
the constitution of socioeconomic systems. Of the other cited social histories, 
sociologists Lash and Urry provide arguably the most cultural-political account 
of post-Fordism, linking whqt they term ‘the end of organized capitalism’ with 
the burgeoning lifestyles of newly enfranchised classes (see Organized, pp. 285- 
300).
commitment to a neo-Marxist theoretical approach -  a commitment towards 
acknowledging gender and race alongside class as social sites of difference and 
oppression. The capacity to fully account for social movement away from Fordist 
time, Harvey argues, is coextensive with the theoretical capacity to determine the 
‘treatment of difference and “otherness” not as something to be added on to more 
fundamental Marxist categories (like class and productive forces)’.9 This is 
because the ‘importance of recuperating such aspects of social organization’, 
such as race and gender, ‘within the overall frame of historical materialist 
enquiry (with its emphasis upon the power of money and capital circulation) and 
class politics (with its emphasis upon the unity of the emancipatory struggle) 
cannot be overestimated’.10 Harvey thus acknowledges that post-Fordist time’s 
flexible domination of space -  the flattening out of global space by 
technologically altered time, allowing capital accumulation to move everywhere 
-  both de-industrializes and draws attention to multiple types of working body. 
But also for Harvey, this transition provides the occasion for Marxism to become 
more flexible, to keep up with this acceleration by incorporating gender and race, 
so that Marxism can theorize everywhere.
Technologies scholar Rob Latham continues the neo-Marxist approach of 
invoking post-Fordism to map cultural transformation onto economic 
transformation. Latham argues that flexibility, as an ideological imperative 
‘animating all persons’ and as a naturalized category of bodily attributes, has 
been the condition of machine culture from Taylorized Fordism onwards,
9 Condition, p. 355.
10 Ibid. For more neo-Marxist writings that invoke post-Fordist time as a 
motivational factor, see the essays collected in New Times: The Changing Face 
o f Politics in the 1990s, ed. by Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1989).
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because flexibility compliments the more general notion of ‘youth’ that has
mobilized the body-machine ethos of perpetually new, reinvigorated
consumption that Fordism first implemented.11 Latham summarizes his argument
of youth’s importance to body-machine time:
‘youth’, in the Fordist industrial-cultural regime, ceased to be a quality 
inextricably attached to quantifiably aged bodies and instead became a set 
of values desirable both as a means of production and the end of 
consumption. Further, these values inhered in bodies no longer as purely 
natural properties, but as artificially attached prostheses facilitating 
incorporation into a techno-economic system. Thus, from the outset of 
modem consumer culture, youth was implicitly a cyborg identity.12
Latham invokes Taylorist rhetoric to support his assertion of youthful cyborg 
bodies. Latham’s prime examples are the principles of ‘quick reflexes’ and 
adaptability on the assembly line, which are suggestive of flexibility and 
youthfulness and were central to Taylor’s personal coefficient test.13 Latham 
claims that all post-Fordist socioeconomic change, and any theorization of a 
post-industrial society, participates in mobilizing youth as an animating and 
constitutive discursive field, into a present era in which post-industrial 
technologies have brought an unprecedented intimacy between body and 
machine:
As in the original Fordist cultural-theoretical nexus, youth circulates 
within postindustrial discourse in a dual fashion [...] postindustrial 
theorists argue that the massive technological change associated with the 
information revolution necessarily privileges youth as social subjects, 
since they are [...] best prepared to respond to its challenges. [...] On the 
other hand, these theorists use metaphors of youth -  curiosity, pliability, 
and so forth -  to depict the socioeconomic and cultural possibilities
11 Consuming, p. 141.
12 Consuming, p. 15. The notion of the cyborg -  cybernetic organism -  has been 
extensively theorized within various disciplines, including technoscience and 
cybernetics. But it suffices here to read the term in Latham as simply a reference 
to a part-human, part-machiqe synthesis. I discuss cybernetics in the following 
chapter.
13 Consuming, p. 14.
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enabled by information processing [...] in terms evocative of adolescent
energy and enthusiasm. 4
Although Latham provides an engaging means of theorizing Fordism’s 
socioeconomic decline, I argue that there is a significant temporal logic 
constituting Latham’s rhetoric, which problematizes the authority of the position 
from which Latham gives, as it were, a social history comprised of the arguments 
of social historians. The metaphors of youth that Latham describes, including 
flexibility and pliability, are specifically temporal, referencing the mobility that 
has accelerated to an unprecedented degree within a post-Fordist way of life. It 
appears therefore that Latham is simply commenting on the ‘flexible’ and 
‘pliable’ mobility over time that informs bodily intelligibility in post-Fordism, 
and the rhetoric of multiple ‘postindustrial theorists’ who participate in and 
reinforce this shift.
But the subject-position occupied by Latham-as-commentator requires 
Latham himself to partake in flexibility as a temporal frame for representing 
bodies and cultural activity. In other words, I argue that positing flexible mobility 
over time as the only means of representing bodies and technologies requires, in 
Frederick Taylor’s terms, ‘the right man for the right job’: a (male) social 
historian whose flexible mobility allows him to connect past, present and future 
by subsuming post-Fordist temporal and technological flux under total critique.15 
Latham’s historical overview depends on Latham’s ability to definitively map 
cultural agency and activity of varying times and places onto previous
14 Consuming, p. 144.
15 ‘The right man for the right job’ is a maxim frequently employed in Taylorist 
rhetoric. See ‘Principles’, p. 126. My assertion o f ‘the (male) social historian’ is 
a significant point of discussion: all of the cited social histories and 
socioeconomic theories are by male authors, a factor that raises the question of 
who speaks for and who speaks as flexibility. I return to this issue throughout 
this chapter.
socioeconomic patterns. Consequently, a body that participates in and is to a 
degree constituted by post-Fordist mobility over time, but whose intelligibility 
within flexible temporality also attests to and demands a certain immobility or 
rigidity, is not eligible to materialize and mean in Latham’s narrative. A body at 
once flexible and rigid, whose intelligibility does not precisely move with and 
according to the inexorable temporal acceleration and transmutation articulated 
by metaphors of youth, must necessarily be excluded by Latham’s narrative of 
bodies and machines, because Latham’s text indeed is an effect and 
naturalization of this temporal frame of technological and bodily movement. A 
body not mobile enough will be an impediment to Latham’s history: Latham’s 
text, in order to function as a social history of post-industrialism, is produced by 
a temporal frame that requires a mobile and flexible (and thus eligible) critic to 
keep in time with the mobile and flexible content being analysed, by utilizing a 
theoretical approach so flexible that it can claim that all forms of cultural agency 
are variable effects of an overarching schema of accelerating, body-machine 
mobility.
It is this issue, of the act or the doing carried out in Fordist time’s 
obsolescence and post-Fordism’s hegemony, that I will address in the following 
two sections, in relation to theorists of post-industrialism and to scholars who 
have subsequently attempted to apply these socioeconomic claims to an analysis 
of cultural production. I will begin by analysing physiological studies of post- 
Fordist working conditions, and the technologies relevant to these conditions, in 
order to consider what it means to be a body-machine after Taylorized Fordism. I 
will then apply this analysis to a more detailed discussion of flexibility as a
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temporal frame that animates social histories of post-Fordist work, and post- 
Fordist technological and bodily change.
Ergonomics: ‘Fitting the Task to the Human9
‘Taylor was the pioneer of what we now know as ergonomics’, argues Peter 
Wollen in his cultural history of Fordism.16 In this section I will argue that the 
temporal shift from Taylorism to ergonomics is significantly more complex than 
the linear taxonomical updating or coming-to-know implied in Wollen’s remark. 
Ergonomics (derived from the Greek ergon ‘work’), the study of people’s 
efficiency in their working environment, is undoubtedly Taylorism in another 
time, or is that which marks the continued influence of Taylorist principles in the 
present. But instead of simply invoking ergonomics in order to project back to a 
Taylorist time that becomes the main point of discussion, which is Wollen’s 
intention, my aim is to explore the temporal implications of the notion that 
Taylorism is now known under another name.
From one perspective, Wollen’s statement implies that knowing 
Taylorism as ergonomics ‘now’ provides the occasion for analysing Taylorism’s 
contribution to certain epistemologies -  Taylorism’s important role in the 
establishment of ‘machine’ as a field of knowledge in which bodies participated 
and were produced. From another perspective, now knowing Taylorism as 
ergonomics implies that through the course of time the signifier ‘Taylorism’ is no 
longer exemplary of the knowledges of bodily function. It appears that 
‘ergonomics’ is the signifier of body-machine discourse now. But if knowing 
Taylorism here involves knowing that Taylorist rhetoric contributed to a field of
16 ‘Cinema’, p. 43.
knowledge in which certain types of body were meaningful, knowing 
ergonomics is simply another means by which the critic, writing in a post- 
Taylorist/post-Fordist time (‘now’), can know Taylorism in this reflexive sense. 
In other words, Wollen implies that ergonomics signifies a shift in body-machine 
discourse (we no longer know Taylorism as Taylorism, and Taylorism is no 
longer exemplary of body-machine knowledge systems that constitute properly 
functioning bodies), which must mean that ergonomics participates in an 
alternative body-machine field of knowledge that organizes a different time of 
bodily eligibility. But for Wollen ergonomics is another name, alongside 
Taylorism, for a set of instructions on how bodies should move in a machine 
culture and society, whether Fordism or post-Fordism. Wollen essentially 
presents Taylorism and ergonomics as the same, and any critical engagement 
with ergonomics as an effect of a temporal modification or alteration of 
Taylorism appears to be unnecessary. Refusing this assumption, I will 
demonstrate the ways in which the post-Fordist practice of ergonomics aims not 
to continue from Taylorism but to show that Taylorism is largely meaningless as 
an interpretative model of bodily timeliness.
The notion that ergonomics represents a departure from Taylorized 
Fordist bodily time informs a particular ergonomics textbook that has been 
regularly revised and reprinted since its initial release in the mid-1960s: 
physiologists Karl Kroemer and Etienne Grandjean’s Fitting the Task to the 
Human}1 Kroemer and Grandjean’s text continues to advocate the Taylorist 
calibration of bodies into healthy and efficient ‘human-machine systems’, but
17 K.H.E. Kroemer and E. Qrandjean, Fitting the Task to the Human: A Textbook 
o f Occupational Ergonomics, trans. by Etienne Grandjean, 5th edn (London: 
Taylor and Francis, 1997).
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with an emphasis on constant change -  of bodies, technologies, workspaces, and
jobs -  which the authors embrace by frequently updating their methods of
measuring and assessing proper bodily function:
Our working conditions have undergone rapid and fundamental changes 
during the last few years. One example is the widespread use of the 
individual computer in the shop, office and home. Another major 
development is that women now hold many jobs that used to be in the 
male domain, and that many more women choose a life-long occupational 
career. Workforces, tasks, conditions and tools are changing! Many office 
and industrial workers are tied to human-machine systems. Repetitive 
work can create cumulative health problems such as reported visual 
strains, mental stress and physical injury. Proper ergonomic measures can 
avoid such harmful effects and instead promote healthy conditions which 
are both efficient and agreeable. [...] In this new edition to Fitting the 
Task to the Man [...] Kroemer has revised and updated the text and data 
while remaining true to the spirit of [...] earlier editions.18
This excerpt is exemplary of the ways in which change is figured as 
coextensively temporal, technological, and corporeal. It is significant that the 
very title of the body-machine textbook is representative of this logic of change. 
Until this edition, body-machines have been calibrated by ‘fitting the task to the 
man’ -  a continuation of Taylorized Fordism’s regulation of flow, in which 
bodies and machines are represented according to the male body’s status as the 
privileged form of function. According to the above passage, ‘women’ and ‘the 
individual computer’ constitute a change in this body-machine temporality 
towards ‘human’ as a signifier of more accommodating and mobile forms of 
working bodies. ‘Human’ thus becomes the privileged form of post-Fordist 
flexibility, technological change, and acceleration, precisely because the term 
appears to negate the privileges and exclusionary implications of Fordist 
pyramidal hierarchies. In Kroemer and Grandjean, the computer’s supplanting of 
industrial machinery has placed a traditionally male-led workforce alongside a
18 Fitting, back cover. Emphasis in original.
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new, predominantly female labour pool, and ‘human’ captures a post-Fordist 
body-machine time in which gender relations are altered and white male 
hegemony loosened.
The transition from Fitting the Task to the Man to Fitting the Task to the 
Human can therefore be discussed in relation to de-industrialization and 
workforce changes that are undoubtedly important to any account of post- 
Fordism. But I find another notion within Kroemer and Grandjean’s rhetoric 
more provocative in relation to representing this shift in time; that of the ‘task’. 
Within the above passage of ergonomics rhetoric, ‘task’ is a distinctly temporal 
notion that synthesizes bodily and technological movement. ‘Task’ at once 
represents a body doing something or being committed to an action, and the 
technologies or machinery that perform tasks and that require operation as part of 
the body’s commitment to doing. Kroemer and Grandjean’s emphasis on ‘task’ 
instead of the Taylorized Fordist ‘job’ is significant. It appears that in post- 
Fordism ‘job’ is an effect of ‘task’ as a more general temporal economy rather 
than another name for the same temporal frame, because ‘task’ signifies a 
general, less place-bound commitment to mobility within which work has 
become subsumed. In other words, Taylorism’s ‘job’ becomes anachronistic as a 
temporal frame of body-machine representation because it is too work-specific: 
because in post-Fordism, ‘work’ no longer signifies manual factory labour, ‘job’ 
(as a Taylorist/Fordist term for body-machine movement) is a remnant of an 
outmoded industrial time. ‘Task’ appears to be the preferred term for body- 
machine time because it is exemplary of mobility everywhere: body-machine 
time has moved out of the factory and out of the factory-inflected socioeconomic
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system of Fordism, and is therefore now too mobile to be gleaned from the 
assembly line temporality that constituted the Fordist job for and way of life.
This generality of ‘task’ as a temporal frame is instanced in the above 
extract from Kroemer and Grandjean, whereby ‘task’ is subject to the same 
potentially infinite representational regress that looking and sorting is in 
Taylorism. Representation is Kroemer and Grandjean’s task, in that ‘task’ -  a 
particular way of organizing bodily and machine movements in time -  is the 
structuring condition of Kroemer and Grandjean’s rhetoric. This temporal frame 
or representational mode affects not only Kroemer and Grandjean’s rhetoric of 
post-Fordist bodies at work, but also the movement of the Fitting textbook itself 
-  Kroemer and Grandjean’s body of work. In other words, Grandjean’s death in 
1991 has presented Kroemer with the task of compiling a fifth edition of Fitting, 
which, the text claims, will represent tasks by ‘remaining true’ to, and therefore 
representing, Grandjean’s previous tasks of representing tasks. The key point 
here is that ‘task’ is not attributable to the actions from any single locus, but can 
be located only as a constitutive temporal frame through which body-machine 
mobility is posited. This ergonomic textbook is an effect of what I call task 
temporality, the time of the task, as the condition for representing post-Fordist 
bodily function: the textbook constantly changes (title, length, principles); its 
data are in a perpetual state of mobility; a new author replaces an old one. 
Mobility (‘task’) rather than factory regularity (‘job’) is in this way the 
organizational principle of post-Fordism.
Kroemer and Grandjean’s rhetoric of ergonomics is premised on 
demonstrating the insufficiency or uselessness of Taylorism as an explanatory 
framework for moving bodies. In a section titled ‘Medico-biological aspects of
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boredom’, Kroemer and Grandjean describe the untimeliness of a Taylorist
model that no longer tells us how the body works:
Until a few decades ago the science of work physiology was mainly 
interested in finding out how to relieve the worker of excessive physical 
load. Increasing mechanisation and automation, as well as the tendency 
to divide up work into as many simple operations as possible (Taylorism), 
has now led, in many occupations, to a new problem: insufficient 
demands on physical and mental capacities. Unused physical and mental 
capacities characterise a state which we call ‘underload’. Nearly all the 
organs of the human body have the important biological characteristic of 
being able to respond to demand by stepping up their performances [...] 
Human development from childhood onwards is heavily dependent upon 
this ability to adapt to the stresses of life. Conversely, if an organ is not 
exercised, it atrophies [...] Cessation of development, followed by 
decline, takes place on a mental level as well as a physical one. It is 
known from experiments on animals that the brain becomes better 
developed, functionally, morphologically, and biochemically, when the 
animal is subjected to various mental demands and stresses than when it 
is allowed to grow up in a quiet situation with few external stimuli.19
Implicit in this passage is the suggestion that Taylorism is unable to account for 
the break in time effected by post-Fordism and its alternatively working bodies. 
Taylorism is figured here as being insufficient to the time of body eligibility, or 
what I have termed the schema of work/working out, because in post-Fordism 
Taylorism engenders boredom. Taylorism is represented by Kroemer and 
Grandjean as a closed set of timed movements within which body-machines are 
spatially restricted, creating repetition that in turn gives rise to the untimeliness 
of boredom or ‘underload’, in which bodies become disorganized -  listless, 
uncomfortable, and thereby unintelligible. Taylorism’s directives for using 
technology produce ‘wmised physical and mental capacities’, Kroemer and 
Grandjean argue. Bodies waste away, literally for Kroemer and Grandjean, if 
corporeal intelligibility is not posited according to the constant mobility, 
adaptability and flexibility of ‘nearly all the organs’. Thus boring Taylorism,
19 Fitting, pp. 223-224. Emphasis in original.
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which in post-Fordism has a propensity to make nothing happen, is Kroemer and 
Grandjean’s evidence for the need to reconceptualize the means of calibrating 
body-machines so that the break with Fordist time can be more fully 
comprehended. In ergonomics, Taylorism -  represented as static, immobile, and 
boring -  signifies the need to make a move, or to take up the task of making the 
body move with a more flexible, changeable temporal frame in Fordism’s 
decline.20
It is significant that Kroemer and Grandjean advocate a flexible, 
adaptable calibration of body-machines by claiming that Taylorism is too 
physically orientated and fails to take into account the mental as well as physical 
capacities of the working body. This claim is particularly contentious, given my 
demonstration in the previous chapter that within Taylorist rhetoric the body 
works or functions not through the possession of innate physical prowess or raw 
material strength that precedes machinery, but as an effect of body-machine 
systems of knowledge through which it is set mind-determined parameters and a 
time of eligibility. The body is made to work through being worked out. But for 
Kroemer and Grandjean, a mentally deficient Taylorism has failed adequately to 
exercise or work out the brain, which they imply is the main reason for 
Taylorism’s inability to exemplify proper bodily function. It appears that bodies 
are out of time in Taylorism because, through the boredom of repetition and 
stasis, the brain is not adequately conditioned to assume its privileged role in the 
enactment of body-machine sense organ temporality, in which the brain is key to 
organizing and ordering the sense organs most present to body-machine
20 Remaining with the theoretical framework of the previous chapter, I argue that 
the eligible body does not precede this ‘new’ temporal frame of the task but is 
made intelligible through it.
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consciousness. For Kroemer and Grandjean, in post-Fordist ergonomic time it is 
only by flexing the brain, subjecting it to varied, flexible, non-linear stimuli and 
movement, that it can be ‘better developed morphologically’, be in better shape, 
in order to restart or make a renewed move towards bodily timeliness 
exemplified by the message transmission carried out by hierarchized organs.
It is interesting to consider this logic alongside the status of ergonomics 
as a profession with human in mind. In one sense, ‘human in mind’ references the 
benevolence of ergonomics as a practice, its attendance to the every need of the 
working body’s continued efficiency. In another sense, ‘human in mind’ 
references the ways in which ‘human’ is constructed within body-machine 
discourse as a mind-determined form: ‘human’ becomes the privileged 
designation in predetermining the eligible time of bodily intelligibility in a time 
too quick and flexible for Taylorized Fordism. This problematizes Kroemer and 
Grandjean’s contention that ergonomics presents a break with Taylorism: it 
appears on the contrary that ergonomics is another means of working out the 
morphologies a body can assume in time in order to be intelligible, a process of 
which Taylorism itself is an effect.
The notion of better shape through flexible movement extends to 
Kroemer’s and Grandjean’s case studies of post-Fordist working conditions. 
Kroemer and Grandjean assess ergonomic measures for bodies working in post- 
Fordist factory environments and in the office spaces that now outmanoeuvre 
factory time. In their factory case study, Kroemer and Grandjean claim that the 
assembly line must now be conducive to flexible movement if the factory is to 
continue offering insight into how bodies work: ‘Sitting along a straight 
assembly line is bad: it is much better if the line follows a semi-circle or is
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sinuous. Any arrangement is good as long as it brings several workers within 
conversation distance of one another’.21 A flexible assembly line will keep up 
with post-Fordism’s time of bodily eligibility, because it provides the conditions 
for varied stimulation that safeguard against the boredom, the non-movement or 
ineligible movement that threatens the process of work/working out.22 In their 
study of office space, the authors devote a substantial amount of rhetoric to 
‘workstation design’, which, they claim, ‘should facilitate movement of the body 
instead of promoting maintained static postures’.23 To facilitate greater 
movement of the body at the workstation, Kroemer and Grandjean prescribe a 
computer ‘keyboard designed in accordance with ergonomic principles’.24 The 
authors provide the following description of this flexible piece of technology: 
‘The two keyboard halves show an opening (slant) angle of 25° in order to avoid 
a sideways twisting (ulnar deviation) of the hands. They tilt sideways down at 
10° below horizontal to lessen the inward rotation (pronation) of the forearms 
and wrists’.25
This description foregrounds task temporality’s signification of non- 
Taylorist movement -  of mobility everywhere, and of a variability that the 
keyboard anticipates. But the description also demonstrates the ergonomic logic 
of human in mind: the representation of the ergonomic keyboard is an effect of 
‘human’ as a mind-determined bodily form of a flexible, task temporality that is 
never permitted to engender the uncomfortable. The ‘opening’, ‘slanting’ and
21 Fitting, p. 236.
22 My description of boredom here as ineligible movement points towards the 
possibility of reading boredom as a transgressive temporality, in which a doing is 
not premised on a task or a movement forward. This will become an important 
argument as this chapter proceeds.
23 Fitting, p. 237. v
24 Ibid.
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‘titling’ of the equipment counters the ‘twisting’ and ‘rotation’ that may move 
against or impede (‘deviate’) a flexible mobility already set parameters. In short, 
amidst post-Fordist technological change and shifts in the meaning of working 
bodies, the logic underwriting task temporality -  the temporal frame through 
which these changes and shifts are predominantly represented -  is that there is a 
certain way of being flexible, a certain time for bodily flexibility against which 
some movements will fail to mean and therefore be prevented from 
materializing.
The Task of Narrating Postmodernity
Task temporality informs other representations of post-Fordism. In this section, I 
analyse academic texts that in varying ways present post-Fordist technological, 
workforce, and economic change as the cause of a flexible, ephemeral and 
tumultuous time of cultural production. Whereas Kroemer and Grandjean 
articulate post-Fordist change in the context of the workplace, in this section I 
consider the argument that post-Fordist change is symptomatic of a particular 
‘global’ phase of capitalism, the permutations of which are explanatory of 
flexibility as a requisite at the level of culture. David Harvey is among the 
principal proponents of this argument. For Harvey, the key signifier of the
9 f\cultural permutations of capital accumulation is ‘postmodemity’. Harvey
26 Another seminal synthesis of capitalism’s cultural permutations is Fredric 
Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism (London 
and New York: Verso, 1991). Jameson claims that ‘every position on 
postmodernism in culture -  whether apologia or stigmatization -  is also at one at 
the same time, and necessarily, an implicitly or explicitly political stance on the 
nature of multinational capitalism today’ (.Postmodernism, p. 3. Emphasis in 
original). To maintain a consistent argument I have chosen to focus specifically 
on Harvey in this section, although by no means are Harvey’s and Jameson’s 
texts reducible: Harvey, for instance, accuses Jameson of exaggerating the
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interprets postmodemity as a crisis in the stability of form and meaning, arguing 
that the term mistakenly implies a radical break in time and should instead be 
seen to represent capitalism’s movement towards a flexible and global 
domination and fragmentation of space, and the cultural conditions and logics 
necessary for capitalism to enter this later phase. In response to this method of 
narrating postmodemity, and following the theoretical framework outlined in the 
previous section, I argue that for Harvey the analysis of postmodemity is a task -  
an urgent imperative to do something in and with post-Fordist time, borne out of 
an anxiety over nothing happening in Fordism’s obsolescence. I will explicate 
and critique Harvey’s theorizations by focusing specifically on the ways in which 
the notion of flexibility enables Harvey to claim that postmodern time’s 
condition, its shape or morphological intelligibility, can be definitively mapped.
Unlike the socioeconomic theorists cited in the introductory section who 
forecast and assert the prevalence of a post-industrial or post-Fordist time,
Harvey does not use the terms ‘post-industrial’ or ‘post-Fordism’ to chart 
Fordism’s supersession. Harvey prefers the term ‘postmodemity’ because it 
allows for a theorization of the contradictory tendencies of capitalism, which for 
Harvey determine all cultural activity, in addition to social movement away from 
Fordism.27 To demonstrate this point, Harvey provides a brief chapter in
‘uniqueness and newness’ of postmodern cultural forms (Condition, p. 305). 
Jameson’s assertions do however feature intermittently throughout the remainder 
of this chapter.
27 ‘Post-industrial’ and ‘post-Fordism’ would be limiting terms for Harvey, 
because in Harvey’s logic they would signify a definite break with the capitalist 
relations established under Fordism, and thus the redundancy of the class-based 
theories and activism formed out of historical struggle with the Fordist system. 
Thus for Harvey, post-Fordism would represent an abandonment of history, a 
hasty dismissal of collective resistances and activisms of the past, which were 
organized against modes of production that have not altered as radically as the 
term post-Fordism implies. Jameson is more explicit in arguing against the
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Condition titled ‘Fordist modernism versus flexible postmodernism, or the
interpenetration of opposed tendencies in capitalism as a whole’.28 Harvey uses
this chapter to display a certain theoretical flexibility, whereby he evinces
nostalgia for Fordist time, expresses pessimism towards a current time of flexible
mobility and ephemerality, and claims an ability to subsume both times within a
theory of capital’s historical propensity towards flux and irregular movement:
It seems as if postmodernist flexibility merely reverses the dominant 
order to be found in Fordist modernity. The latter achieved relative 
stability in its political-economic apparatus in order to produce strong 
social and material change, whereas the former has been dogged by 
disruptive instability in its political-economic apparatus [...] But what if 
[this opposition] constitutes a structural description of the totality of 
political-economic and cultural-ideological relations within capitalism? 
To view it this way [...] helps us dissolve the categories of both 
modernism and postmodernism into a complex of oppositions expressive 
of the cultural contradictions of capitalism [...] Within this matrix of 
internal relations, there is [...] a swaying back and forth between [...] 
permanence and flexibility [...] the flux of internal relations within 
capitalism as a whole.29
Here we witness Harvey multitasking, doing three things at once, in order to 
assert capitalism’s flexibility. Harvey applies an oppositional logic of flux and
notion of post-industrial time, claiming that ‘such theories of [‘a whole new’ 
post-industrialism] have the obvious ideological mission of demonstrating, to 
their own relief, that the new social formation no longer obeys the laws of 
classical capitalism, namely, the primacy of industrial production and the 
omnipresence of class struggle’. Jameson instead sees ‘this new society [...] as a 
third stage or moment in the evolution of capital [...] if anything, a purer stage of 
capitalism than any of the moments that preceded it’ (.Postmodernism, p. 3). Here 
Jameson is influenced by Marxist economist Ernest Mandel’s work Late 
Capitalism (London: Verso, 1988). Jameson’s refusal o f ‘post-industrial’ can in 
fact be read as a change of direction in his work, considering that in his 1971 
book Marxism and Form he argues for a ‘postindustrial [...] Marxism’ to address 
the decline of the ‘visibility and continuity of the class model’. See Fredric 
Jameson, Marxism and Form (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), 
pp. xvii-xix, xvii. Against Jameson, I do not reject the term ‘post-industrial’: 
instead I retain it in order to argue for unexplored movements and relations 
between bodies amid de-industrialization. This argument will become clearer in 
the following chapters of thi^ thesis.
28 Condition, pp. 338-342.
29 Condition, pp. 339-342.
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permanence to a current postmodern time, maps this time onto capitalism as a
constitutive and analysable totality or continuum, and claims that in its present
phase this continuum is not conducive to the ‘strong material change’ it produced 
• # ™in the Fordist era. To narrate a time after Fordism, Harvey must move flexibly, 
to show that any activity in any place is graspable by a theory of capitalism as a 
flexible whole, or as a system that reaches and determines all cultural life. For 
Harvey, representing capitalism as a determining, flexibile mobility is 
coextensive with demonstrating that he can keep in time or keep up with this 
mobility.
Harvey’s flexibility, demonstrated by his abstract theory of capital that 
purports to account for culture, is determined not simply by Harvey’s assumption 
that capitalism moves flexibly, but also by his assumption that capitalism has or 
is a pre-discursively flexible body. Harvey assumes that capitalism, or ‘flexible 
accumulation’, is always already flexible, has already taken meaningful shape, 
and has predetermined, eligible movements that mark its integrity and enable its
n  i
signification. It is this body, the flexible body of capitalism, that holds
accountable, suffuses, thwarts, outmanoeuvres, stymies, violates and destroys all
other bodies both economically and culturally. Harvey indeed confirms this
assumption of a mobile capitalist body outside all other movement:
Capital [...] continues to dominate, and it does so in part through superior 
command over space and time, even when opposition movements gain 
control over a particular place for a time. The ‘othernesses’ and ‘regional
30 Harvey organizes Fordism and ‘Flexible postmodemity’ into a table of 
numerous oppositions including, respectively, mastery/exhaustion, trade 
unions/individualism, single task/multiple tasks, and relative space/place 
(Condition, pp. 340-341). We can equate Harvey’s assertion of the Fordist 
‘single task’ with the term ‘job’, which Kroemer and Grandjean subordinate to 
the post-Fordist body’s ‘natqral’ need to do something different (‘multiple tasks’) 
at every opportunity.
31 For Harvey on flexible accumulation, see Condition, pp. 141-172.
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resistances’ that postmodernist politics emphasize can flourish in a 
particular place. But they are all too often subject to the power of capital 
over the co-ordination of universal fragmented space and the march of 
capitalism’s global time that lies outside of the purview of any particular 
one of them. 2
Harvey’s notion of ‘othernesses’ refers to the strategies whereby members of 
minority groups -  women, non-whites, non-heterosexuals -  creatively draw 
attention to their subordinate positions within societies, and to their positioning 
as ‘other’ to the ways in which dominant societal structures have traditionally 
been resisted. Regional resistance is Harvey’s term for describing how these 
strategies occur: for Harvey, the weakening of unionization after Fordism has 
significantly restricted the opportunities for oppressed groups to co-ordinate 
subversive action over a wide area. Only capital accumulation can move 
dynamically over the globally fragmented communications networks in 
Fordism’s decline, argues Harvey, and those minority subjects who in the first 
instance were excluded by union power are afforded only a place, a disconnected 
region, from which to act against their situation in post-Fordist postmodemity. 
Place, region, and body are equivalent terms for Harvey, because they each 
reference the negligible impact of critical expression in post-Fordist time and 
space: Harvey is clearly suggesting here that politics is meaningless if given over 
to a localized and immobile focus on bodies instead of a new form of communal, 
globalized activity. But whereas Harvey implies that keeping up with 
capitalism’s flexibility involves a transnational transcendence of place-bound 
body politics, we have seen that the processes of bodily intelligibility indeed 
constitute Harvey’s task of contemporaneousness. The movements of minority 
bodies in a disorganized way of life may, Harvey claims, ‘at times’ transgress
32 Condition, pp. 238-239.
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and resist the power structures of society, but will always ultimately be left 
behind or kept in place by the more mobile body of capitalism, which is able to 
march through the Fordism-to-post-Fordism shift as part of its maturation.
There is an implicitly gendered, sexual, and normatively temporal logic to 
Harvey’s claim that capitalism is the most flexible and most powerfully 
conditioned of all bodies. For Harvey, flexibility is the notion enabling us to map 
capitalism’s historical stages through time. In the two above excerpts from his 
text, it appears that Harvey invokes post-Fordist mobility and flexibility in order 
to claim that capitalism is recognizable within a temporal frame of growth or 
upbringing. This representation of capitalism is dependant on the capacity to 
show that capitalism, as a body, has passed through successively timed phases 
that subsume and are expressive of flux and mobility in Fordism’s decline. 
Harvey also asserts that this flexible growth endows the capitalist body with the 
power and prerogative of ‘penetration’ to invade, outmanoeuvre and subordinate 
all post-Fordist activity.33
These attributes exemplify the implication pervading Harvey’s rhetoric 
that the flexible body of capitalism is also white and male. This implication 
particularly informs Harvey’s dismissal of the agency of female, non-white, and
' X ' X Condition, p. 239, 285. Jameson also assumes the inevitability of Tate’ 
capitalist penetration: ‘One is tempted to speak [of late capitalism in terms of] a 
new and historically original penetration [and] destruction of precapitalist Third 
World agriculture, and the rise of the media and the advertising industry’
(.Postmodernism, p. 36). We can connect this claim with Jameson’s endorsement 
of Mandel’s model of capitalist development, which sees post-Fordist society as 
‘a third stage or moment in the evolution of capital’ (.Postmodernism, p. 36). 
Here we can see how capitalism is made intelligible by Jameson according to a 
normative temporality of bodily and sexual maturity: meaningful (flexible) 
capitalism has a period of infancy (a first stage), a period of adolescence (a 
second stage), before maturing into a later third stage by which time it is able to 
penetrate most effectively (.Postmodernism, p. 3).
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non-western subjects who participate in post-Fordist transformations of the 
meaning of work:
While it is true that the declining significance of union power has reduced 
the singular power of white male workers [...] it does not follow that 
those excluded from those labour markets have achieved sudden parity 
(except in the sense that many [...] white male workers have been 
marginalized alongside them). While some women and some minorities 
have gained access to more privileged positions, the new labour market 
conditions have [...] re-emphasized the vulnerability of disadvantaged 
groups.34
Harvey forecloses the possibility that informal labour markets may have brought 
women and minorities together in ways that diminish the relevance of achieving 
parity with white male workers. Harvey figures Fordist unionization as a male 
bonding experience, and sees the strength and purposefulness of this formation as 
the standard by which all activity in the disorganized workplace is measured, or 
as the key objective for bodies coming into contact with one another in post- 
Fordism. The stable (Fordist) conditions for building resistance no longer exist, 
Harvey claims, and the majority of working bodies in contemporary societies are 
vulnerable to exploitation and subordination as a result of these changes. For 
Harvey, the place-bound activity of women and minorities does not help work 
out a way for bodies to move meaningfully after Fordism, and what takes place 
among these disadvantaged groups is not worthy of examination. Subsequently, 
Harvey can describe only what capitalism does -  inevitably defeat minorities. I 
am not convinced by Harvey’s claim that white male dominance has been 
marginalized, though: Harvey has told us, in his advocacy of union power, that 
white maleness is the quality that constitutes a meaningfully formed, active body, 
and placeless late capitalism is the only total body that remains in Harvey’s 
rhetoric. Moreover, white maleness -  in the form of either past union activity, or
34 Condition, p. 152.
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(the white male) Harvey’s critical endeavour -  is constructed as the only 
reference point for responding to this dominant formation. To summarize, the 
potentially multiple forms of agency created by increased female and non-white 
labour participation, in alternative body-machine ways of living not adjusted 
solely to a reductive conception of the hard working bodies of the white male 
working class, are useless for Harvey, because these subjects are always already 
penetrated by the superior flexibility of a superior form with which they cannot 
keep in time.35
This assumption, of a supremely flexible capitalist body that will always 
penetrate and thus dominate on a global scale, is the subject of an important 
critique by feminist J.K. Gibson-Graham, who with acumen interrogates ‘left 
discussions’, such as Harvey’s, ‘in which globalization is represented as the 
penetration (or imminent penetration) of capitalism into all processes of 
production, circulation, and consumption, not only of commodities but also of 
meaning’.36 The capitalist body’s flexible propensity to penetrate everywhere,
A crucial point must be made here in order to underscore my assertion that 
Harvey provides a reductive conception of the white working class. I do not 
criticize Harvey’s text simply on account of his specific focus on the working 
class as a site of oppression. This would be a reductive and dangerous dismissal 
of class analysis in preference of employing apparently more dynamic and less 
narrowly focused categories such as gender, race, and sexuality. Instead, I 
criticize Harvey because he assumes that the white working class is a securely 
recognizable entity that never creatively intersects with the above sites as body- 
machine time changes. For a crucial discussion of academic hostility towards 
working class analysis, see Eric Lott, ‘All the King’s Men: Elvis Impersonators 
and White Working-Class Masculinity’, in Race and the Subject o f Masculinities, 
ed. by Harry Stecopoulos and Michael Uebel (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1997), pp. 192-227.
36 J.K. Gibson-Graham, ‘Querying Globalization’, in Post-Colonial, Queer: 
Theoretical Intersections, ed. by John C. Hawley (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2001), pp. 239-276 (p. 239). Emphasis in original. J.K. Gibson- 
Graham is the pseudonym fo( feminists Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham, 
whose collaborations have contributed to an important rethinking of Marxist 
critique.
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Gibson-Graham asserts, is not the directive of a pre-discursive force but is 
‘bound up with the lack of an economic imaginary capable of conceiving 
economic development that is not capitalist development (with its inherent 
globalization tendency), just as conceptions of sexuality that are not dominated 
by a phallocentric heterosexism (in which the act of penetration, whether called 
rape or intercourse) are difficult to muster’.37 Thus, capitalism’s flexible 
domination does not occur outside and beyond the place-bound movements of 
bodies, as Harvey assumes, but is posited according to a heteronormative 
temporal frame of eligible bodily movement.
The Fordism-to-post-Fordism shift, and finding a way of alternatively 
theorizing this transition, is central to Gibson-Graham’s critique. Gibson-Graham 
represents the transition using poststructuralist critiques of identity and 
signification: ‘For those interested in historical periodizations of capitalism, this 
development [of global credit and finance markets] signifies the demise of 
capitalism in its “second nature” [Fordism], when the productive base anchored 
the movements of credit and money. Today, the whole relation between signifier,
‘Querying’, p. 265 n. 2. Emphasis in original. The link between globalization 
and rape is a key theme of Gibson-Graham’s essay. In challenging the 
naturalized morphology of capital domination, Gibson-Graham cites the notion 
of the ‘rape script’ identified by feminist Sharon Marcus -  a “‘language of rape” 
which assumes that “rape has always already occurred and women are always 
either already raped and rapable [sic]”’ (‘Querying’, p. 240). Gibson-Graham 
draws inspiration from Marcus’s subversion of the rape script, which involves 
both ‘refusing to accept the victim role’ and challenging ‘the discourse of 
sexuality that the rape script inscribes and from which it draws its legitimacy’ 
(‘Querying’, p. 244). Marcus’s interventions enable Gibson-Graham to identify 
and interrogate a ‘globalization script’, in which ‘capitalist social and economic 
relations are scripted as penetrating “other” social and economic relations but not 
vice versa. (The penis can penetrate or invade a woman’s body, but a woman 
cannot imprint, invade, or penetrate a man)’ (‘Querying’, p. 245). For an 
explication of the rape script, see Sharon Marcus, ‘Fighting Bodies, Fighting 
Words: A Theory and Politic^ of Rape Prevention’, in Feminists Theorize the 
Political, ed. by Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 
385-403.
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signified, and referent has been ruptured thereby unleashing capitalism’s “third 
nature,” “the spectacle” [...] in which the “economic real” is buried under the 
trade of risk, information, image’.38 We can say that Gibson-Graham equates the 
regular temporal oscillations of the mechanized Fordist factory -  and the regular 
temporal movements of bodies and objects that supported the required turnover 
time of Fordist production -  with the notion of Fordist identity. Fordism’s 
identity coheres because the intelligibility of the sign ‘money’ coheres with the 
working time of the Fordist factory in an objective motivation: the system of 
exchange by which Fordism’s products circulate within society corresponds with 
an identifiable referent -  the factory system located within that society.39 Fordist
38 ‘Querying’, p. 254. When referring to capitalism’s ‘second nature’ and ‘third 
nature’, and the spectacle, Gibson-Graham is citing situationist philosopher Guy 
Debord’s critique of post-World War II consumer life, Society o f the Spectacle 
(London: Rebel, 1992). For Debord, representation replaces direct experiences in 
a social relation mediated by images as commodities. ‘The economic real’ is 
coined by media theorist McKenzie Wark in his book Virtual Geography: Living 
With Global Media Events (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 
194-203.
39 I borrow the term ‘objective motivation’ from linguist Emile Benveniste, who 
problematizes and expands the seminal account of the linguistic sign given by 
Ferdinand de Saussure. See Emile Benveniste, ‘The Nature of the Linguistic 
Sign’, in Debating Texts: A Reader in 20th Century Literary Theory and Method, 
ed. by Rick Rylance (London: Open University Press, 1987), pp. 77-81 (p. 80), 
and Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. by Charles Bally 
et al., trans. by Wade Baskin (London: Fontana, 1974), pp. 111-122. In 
Saussurian linguistics, signifiers (phonetic sounds and graphic marks that 
constitute words) and signifieds (the concepts or images associated with these 
elements) that together form signs are arbitrarily linked in a system of 
differences. Benveniste argues that the critical significance of Saussure’s theory 
lies not in Saussure’s mistaken belief that the bond between signifier and 
signified is arbitrary (mistaken because it detracts from the symbiosis of 
concept/image and sound, thus implying that ‘empty’ concepts are contained in 
the mind), but in the arbitrariness of the relationship between the linguistic sign 
and the extra-linguistic referent or ‘material object’ (‘Nature’, p. 80. Emphasis in 
original). Benveniste terms this arbitrariness ‘the unnecessary and unmotivated 
character of the bond which unite[s] the sign to the thing signified’ (‘Nature’, p. 
80. Emphasis in original). Bepveniste’s model of signification enables us to 
theorize identity as the changeable and conventional bonding of signs to real 
objects or materialities.
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or capitalist identity is subverted, Gibson-Graham argues, because it has moved 
from referentiality to signification: the global mobility of capital accumulation 
becomes too mobile and fluid to cohere with a secure referent of production (the 
conditions apparently needed to form ‘stable’ politics and resistance), thus 
enabling capitalist identity to be articulated at the level of the signifier. But 
whereas Harvey interprets this crisis in the stability of form and meaning as a 
crisis in political possibility, Gibson-Graham interprets crisis as simultaneously 
an opportunity:
Globalization, it seems, has set money free of the ‘real economy’ and 
allowed capital to seep if not spurt from the productive system, but the 
implications of this unboundedness, this fluidity, for the identity of 
capitalism remain unexplored. Having set the signifier free from the 
referent, theorists of the global economy are loath to think about the 
effects of seepage, porosity, uncontrollability, that is, to feminize 
economic identity. The global economy may have been opened up by 
international financial markets, but nothing ‘other’ comes into or out of 
this opening. It would seem that the homophobia that pervades economic 
theorizing places a taboo on such thinking.40
This important criticism draws further attention to the implications of gender and 
sexuality that are bound up with Harvey’s narration of capital domination. One 
could justifiably claim that Harvey is articulating capitalism at the level of the 
signifier: the purpose of Harvey’s text is to make the reader aware of capitalism’s 
formlessness after its Fordist stage. But Harvey negates the subversion of 
capitalist identity in favour of crisis rhetoric that is anchored by a bodily referent 
-  a white, male heterosexual capitalist body that always penetrates but is never 
penetrated.41 Harvey’s task is not possible without this referent of bodily
40 ‘Querying’, p. 255.
41 Gibson-Graham works a space for thinking capitalism differently, but we 
should not assume -  and I do not think Gibson-Graham assumes -  that a non­
heterosexual capitalism always represents a subverted capitalism. Indeed, 
cultural theorist Rosemary Hennessy has argued that late capitalism relies on 
non-normative sexualities for its hegemony. See Rosemary Hennessy, Profit and
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intelligibility. Gibson-Graham asserts that in order to resist this dominant 
strategy of representation, we must refuse to keep in time with the normativizing 
leftist task: ‘Making global capitalism lose its erection becomes a real possibility 
if we reject the naturalization of power and violence that is conferred [...] by the 
globalization script [...] We may attempt to make globalization less genital, less 
phallic, by highlighting various points of excess in its inscriptions -  places where 
the inscription can be seen as uncontrollable or indeterminate, or as potentially 
inscribing noncapitalist identity’.42
Gibson-Graham’s assertion of global capitalism’s erection enables us to 
critique the flexibility of the subject position of the male leftist critic. The notion 
of penetration indeed adds complexity to my earlier assertion of Harvey’s 
flexibility, which can now be read as follows: within Harvey’s text, the 
representation of a capitalist body that flexibly penetrates all economic and 
cultural practices is coextensive with Harvey’s own contention that, by affirming 
the prevalence of this flexible accumulation, he is able to flexibly penetrate all 
cultural and economic practice in a theoretical capacity. My above assertions that 
Latham and Harvey must keep up with their post-Fordist subject matter can also
Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism (London: Routledge, 2000). 
Hennessy asserts that ‘open, fluid, ambivalent sexual identities [...] are quite 
compatible with the mobility, adaptability, and ambivalence required of service 
workers today [...] While they may disrupt norms and challenge state practices 
that are indeed oppressive, they do not necessarily [...] disrupt capitalism’, 
because ‘they de-link sexuality from its historical connection to the human 
relationships of exploitation capitalism relies on’ {Profit, pp. 108-109). 
Hennessy’s argument is important, but she echoes Harvey in emphasizing 
capital’s domination over bodily acts, even though she contests the inevitability 
of capitalism’s heterosexuality. I do not elaborate on Hennessy in this thesis 
because the question of whether or not capital dominates bodies is not my main 
concern: we saw in chapter 1 and will see in subsequent chapters that I am more 
interested in how bodies and technological objects form relationships within 
post-Fordist time and space.
2 ‘Querying’, p. 264.
107
be explicated in relation to capitalism’s erection. Keeping up, as another term for 
‘task’ as an urgent imperative to move or do in time, references both the 
temporal frame that produces Harvey’s text and the discourse of sexuality that 
task temporality naturalizes. Because capitalism’s erection is the constitutive 
condition of Harvey’s text, I argue that Harvey’s theoretical project or task of 
keeping up with capitalism’s flexible body can be read as a requirement, on the 
part of the theoretically flexible and mobile male social historian, to keep an 
erection in time with capitalism’s. Keeping up is refigured here in the 
euphemistic sense of keeping (it) up -  a phrase that provocatively points to the 
mutually reinforcing imperative of flexible penetration that underwrites Harvey’s 
narration of life after Fordism.43 Keeping (it) up is not simply a play on words 
provided as a point of relief after a period of earnest and dense analysis. I instead 
offer the phrase as an important means of interrogating the alarmingly 
masculinist and heteronormative implications of left attempts to theorize a 
‘postmodern’ post-Fordist time.44
431 also invoke ‘it’ here in the sense described by gender and sexualities scholar 
Mandy Merck: as ‘the flitty parataxis that [...] calls the speaker’s manhood into 
question’. See Mandy Merck, ‘Figuring out Andy Warhol’, in Pop Out: Queer 
Warhol, ed. by Jennifer Doyle, Jonathan Flatley, and Jose Esteban Munoz 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 224-237 (p. 227).
44 My interrogation of Harvey adds to the number of critiques of Condition that 
have been provided by other, predominantly feminist authors. Perhaps the most 
significant of these is cultural theorist Meaghan Morris’s essay ‘The Man in the 
Mirror: David Harvey’s “Condition” of Postmodemity’, in Identity Anecdotes: 
Translation and Media Culture (London: Sage, 2006), pp. 127-150. Morris 
exposes many limitations of Condition, including the fact that Harvey pays ‘scant 
attention in his own text to any but the major white male theorists of 
postmodemity -  and none at all to postcolonialism (subsumed as “geo-politics”)’ 
(‘Mirror’, p. 131). Also see Rosalyn Deutsche, ‘Men in Space’, Strategies, 3 
(1990), 130-137; ‘Boys Town’, Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 9 (1991), 5-30; Doreen Massey, ‘Flexible Sexism’, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Spa^e, 9 (1991), 31-57; ‘The Political Place of Locality 
Studies’, Environment and Planning A, 23 (1991), 5-30; Angela McRobbie,
‘New Times in Cultural Studies’, New Formations, 13 (1991), 1-17; Massey,
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The connection between hegemonic masculinity and Harvey’s 
imperative to be up to the task can be located alongside early-1990s popular 
literature that sought to compensate for the hard working body’s decline in post- 
Fordism. It is possible to appropriate the periodizing imperative of Harvey’s 
rhetoric here, in order to demonstrate the ways in which Harvey’s narration of 
post-Fordism intersects with popular men’s studies or self-help texts of the same 
period, which attempt to re-centre and recuperate white, male, heterosexual 
masculinity as the exemplar of bodily movement over time. The principal 
example of these self-help texts, and arguably the most influential, is poet Robert 
Bly’s Iron John, published in 1990, the same year of publication as Harvey’s The 
Condition.45 Bly provides a chronology of male masculine development from the 
Fordist 1950s to his time of writing, charting a series of post-Fordist periods of 
‘feminization’ that, Bly claims, have in part benefited males but have more 
significantly comprised the ultimately detrimental, grief-stricken ‘journey many 
American and Western men have taken into softness, or receptivity’.46 Bly shares
‘Power-Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place’, in Mapping the Futures: 
Local Cultures, Global Change, ed. by Jon Bird et al. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), pp. 59-69; Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place: 
Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York and London: New York 
University Press, 2005), pp. 5-12.
45 Robert Bly, Iron John: Men and Masculinity (London: Rider, 1990). Iron John 
is one of a cluster of men’s studies self-help books released in the early 1990s. 
Others include Guy Comeau, Absent Fathers, Lost Sons: The Search for 
Masculine Identity (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), and Sam Keen, Fire in the Belly: 
On Being a Man (New York: Bantam, 1992). It is not my intention to provide a 
precise reason for these books’ dates of publication, but I argue that critical 
insight can be gained by linking ‘the “fall of socialism” in 1989’, which Gibson- 
Graham asserts fuelled ‘references [...] to the inevitability of capitalist 
penetration and the naturalness of capitalist domination’, Harvey’s task of 
narrating postmodemity, and the above self-help attempts to reassert the power 
of maleness (‘Querying’, p. 240).
46 Iron, p. 4. The homophobi^ implicit in Bly’s invocations of softness and 
receptivity is unsurprising, given that Bly’s timeline of male development is 
based solely on heterosexual relations. Parallels can be drawn between Bly’s
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Kroemer and Grandjean’s imperative to show that Taylorized Fordist bodies no 
longer have the mobility to exemplify proper function. Bly asserts that the 
Fordist ‘Fifties male [...] laboured responsibly, supported his wife and children,’ 
and ‘had a clear vision of what a man was’, but could not move maleness 
forward in time because ‘underneath the charm and bluff [o f‘strong’, ‘positive’, 
‘aggressive’ qualities] there was, and there remains, much isolation, deprivation, 
and passivity’, a ‘dangerously’ unreceptive ‘personality [that] lacked some sense 
of flow’.47 Again echoing Kroemer and Grandjean, Bly argues that women 
constitute the movement away from the stasis of Fordist working time. From the 
1960s to the present, Bly claims, increased intimacy with women and increased 
participation in ‘women’s history’ and ‘women’s sensibility’ -  which Bly 
attributes to ‘the feminist movement’ -  has importantly provided males with the 
stimuli necessary to develop through and leave behind the dangerous immobility 
of 1950s masculinity. But Bly also asserts that this feminine post-Fordist shift 
in mobility, while important, is increasingly leaving the male body entropic and 
out of time, deprived of the ‘fierce’ qualities and ‘decisiveness’ needed to resolve 
life problems 49
Within this time shift led by ‘energetic women’, the ‘soft male’ -  Bly’s 
term for the problematic body produced by this time shift -  possesses a ‘lack of 
energy’ and is thus not mobile enough to ‘carry through’ the ‘troubled times’ of 
marriage and familial relations, in particular the relations between father and
rhetoric and the aforementioned leftist assumptions of a penetrating but 
impenetrable capitalist body. For a detailed critique of the misogyny and 
homophobia informing Bly’s text, see Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies, pp. 9-13. 
41 Iron, pp. 1,2.
48 Iron, p. 2.
49 Iron, p. 4.
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son.50 In direct relation to Harvey’s rhetoric, then, Bly implies that increased 
mobility is of little use unless it can move in time with the male heterosexual 
body as the privileged form of time. ‘The journey [...] men have taken into 
softness, or receptivity, or “development of the feminine side’” , Bly claims, ‘has 
been an immensely valuable journey, but more travel lies ahead. No stage is the 
final stop’.51 For Bly, constant mobility must be rethought as an energizing force 
that addresses ‘the increasing monotony and barrenness in contemporary men’s
59 •lives’. Post-Fordist time travel is synonymous here with men’s movement -  not 
coincidentally the name of the all-male self-help collective that Bly established 
to eradicate male entropy in this period.53
Both Harvey’s urgent task to flexibly narrate flexible postmodemity, and 
Bly’s energizing imperative to make a man move, can be read as effects of the 
same recuperative logic. This logic frames representations of a post-Fordist time 
where global information technologies, and the blurring of the sexual division of 
labour, ensures ‘working body’ no longer signifies in terms of an efficient, white- 
male-defined vigour in relation to a recognizable capitalist identity.54 The
50 Iron, pp. 3-4.
51 Iron, p. 4.
52 Iron, ii.
53 Bly is credited as the founder of the Mythopoetic Men’s Movement, a 
collection of psychological male self-help organizations active since the early 
1980s. Many popular and academic works discuss Bly’s instrumental role in the 
Men’s Movement. For an account that posits Bly as the father of this movement, 
see Andrea O’Reilly, Mothers and Sons: Feminism, Masculinity, and the 
Struggle to Raise Our Sons (London: Routledge, 2001).
54 Indeed, the energetic doing that conditions both Harvey’s and Bly’s rhetoric 
can be interpreted as affirmations of determination from both authors that white, 
heterosexual maleness is up to the task of keeping up with a time in which it does 
not have the same privileges. We can say that Bly and Harvey share a particular 
type of ‘can do’ attitude in response to the widespread disorganization of white, 
male, hard working bodies. Tips attitude correlates with the activities of the UK 
fathers’ rights organization ‘Fathers 4 Justice’. A veritably post-Fordist 
collective, Fathers 4 Justice elaborately demonstrate against a perceived lack of
I l l
significant point here is that the projects of Harvey and Bly can be termed 
ergonomic: the post-Fordist body-machine time that threatens hegemonic 
masculinity is subsumed and obscured as part of a capitalist-historical form or 
condition that never stops moving and which, unless kept up with, will prevent 
human agency and action in its postmodern phase. I compare Harvey and Bly 
with Kroemer and Grandjean not simply to suggest that their texts correlate with 
a theory of ergonomics. More importantly, critiquing Harvey and Bly in this way 
draws our attention to an ergonomics of theory: for Harvey, doing theory is the 
occasion for outlining a programme of flexibly adaptive action in response to the 
rise of global communication technologies and their channelling by capitalism. 
For Bly, forming a men’s movement is a similarly energetic response to this 
history of technology. Doing masculinity in late capitalism is a performance of 
ergonomics, which is bound up with attempts to attune critical theory to 
technological change. These attempts are established against other types of 
action -  movement in place, regional movement, bodily or localized movement -  
that are represented as deviations from a close and comprehensive knowledge of 
contemporary technologized society, and from a detailed understanding of how 
to move meaningfully in this society. In the following sections of this chapter I 
explore the ways in which this ergonomics of theory affects the rhetoric of 
certain critics who claim to speak for particular post-Fordist social movements.
legislative privilege accorded to the father by family court judges. Demonstrating 
fathers display flexible qualities in an attempt to prove their continued societal 
eligibility and use, scaling buildings and donning an array of superhero costumes 
in order to recuperate the father as a causal agent in (and of) time. See Matt 
O’Connor, Fathers 4 Justice: The Inside Story (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
2007).
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Flexible Feminism
Harvey’s account of flexible accumulation has inspired an important feminist 
investigation into the meaning of bodily flexibility in relation to historical 
discourses of health and immunity. Emily Martin’s Flexible Bodies draws on 
Harvey’s social history to argue that flexibility is ‘one of our new taken-for- 
granted virtues for persons and their bodies’, emerging out of a shift in Fordist to 
post-Fordist discourses of the bodily immune system, or from ‘the days of polio’ 
to ‘the age of AIDS’.55 Analysing academic and popular medical literature, 
medical guidebooks, magazine articles, and advertisements from the Fordist 
1940s and 1950s, Martin argues that the body is represented in Fordism as ‘a 
factory’ or ‘a machine [...] made up of parts that can break down’ and that 
‘sometimes require [...] overhaul’.56 The Fordist body, Martin argues, is a unit of 
very little complexity, a ‘seamless whole’ defined by and ‘defended at its 
surface’, maintaining proper function via ‘regular, predictable habits [...] of 
personal hygiene as well as the good habits learned by cells to produce 
antibodies’.57 Martin connects Harvey’s assertions of a shift from Fordism to 
flexible accumulation, including the ‘acceleration in the pace of product 
innovation’ and the ‘unimpeded’, global flow of capital, with a shift in medical 
discourse from the body being represented as a factory to the body being posited
f O
as an adaptable, flexible system that ‘can hardly rely on mere habit any longer’.
55 Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies: The Role o f Immunity in American Culture 
from the Days o f  Polio to the Age o f AIDS (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. xvii.
56 Flexible, p. 29.
57 Flexible, pp. 26, 29. Regular habits of good hygiene were a central 
requirement of Henry Ford’s factory workers, and were enforced throughout 
workers’ households by Ford’s social department. See Ford, Life, pp. 145-146.
58 Flexible, pp. 33, 40.
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Martin asserts that ‘the increasing importance of the concept of 
immunological specificity’ within medical discourses over the 1960s and 1970s, 
occurs alongside a new set of assumptions about the body in biology and health 
books from this period to the present: ‘What we see emerging through the 
immunologists’ eyes by the late twentieth century [...] is a body that actively 
relates to the world, that actively selects from a cornucopia of continually 
produced new antibodies that keep the body healthy and enable it to meet every 
new challenge. Possessed of agile responses, and flexible specificity, our [...] 
innovative bodies are poised to anticipate any conceivable challenge’.59 For 
Martin, these assumptions do not exemplify economic or scientific causality but 
are rather effects of a shift in the discourses constituting eligible bodily 
movement. Inadequate attention to the processes of this shift, Martin argues, will 
perpetuate the ‘neo-social Darwinism’ enacted by flexibility as a post-Fordist 
cultural norm:
Fresh from these experiences [of the Fordist body’s rigid postures and 
movements], it is no wonder that moving gracefully as an agile, dancing, 
flexible worker/person/body feels like a liberation. [...] But can we 
simultaneously realize that the new flexible bodies are also highly 
constrained? They cannot stop moving, they cannot grow stiff and rigid, 
or they will fall off the ‘tightrope’ of life and die. We need to examine the 
social consequences of these constraints.60
59 Flexible, pp. 36-37.
60 Flexible, pp. 247-248. Martin gives a number of examples of the ways in 
which post-Fordism is informed by social Darwinism. Arguably her chief 
analysis is of the hierarchization of immune system cells within biology and 
health texts. Martin demonstrates how the representation of proper bodily 
function within these texts is bound up with asserting the superior flexible 
mobility and penetrative prowess of the white-male-coded ‘T cells’, which are 
‘ranked above’ the flexible upper-class female-coded ‘B cell’, which in turn 
ranks above the gender, class, and racially marked ‘macrophage’ cell with its 
‘housekeeping’, ‘engulfing’, and ‘cannibalistic’ functions {Flexible, pp. 49-53). 
Other examples include the high-risk, high-octane team-building exercises 
organized by post-Fordist office companies to determine flexible members of 
staff, and an alarmingly homophobic implication within discourses of AIDS that
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Martin calls for a feminist politics of temporal rigidity, in order to articulate the 
agency of those bodies excluded by post-Fordist flexibility, across sites of class, 
race, gender, and sexuality. But this argument for rigidity is problematic given 
Martin’s strong, if ambivalent, reliance on Harvey’s narrative of flexible 
capitalism. Martin does indeed acknowledge the possible limitations of building 
upon Harvey’s representation of capitalism’s flexible body for a feminist project. 
This is most clearly instanced in Martin’s essay ‘The End of the Body?’, the 
article which preceded the publication of Flexible Bodies. In this essay Martin 
often uncritically cites Harvey’s assertions of flexible accumulation’s 
disorientation of time and space, in order to emphasize ‘the wrenching effects of 
a new mode of being’ and the types of body eligible and ineligible to keep up 
with and profit from this shift.61 On one occasion, however, Martin qualifies her 
use of Harvey with the following: ‘I am obviously indebted to the kinds of 
[capitalist-determined] patterns [...] Harvey [...] [sees] in architecture and other 
forms, even though I prefer not to see the economic realm as so simply
AOdeterminant of cultural forms’. There is a tension, Martin acknowledges, in 
arguing for untimely, minority bodies by using as a theoretical template a social 
history that has no time for those bodies in the first place.
But Martin’s noticing of this methodological difficulty does not 
significantly disrupt her reliance, from ‘The End of the Body?’ to Flexible 
Bodies, on Harvey as the critical authority on flexibility. Martin admirably 
provides a detailed focus on post-Fordist cultural forms, using a variety of 
research bases crucially missing from Harvey’s abstract theory of economics.
only certain types of immune system will survive the disease (Flexible, pp. 207- 
225, 229-235).
61 ‘End’, p. 133.
62‘End’, p. 134 n. 6.
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However, Martin’s theorization of alternative agencies and resistances in post-
Fordism is structured by the same task temporality that determines Harvey’s
narrative. Consider the following passage:
In the face of the incitement to be nimble and in constant motion, we 
need to remember the common human need for stability, security, and 
stasis. The challenge is to sustain our critical perceptions in a culture that 
prizes being flexibly adaptive without allowing our perceptions to 
become so flexibly adaptive that they can only compliantly perpetuate -  
instead of calling attention to -  the order of things.
Martin thus appears to express caution about the flexibly adaptive critical 
approach assumed by Harvey. But I am unconvinced by Martin’s claim that a 
politics of stability, security, and stasis will engender recognition of a ‘common 
human need’. As critic, Martin surely must sustain a flexibly adaptive perception 
in order to maintain that her varied case studies all exemplify post-Fordist time’s 
domination of bodies, bodies that in turn can all be shown to otherwise share a 
temporal stubbornness. Martin is proposing a flexible theory of stasis, as does 
Harvey when he implies that bodies, as sites of resistance and analysis, are 
commonly place-bound and thus out of reach of the more urgent movements of 
flexible capitalist domination.
The following section addresses the type of methodological problem 
found in Martin, by arguing for feminist practices that resist being made 
intelligible through the binaries of flexible/rigid and global/local. Put differently, 
I argue that considering feminism in terms of post-Fordist technological change 
and mobility requires us to pose the following question: what happens if 
feminism, as a task, is not taken up? This should be read not as a refusal to do
63 Flexible, p. 249. Martin’s invocation of ‘the order of things’ is an implicit 
reference to political philosopher Michel Foucault’s cultural study of knowledge, 
The Order o f  Things: An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences (New York: 
Pantheon, 1970).
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feminism, but as a call to examine the temporal frames that we assume when 
feminist movement is invoked.
Factory Girls
In Kroemer and Grandjean’s terms, boredom motivates post-Fordist movement, a 
more flexible mobility over time. Basing society on the factory produces rigid 
postures and limited external stimuli, qualities that, in a successively quicker way 
of life, tell us nothing about bodies. Kroemer and Grandjean at once claim that 
the implementation of Taylorism into a flexible socioeconomic system makes 
bodies motionless, progressively brainless, and uninterested, and that positing 
bodies according to motions that research shows are out of date is uninteresting 
and brainless, in terms of foolishness, pointlessness, and irrationality. The logic 
here is that something is pointless precisely because it is uninteresting, boring, 
and rigid. Taylor himself had attempted to prevent his factory girls from 
becoming bored from the monotony of sorting ball bearings. Taylor introduced 
(or, as Mark Seltzer suggests, ‘invented’) the factory work break because 
walking and talking around the factory for brief periods was perceived by Taylor 
and his associates to vary stimulation and conserve energy, which supported the 
principle of continual bodily efficiency, or timeliness, over competitive physical 
exertion and subsequent exhaustion.64 While sharing the same general imperative 
of efficiency, Kroemer and Grandjean proclaim Taylor’s attempt to avert 
boredom to be obsolete or indeed boring: the work break, rigid because confined
64 Bodies, p. 221 n. 25. This principle of body-machine efficiency can be read as 
an effect of what historian Anson Rabinbach calls a discursive shift, at ‘the end 
of the nineteenth century’, fropi idleness to fatigue ‘as the predominant mode of 
conceptualizing resistance to labour’. See Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: 
Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins o f Modernity (New York: Basic, 1990), p. 35.
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to a single space and devised according to an outdated, fixed meaning of work, is 
no longer of interest because it is no longer able to exemplify the break in time 
that tells us how the body works.
This rhetoric of boring Taylorized Fordism and mobile, ergonomic post- 
Fordism informs Harvey’s representation of feminism. Recalling my earlier 
citation, Harvey invokes feminism and civil rights as ‘equally vigorous [...] 
movements]’ made as part of a cultural-political ‘criticism of the blandness of 
the quality of life’ and ‘rigidity in labour markets’ under the Fordist everyday.65 
It appears here that feminism is a flexible movement constructed out of a shift in 
body-machine time. For Harvey, feminism emerges when Fordism becomes 
outmoded, and is a transgressive energy produced out of Fordism’s 
socioeconomic failings that offers new, more varied positions in machine culture, 
which enable us to realize just how boring and rigid Fordism is. Thus, it appears 
pointless to continue locating feminist agency in relation to the factory girls 
whose calibration was so crucial to Taylorist discourse, and therefore to the 
inauguration of twentieth-century body-machine time. Apart from serving as a 
marker of a past industrial capitalist system whose supersession enriches an 
understanding of how movements are made ‘now’, factory girls ostensibly 
cannot affect feminism in the present. This is because the meaning of feminism 
appears to be coextensive with cultural-political shifts that, taken together, tell us 
that Taylorized Fordist bodies are produced by rigid, boredom-inducing 
movements (non-movements, indeed) that are no longer made.
65 Condition, pp. 138, 139. Harvey asserts that Fordism produced ‘a rigidity in 
labour markets’ due to its ‘division between a predominantly white, male, and 
highly unionized work-force and “the rest’” . This division ‘made it hard to re­
allocate labour from one line of production to another’ because ‘the exclusionary 
power of the unions strengthened their capacity to resist de-skilling’ in the 
workplace {Condition, p. 138).
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The ‘vigorous’ feminist movement to which Harvey refers is more 
commonly known within the academy and beyond as second wave feminism. 
Developed in the late 1960s, second wave feminism is characterized by its 
emphasis on the shared oppression of women as the fundamental condition of 
societal function. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, second wave 
feminism drew inspiration politically and theoretically from the radical feminist 
critique of the liberal and socialist positions comprising feminism’s first wave. 
This radical position resisted liberal feminism’s abstract emphasis on sameness 
and freedom of choice, and the traditional socialist subordination of gender to 
class within male-led labour movements, in order to argue that societies are 
organized by a patriarchal gender system through which women are universally 
dominated.66 The formative years of second wave feminism were thus animated 
by this radical movement that drew attention to the social fact of women’s 
oppression, and which motivated universal theories of patriarchy that were 
perceived to create the basis for the oppositional logic of sisterhood, through
66 Liberal feminism has a long history, dating from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. Radical feminism’s assertion of universal male domination of 
women, in terms of both mind and body, is formed in critique of liberalism’s 
focus on women’s claims to rationality, and thus its negation of the body and the 
ways in which the body grounds truth-claims regarding female sexual difference. 
Radical feminism’s emphasis on the societal pervasiveness of patriarchy can also 
be read as a critique of liberalism’s failure to politicize the divide between public 
and private. Foundational liberal texts include Mary Astell, The First English 
Feminist Reflections upon Marriage and Other Writings, ed. by Bridget Hill 
(Aldershot: Gowe/Maurice Temple Smith, 1986), and John Stuart Mill, ‘The 
Subjection of Women’, in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. by John Gray 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 471-557. Influential radical 
feminist texts include Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic o f Sex: The Case for 
Feminist Revolution (London: Paladin, 1972), and Sisterhood is Powerful: An 
Anthology o f  Writings from the Women’s Liberation Movement, ed. by Robin 
Morgan (New York: Random House, 1970).
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which women could unite on a global scale.67 This late-1960s and early-1970s 
change, which aimed to extend feminism’s reach to an unprecedented 
universality, is synonymous with the characterization of the second wave by the 
tenet of ‘doing’ -  of feminism being able to do something, able really to achieve 
social change. The notion of activism -  energetic action -  signifies this process 
whereby meaningful feminism is bound up with greater mobility. Flexibility is a 
key implication of second wave energy: second wave feminism becomes 
intelligible as a movement because it is inspired, in part, by radical feminism’s 
claim that the theorization of women as a class is an effective, movement- 
inducing modification of more rigid socialist feminisms (rigid because of their 
subordination of gender to class).68 Second wave feminism’s key concept 
‘woman’ signifies flexibility in terms of knowing, through a theory of universal 
patriarchy, that patriarchy is so mobile that it exploits and oppresses women 
transhistorically, globally, and in all areas of society.69 Thus, it appears that
67 Other early second wave texts motivated by radical critique include Mary 
Daly, Gyn/Ecology: Metaethics o f Radical Feminism (London: Women’s Press, 
1979) and Adrienne Rich, ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’, 
in Desire: The Politics o f  Sexuality, ed. by Ann Snitow et al. (London: Virago, 
1984), pp. 212-241./o 1 1
I must stress here that ‘second wave’ does not signify a uniform set of feminist 
practices. From the early 1970s onwards, and in response to radical feminism and 
theories of sisterhood, second wave socialist feminisms have made attempts to 
better accommodate gender and race alongside class. The 1980s saw the 
development of standpoint theory, which sought to theorize the interrelation 
between multiple sites of oppression whilst retaining a materialist approach. See 
Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power (New York: Longman, 1983).
69 Harvey never discusses the complexity of this ‘vigorous’ movement and the 
important political transformations achieved by second wave feminism 
throughout the 1970s, in particular its critique of the gendered logic of the 
public/private binary: the creation of separate spheres that restricted women to 
domesticity while making politics and trade specifically male domains. A 
detailed analysis of this process would undoubtedly have benefited Harvey’s 
discussion of the naturalization of time and space. Judith Halberstam identifies 
this problem in Harvey’s analysis in Queer, pp. 8-9. It must also be noted that the 
1970s saw feminism’s entry into the academy through the discipline of women’s
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within its second wave -  which is distinguished by a cultural-political critique of 
Fordist rigidity -  feminism is meaningful as that which completes tasks. Indeed, 
the completion of tasks -  doing something -  is a key implication of the praxis of 
activism that characterizes second wave feminism and which, according to 
Harvey, emerges in response to Fordism’s mundanity and exclusionary
70organization of working bodies. Harvey instructs us to read 1970s feminism as 
an effect of the same task temporality that conditions the narration of post- 
Fordism’s emergence. Meaningful feminism, Harvey suggests, is determined by 
taking up the task -  that is, the urgently energetic, flexible, non-place-specific 
mobility of female subjects everywhere, or the taking up by these subjects of 
(non-Fordist) qualities that signify better movement through more movement.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the efficacy of the flexible mobility of 
sisterhood has been critiqued by subjects who claim marginalization due to its 
premise of unity-through-universal-oppression, particularly on the grounds of 
racial and class difference. Critique by radical women of colour in particular 
comprises this interrogation of feminism’s internal politics. The notion of 
movement that for the early second wave determined feminism’s intelligibility -  
movement in the sense of mass-based, social activism -  was importantly revealed 
by radical women of colour to be premised on the experiences of predominantly 
white, middle-class female subjects. Multiple, intersecting, and ambivalent sites 
of oppression and agency across racial, sexual, class, and age difference were 
thus shown to be excluded -  indeed left behind -  by the second wave’s concept
studies. This is perhaps another example of the mobility that characterizes the 
second wave -  feminism’s ability from the 1970s to move through both activist 
and academic spaces. v
701 invoke praxis in the Marxist and neo-Marxist sense, where theory is taken as 
that which is transformed into political activity.
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‘woman’.71 From the late 1980s through to the early 1990s, the notion of feminist 
movement received a thoroughgoing critique from anti-foundationalist feminist 
scholarship. The anti-foundationalist debates are, in part, comprised of 
poststructuralist feminist critiques of the necessary exclusions constituting 
‘woman’ and ‘women’ as signs that ground and motivate eligible feminist 
movement. A crucial assertion from the anti-foundationalist debates is that the 
category women is not simply exclusionary but participates, through its 
exclusionary call to coherency, in the naturalization of gender relations made 
intelligible by heterosexual practice.72
71 Poet, writer, and activist Audre Lorde critiques the concept of feminist
movement in her anthology Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Freedom: 
Crossing Press, 1984). Lorde argues that ‘within the women’s movement today,
white women focus upon their oppression as women and ignore differences of 
race, sexual preference, class, and age. There is a pretense to a homogeneity of 
experience covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist’ (Sister, p.
116). Other critiques of feminist movement by women of colour include bell 
hooks, A in’t I  a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (London: Pluto Press,
1982); This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women o f Colour, ed. 
by Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (New York: Kitchen Table Press, 1983); 
Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, ed. by Barbara Smith (New York: 
Kitchen Table Press, 1983).
77 Key works from the anti-foundationalist debates include Denise Riley, Am I 
that Name? Feminism and the Category o f  Women in History (New York: 
Macmillan, 1988); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion 
o f Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1990); Judith Butler, ‘Contingent 
Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism”’, in Feminists 
Theorize the Political, ed. by Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-21; Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind and Other 
Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); Diane Elam, Feminism and 
Deconstruction: Ms. enAbyme (London: Routledge, 1994). In Gender Trouble, 
Butler calls for ‘the task of a feminist genealogy of the category of women’ in 
order to show how ‘the unproblematic invocation of that category may preclude 
the possibility of feminism as a representational politics’ (Gender, p. 9. Emphasis 
in original). The task that Butler incites is one that questions feminism’s 
intelligibility within task temporality (as a body eligible to make a move or to do 
something). The issue of feminist movement is also discussed in the interview 
between Jacques Derrida and Christie V. McDonald, ‘Choreographies’, in 
Between the Blinds: A Derrida Reader, ed. by Peggy Kamuf (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 441-456.
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Although the above periodization serves as a useful reference for multiple 
feminist interventions, I am wary of the way in which it leaves untheorized the 
assumption of feminist energy. Indeed, I am adopting a flexibly adaptive 
approach by fitting almost forty years of feminism’s internal differences, 
conflicts and struggles into a serviceable narrative that moves this chapter and 
thesis into a new direction. In other words, I am using feminist history as an 
energizing force without examining the significance of energy as an effect of 
machine culture. Energy is prized within Taylorist and Fordist rhetoric as a 
quality synonymous with the machine-like regularity of bodies, a precious 
attribute that must be conserved in order for the body to be known. But within 
task temporality, energy undergoes a discursive shift to represent the quality that 
marks Taylorized Fordism as outmoded and superseded, appearing as a precious 
attribute that cannot be conserved in any set of specific postures for any length of 
time. Hence the importance of energy within the rhetoric of Kroemer and 
Grandjean as that which supports the ergonomic principle of constant, varied, 
flexible movements in avoidance of the dead waste of stasis and rigidity: entropy 
equals atrophy is Kroemer and Grandjean’s key principle.
71 Anson Rabinbach concludes his study of the human motor by claiming that the 
coextensive disappearance of ‘the work-centredness of the metaphor of the 
human motor’ and ‘the work-centred society’ is ‘a consequence of the declining 
power of an intellectual discourse that placed energy and fatigue at the center of 
social perception’ (Motor, p. 300). I have shown via Harvey and Bly, and will 
show in this section with regard to feminist chronology, that energy and fatigue 
remain central to task temporality’s framing of representations of bodies ‘after’ a 
work-centred society. Indeed, literary critic and historian Elizabeth Goodstein 
criticizes Rabinbach for failing to acknowledge the ways in which his methods of 
discourse analysis are bound up with the rhetoric of energy he so thoroughly 
analyses: ‘[Rabinbach’s analysis of] subjectivity as an effect of power bears a 
family resemblance to evaluating people in terms of their susceptibility and 
resistance to fatigue; to regard “modalities of knowledge” associated with the 
science of work as effects of power effectively elevates those modalities to 
timeless truths’. See Elizabeth Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities:
Boredom and Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 149.
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Therefore while it is possible to map a shift in time from Fordism to post- 
Fordism, it is equally possible that energy, as a rhetorical device, will go 
unnoticed as the naturalized means of representing time and the societal shifts it 
subsumes. It is precisely this uncritical acceptance of energetic action -  a key 
construct of body-machine time -  that informs the periodization of feminist 
politics. I recognize that periodizing narratives draw attention to multifarious 
internal feminist critiques and interventions, but I think that because of a concern 
with tracking feminism’s movement over time, such narratives present these 
internal critiques as having redirected feminism’s energy -  the quality that 
apparently always already makes feminism recognizable as feminism -  towards 
alternative forward movements. These constantly renewed waves of energy that 
subsume and outmode internal debates, such as those introduced by women of 
colour and poststructuralist feminists who critiqued the very concept of 
movement, reinforce a logic whereby it is meaningless to think of feminism 
outside of an appointed time.
This logic underlies a particular social history of post-Fordist feminist 
movement presented by Marxist feminists Susan Archer Mann and Douglas J. 
Huffman.74 Mann and Huffman claim that the 1980s critiques by women of 
colour, and the poststructuralist accounts that followed from these critiques, 
constitute an updated, third wave of feminism, ‘a new discourse on gender 
relations’ emerging out of the interrogation and thus outmoding of the second
74 Susan Archer Mann and Dquglas J. Huffman, ‘The Decentering of Second 
Wave Feminism and the Rise of the Third Wave’, Science & Society, 69:1 
(2005), 56-91.
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wave. The authors give the following justification for their employment of the 
wave metaphor:
we think a wave approach has merit when it is used to describe the 
existence of mass-based feminist movements. This does not mean that 
there were no feminists or feminist activism before or even after these 
waves, but simply that their ideas and actions did not materialize into a 
mass-based, social movement. Indeed, we think the wave metaphor only 
makes sense when it is used to describe mass-based movements that ebb 
and flow, rise and decline, and crest in some concrete, historical 
accomplishments or defeats [.. .1 waves are simply those historical eras
H ( \when feminism had a mass base.
Thus for Mann and Huffman, feminism is analysable from the moment it has 
energetic movement, the invocation of which is bound up with task temporality 
rhetoric of unpredictable, flexible mobility over time (‘ebb and flow’, ‘rise and 
decline’, ‘crest in [...] accomplishments or defeats’). Moreover, the authors use 
the term ‘mass-based movement’ to construct feminism as an eligible body 
moving in time: feminisms ‘before and after’ this wave schema do not warrant 
analysis because they do not move and do not ‘materialize’, do not exemplify the 
flexible movements of ebb and flow that determine materialization. Therefore 
knowing feminism not only involves knowing its body but participating in the 
temporal frame through which the body is eligible to materialize.
Mann and Huffman use this schema of inherent energy to interpret 
critiques by women of colour and poststructuralist feminists, determining their
75 ‘Decentering’, p. 56. My emphasis. Indeed, it is apparent from this citation 
that, for the authors, to critique something is to outmode it, to render it out of 
date and demonstrate its inflexibility -  its inability to move with the times. It 
must be stressed here that there are many different academic and non-academic 
interpretations of third wave feminism. For a non-academic and rather 
celebratory account of the third wave, see Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy 
Richards, Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). A collection of critical perspectives on the third 
wave is Third Wave Feminist^: A Critical Exploration, ed. by Stacy Gillis,
Gillian Howie and Rebecca Munford (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
76 ‘Decentering’, p. 58.
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value solely in terms of their novelty or their re-energizing of an abstract feminist 
movement. These critiques, the authors claim, comprise ‘the early third wave’.77 
According to Mann and Huffman, women of colour activists and writers ‘were 
truly the pioneers of the third wave in that they were the first to provide an 
extensive critique of second wave feminism’.78 The logic here is that women of 
colour matter because they were the first to move matters on from a second wave 
in which -  in the opinion of Mann and Huffman -  eligible feminist movement 
was first made. Put differently, women of colour critique is useful because it 
contributed to an energetic movement that is ultimately greater than its specific 
interventions. For Mann and Huffman, feminism’s abstract energy is more 
flexible than the critical positions comprising feminism, because this energy can 
accommodate ever-newer critiques at an exponential rate. Thinking 
ergonomically, it appears meaningless to stay in any theoretical position for too 
long: to continue asserting the salience of the critiques, by women of colour, of 
feminism’s flexible movement is to become rigid -  as rigid as these outmoded 
critiques -  by missing the key point that these critiques have made their 
contribution to a feminist body with which they cannot keep up.79
According to Mann and Huffman, the ‘new feminism’ emerging from 
activism and writing by women of colour inspired poststructuralist feminist 
accounts, which provided the means of overcoming the identity politics in which
77 ‘Decentering’, p. 59.
78 Ibid. My emphasis.
79 This assumption that women of colour necessarily cannot keep in time 
alarmingly repeats the gesture within racial discourse of positioning non-whites 
behind the curve of history. Judith Halberstam raises this issue in Carolyn 
Dinshaw et al., ‘Theorizing Queer Temporalities: A Roundtable Discussion’, 
GLQ, 13:2-3 (2007), 177-195 (pp. 190-191).
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women of colour critique had become mired by the late 1980s.80 The authors go 
on to claim that in time, as the flexible trajectory of feminism moved forward, 
this poststructuralist shift ‘ushered in’ a ‘politics based on non-identity’, ‘a full- 
scale critique of binary or dualistic thinking that undermined oppositional 
analyses of oppression. The central idea is that identity is simply a construct of 
language, discourse, and cultural practices’.81 The adverb ‘simply’ is revelatory 
of the authors’ contention that poststructuralist feminist critiques of identity have 
had their time. By framing the poststructuralist destabilization of feminist 
movement into ‘simply’ a ‘central idea’, which took place and is thus able to be 
periodized, Mann and Huffman imply that feminism is bored with 
poststructuralism, that poststructuralist critique once energized feminism but is 
now going nowhere. Poststructuralist feminism here produces an energy that
80 ‘Decentering’, p. 60. The authors are referring here primarily to the feminist 
epistemology of ‘situated knowledges’ formulated by critic Patricia Hill Collins. 
Situated knowledges emphasize partial feminist perspectives, taken up within an 
overarching schema of domination that produces multiple, coexisting identities 
and locations. This approach problematizes the degree to which one can claim to 
speak from a stable position in debating feminist politics. See Patricia Hill 
Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics o f 
Empowerment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
81 ‘Decentering’, p. 63. My emphasis. This citation is part of an extremely poor 
reading of the critique of identity within poststructuralist feminist scholarship. 
Mann and Huffman make two prominent queer theorists -  Judith Butler and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick -  stand in for a project of ‘non-identity’ that neither Butler 
nor Sedgwick supported. The term ‘non-identity’ which the authors cite refers to 
a claim made by political philosopher Michel Foucault in his discussion of the 
memoirs of Herculine Barbin, a nineteenth-century hermaphrodite. If Mann and 
Huffman had read Butler’s Gender, they would have realized that Butler is 
extremely critical of Foucault’s premise of ‘non-identity’. See Gender, pp. 119- 
135, and Herculine Barbin, Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered 
Memoirs o f a Nineteenth Century Hermaphrodite, trans. by Richard McDougall 
(New York: Colophon, 1980). Mann and Huffman frequently conflate 
‘postmodernist and poststructuralist’ without explaining how these positions are 
alike (‘Decentring’, pp. 2, 3, 7, 9, 20, 21). This is a glib theorization of which 
Butler is very critical: ‘in recent discourse, the terms “postmodernism” or 
“poststructuralism” settle the (differences among those positions in a single 
stroke, providing a substantive [...] that includes those positions as so many of 
its modalities or permutations’ (‘Contingent’, p. 4).
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enables its practices to be outmanoeuvred and outmoded by the perspectives 
comprising what Mann and Huffman call ‘later challenges to the second wave’.82 
Resistance to boredom thus animates this social history, placing a certain demand 
on the reader to expect a more mobile -  thus more interesting -  feminism from 
page to page. Indeed, within the logic of this social history that demands a 
flexible reader, page turning becomes an exercise in ergonomics: each successive 
page presents a feminism that, in order to be eligible as feminism, provides more 
stimuli by accommodating more positions in an increasingly mobile (‘global’) 
society.
The practices comprising the ‘later [that is, more interesting and 
politically useful] challenges’ are grouped by Mann and Huffman under the 
category ‘feminist postcolonial theory’ which, the authors claim, gave ‘more
theoretical coherency and political potency’ to a formerly rudimentary feminist
• 0*1 *understanding of globalization. This ‘new theoretical perspective that draws 
from [...] poststructuralism’ but which carries a greater awareness of world 
change ‘transcends dilemmas encountered in these earlier perspectives’, Mann 
and Huffman claim. Mann and Huffman’s valuation of feminism in terms of its 
ability to transcend dilemmas can be read as an effect of the same task 
temporality that structures the ergonomics principle whereby movement is 
motivated by avoiding the uncomfortable. The schema of feminist energy thus 
appears to be a convenient means of overlooking those critiques of movement, 
by women of colour and poststructuralist scholars, which uncomfortably persist
82 ‘Decentering’, p. 65.
83 ‘Dencentering’, p. 66. Mann and Huffman assert that feminist postcolonial 
theory ‘transform[ed] the ma^ro-unit of [feminist] analysis from a societal to a 
global level’ (‘Decentering’, p. 11).
4 ‘Decentering’, pp. 66-67.
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in a global societal system where bodies must not stop in order to mean and 
materialize.85
Mann and Huffman provide the following programme for contemporary
feminist practice: ‘Clearly, in a world where our everyday lives are increasingly
affected by a global economy, the rapid growth of transnational economic and
political units, and an unprecedented flow of people and information across
international borders, our levels of analyses must reflect these new realities’.86
For the authors, the realities with which feminism must keep in time, and which
ground the schema of feminist energy or waves, are post-Fordist technological
and workplace shifts:
Features of poststructuralist thought are mirrored in the forms of work 
that have come to characterize the new global economy as work sites 
become more organized along post-Fordist lines. For example, a 
cornerstone of post-Fordist management practice is the belief that loose 
networks are more open to innovation than are the more structured, 
pyramidal hierarchies that ruled the Fordist era. A deceptive feature of 
this team-work is that lines of authority appear to be flattened, even 
though control from the top still exists [...] Moreover, because these 
teams are constantly breaking apart or continually being redefined, they 
require a more flexible, elastic and chameleon-like orientation to work 
[...] These features of the post-Fordist workplace echo the blurred lines 
of authority and the non-hierarchical view of power espoused by post-
85 The association between past feminist debates and the uncomfortable is 
discussed with acumen by feminist critic Jane Elliott in her important essay ‘The 
Currency of Feminist Theory’, PMLA, 121:5 (2006), 1697-1703. Elliott critiques 
the temporal logic underwriting feminist attempts to transcend ‘the debates of the 
1980s and 1990s’ and feminist attempts to avoid ‘unmodified Marxism’, 
asserting that ‘the production of the new as a signal intellectual value can be used 
to dismiss uncomfortable insights, which don’t have to be disproved as long as 
they can be made to seem passe’ (‘Currency’, p. 1700). Elliott also emphasizes 
the importance of considering feminist critics who wrote outside of the 
appropriate moments that the waves paradigm designates, most notably Simone 
de Beauvoir, who in 1949 explicated the constructedness of the category 
‘woman’. See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by H. M. Parshley 
(New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 301. Also see Julia Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’, in 
New Maladies o f the Soul, trans. by Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), pp. 2b 1-224.
86 ‘Decentering’, p. 66.
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structuralism, as well as its more fluid and chameleon-like views of 
identity.87
By making an extremely reductive view of poststructuralist critique metaphorize 
for the ‘reality’ of a post-Fordist society, Mann and Huffman can claim that 
poststructuralism’s use to feminism is also the basis for its supersession by
an
feminism. In other words, for Mann and Huffman poststructuralist critiques of 
identity enable feminism to better mobilize in a post-Fordist societal real because 
they are an effect of this societal real: poststructuralism, as a ‘mirror’ of material 
conditions, apparently provides feminism with a better understanding of the 
world we inhabit, which seems to be the key directive of feminism under the 
waves schema. If feminism remains with these critiques for too long, Mann and 
Huffman imply, it will have failed to comprehend poststructuralism’s apparent 
complicity with exploitative labour relations in post-Fordism, and feminism itself 
will become complicit in these relations.
But I want to question the certainty with which Mann and Huffman 
reference the apparent social facts of post-Fordism that ground and constitute 
intelligible feminist movement. Mann and Huffman’s periodization of feminist 
theory and politics is characterized by an inability to think through flexibility, 
movement, or post-Fordism other than as affirmations that feminism should be 
current, constantly re-energized, moving with the times. I see no critical 
difference between these affirmations and the logic of keeping up discussed in 
this chapter, through which both Harvey and Bly appropriate feminism’s 
perceived mobility to make claims that subordinate feminist critique. Harvey
87 ‘Decentering’, p. 82.
88 Poststructuralism’s use to feminism is debated in the anthology Coming Out o f 
Feminism?, ed. by Mandy Merck, Naomi Segal, and Elizabeth Wright (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998).
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invokes feminism’s vigour but offers no commentary on the important gains 
made by feminism in the early 1970s, citing its immobility compared to the 
flexibility of both capitalism and his interpretative capacities, while Bly 
interprets feminism’s energy as being useful for the flow of a hegemonic 
masculinity that is ultimately more important for the sustenance of (heterosexual) 
human relations. Similarly, the feminist waves paradigm argues for multiple 
feminisms through mass-based movement, but in doing so constantly outmodes 
critical positions that forcefully move feminist subjects out of an ergonomic
Q Q
comfort zone. Considering that feminism’s flexibility is useful here for the 
negation of feminism’s complexity, I want to formulate a response, within post- 
Fordist time, that locates powerful feminist agency in female subjects who in 
Fordism’s decline do nothing, are both boring and bored. This will involve 
arguing for the factory -  that figure of dead movement and meaningless bodies -  
as an affective disruption in the linear temporal scheme that grounds Fordist-to- 
post-Fordist activity.
The factory to which I am referring is the Factory: the New York studio 
of Pop artist Andy Warhol. From 1962 to 1968, the Factory housed Warhol’s
Q Q
bell hooks occupies one such critical position in her book Feminist Theory: 
From Margin to Center, 2nd edn (London: Pluto, 2000). hooks describes a 
recurring scene of discomfort whereby ‘a group of white feminist activists who 
do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. 
They may feel they are bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the 
atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters the room. The 
white women will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory. 
Unconsciously, they feel close to one another because they shared racial identity. 
The “whiteness” that bonds them together is a racial identity that is directly 
related to the experience of non-white people as “other” and as a “threat”’ 
{Feminist, p. 56). We can certainly say that an ergonomic accommodation of 
bodily positions is disrupted in this scene. However, the tense feelings that hooks 
describes and by which she is affected are produced by a certain ergonomics: a 
fitting together of bodies -  in the name of feminism -  that is based on white 
society’s dominant ways of experiencing blackness, in which the black body is 
attributed as the cause of white bodies becoming tense.
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filmmaking and production of silkscreen prints, along with the predominantly 
gay male actors, the multitude of female subjects including precocious 
‘superstars’ such as Edie Sedgwick and influential artists such as Brigid Berlin, 
and the various members of New York’s art scene who either starred in these 
artworks or, as studio assistants, contributed to their constant production.90 
Warhol’s Factory has also been popularized for its sex parties and drug culture, 
which reinforces its status within the popular imaginary as a site of constant, 
regular activity. We can read this popular conception alongside the machine 
processing of silkscreen images as examples of Warhol’s appropriation of Fordist 
societal function into art making. Indeed, Warhol can be called a quintessential 
construct of body-machine time: he began his career in the Fordist 1950s 
producing commercial drawings of shoes whose fine detail drew attention to the 
technical precision of sewing machines, and by the early 1960s had come to 
prominence through serializing (mass producing) silkscreen images 
(predominantly of mass produced products).91
Given his intimacy with machine production from the early stages of his 
working life, it is perhaps unsurprising that Warhol could equate establishing 
himself as an artist with managing a factory. Here Warhol can be likened to
90 For biographical accounts that give a more detailed history of Factory 
constituents and activities, see Andy Warhol, The Philosophy o f Andy Warhol 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Warhol and Pat Hackett, 
POPism: The Warhol Sixties (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980); 
Warhol, The Andy Warhol Diaries, ed. by Pat Hackett (New York: Warner 
Books, 1989).
91 Feminist critic Jennifer Doyle remarks on the machine-like detail of Warhol’s 
commercial drawings, suggesting that the ‘dainty and precious detail of these 
drawings references machine-made fingerwork and engages a confusion of hands 
and machines’. See Jennifer Doyle, ‘Tricks of the Trade: Pop Art/Pop Sex’, in 
Pop Out: Queer Warhol, ed. by Jennifer Doyle, Jonathan Flatley, and Jose 
Esteban Munoz (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 191- 
209 (p. 200).
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Frederick Taylor in that both, as prominent figures in body-machine time, extol 
the hermeneutic qualities of factory life: for both, machine processes are bound 
up with and enable interpretation. But whereas Taylor manages the factory in 
order to participate in the determination of eligible bodily timeliness, Warhol 
manages the Factory -  if by ‘manage’ we mean co-ordinate bodies and machines 
into an intimate co-dependency -  in order to challenge dominant assumptions of 
authorship, work, and use that are crucial to the working out of the body in 
Scientific Management discourse. Warhol’s machine-produced artworks, and his 
employment of Factory assistants who, variously stationed along a 
photomechanical assembly line, processed the silkscreens and thus contributed to 
a critique of the originary presence of the master artist’s human hand, have been 
attributed within art criticism to what feminist critic Jennifer Doyle terms 
Warhol’s ‘blank affect’.92 Doyle highlights art criticism’s linking of Warhol’s 
machine-mediated work and his apparently passive demeanour, or what Doyle 
calls his ‘performance of cosmopolitan boredom’ ,93 Certain members of the art
Q9 Jennifer Doyle, “‘I Must be Boring Someone”: Women in Warhol’s Films’, in 
Sex Objects: Art and the Dialectics o f  Desire (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), pp. 71-96 (p. 93). For a specific account of Factory 
assistants and procedures, see Steven Watson, Factory Made: Warhol and the 
Sixties (New York: Pantheon, 2003).
93 ‘Boring’, p. 93 .1 realize that I have moved swiftly from a discussion of non­
whiteness and feminism to a discussion of feminism, the white male Warhol, and 
the predominantly white female subjects of the Factory. However, we will see in 
the remainder of this chapter that Warhol, and Warhol’s Factory, inspires a 
critical approach based on the qualities that Mann and Huffman automatically 
resist when moving away from women of colour critique. Also, Warhol’s 
demeanour and whiteness do relate to racial politics: see Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, ‘Queer Performativity: Warhol’s Shyness/Warhol’s Whiteness’, in 
Pop Out: Queer Warhol, ed. by Jennifer Doyle, Jonathan Flatley, and Jose 
Esteban Munoz (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 134- 
143. Sedgwick interprets Warhol’s passivity as a shyness or shame that is 
‘closely intertwined’ with whiteness; white shame being a key factor ‘in the 
exacerbated race relations around urban space, civil rights, sexuality [...] in the 
United States by the early 1960s’ (‘Shyness’, p. 139). For Sedgwick, Warhol’s
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history canon, Doyle affirms, have established this connection to equate
Warhol’s homosexuality with machine-mediated sexual practices that they see as
preventing access to life, progressive action, true pleasure and passion. For
example, consider art historian Thierry de Duve’s critique of the Factory:
Warhol, an American immigrant of working class origins, wanted to be a 
machine [...] He called his bohemia the Factory. But that’s precisely his 
bohemia. It is a simulacrum of bohemia, having nothing any longer to do 
with the place of literary myth whose historical meaning and necessity 
was tied to giving a voice to proletarian hopes and despair. In his factory 
there were no proletarians [...] In the Factory one led the bohemian life, 
played at it, but never submitted to it as destiny. Drugs and sex, 
eccentricities and gestures of the accursed inflicted those who assumed 
them and wreaked more than their share of personal tragedies. But that 
was the price of a life-style that was beautiful only in its coherence, that 
wasn’t a life, and was in no way the life of the species-being.94
Some telling assumptions are made here that connect bodily function to ‘real’ 
work and activity. For de Duve, nobody properly works at the Factory -  ‘there 
were no proletarians’ -  and thus Warhol does not produce proper works of art, 
insofar as art is meaningful only as work dedicated to giving voice to those who 
work properly. If Warhol’s art is going nowhere, because it is not ‘tied’ to the 
trajectory of proletarian ‘hope’, then neither are those Factory constituents whose 
eccentric gestures and life-styles move contrary to ‘the life of the species-being’. 
Those non-working bodies that do not produce works of art also do not 
reproduce, which is evidence that heterosexuality informs de Duve’s invocation
peculiarly white or ‘w«blushing’ skin subverts one of the historical assumptions 
of scientific racism, whereby the colour of the blush is identifiable only on white 
skin, meaning that whites were ‘normalized’ and ‘universalized’ as the only 
subjects capable of blushing (‘Shyness’, p. 139. Emphasis in original). Warhol’s 
unblushing shyness/shame, Sedgwick asserts, instead provides a point of 
identification for non-white subjects who carry ‘particular histories of expertise 
in negotiating indignity with dignity’ (‘Shyness’, p. 139). I discuss shame at 
length in the following chapter.
94 Thierry de Duve, ‘Andy Warhol, or The Machine Perfected’, trans. by 
Rosalind Krauss, October, 48y(1989), 3-14 (p. 3). Emphasis in original. Doyle 
draws attention to the homophobic implications of de Duve’s article in ‘Tricks’, 
p. 193.
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of ‘proletarian’, de Duve implies that non-heterosexual Factory bodies go 
nowhere because their coherent movements do not partake in futurity, or do not 
participate in the hope of proletarian movement away from exploitative factory 
conditions. Factory bodies stay in the Factory and therefore die through ‘personal 
tragedies’ brought by non-reproductive movement: for de Duve, entropy equals 
atrophy. Warhol’s apparently passive submission to machine processes is seen by 
de Duve to privilege queer consumption over the politically active or urgent 
principle of (re)production.
It may appear that de Duve’s claims belong in the previous chapter on 
hard working bodies. But I include his commentary in this chapter on flexibility 
because Warhol clearly unsettles the notion of Fordist-to-post-Fordist movement 
or movement away from factory time that, as a social fact, motivates Mann and 
Huffman’s feminist waves paradigm. I shall come on to the feminist aspects of 
Warhol’s Factory shortly, but first it is necessary to emphasize the degree to 
which Warhol’s work occupies an uneasy position between Fordist and post- 
Fordist time. For de Duve, Warhol, as ‘an immigrant of working class origins’, 
had the potential to deliver a meaningful critique of Fordist society, but betrayed 
the (male, heterosexual) working-class cause by taking pleasure from staying in 
the factory indefinitely. De Duve thus sees Warhol’s useless work as being 
useful for one purpose: making the reader aware of the ‘real’ struggles of Fordist 
time to which art ought to relate.
For Fredric Jameson, however, Warhol’s work provides the occasion for 
discussing late capitalism, or ‘the purest form of capital yet to have emerged’, 
because it is symptomatic of this stage of capitalist development.95 Jameson
v
95 Postmodernism, p. 35.
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chooses Warhol’s 1980 painting Diamond Dust Shoes to exemplify late 
capitalism’s ‘cultural logic’. In reference to the painting’s inability to act as a 
hermeneutic for the conditions of production and real, toilsome (‘hard’) work, 
Jameson claims that Diamond Dust Shoes, as ‘a random collection of dead 
objects hanging together on the canvas’, ‘does not really speak to us at all,’ is 
conferred the ‘deathly quality’ of ‘the photographic negative’.96 Here it is 
Jameson’s turn to assume the position of flexible critic, whose analyses of 
cultural forms coexist with an endeavour to keep up with the exponential 
flexibility of capitalism’s global phase. Warhol’s creations enable Jameson to 
claim that ‘every position on postmodernism in culture [...] is also at one and the 
same time [...] an implicitly or explicitly political stance on the nature of 
multinational capitalism today’.97
But Factory work is not reducible to task temporality and indeed disrupts 
this temporal frame, revealing Jameson’s homophobic negation of non- 
heteronormative histories. Queer theorist Mandy Merck points out that Diamond 
Dust Shoes, far from saying nothing, can be seen to reference Warhol’s 1950s 
shoe drawings and his silkscreen technique implemented in the Factory of the
AO
1960s. These prior works already instance a confusion of hands and machines, 
and therefore already question the degree to which we can locate the hard work 
of the artist. The 1950s and 1960s productions thus connect with Diamond Dust 
Shoes but in a way that critiques the necessity, and possibility, of definitively 
connecting the artist’s hard work with the hard work of white, heterosexual 
working class struggle. Merck studies Warhol’s biographies in order to connect
96 Postmodernism, pp. 8-9. v
97 Postmodernism, p. 3.
98 ‘Figuring’, p. 230.
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Diamond Dust Shoes to a history of queer activity: ‘Who would wear such 
shoes? Cinderella and the Drag Queen [...] femininity and masculinity, brought 
together by work [...] And what is the “perverse usage” to which the Diamond 
Dust Shoes will be put? [...] the dick’s disguise, the equipment that some boys 
employ in the hard work of “trying to be complete girls”’.99 Warhol’s work 
connects to hard work, but to the type of hard work -  sex work and transvestism 
-  that Jameson does not consider while making his capitalist-historical 
proclamation of Warhol’s muteness.100 The crucial point here is that the Factory 
always comments on and reveals the exclusionary implications of one’s 
invocation of the factory, or ‘the primacy of industrial production and the 
omnipresence of class struggle’ for which the factory metaphorizes.101 With 
Diamond Dust Shoes an older, outmoded Factory accompanies Warhol’s work 
into the post-Fordist 1980s, and in doing so reveals why Jameson refutes the 
notion of post-industrial society. For Jameson, the historical transmutation but 
continued relevance of ‘traditional [white, male, working class] [reproduction’ 
provides us with the political urgency to do something with queer non-works 
such as Warhol’s by enabling us to say something about them: by enabling us to 
say that they always capitulate to (female, bourgeois) consumption in 
capitalism’s later stage.102 My coinage ‘factory/Factory’ articulates this 
interruption in the logic of capitalist-historical flexibility.
99 ‘Figuring’, pp. 231-232. Merck here takes inspiration from Jacques Derrida’s 
important interrogation of the methods of interpreting art. See Jacques Derrida, 
The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987).
100 For more on the homophobia of Jameson’s critique, see Halberstam, Queer, p. 
100.
1 0 1  ^Postmodernism, p. 3.
1 ( Y ) Postmodernism, p. 53.
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The lingering presence and force of the factory/Factory also intervenes in
feminism’s energetic avoidance of boredom. If there is one aspect that links
Warhol to the flexible, it is the varied, unpredictable but pervasive presence of
female subjects in his work. In her important essay on feminism and Warhol’s
1960s Factory films, Doyle considers ‘the flexibility of women’s relationships to
Warhol’s cinematic practice’.103 Doyle asserts that to understand these flexible
relationships, one must be aware of the simultaneous optimism and discomfort
that locates female subjects within the gay male films of the Factory:
While one could say that there is no place for feminism in Warhol’s films 
because their dominant erotic economy is gay (authored by gay men, 
aimed at largely gay male audiences), one might also say that many of 
these films create an alternative cinematic space for women insofar as the 
films read as ‘gay’ [...] That alternative context, however, is not one in 
which we see ‘happy’ representations of women -  meaning, for example, 
positive representations of women, women free from violence and 
oppression, at ease with their femininity, and valued by their on-screen 
counterparts as full human subjects [...] As often as they assert a 
liberated, antipatriarchal position, women also find themselves subject to 
hostility and abjection and are not often able to convert that negativity 
into something glamorous. In fact, many of the performances in Warhol’s 
films can be painful to watch (for this reason, for some, the films are 
distinctly wwfeminist).104
The flexibility for which Doyle argues is markedly different than the flexibility 
asserted by the feminist waves paradigm as a societal ground. Mann and 
Huffman’s post-Fordist waves paradigm is supported by the notion that each 
wave of feminism is more flexible than the last, as if political and theoretical 
dilemmas have been continuously superseded since second wave feminism’s 
movement in factory time’s decline. Doyle, on the other hand, argues that 
flexibility can instance multiple positions of female agency but certainly not the 
transcendence of dilemmas. For Doyle, eligible feminist movement is produced
103 ‘Boring’, p. 75.
104 ‘Boring’, p. 72. Emphasis in original.
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not in factory time’s decline but in the Factory’s critique of the mandate to be 
energetic in body-machine time. This critique requires that feminism stay with or 
in the factory/Factory in order to deconstruct feminism’s mass materialization 
and formation over time. The Factory’s inclusion of female subjects in gay male 
spaces must not be read as accommodation. This co-presence does not offer 
feminism another perspective that enables it to energize and move away from the 
hostility directed at female subjects in Factory space.105 Appropriating the 
rhetoric of energy, Doyle asserts that important feminist insights can be gained 
from moments in which oppression cannot be converted into a more comfortable 
experience.
In George Hickenlooper’s 2006 film Factory Girl, the Factory is made to 
exemplify the notion that ‘uncomfortable’ and ‘unfeminist’ mean the same.106 
Factory Girl provides a retrospective on ‘Superstar’ Edie Sedgwick’s time as 
Warhol’s muse in 1960s Factory life. The film charts Sedgwick’s rise from art 
student to celebrity, and her rapid descent into drug addiction, which the 
narrative presents as being exacerbated by Warhol’s machine-like indifference to 
Sedgwick’s plight. Interestingly, a rhetoric of energy informs invocations of 
Sedgwick both in the academy and in popular culture. Jameson, for example,
105 Feminism’s problematic place in the Factory is exemplified by Warhol’s 
fraught relationship with radical feminist writer Valerie Solanas, who in the late 
1960s wrote the feminist pamphlet SCUM Manifesto (New York and London: 
Verso, 2004). (SCUM is an acronym for Society for Cutting Up Men.) Solanas 
and Warhol became acquainted in this period, when Warhol agreed to produce a 
feminist play Solanas had written. In 1968, shortly after completing Manifesto, 
Solanas shot and seriously injured Warhol: the reason Solanas gave for her 
actions was that Warhol -  mimicking Taylor, we could say -  was too controlling 
of her artistic input into the Factory space. See Marcie Frank, ‘Popping Off 
Warhol: From the Gutter to the Underground and Beyond, in Pop Out: Queer 
Warhol, ed. by Jennifer Doyle, Jonathan Flatley, and Jose Esteban Munoz 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 210-223.
106 Factory Girl. Dir. by George Hickenlooper. Paramount. 2006.
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cites Sedgwick as one of ‘the notorious cases of burnout and self-destruction of 
the ending 1960s’ who characterizes the ‘fragmentation’ of the subject in
107  •postmodern culture. Echoing Harvey, Jameson implies here that post-Fordist 
movement (‘fragmented’ movement everywhere) occurs after an irreversible 
decline or ‘burnout’ of energy. Similarly, promotional text for Factory Girl reads 
as follows: ‘In the 1960s, no star burned brighter than original “it” girl Edie
• 1 OS •Sedgwick’. Expenditure or burning of energy characterizes Sedgwick’s ascent 
towards celebrity and her status as 1960s female icon, which is the aspect of 
Sedgwick that both texts present as the most meaningful.109 Over-expenditure or 
burnout, presumably caused by remaining in the Factory for too long, which 
produces entropy, characterizes Sedgwick’s deterioration within a space of drugs 
and queers, and her eventual death. The Factory Girl narrative clearly frames 
non-heteronormative body-machines, most notably Warhol, as the cause of this 
burnout: Hickenlooper’s film suggests that Warhol’s passive or unenergetic 
submission to machine processes prevents Warhol from feeling Sedgwick’s 
specifically human plight.110
Doyle however provides a much more complex reading of female 
presence within the Factory’s gay male economy. Doyle analyses scenes from
107 Postmodernism, p. 14.
108 Back cover of cited DVD edition of Factory Girl.
109 Sedgwick’s entropy is meaningful for Jameson, but only as a symptom of 
capitalism’s movement into a third, even more penetrative stage. Sedgwick’s 
entropy is thus the occasion for Jameson to expend energy by displaying his 
ability to co-ordinate all cultural practice with capitalism’s ever-flexible
unequivocally presents Sedgwick as a reject of the Factory, a body 
ruined by the Factory’s lifestyles and excesses. Factory Girl views as an injustice 
Sedgwick’s death before Warhol’s: in an interview scene in the film’s closing 
stages, a blank looking Warhol (played by Guy Pearce) is shown robotically 
dismissing the significance — and being unable to recall any meaningful memory 
-  of his relationship with Sedgwick.
properties. 
110 The film
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Warhol’s 1968 film Bike Boy, which consists of gay male hustler ‘Bike Boy’ and
Factory girl Ingrid Superstar exchanging insults and generally partaking in
strained, meaningless conversation. Because both are being filmed, Doyle
asserts, there is a tacit acknowledgement from both participants that they should
do something despite Bike Boy’s conviction that his sole interest on screen is in
enticing a gay male spectatorship. Bike Boy is the acknowledged star of the film
(because it is authored by gay males for a predominantly gay male audience), and
so the impulsion to do translates as an onus on Superstar to be of interest to Bike
Boy while he continues his job of appealing to an intended audience. But, Doyle
asserts, Bike Boy prioritizes his role to the extent that he is never interested in
Superstar’s attempts to initiate conversation, which results in Superstar
repeatedly talking to herself throughout the film, erratically commenting on the
most mundane aspects of household life ‘when she realizes [Bike Boy] will never
respond to her.’111
Like the burnout rhetoric informing invocations of Sedgwick, Bike Boy
appears to exemplify the entropy suffered by female subjects amidst the blank
affect of non-heteronormative body-machines. But Doyle argues against the
transcendence of Factory girl entropy:
The queer frame of [Bike Boy’s and Superstar’s] encounter is perhaps the 
only thing that keeps the scene on the funnier side of the tragic. Her 
performance is enabled by Bike Boy’s, the perfect ‘trade’ object of 
homosexual desire; his presence unmoors hers from the seduction 
narrative and allows our attention to wander [...] So Superstar kills time, 
emptying out her speech until the viewer can hardly stand it because the 
dynamics of interest in the scene have become so perverse [...] Her 
passive resistance to the demand that she interest Bike Boy becomes 
fascinating as a performance of the desire to be boring, of, even, the 
production of boredom as a critical mode.112
111 ‘Boring’, p. 90.
112 ‘Boring’, pp. 93,91.
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The uncomfortable onscreen Factory pairing of Bike Boy and Superstar, which 
engenders Superstar’s active doing of boredom, also engenders boredom in the 
viewer. But the viewer’s boredom, because it allows for a critical engagement 
with Superstar’s boredom, precisely enables the viewer to understand how 
interesting the factory/Factory girl’s boredom is, particularly for the critique it 
produces, out of entropy, of the way in which feminism’s imperative to move 
flexibly is bound up with its imperative to be interesting.113 In the case of Mann 
and Huffman, we see an endeavour to find more interesting feminist positions 
than the poststructuralist and queer feminist debates that allegedly went nowhere 
after the 1990s. But Warhol’s film comments on the possibility of queer/feminist 
coalitions formed out of continued pain, discomfort, and stasis: the 
(im)possibility of coalition that will be of no interest to the task of feminist 
epistemology and activism. In other words, the factory/Factory, as an outmoded 
site of female agency before eligible feminist movement has taken place, 
enriches our understanding of feminist and queer intersections after the waves 
paradigm has had the opportunity to subsume and transcend these positions in the 
passage of flexible time. Factory Girl wants to claim that there can be no factory 
girls in post-Fordism; they are dead or will die, out of time in a world of queer 
body-machines who see and have no time beyond the factory/Factory. Resisting 
this recuperative, heteronormative logic of body-machine time after Fordism, I 
argue for the lingering presence of Factory/factory girls in factory time’s 
obsolescence, which can offer an untimely interrogation of feminism’s 
appropriate mo(ve)ment.
113 For more on the relationship between work, female subjects, and entropy, see 
David Staples, ‘Women’s Work and the Ambivalent Gift of Entropy’, in The 
Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, ed. by Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean 
Hailey (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 119-150.
142
This chapter has shown that we should not assume the inevitability of 
every body’s movement into a time that is no longer Fordist. In chapter 3 ,1 will 
apply my assertions of an untimely Fordism to a more specific discussion of the 
technologies that are supposed to have emerged with post-Fordism’s hegemony.
V
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3: Digital Bodies
This chapter is primarily one of returns -  a return to the Fordist 1940s and 1950s, 
a return of body-machine movements excluded by technologically determined 
temporal frames, and a return to theoretical modes apparently outdated in the 
twenty-first century. That this chapter continues such a temporal lag is perhaps 
surprising given its title. As an exploration of bodily function and the digital, it 
might be expected that this chapter is or should be the most technological or most 
technologically developed of the thesis thus far: a chapter about new times, 
located within new times, where newness is supported by ‘digital’ as a signifier 
of epochal rupture -  a ‘digital age’ or a time in which technologized societies are 
moving ever closer to full digitization. But it is precisely this logic of expectation 
that I will argue against: the Forwardist expectation that a chapter on the digital 
will focus on how we expect the digital to move us forward. I do not intend to 
dispense with the notion of the digital. On the contrary, I will show that each of 
these returns is simultaneously a return to the digital, where the digital is 
theorized as that which enables communication, signification, and bodily 
knowledges.
I will begin by arguing that for the digital to be meaningful, we did not 
have to wait for advancements in mass, general-purpose computer technologies. I 
draw on mid-twentieth-century cybernetic theory -  the study of communication 
and control in animals and machines -  in order to problematize leftist 
representations of computers and bodies in post-Fordism. I argue for the 
retention of cybernetics’ theorization of the body as a (partly) digital computer, 
against the leftist assumption fhat computerization heralds the newest form of
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bodily exploitation by capital accumulation. The cybernetic body-computer, I 
will show, is inextricably bound up with body-machine discourse, but is not 
reliant on the temporal frame of technological determinism. I extol the value of 
waiting with cybernetics, as a means of understanding that we did not have to 
wait for new technologies to validate discussions of the body’s digitization.
The second section of the chapter focuses on recent scholarship that 
criticizes the digital, on account of its reductiveness as a theoretical model of 
bodily movement. This scholarship calls not for a return to the digital, but for a 
return to the analogue as a communicative mode that persists in and subverts a 
so-called digital epoch.
The chapter concludes by assessing the limitations of this analogic turn. 
Reusing the theoretical models that the analogic turn deems insufficient to body- 
machine function, I draw attention to the normative temporal logic informing the 
notion, implicit in this recent scholarship, that we should not believe in the 
digital in light of the analogue’s imputed superiority.
Computers
In the 1989 leftist anthology New Times: The Changing Face o f Politics in the 
1990s, economist Robin Murray describes the reorganization of the working 
body in post-Fordism: ‘Even hourly-paid workers are trained in statistical 
techniques and monitoring, and register and interpret statistics to identify 
deviations from a norm [in products and processes] -  tasks customarily reserved 
for management in Fordism. Quality circles are a further way of tapping the ideas 
of the workforce. In post-Fordism, the worker is designed to act as a computer as
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well as a machine’.1 Murray’s description echoes Susan Mann and Douglas 
Huffman’s scepticism towards post-Fordist workplace and workforce shifts, 
discussed in the previous chapter. Mann and Huffman claim that de-unionized, 
post-Fordist workforces are manipulated by the non-hierarchical ‘loose 
networks’ required by a global economy.2 According to Mann and Huffman, 
these networks appear to democratize work relations but in fact perpetuate an 
established order of authority, fragmenting the workforce to the extent that 
meaningful worker resistance is prevented. Murray provides a similar 
interpretation of post-Fordism’s delegation of formerly hierarchized information- 
processing jobs, into the more participatory milieu of ‘quality circles’. For 
Murray, post-Fordist working bodies are encouraged to interact with one another 
and with the products and services of their working environments, but the 
constant reallocation and reorganization of these participatory circles ensures that 
the ideas or information they generate are restricted to ephemera that serve only 
the interests of flexible accumulation, and are thus prevented from forming a 
critical consciousness.
1 Robin Murray, ‘Fordism and Post-Fordism’, in New Times: The Changing Face 
o f Politics in the 1990s, ed. by Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1989), pp. 38-53 (p. 46).
2 ‘Decentering’, p. 82.
3 Note here the similarities between Murray’s ‘quality circles’ and Kroemer and 
Grandjean’s flexible, semi-circular ergonomic assembly line. Of course Murray, 
as a leftist economist and critic, is critical of the disempowerment implicit in the 
post-Fordist workplace, and of the social implications of such disempowerment, 
whereas Kroemer and Grandjean prescribe flexible movement as an 
advancement of physiology’s understanding of the body at work. But linking 
both accounts is the assumption that bodily function is posited through a 
trajectory of increasing information or external stimuli (information that 
interests, which enables the body to ‘process’, in terms of work -  interpreting -  
and bodily function -  going on, living). Murray suggests that his scepticism 
towards a computer network society will be overturned once it provides, through 
political struggle (hard work), the conditions for ‘an alternative socialism 
adequate to the post-Fordist age’ (‘Post-Fordism’, p. 53).
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But whereas Mann and Huffman attribute the working body’s 
exploitation to the superior movement of global capital, Murray invokes the 
computer to explicate this newest phase of capitalist domination. Murray claims 
that body-machines or working bodies are also computers in post-Fordism, 
because they constantly process information; workers ‘monitor’, ‘interpret’, and 
‘register’ statistics (or registers -  lists of electronically stored data) in the 
disorganized workplace. Although Murray appears to be using the term 
‘computer’ only to represent the worker, we can read a more pervasive rhetoric 
of computerization influencing Murray’s description of the exploitation that 
results from the worker’s new role. Murray asserts that the post-Fordist capitalist 
‘tap[s] the ideas’ of the informational workforce. It is possible to see working 
time figured here not only as a loose network but a network of computer 
terminals: reticular working time consists of worker-computer terminals and, 
metaphorically, a terminal of superior computation: capital accumulation. The 
superior terminal continually intercepts the information transmitted between the 
proletariat processors, redirecting and co-opting this quality before it can create 
collective action.4 ‘Tapping’ here signifies access to information in the sense of 
secretly listening or witnessing and in the sense of keyboard operation 
facilitating this access.5 Murray implies that in a socioeconomic system called an
4 Reversing but preserving this idea of the terminal, Murray argues elsewhere in 
his essay for ‘[njew technology networks [to] be set up’ to facilitate post-Fordist 
collective action, forming ‘a new model of the public economy made up of a 
honeycomb of decentralised, yet synthetic institutions, integrated by a common 
strategy’ (‘Post-Fordism’, p. 52).
5 Murray’s use of ‘tapping’ alongside ‘computer’ is noteworthy for the way in 
which it alludes to the sense of touch in tapping -  the skilful programming of 
computers, and the use of this skill to gain unauthorized computer access (the 
practice referred to as ‘hacking’) -  alongside the sense of sound more 
traditionally associated with tapping, in terms of discreetly listening to a 
telephone conversation. In this chapter’s concluding stages and particularly in the
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‘information society’, the capitalist body will always have more information than 
other bodies functioning in this society. Murray presents a dominant, post-Fordist 
order whereby the capitalist master-computer is positioned to receive information 
that will always inevitably arrive, from body-machine-computers for whom 
information at once represents a means of living -  these bodies cannot not 
process -  and the means by which they are kept place-bound and inactive.
Murray’s use of ‘computer’, particularly in arguing for the novelty of 
bodies-as-information-processors, is erroneous both socio-historically and 
theoretically. A brief return to my analysis of Taylor’s ball bearing factory 
demonstrates the reductiveness of invoking computation as a signifier of new 
development. Taylor’s role of inspecting and sorting bodies at work, bodies 
whose work is also to inspect and sort (ball bearings, and each other sorting ball 
bearings, and so on), participates in a discursive shift dating from the nineteenth 
century: the closing of the distance between work and its representation. Work 
here becomes redrawn as representing via the action of information processing. 
Thus, from a socio-historical perspective, it is inaccurate for Murray to claim that 
the worker becomes a computer after Fordism. Following a critique of Taylorist 
rhetoric, we can call Taylor’s factory girls computers (who are caught in an 
infinite regress of computation), which suggests that the worker was a computer 
not only in Fordism but in the Taylorist Scientific Management that preceded 
Fordism.6 Anne Balsamo gives a more concrete example of this link to
following chapter, I will use the concept of the digital to problematize the sense 
of touch in post-industrial time.
6 Beninger’s Control Revolution provides a detailed investigation into the 
historical formations of an information society -  a project that further 
underscores the glibness of Murray’s call to action amid impending 
computerization. See Control, pp. 224, 269.
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computation, pointing out that in 1930s and 1940s America, clerical labourers -  
predominantly female -  were indeed referred to as ‘computers’.7
From a theoretical perspective, we can deconstruct Murray’s participation 
in what Mark Seltzer calls the ‘resistance to the understanding of information- 
processing as “real work’” , which ‘persists [...] in the notion of a move from an 
industrial to a post-industrial society or “information society” or in the
n
denigration of “paper-pushing”’. Murray -  as a leftist economist -  wants to tell 
us how real work has been mediated by information processing, so that we can 
know how to resist it. It follows from this that Murray himself is not ‘really’ 
working (that is, he is not a member of the workforces he cites), but is instead 
representing -  in terms of both proxy and portrait -  those who ‘really’ work prior 
to their manipulation by and for information.9 Because for Murray the worker 
becomes a computer, Murray also implies that he is certain of what ‘real’ work 
is: bodies already work without or prior to information. But because, within 
body-machine discourse, representing is work, in the coextensive sense of labour
7 Technologies, p. 133. A discussion of this history leads Balsamo to her dictum, 
‘[m]y mother was a computer’ (ibid). Juxtaposing Balsamo’s clerical worker- 
computers and Taylor’s factory girl-computers reveals the gendered logic 
implicit in Murray’s rhetoric. Murray’s equation of the computer with the new 
erases these rich histories of female work. Murray posits ‘computer’ in the hope 
that it will provoke ‘new’ transnational political movement in the wake of 
socialism’s decline, presumably led by those (male) bodies whose history of 
work is able to constitute a movement.
o
Bodies and Machines, p. 221 n. 25.
9 Gayatri Spivak provides a detailed explanation of representation as proxy and 
portrait, describing how the former signifies ‘treadfing] in someone’s shoes’ or 
‘political representation’, and how the latter signifies the act o f ‘placing’ those 
whom one represents politically into a single, homogeneous group: ‘the thing to 
remember is that in the act of representing politically, you actually represent 
yourself and your constituency in the portrait sense, as well. You have to think of 
your constituency as working class [...] and so on’. See Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, ‘Practical Politics of The Open End’, in The Post-Colonial Critic: 
Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. by Sarah Harasym (New York & London: 
Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-112 (pp. 108-109).
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(work) and participation in naturalizing a certain temporal frame in which bodies 
function (working out), then Murray is a worker-computer or information 
processor, as the necessary condition of being able to posit capitalism’s insidious 
computerization of hard working bodies. Murray’s argument is contradictory 
precisely because Murray is already working as a computer before an 
appropriately periodized information age and, like the capitalist body-computer 
he represents and derides, is always already ‘informatizing’ those bodies he is 
attempting to defend from information.
Cybernetic (Im)patience, or, Waiting for Information
My initial critique of Murray enables us to observe a particular quality of task 
temporality: impatience. As my critique of David Harvey revealed, a 
characteristic leftist assumption is that capitalism waits for no-body; its superior 
speed and flexibility is an inevitability with which place-bound bodies have no 
option but to try to keep in time. Murray’s metaphor of bodies as computers 
continues this assumption. The computerization of society, Murray claims, 
provides the latest occasion for affirming capitalism’s impatience: the messages 
(composed of the workers’ labour: interpreted information) that are always sent 
from the worker-computers to the capitalist computer only aid capitalism’s 
growth, increasing its inability to remain in a particular place for any length of 
time. Thus, for Murray this message transmission does not draw working bodies 
closer to the body of capitalism: on the contrary, by facilitating capitalism’s 
acceleration it prevents a stable, enduring relation between the two, which in the 
leftist logic would be the necessary ground for meaningful political action.
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By ‘impatience’, then, I am referring to an unwillingness to endure, 
which informs Murray’s rhetoric of capitalism’s co-optation of worker 
information or ideas. It also motivates Murray as a leftist critic writing at the end 
of the 1980s. The impatient capitalist body-computer, the body-computer that 
will not wait, is a construct of Murray’s own impatience. Unwilling to endure the 
1989 fall of socialism, Murray is impatient for information that ‘New Times’ 
have arrived, ‘New Times’ for which ‘computer’ metaphorizes. Murray equates 
‘computer’ and ‘new’ in order to outline a programme of eligible political 
movement at a moment when the future of political movement is uncertain. 
Impatience describes Murray’s participation in a succession-logic that affects the 
notion of an information age. This is a legitimization of the temporal frame I 
have previously referred to as the task.
In order to resist the simplistic notion of computers posited by Murray, 
we must consider information in its technical sense, and engage with the 
genealogy through which ‘information’ emerged as a theorizable entity. In the 
late 1940s, the discipline of cybernetics proposed that understanding the body as 
a machine is coextensive with understanding a specific theory of information. 
Derived from the Greek kybernetike ‘steersmanship’, cybernetics is the study of 
control and communication in the animal and the machine, and was established 
by mathematician Norbert Wiener in the years preceding, during, and 
immediately after World War II.10 Wiener defines information as a probability 
function that enables communication in a chaotic, disorganized existence. 
Wiener’s notion of disorganized existence refers to his belief that the physical
10 Wiener has published extensively on cybernetics: arguably his most important 
publication, in which the principles of cybernetics are outlined, is Cybernetics or 
Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1961).
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capacity to measure, access, and determine ‘initial positions and momenta’ is
fundamentally inaccurate and unstable.11 Beneath the domain of physical
measurement, Wiener maintains, are molecular microstates that perpetually,
randomly collide and reposition, and which thus always undermine the
intelligibility of movement. For Wiener, because movement can never be
precisely determined, we can only control the uncertainty of movement through
the use of probabilistic methods: a movement can be determined only in relation
1 0to other movements that might be made.
Wiener’s notion of ‘information’ concerns the application of probabilistic 
methods -  established at the level of molecular states -  to the level of 
communication. For Wiener this is a logical application because communication 
intrinsically involves movement: the transmission or movement of messages. 
Because movement is immeasurably chaotic, and because physical 
comprehension of movement is inaccurate and uncertain, within communication 
‘information’ ceases to refer to the meaningful content of a message (as it does 
commonsensically, in the sense that a sign conveys a reality), referring instead to 
the containment of an uncertain situation by representing this situation as a set of 
mutually excluding alternatives. Thus, the transmission of any one message is 
dependent on the probability of other messages being sent: not as things-in- 
themselves but as relational differences within a system.13 As Wiener states, ‘the 
transmission of information is impossible save as a transmission of
11 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use o f  Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 
2nd edn (New York: Doubleday, 1954), p. 8.
12 See Cybernetics, pp. 10-11.
131 draw here on technologies theorist N. Katherine Hayles’s detailed 
explanation of Wiener’s probabilistic methods. See N. Katherine Hayles, How 
We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 88-92, 
in particular p. 91.
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alternatives’.14 In short, information implies the deconstruction of essence in the 
communicative domain.
By distinguishing information from semantics, cybernetic research posits 
information as a dimensionless, meaningless property that relates human, animal, 
and machine as probabilistically controlled communication systems. 
Dimensionless information relates directly to the concept of analogy, which 
importantly informs cybernetics’ view of body-machines. Cybernetics rejects the 
claim that the organism is like a machine or that the machine is like an organism, 
because this claim presupposes essential characteristics of objects prior to body- 
machine discourse. Instead, information moves from context to context in order 
to demonstrate that organism and machine have analogous functions 
cybemetically, and that organism and machine cannot be posited apart from the 
differential transmission of information that encloses and relates them both.15
Cybernetics’ redrawing of the working body also stresses the importance 
of the relationship between body-machine function and entropy. In the previous 
chapter, I demonstrated how entropy is crucial to body-machine time, by 
connecting the fundamental maxim of ergonomics -  entropy equals atrophy -  to 
neo-Marxist rhetoric of energetic post-Fordist action (which frames and 
naturalizes eligible bodily movement). In cybernetics, entropy equals atrophy, 
but resistance to entropy cannot be achieved by energetic action. A key premise 
underlying Wiener’s notion of a twentieth-century age of communication and 
control is that the advent of this age marks a shift away from an industrial,
14 Cybernetics, p. 10.
15 Hayles provides an important discussion of cybernetic analogy in Posthuman, 
p. 91.
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eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ‘economy of energy’.16 For Wiener, the 
economy of energy of course participated in body-machine discourse, by positing 
the body according to rhetoric of engine dynamics and fuel combustion. But 
Wiener importantly asserts that this body-machine epoch retained the 
metaphysical concept of ‘life’: within this period, the body is represented as ‘a 
glorified heat engine, burning some combustible fuel instead of the glycogen of 
the human muscles’.17 There body-machines act energetically in relation to their 
environments, functioning as conservative units that move by expending their 
own internally stored power. The energetic action implied by the body-machine 
representation of fuel combustion thus presupposes the body as the source of 
power, a unit that moves volitionally through space.
Wiener announces the inadequacy of this model of body-machine 
function in a twentieth-century age of electrical communications engineering: 
‘we are beginning to see that such important elements as the neurones -  the units 
of the nervous complex of our bodies -  do their work under much the same 
conditions as vacuum tubes, their relatively small power being supplied from 
outside the body’s circulation, and that the bookkeeping which is most essential
15£to describe their function is not one of energy’. Here Wiener equates the 
working body-machine with the vacuum tube -  a glass, metal, or ceramic tube or 
envelope evacuated of air in order to control the flow of an electric current
16 Cybernetics, p. 50.
17 Cybernetics, p. 51. For more on these body-machine epochs, see David Tomas, 
‘Feedback and Cybernetics: Reimaging the Body in the Age of the Cyborg’, in 
Cyberspace, Cyberbodies, Cyberpunk, ed. by Mike Featherstone and Roger 
Burrows (London: Sage, 199^), pp. 21-44.
18 Norbert Wiener, ‘Cybernetics’, Scientific American, 179 (1948), 14-19 (p. 15).
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(whereby the vacuum draws the current into a controlled, unidirectional path).19 
In cybernetics, the body -  which is without, or is evacuated of, an internal power 
source -  does not act energetically but controls energy, regulating and 
maintaining its energy levels as its environment changes, a changing 
environment here mirroring the concept of the alternating flow of a current. This 
process of self-regulation describes the cybernetic notion of homeostasis, the 
maintenance of a consistent bodily state via an input/output or negative feedback 
function, by which the body learns and adapts. Cybemetically, then, energy, as 
an alternating flow external to volition, is controlled by information: neural 
decisions sort and regulate energetic release, because uncontrolled energy 
(positive feedback) will lead to a system’s entropy or burnout. This is precisely 
the sense in which Wiener invokes body-machine function as ‘bookkeeping’: 
cybernetic systems constantly monitor, sort, statistically evaluate, are paper- 
pushers rather than combustors. The key point here is that the advent of the 
‘Information Age’, in the Fordist 1940s, is distinctly wwenergetic, which 
problematizes Murray’s general argument regarding an information society. 
Murray ignores the computer’s unenergetic history, because he claims that 
computers, or information processors, emerge with the newest phase of 
capitalism’s energetic movement in the late 1980s, and therefore that computers 
are constitutive of post-Fordist ‘new times’ of oppression that ought to inspire a 
new time of energetic activism.
An important question dominating cybernetic research was that of the 
extent to which the properly functioning, homeostatic body functions as a digital 
computer and as an analogue computer. A seminal essay that develops
19 For more on the significance of vacuum tubes to representations of the body, 
see Hayles, Posthuman, pp. 100-108.
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cybernetics’ articulations of the analogue and the digital is literary critic Anthony 
Wilden’s ‘Analog and Digital Communication: On Negation, Signification, and 
Meaning’.20 This essay is part of Wilden’s 1972 book System and Structure, in 
which Wilden attempts to connect the above principles of cybernetics with 
humanities-based studies of communication and representation 21 Wilden defines 
an analogue computer as ‘any device which “computes” by means of an analog 
between real, physical, CONTINUOUS quantities and some other set of 
variables. These real quantities may be the distance between points on a scale 
[...] a quantity of some liquid, or the electrical current in a conductor. Examples
of the analog computer thus include a number of common devices: the map, the
00clock, the ruler, the thermometer’. To use one of Wilden’s examples, the 
analogue clock -  whether a sundial or a display with hour, minute, and second 
hands -  is analogue because it represents a continuum (time experienced as 
continuous) using a scale analogous to this continuum: dividing an hour with its 
hands, for example, enables visible comprehension of an amount of time 
remaining and an amount of time past, thus approximating an experience of 
time’s continuous movement. ‘The digital computer,’ Wilden states, ‘differs 
from the analog in that it involves DISCRETE elements and discontinuous 
scales. Apart from our ten fingers, the abacus was probably the first digital 
computer invented [...] Any device employing the on/off characteristic of 
electrical relays or their equivalents (such as teeth on a gear wheel) is a digital
20 Anthony Wilden, ‘Analog and Digital Communication: On Negation, 
Signification, and Meaning’, in System and Structure: Essays in Communication 
and Exchange (London: Tavistock, 1972), pp. 155-196.
21 For a useful explanation of the importance of cybernetics to Wilden’s project, 
see Gary Lee Stonum’s review of System and Structure in Modern Language 
Notes, 91:5 (1976), 1116-1120.
22 ‘Analog’, pp. 155-156. Emphasis in original.
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computer’. Wilden’s principal example of a digital computer is ‘the thermostat, 
[because] although [the thermostat] depends upon continuous analog quantities 
(the bending of its thermocouple in response to temperature) [it] involves a 
digitalization at a second level, because the thermocouple is connected to a 
switch which either turns the furnace off or turns it on’.24 In other words, proper, 
homeostatic function depends on a digital intervention, distinction, and decision 
within a variable analogue continuum. For the analogue clock/computer to 
become digital, it must shift from measuring time -  the employment of a device 
that follows or keeps up with a continuous experience, enabling one to 
imprecisely (or variably) ‘see’ this experience -  to calculating time -  the 
employment of a device that intervenes in a continuum using several discrete, 
discontinuous elements, enabling one to precisely calculate the micro-variations 
within this experience that are inaccessible to human perception and 
knowledge.25 We can thus summarize Wilden’s distinctions: the analogue is the 
domain of the continuous, the ‘more or less’, the variable or fluctuating. It is the 
domain exemplary of ‘bending’, to recall Wilden’s description of thermostat
23 ‘Analog’, p. 156.
24 Ibid.
25 This distinction between (analogue) measuring and (digital) calculating is a 
fundamental maxim of cybernetics. For a detailed description see Wiener, The 
Human Use o f Human Beings, p. 64. See also Tiziana Terranova, Network 
Culture: Politics for the Information Age (London: Pluto, 2004), pp. 32-33. 
Wilden’s distinction is of course complexified by the fact that many digital 
clocks have analogue-style displays, but this does not preclude Wilden’s guiding 
principles on analogue and digital characteristics. Indeed, the liquid crystal 
display representation of an analogue clock face is still digital, because the LCD 
area has a pre-set number of possible positions in which the represented ‘hands’ 
can move, unlike a mechanical clock.
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• 26 • •  •function. The digital is the domain of the discrete, the discontinuous. It is the 
domain of opposition, decision, control, and the constitution of borders.
For Wilden the analogue/digital distinction, as well as describing the way 
in which information is transmitted in computers, ‘is equally applicable to or 
derivable from the way information is transmitted within the human organism 
[...] or from the way it is transmitted between human organisms’.27 Wilden goes 
on to claim that the analogue/digital distinction is not made as clearly when 
describing information transmission in and between bodies. To demonstrate the 
distinction’s more complex applicability to information transmission within 
bodies, Wilden refers to ‘the constant switching between the analog and the 
digital in the behaviour of the message systems of the body’ at the level of the 
human nervous system. A ‘digital command’, Wilden claims, ‘releases a 
chemical compound which performs some analog function or other, this release 
or its result is in turn detected by an internal receptor neuron which sends a 
digital signal to command the process to stop or sets off some other process, and 
so on’. Wilden here posits the working body as a chain of discrete, digital
26 Wilden describes a key characteristic of the analogue as ‘the release of “more 
or less” of something’ (‘Analog’, p. 156).
27 ‘Analog’, p. 155.
28 ‘Analog’, p. 158. Wilden here is drawing upon the work of mathematician and 
cybernetician John von Neumann, whose 1958 book The Computer and the 
Brain argues that the brain operates part digitally, part analogically, as a 
computational system but with probabilistic methods that distinguish it from 
man-made machines. See John von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 2-11. The cybernetic theorization 
of the brain is important, because it posits the brain as a sorting mechanism that 
has little power over incoming messages, and which thus cannot assume a 
determining position within the nervous system. Philosopher Henri Bergson aptly 
summarizes this theorization, when he describes the brain as a form of inessential 
office worker: ‘In our opinioq [...] the brain is no more than a kind of central 
telephone exchange: its office is to allow communication or to delay it. It adds 
nothing to what it receives’. See Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. by
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(on/off) commands bome by the analogue chemical processes that these digital 
commands continuously ‘set o ff. Therefore the digital always takes on 
characteristics of the analogue: a fully digital body is never achieved because a 
digital intervention only refers, continuously (analogically), to another digital 
intervention. Wilden thus implies that bodies work analogico-digitally, rather 
than through the imposition of one definable command or computer onto another.
In Wilden’s discussion of information transmission between bodies, the 
overlapping of analogue and digital communication is emphasized further. 
Wilden begins with some guiding distinctions within the domain of human 
communication:
The analog computer [...] is directly or indirectly related to ‘things’, 
whereas the ‘language’ of the digital computer is essentially autonomous 
in relation to ‘things’ [...] The analog computer is an icon or an image of 
something ‘real’, whereas the digital computer’s relationship to ‘reality’ 
is rudimentarily similar to language itself [...] The analog is pregnant 
with MEANING whereas the digital domain of SIGNIFICATION is, 
relatively speaking, somewhat barren. It is almost impossible to translate 
the rich semantics of the analog into any digital form for communication 
to another organism. This is true both of the most trivial sensations 
(biting your tongue, for example) and the most enviable situations (being 
in love). It is impossible to precisely describe such events except by 
recourse to unnameable common experience (a continuum). But this 
imprecision carries with it a fundamental and probably essential 
ambiguity: a clenched fist may communicate excitement, fear, anger, 
impending assault [...] or revolutionary zeal. The digital, on the other 
hand, because it is concerned with boundaries and because it depends 
upon arbitrary combination, has all the syntax to be precise and may be 
entirely unambiguous. Thus what the analog gains in semantics it loses in 
syntactics, and what the digital gains in syntactics it loses in semantics.29
N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (New York: Zone, 1988), p. 31.1 discuss Bergson at 
length later in this chapter.
29 ‘Analog’, p. 163.1 am aware that the analogue ‘sensations’ that Wilden 
invokes and engages with here would be subject to a more thoroughgoing 
critique within poststructuralism. A poststructuralist perspective would arguably 
criticize Wilden’s invocation of analogue communication that is ‘directly or 
indirectly related to things’^, and of digital communication that is ‘arbitrary in 
relation to things’, because even this guiding distinction implies the possibility of 
engaging with affect in a pre-discursive capacity. Wilden is careful to note that
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Wilden uses these distinctions as the basis for a discussion of subjectivity and 
identity. Within Wilden’s logic, subjectivity, as the domain of shared meaning, 
concerns the accessing of an analogue, undivided, unmediated (prediscursive) 
continuum of experience via (digital) signification -  language as a system of 
discrete elements, finite in number. These digital elements combine arbitrarily 
(‘autonomous in relation to things’) to enable analogue meaning to be accurately 
communicated from organism to organism. But as the accurate communication 
of the analogue, the digital entails a loss of analogue sensation in its complexity 
and singularity: functioning at a distance from ‘things’, digital accuracy always 
implies the inability to be accurate about the analogue ‘rich[ness]’ of an
'J A
experience. Identity, which Wilden interprets as the assumption of a coherent 
self from subject position to subject position, is essentially more digital than 
subjectivity, Wilden asserts, because it acts as a form of second-order 
digitization. Wilden indeed calls identity ‘a pure digital concept. That is to say, it 
is [...] a rule about digitalization, like “not”’: in other words, a digital (on/off or
‘without the digital, we could not speak of the analog’, that is, to posit the 
analogue as an undivided continuum is still to posit and therefore signify 
(digitize) an undivided continuum. But from a poststructuralist perspective, this 
statement can be extended in order to problematize the temporal logic that 
constitutes Wilden’s rhetoric, by which the analogue is still spoken of as that 
which always comes first: for Wilden, something is always analogue before it is 
digital, despite his acknowledgement that the analogue must be signified. There 
is thus the possibility of arguing, contra Wilden, for the (analogico-)digital as the 
necessary condition of an analogue continuum, in order to counter the 
problematic assumption that there exists an indivisible, unmediated continuum 
for us to speak of, free of digitization. I will not pursue this debate at this stage, 
because the issue of whether affect is always already discursively constructed is 
central to the later stages of this chapter.
30 Elsewhere, Wilden extends this argument to claim that in ‘human 
communication, translation from the analog to the digital often involves a gain in 
information (organization) but a loss in meaning’ (‘Analog’, p. 168). The 
argument that a ‘barren’ digital misses, as it were, the complexity of the 
analogue, informs the essays discussed in the following section of this chapter, 
which argue for the analogue as that which inspires our notions of movement in a 
so-called digital age.
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either/or) distinction that, in subjectivity, introduces discontinuity into an 
analogue continuum, becomes a binary opposition in identity, because identity 
negatively distinguishes between the poles of a distinction (that is, either/or 
becomes further digitized or organized by what Wilden calls the ‘analytical
• T 1 _logic’ of ‘A and non-A’). Thus, even though they involve varying degrees of 
analogue and digital communication, both identity and subjectivity depend on the 
analogue’s digitization. Wilden however stresses that this should not imply a 
general subordination of analogue to digital: ‘The digital [...] has greater 
“semiotic freedom” [than the analogue], but it is ultimately governed by the rules 
of the analog relationship between systems, subsystems, and supersystems in 
nature. The analog (continuum) is a set which includes the digital (discontinuum)
T9as a subset’. Wilden here aims to locate linguistic communication within a 
wider context of general ecosystem survival. For Wilden, a digital intervention 
marks an individuation in an analogue continuum, but this individuation is a 
‘subset’ employed to organize against a system’s entropy: ‘system’ here refers to 
nature conceived cybemetically, as a set of co-ordinative levels in continuous 
relation to one another. Nature, in Wilden’s logic, functions analogico-digitally 
and incorporates inter-organismic communication as a component of this 
function, meaning that nature cannot be described simply as a biological domain 
that becomes mechanized in digitization. In short, linguistic (digital)
31 ‘Analog’, p. 186. This formulation underwrites Wilden’s general argument that 
in the digital, one is able to say ‘no’, a function not available in the analogue 
because, for Wilden, the analogue can only ‘refuse’ or ‘reject’ (the manifestation 
of which includes, for example, the persistent return to a perilous or threatening 
state without ever being able to finally negate the occurrence of such 
circumstances). See ‘Analog’, p. 163. These distinctions importantly inform the 
theory of shame that I will discuss in this chapter’s final section.
32 ‘Analog’, p. 189.
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communication is employed to ensure survival, which is analogue -  a continuous 
relation between bodies and an environment.
My purpose here is not to determine the scientific or anthropological 
veracity of Wilden’s assertions, nor is it to locate Wilden’s rhetoric of the 
nervous system, inherited from Wiener, within the body-machine discourse of 
hierarchized organs and an eligible time of bodily representation.33 Instead I wish 
to underscore Wilden’s implication that bodily intelligibility is coextensive with 
the inability of the digital to supersede and nullify the analogue. The crucial point 
to be drawn from Wilden’s study is that within communication, full digitalization 
is forever deferred: a distinction between the digital and the analogue is made 
only to name the two communicative components that relationally enable bodily 
awareness and function. This point is significant because it problematizes the 
succession-logic informing the notion that, in the twenty-first century, bodies are 
moving inexorably towards (or have inexorably entered) a ‘digital age’. I am 
referring here to the rhetoric of a transition from analogue to digital; at the time
The critique of cybernetics’ prioritization of the nervous system is nonetheless 
important. Although cybernetics posits the nervous system as levels of control 
that include the brain as a localized sorting mechanism, it can be argued that this 
theorization does not do enough to destabilize the brain’s originally differentiated 
status as that which hierarchizes the sense organs. As David Tomas points out, 
Wiener’s model of cybernetic organization is indeed posited ‘as if structured 
according to sophisticated systems of control with its brain serving as a top-level 
co-ordinator’ (‘Feedback’, p. 26). It is thus valid to argue that Wiener and 
Wilden do little to trouble the temporalized hierarchy of organ function that I 
have discussed from the beginning of this thesis, because both claim that 
cybernetic organization is exemplified by a model of the nervous system that, as 
Tomas shows, is the same as Taylor’s logic of the personal coefficient. The 
interrogation of this cybernetic logic is found in early poststructuralist thought. 
Jacques Derrida highlights the anthropomorphism still implicit in Wiener’s 
theory of meaningless information: ‘Wiener, for example, while abandoning 
“semantics”, and the opposition, judged by him as too crude and too general, 
between animate and inanimate etc., nevertheless continues to use expressions 
like “organs of sense”, “motor organs”, etc. to qualify the parts of the machine’. 
See Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 324 n. 3.
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of writing, governments worldwide are enacting policies designed to facilitate 
the transition from analogue media to digital media. Accompanying these 
policies is the distribution of information that prepares body-machines for 
imminent digitization: households are instructed to replace analogue technologies 
with digital technologies in time for this shift in communicative type. In the 
United Kingdom, this policy is referred to as the ‘digital switchover’.34 The 
premise here is that, owing to technological development, a digital (on/off) 
decision and intervention is capable of bringing analogue communication to an 
end, switching off the analogue and thus inaugurating a new time of bodily 
relations.
But the information of the switchover, whereby information designates 
the content of messages about this change of communication -  namely, we shall 
not wait long for a new (that is, digital) time that more appropriately describes 
our function -  is rendered problematic by the informational cybernetic systems 
that wait, patiently, for a fully digital that can never arrive. The patience I ascribe 
to cybernetics is patience in a peculiar form. Cybernetic systems or body- 
machine-computers work, analogico-digitally and homeostatically, without the 
technological ‘development’ -  the succession of one body-machine time by 
another -  that in switchover rhetoric legitimates a body-computer equation. In 
other words, cybernetic systems do not require Forwardism in order to function: 
Wiener raised an awareness of bodies as cybernetic systems between the late 
1940s and mid-1960s, after which widespread, powerful general-purpose 
computerization would go on to (in part) define the advent of post-Fordism, and
34 See <http://www.digitaluk.co.uk> [accessed 10 March 2009]. This website 
includes the explanation th a t‘between 2008 and 2012 the UK is switching to 
Digital [television] and the old Analogue signal will be switched off: this text is 
accompanied by the tagline ‘Get Set for Digital’.
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in part frame the function of bodies in post-Fordism (as we see in Murray, where 
a body can legitimately be called a computer only after announcing post- 
Fordism’s presence). Cybernetic systems sort and self-regulate without the 
impatience for technologically determined new times. This is not to deny that 
cybernetic systems are articulated in anticipation of powerful computerization: 
the possibility of advanced, general-purpose computers provides cybernetic 
imagination with its impetus. But Wienerian cybernetics anticipates a 
technological development whose advent will render its body-machine-computer 
representations obsolete. The Wienerian cybernetic moment, in other words, is 
neither destined nor required to survive the introduction of the actual technology 
it anticipates, because it anticipates computers powerful enough to make its 
imaginations and speculations unnecessary -  a ‘development’ that will in part 
validate, in part invalidate and thus streamline Wiener’s richly imagined body-
n c
computers according to the realizations of a superseding time. This notion of 
body-computers not surviving the development of computers is particularly 
significant. It enables us to argue that informational cybernetic systems wait, in 
homeostasis, for nothing to happen: a movement forward into actual 
computational power will result in their death or switch-off, forcing them to wait
35 In arguing that this cybernetic moment is ‘neither destined nor required to 
survive the introduction of the actual technology’, I am paraphrasing critics Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s important claims for cybernetic 
significance in ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins’, in 
Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 93-122 (p. 105). The cybernetic 
moment I invoke is referred to by Sedgwick and Frank as the ‘cybernetic fold’: 
‘the moment [roughly from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s] when scientists’ 
understanding of the brain and other life processes is marked by the concept, the 
possibility, the imminence, of powerful computers, but the actual computational 
muscle of the new computer^ isn’t available yet’ (‘Shame’, p. 105. Emphasis in 
original). I discuss Sedgwick and Frank’s essay in the concluding sections of this 
chapter.
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indefinitely as their patience, their homeostasis-in-anticipation, remains 
continuous. We can name this quality (im)patience: an untimely waiting that 
forces/is forced by a movement that goes nowhere.
The unenergetic, overbearing (im)patience of cybernetic systems is 
provocatively articulated in Sam Mendes’ 2008 film Revolutionary Road?6 Set 
in Fordist 1955 Connecticut, Revolutionary Road narrates the marital breakdown 
of Frank and April Wheeler, a breakdown prompted by the couple’s 
dissatisfaction with the way in which their entry into heteronormative, upward 
class mobility (marriage, children, Frank’s job for life, and April’s suburban 
housewife status) has thwarted their attempts to mobilize their life aspirations. In 
the film’s concluding stages, Frank and April are sat at their kitchen table having 
breakfast, the morning after a violent confrontation in which the pair announced 
their hatred for one another. This breakfast is an involuntary reconciliation:
Frank has rejected his and April’s impulsive move to Paris by choosing to stay in 
the job he hates, accepting a promotion to a new department selling newly 
developed, powerful general-purpose computers, leaving April stranded in the 
boredom of domesticity and pregnant with their (unwanted) third child.
As April pretends to show an interest in Frank’s new job before he leaves 
for his first day, she asks Frank to explain precisely what this new post entails. 
Frank obliges by providing a sketch of the new computer on his breakfast napkin, 
supplementing the drawing with a valorization of the computer’s power: ‘It’s full 
of vacuum tubes!’. As this demonstration proceeds, the scene cuts to April’s face 
as she reaches the shattering realization that (like the girls in Warhol’s Factory)
36 Revolutionary Road. Dir. by Sam Mendes. Dreamworks and BBC Films. 2008. 
Mendes’s film is an adaptation of Richard Yates’s 1961 novel of the same name. 
See Richard Yates, Revolutionary Road, 3rd edn (London: Vintage, 2008). I focus 
on the film version for reasons that will become clear later in this chapter.
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she is bound for a life of inertia. Frank’s sketching of vacuum tubes, which 
announces a Forwardist movement -  the transition from Fordist car or Wheel(er) 
to computer, despite the fact that, following Wiener, these two Fordist bodies can 
already be posited as body-machine-computers -  engenders a temporal vacuum 
that forces April’s (im)patience. Devastated by her suspension-in-non-aspiration 
caused by Frank’s technologically determined mobility, April decides to make 
something happen: after Frank has left for work, April uses what can only be 
described as a form of vacuum -  a crude, unsafe, manual contraceptive device -  
to forcibly abort her unwanted baby. But the movement prompted by this 
Forwardist succession leads nowhere: the abortive vacuum draws too much 
blood, and April dies. Revolutionary Road thus draws out the key critique 
offered by my notion of (im)patience: the positing of bodies according to an 
appropriate, technologically determined age perpetuates a normative temporal
• • •Another intriguing aspect of Revolutionary Road is what we can call the 
appearance, in the narrative, of Wiener in allegorical form. Throughout the film, 
Frank and April are questioned and criticized for joining the trajectory towards 
‘the good life’ by their elderly friends’ son John, a mathematician suffering from 
schizophrenia who is permitted leave from a psychiatric institution to visit the 
Wheelers on a regular basis. An uncomfortable, disruptive presence at the dinner 
table and in the living room of the Fordist household, John’s ill-timed outbursts 
against family time force Frank and April to confront the contradictions inherent 
in the promise of upward class mobility. Thus John, the malfunctioning 
mathematician unable to join with computer-enabled upward mobility (like 
Wiener the mathematician, who, in thinking cybemetically, will be left behind or 
whose formulations will be made to malfunction by mass computer technology’s 
introduction), remains in place importantly to make marriage malfunction. John 
is important because he reveals the fault lines of a future-bound temporal schema 
that makes certain movements and emotional responses appear natural. It is 
important to note however that Wiener often anticipated powerful 
computerization with trepidation. Wiener warily predicted the automatic, 
robotized factory, and after playing an important role in the design of American 
anti-aircraft weaponry in World War II, assumed an anti-war stance over fears 
that such technology would be used against humanistic values. In both cases, 
Wiener was anxious to ensure that his concept of homeostasis protects the 
boundaries of the liberal humanist subject. For an important discussion of the 
racial, gendered, and sexual implications informing Wiener’s anxiety, see 
Hayles, Posthuman, pp. 84-113.
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logic, which impatiently moves past those bodies or cybernetic systems that do 
not survive such a reduction or streamlining into succession. Those bodies, in 
their analogico-digital function, are no less computerized than those inaugurated 
by a technological advancement and, in having their intelligibility bound up with 
a cybernetic moment of thought that waits patiently for an advancement it does 
not require, continue to offer us a means of interrogating the Fordism-to-post- 
Fordism shift that grounds such a reductive notion of computers.
Moving
Since Wilden’s theorization of analogue and digital communication over thirty 
years ago, other scholars have warned against the reductive assumption of digital 
bodies, or of bodies that function in a digital age. The two principal essays that I 
will discuss in this section -  from 2002 and 2005 -  each call for the analogue and 
the digital to be thought relationally, in order to subvert the normative 
temporality of technological and bodily change that a digital age implies.
0 0
I realize that cybernetics is not reducible to the theories of Wiener and Wilden. 
After the cybernetic fold, there was a ‘second wave’ of cybernetics, which was 
characterized by the concept o f ‘autopoesis’ or ‘self-making’. Autopoesis 
emphasizes that an ecosystem cannot be observed as a totality or a functional 
whole from a position outside this totality. Instead, all such observations are 
made within the system itself, by yet more discrete -  individually closed -  
systems that each create their own environments, as a result of the highly specific 
ways in which each system’s closed (or constantly and discretely maintained) co- 
ordinative relations permit the environment to affect/transform its internal 
structure. See Hayles, Posthuman, pp. 131-159, and Zylinska, Bioethics, pp. 38- 
42. Thus, autopoesis demonstrates that the observer’s totality -  their 
comprehension of a reality or world -  is but one among multiple, ‘partial, 
fragmentary’, self-made totalities, which together constitute the system in a 
broader sense (.Bioethics, p. 40). It is important to acknowledge this second wave, 
because it disrupts Wiener’s attempts to distance himself from his theorizations 
in order to make them support a liberal humanist worldview. However, the 
chronology of cybernetics is outside the scope of my thesis, and my principal aim 
in this section has been to explore the critical significance in the present of the 
cybernetic fold’s conservatism, or, as Zylinska describes, its foregrounding of 
‘the importance of maintaining the system’s status quo’ (,Bioethics, p. 41).
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However, there is a more notable issue linking these essays: the need for the 
authors to re-emphasize the analogue alongside the digital is a response to the 
perceived inadequacy of poststructuralist theory to account for bodily movement 
and sensation.
In his 2002 essay ‘On the Superiority of the Analog’, philosopher Brian
Massumi juxtaposes a dynamic, transformative analogue mode and a digital
mode devoid of life and change:
The analog is process, self-referenced to its own variations. It resembles 
nothing outside itself. [...] Sensation, always on arrival a transformative 
feeling of the outside, a feeling of thought, is the being of the analog. It is 
matter in analog mode. This is the analog in a sense close to the technical 
meaning, as a continuously variable impulse or momentum that can cross 
from one qualitatively different medium into another. Like electricity into 
sound waves. Or heat into pain. [...] Or outside coming in. Variable 
continuity across the qualitatively different: continuity of transformation. 
[...] sensation is the analog processing by body-matter of ongoing 
transformative forces. [...] The digital is a numerically based form of 
codification (zeros and ones). As such, it’s a close cousin to 
quantification. Digitization is a numeric way of arraying alternative states 
so that they can be sequenced into a set of alternative routines. Step after 
ploddingly programmed step. Machinic habit.39
For Massumi, the technical definition of analogue communication provides a 
framework for radically rethinking how bodies move and feel in a new media 
existence. Massumi here collapses the distinction between moving and feeling. 
Within the mode of the analogue, Massumi asserts, sensation is a type of 
continuous movement: sensation does not simply give rise to an awareness of 
bodies and objects but rather references the body’s ability to keep up with its 
‘own variations’ or self-deformations. To speak of bodies and objects is thus, in 
Massumi’s logic, to detract from the contemporaneous flux of sensation; 
continuously variable, shape-shifting ‘body-matter’ is Massumi’s preferred term
Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 133-143 (pp. 135, 137). 
Emphasis in original.
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for describing how the complexity of movement can be more fully 
comprehended. To understand Massumi’s assertion of ‘analog processing by 
body-matter of ongoing transformative forces’, we can return to the problem of 
micro-variations of movement occurring beneath the level of human perception, 
which Wiener addressed by controlling these microvariations with a probabilistic 
theory of cybernetics. Massumi argues that the body is united with its own 
unquantifiable momenta if it is theorized as an analogue computer: body-matter, 
as unmotivated variation, can closely ‘process’ or compute ‘ongoing 
transformative forces’ and thus provide a fuller, more accurate understanding of 
bodily movement and change.
Massumi is implicitly against Wiener here. Wiener’s theory that a single 
movement is constituted in relation to other, alternative movements that are 
possibly made, would be viewed by Massumi as being lifelessly programmatic. 
Massumi would interpret Wiener’s claim that bodily intelligibility is produced 
probabilistically, at a distance from variable movements that cannot be 
accurately measured, as a ‘ploddingly’ ‘numeric way of arraying alternative 
states’, because for Massumi this theory is incapable of accounting for the 
movements that occur in between each of the alternative positions it quantifies 
and accounts for. In short, within Massumi’s logic, Wiener’s cybernetics is too 
digital', it accounts for movement by excluding movement as a fully continuous 
variability.
Although he juxtaposes the mobile fluidity of the analogue and the static 
clumsiness of the digital, Massumi stresses that the digital is immobile only 
insofar as we mistakenly continue to think the digital apart from the analogue, as 
that which replaces analogue' communication. Thus, despite the title of his essay
169
(‘On the Superiority of the Analog’), Massumi insists that the question of the 
analogue and the digital is not one of subordination. In the following passage, 
Massumi considers the ways in which Internet use refuses the periodization of a 
digital time:
While it is still true that everything on the Web is [digitally] 
preprogrammed, the notion of a dictatorship of the [hyper]link carries less 
weight. [...] The open architecture of the Web lends itself to the 
accumulation of analog effects. The increase in image and sound content 
alongside text provides more opportunities for resonance and interference 
between thought, sensation, and perception. A crucial point is that all the 
sense modalities are active in even the most apparently monosensual 
activity. [...] When the hyperlink surfer moves from one link to the next, 
the conditioning synesthetic fringe of sensation moves with the flow. At 
the next link, the complexion of its vagueness will have changed. One 
sense may stand out more from the perceptual infusion of the always 
accompanying fringe-flow of sensation. The vagueness may sharpen into 
a selective perceptual focus or a clarity of thought that strikes the 
foreground of consciousness in a flash of sudden interest or even 
revelation. Or the vagueness may thicken into a lull or daze. Boredom. 
Who hasn’t experienced that on the Web? The boredom often comes with 
a strange sense of foreboding: a sensing of an impending moreness, still 
vague. Next link. [...] Given the meagemess of the constituent links on 
the level of formal inventiveness or uniqueness of content, what makes 
surfing the Web compelling can only be attributed to an accumulation of 
effect, or [...] momentum, continuing across the linkages.40
Here Massumi is claiming that the digital aspects of technology are not enough 
to exemplify the function of body-machines in computerized societies. The 
World Wide Web is architecturally digital, in that it is programmed to anticipate 
all possible links, but Massumi argues that it is both reductive and deterministic 
to assume that bodies become digital by participating in this medium. Against 
this assumption, Massumi asserts that when bodies interact with the Web, the 
Web’s ‘programmatically prearrayed’ links give rise to the analogue process of 
‘vagueness’ 41 Vagueness is Massumi’s term for the body’s continuously 
unmotivated navigation of cyberspace, produced by cumulatively moving
40 Parables, pp. 140-141.
41 Parables, p. 140.
through links that, by virtue of their mw/ft'media content, distract conscious 
reflection and obfuscate the distinction between thought, vision, and sensation. 
The Web surfer’s perceptions, Massumi states, cannot privilege Internet use as a 
cerebral activity, because the surfer’s vision and thoughts are always 
‘accompanied by a physical sensation of effort or agitation,’ whether ‘a knitting 
of the brows, a pursing of the lips’ or ‘scratching [and] fidgeting’.42 In line with 
his definition of the analogue as ‘process [...] self-referenced to its own 
variations’, Massumi describes these sensations of attention and distraction as 
‘self-referential actions’ that engulf thought and vision, enacting ‘the turning in 
on itself of the body’ by not allowing bodily movement an objective 
motivation 43 Body-matter’s self-referential variability therefore explains for 
Massumi why the notion of a digital identity is wholly glib, and also aptly 
describes the vaguely interesting, compellingly boring activity of Web surfing, 
whereby momentary attention is fostered by ‘clicking] ourselves into a lull’.44 
Massumi’s notion of vagueness thus deconstructs the oppositions of 
interest/boredom and movement/stasis: a body goes nowhere because it is in 
dynamic flux, in which interest is, to use Massumi’s term, ‘fold[ed]’ into a more 
general compulsion for that which does not stimulate.45
Clearly influenced by Massumi, feminist critic Elizabeth Grosz also 
expresses concern over the implications of a world conceived digitally. Grosz 
builds on Massumi’s assertions of programmatic habit and predictability to 
represent the digital in terms of inaccuracy, congealment, and loss:
42 Parables, pp. 138-139.
43 Parables, p. 139.
44 Ibid.
45 Parables, p. 140.
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While the intellect masters what we need from the world for our 
purposes, it is fundamentally incapable of understanding what in the 
world, in objects and in us, is fluid, innumerable, outside calculation. [...] 
The intellect functions to dissect, divide, atomize: contemporary 
binarization and digitalization are simply the current versions of this 
tendency to the clear-cut, the unambiguous, the oppositional or binary 
impulses of the intellect, which are bound by the impetus to (eventual or 
possible) actions. The technological, including and especially 
contemporary digital technologies, carries within it both the intellectual 
impulse to the division of relations into solids and entities, objects or 
things, ones and zeros, and the living impulse to render the world 
practically amenable. Digitization translates, retranscribes, and 
circumscribes the fluidity and flux by decomposing the analogue or the 
continuous into elements, packages, or units, represented by the binary 
code, and then recomposing them through addition: analysis then 
synthesis. But these activities of recomposition lose something in the 
process. The sweep and spontaneity of the curve, represented only 
through the aid of smaller and smaller grids [...] represents] a 
diminution of the fullness of the real performance; the analogue 
continuum is broken down and simplified in digitization.46
This discussion of digitization is notable for the ways in which it echoes my 
theorization of the hard working body, and of Fordism’s co-ordination of bodies 
and machines into a planned, predetermined (or less fluid) flow. For Grosz, the 
digital reinforces normative conceptions of bodily movement: digitally, bodies 
function by hardening or solidifying -  ‘function’ here being determined by the 
ability to make use of technology, or to affirm the usefulness of technology as 
the basis for life-making, which for Grosz is the primary purpose of digitization. 
An intelligible body is one that is pixellated, increasingly broken down into more 
discrete elements (‘smaller and smaller grids’), which are then added together to 
recompose movement according to a logic of accurate measurement. Thus for 
Grosz, the meaningful body is hard not simply in terms of being bounded or 
having taken shape, but in terms of being a synthesis of already congealed or
46 Elizabeth Grosz, Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 141.1 say ‘clearly influenced’ because 
Grosz cites and advocates Massumi’s notions of bodily movement. See Travels, 
pp. 145, 226 n. 1, 229 n. 17. Grosz also makes an explicit connection to Wilden’s 
‘Analog’ (Travels, p. 233 n. 5).
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frozen movements: the claim that digitization brings a more advanced, accurate
understanding of movement is misleading, Grosz claims, because when we
witness bodies moving in the digital we are witnessing bodies whose movements
are constituted by discrete non-movements, positioned petrifications of
movement which support technological and scientific imperatives to analyse and
put to use. Digitization is significant, in Grosz’s terms, only as a contemporary
example of how the body’s hardness or intelligibility is bound up with a type of
forward movement that confers an eligible means of travelling in time. A digital
body’s travels are only ever realizations of movements that have been
determined in advance via stoppage, emplacement, and analysis.
While we can relate their assertions to Wilden’s theorization, Massumi
and Grosz’s arguments for the analogue draw more explicitly on the work of
philosopher Henri Bergson. Bergson’s critique of ‘Zeno’s arrow’ -  the paradox
posited by ancient philosopher Zeno whereby the concept of an arrow’s flight
confirms that the arrow cannot move at all -  exemplifies Massumi and Grosz’s
attempts to theorize beyond digital interventions in analogue continuums:
Take the flying arrow. At every moment, says Zeno, it is motionless, for 
it cannot have time to move, that is, to occupy at least two successive 
positions, unless at least two moments are allowed it. At a given moment, 
therefore, it is at rest at a given point. Motionless in each point of its 
course, it is motionless during all the time that it is moving. Yes, if we 
suppose that the arrow can ever be in a point of its course. [...] But the 
arrow never is in any point of its course. [...] The truth is that if the arrow 
leaves the point A to fall down at the point B, its movement AB is as 
simple, as indecomposable, as the tension of the bow that shoots it. [...] 
[T]he arrow which goes from A to B displays with a single stroke, 
although over a certain extent of duration, its indivisible mobility. 
Suppose an elastic stretched from A to B, could you divide its extension? 
[...] The course of the arrow is its very extension; it is equally simple and 
equally undivided. You fix a point C in the interval passed, and say that at 
a certain moment the arrow was in C. If it had been there, it would have 
been stopped there, and you would no longer have had a flight from A to 
B, but two flights, one from A to C and the other from C to B, with an 
interval of rest. To suppose that the moving body is at the point of its
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course is to cut the course in two [...] [and to] admit a priori the 
absurdity that movement coincides with immobility.47
Thus for Zeno, when an arrow is in flight it moves successively from one 
discrete position to another discrete position. The problem with conceiving of 
such a trajectory, Zeno claims, is that between one position and another are 
infinitely smaller positions; before the arrow can move from point to another it 
must take up each of these micro-discrete positions, which are forever divisible 
and thus prevent the arrow from moving anywhere 48 Also, the arrow is 
immobilized by its own measurement: at each point it occupies in its trajectory, 
the arrow is equal to its own length, meaning that the arrow’s travel is constituted 
by the arrow-in-analysable-stasis; put simply, no extra dimensions exist to 
validate the claim that the arrow moves forward 49
Bergson refuses what we can call Zeno’s digitization of mobility, arguing 
that Zeno’s crucial error is in conceiving of the arrow as a (digital) thing-m- 
movement rather than as a qualitative (analogue) transformation-in-process. For 
Bergson, Zeno is never contemporaneous with the arrow’s movement as he 
assumes to be, because Zeno’s notion of movement is constituted by positions 
plotted after an indivisible, self-varying flux by which the arrow is qualitatively 
transformed. The arrow, Bergson argues, is in a state of arrest only once it has hit 
its target, by which time it has undergone a change in type (‘the course of the 
arrow is its very extension’): it is no longer an arrow but a successfully-shot 
arrow and thus, however nominally, resists the logic of sameness required by
47 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell (London: 
Macmillan, 1911), pp. 325-326, 327. Emphasis in original.
48 Massumi provides a similar description of the arrow paradox in Parables, p. 7.
49 For more on the arrow’s immobilization-in-measurement, see Alan Robert 
Lacey, Bergson (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 32-33.
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trajectory analysis.50 Zeno’s conception of movement is thus limited to 
retrospective possibilities (‘A to C’ and ‘C to B’), by which the arrow’s mobility 
only confirms its inability to transform. Bergsonian movement, which inspires 
the rhetoric of Grosz and Massumi, therefore references the analogue compulsion 
of objects and bodies towards their own undoing as digital things. Massumi 
invokes the critique of Zeno to extol the virtues of ‘[fluidifying with Bergson’ 
within the context of bodies and new media.51 Massumi’s concept of vagueness 
exemplifies this incitement: when we retrospectively plot our visited links as the 
sum of our navigation through the World Wide Web, we fail to understand that 
the fluid ‘analogue effects’ of this navigation changed the body beyond the 
recognizable form it maintains when the surfing process is digitized into several 
stopping points.52
Massumi and Grosz’s calls to fluidify and fluctuate with Bergson bring a 
sophisticated and important critique of digitization-as-succession, and of the 
celebratory and apocalyptic valorizations popularly attached to this notion. But
50 The description of the transformation from arrow to successfully-shot arrow is 
made by Massumi in Parables, p. 7.
51 Parables, p. 6.
A similar claim is made for the gaming body in David Cronenberg’s 1999 film 
eXistenZ. Protagonists Allegra Geller and Ted Pikul become so immersed in 
virtual reality game ‘eXistenZ’ that it becomes impossible for them to distinguish 
between the game and the real world, and between their actions and those 
determined by the game’s prearrayed points of navigation. Geller and Pikul 
continually stop to ask one another, ‘are we still in the game?’, as the narrative 
proceeds, but these attempts to attribute a purposeful motivation to their 
trajectory are always interrupted, as the pair are abruptly transported each time to 
a newly perilous situation that requires them to acquire new skills (or to 
‘transform’ in Massumi’s sense) in order to move on. Thus the cumulative 
(analogue) effects of gaming prevent the ability to locate a solid, definitively 
bounded body that stays the same in the course of its navigation. See eXistenZ. 
Dir. by David Cronenberg. Momentum. 1999.
53 Massumi argues that ‘[a] commonplace rhetoric has it that the world has 
entered a “digital age” whose dramatic “dawning” has made the analog obsolete. 
This is nonsense. The challenge is to think (and act and sense and perceive) the
175
a far less critical temporal logic frames rhetoric in which the turn to Bergson is
explained as an important move in the time of theory. Before I discuss how
Massumi in particular participates in this logic, I want to refer to an analysis by
literary critic Suzanne Guerlac. Guerlac suggests that philosopher Gilles Deleuze
inherits Bergson’s affinity with technological change, which for Guerlac enables
Deleuzian thought to overcome the ennui produced by obsolete modes of
criticism at the end of the twentieth century:
However compelling the force of deconstruction, and however fruitful it 
has shown itself to be in investigations of cultural studies, by the 1990s 
the textual paradigm (Derrida, Barthes) and discourse analysis (Foucault) 
appeared to have done much of the critical work that they could do. I 
would suggest that the interest in Deleuze increased because he was less 
limited by a textual/discursive framework and, as Bergson had been 
before him, more attuned to developments in science and technology.54
For a project titled Thinking in Time, Guerlac here presents a remarkably simple, 
unsubtle model of temporal supersession: the notion of ‘Thinking in Time’ 
appears to be posited on the assumption that thought is only useful if it is 
contemporaneous with a world primarily compelled by (a glibly stated) 
technological ‘development’. I must stress that my concern with the rhetoric of 
theoretical timeliness does not represent a departure from the issue ofbody-
co-operation of the digital and the analog, in self-varying continuity. Apocalyptic 
pronouncements of epochal rupture might sell well, but they don’t compute. [...] 
The analog and digital must be thought together, asymmetrically. Because the 
analog is always a fold ahead’ {Parables, p. 143). Grosz makes a similar 
argument against celebratory accounts of computers and the Internet in Travels, 
pp. 93-94, and also in ‘Virtuality’, pp. 75-90.
Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 187. Deleuze’s affinity with Bergson is most 
expressly articulated in Deleuze’s book Bergsonism, in which Deleuze draws out 
Bergson’s arguments for self-varying transformation using the concepts of the 
virtual and the actual. I discuss Deleuze briefly in the following chapter, when I 
explicitly address the issue of virtuality. I want to separate the digital and the 
virtual at this stage for clarification, although the following chapter will show 
that they cannot be separated as such. See Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. by 
Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone, 1991), pp. 96-98.
machines. On the contrary, my point here is that Guerlac’s assessment of critical 
responses to techno-scientific change instances the process whereby theory takes 
on meaningful body-machine-computer form. As with the feminist waves 
paradigm in the previous chapter, Guerlac interprets the ‘interest[s]’ of subjects 
as the catalyst of a more abstract body of theory that cannot tolerate stasis: when 
interest ‘increase[s] ’, this body discards outmoded critical frameworks that have 
inhibited its movements by staying with it for too long. Also, the ‘machine’ 
aspect of Guerlac’s theoretical body reveals parallels with flexible feminism: the 
waves paradigm posits a body of feminism compelled by waves of energy out of 
the untimely Fordist factory, and similarly for Guerlac the unquestionable fact of 
‘developments in science and technology’ suffices to theorize theory 
ergonomically.
Guerlac’s analysis undermines the nuanced theorizations of the analogue 
and the digital drawn from Bergsonism. Bergson’s critique of the arrow -  a 
technological development -  demonstrates that analogue transformations occur 
across (and disrupt the intentions underlying) digital distinctions, thus preventing 
the complete digitization of movement. Bergson’s critique implies that 
technological development cannot serve as the basis for forward motivation: an 
arrow is developed, but (in analogue terms) its function requires that it 
qualitatively redevelops; an arrow fired is no longer an arrow, which frustrates 
the digital attempt to make sense of a thing through the analysis of its trajectory. 
Considering Bergson’s advocation of unmotivated change, it is reductive for 
Guerlac to posit a Bergsonian ‘ attune[ment]’ to technological development as an 
established quality for moving forward in time.
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Guerlac makes the claim that textual and discursive theories can do no 
more work. This claim is significant for the way in which it corresponds with the 
justification of Taylorism’s supersession by ergonomics within the rhetoric of 
physiology. Just as Taylorism’s division of work into discrete movements and 
positions is deemed by Kroemer and Grandjean to bore, inhibit and atrophy the 
body’s ‘biological characteristic’ of flexibly adapting to change, Guerlac 
attributes theory’s unwanted stasis in the 1990s to poststructuralist critical modes 
that, within a cultural studies paradigm, have predominantly emphasized the 
positions and counter-positions taken up by bodies within an ideological 
structure.55 Thus Guerlac’s observation of poststructuralism’s retirement is
55 These assumed positions and counter-positions can be called ‘discrete’, but 
discreteness does not mean the same across all areas of poststructuralist theory. 
This is evident when we consider the theoretical paradigms of the prominent 
poststructuralists Guerlac cites: Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. In 
Foucauldian terms, discrete or individual subject-positions are produced by 
power as ‘an open, more or less coordinated (in the event, no doubt, ill 
coordinated) cluster of relations’, for example between parent and child, doctor 
and patient, analyst and analysand, through which discourse is incited and 
multiplied, and identities are fabricated in the hierarchization of populations. 
Thus resistance or counter-movement is not external to power, but enabled and 
constrained by those very mechanisms these movements seek to oppose. See 
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, ed. by Colin Gordon, trans. by Gordon, Leo Marshall et al. (Harlow: 
Longman, 1980), p. 198, and Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History o f 
Sexuality: 1, trans. by Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976). In 
Derridean terms, discreteness concerns Derrida’s critique of Saussurian 
linguistics, which, as I described above, theorizes language as a system of 
discrete elements, finite in number. Saussure’s assertion that meaning is 
produced not through the self identity of phonemes -  the smallest or most 
discrete units of sound that constitute words -  but through the differences 
between phonemes, is interrogated by Derrida for continuing a 
phonocentric/logocentric tendency, whereby writing is mistrusted as that which 
corrupts speech as the repository of self-present self-consciousness. Derrida 
counters this phonocentrism by deconstructing the speech/writing binary, arguing 
that there is not first an oral language and a written copy of that language, but 
that language is always already a writing or inscription -  a system of traces or 
discrete elements marking that which is forever and foundationally absent. See 
Grammatology, pp. 30-65, and Jacques Derrida, ‘Semiology and Grammatology:
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affected by two primary Forwardist assumptions: the uncritical prescription of
proper bodily function that accompanies the invocation of work-as-labour
(bodies fixed in position do not work properly), and the equally uncritical
acceptance of material transformation as the propulsion of intellectual endeavour
(technology and science have changed, and therefore theory must be relevant to
these changes). Paradoxically, then, Guerlac alludes to the crudely digital aspects
of critical modes in order to enact the body of theory’s trajectory toward a new
position, which Bergson and neo-Bergsonists (such as Massumi and Grosz)
would surely criticize as precisely the type of succession-logic supported by a
crude misunderstanding of, and investment in, digitization.56
But Massumi in fact begins his Parables for the Virtual by explicating the
limitations of ‘[c]ultural theory of the past two decades [the 1980s and 1990s]’:
‘The Body’. What is it to The Subject? Not the qualities of its moving 
experience. But rather, in keeping with the extrinsic approach [Massumi’s 
reference to cultural theory’s positing of ‘a subject “constructed” by 
external mechanisms’], its positioning. Ideological accounts of subject 
formation emphasize systemic structurings. The focus on the systemic 
had to be brought back down to earth in order to be able to integrate into 
the account the local cultural differences and the practices of resistance 
they may harbour. The concept of ‘positionality’ was widely developed 
for this purpose. Signifying subject formation according to the dominant 
structure was often thought of in terms of ‘coding’. Coding in turn came 
to be thought of in terms of positioning on a grid. The grid was conceived 
as an oppositional framework of culturally constructed significations: 
male versus female, black versus white, gay versus straight, and so on. A 
body corresponded to a ‘site’ on the grid defined by an overlapping of 
one term from each pair. [...] Proponents of this model often cited its 
ability to link body-sites into a ‘geography’ of culture that tempered the 
universalizing tendencies of ideology. The sites, it is true, are multiple. 
But aren’t they still combinatorial permutations on an overarching 
definitional framework? Aren’t the possibilities for the entire gamut of
Interview with Julia Kristeva’, in Positions, trans. by Alan Bass (London: 
Athlone Press, 1981) pp. 15-36.
56 Guerlac undermines her renewal of Bergsonian philosophy by positing theory 
as a r/img-in-flight, rather than as body-matter whose arrested position after flight 
attests to a vague, unmotivated self-variation or becoming-undone that would 
undermine the preoccupation with where theory is going.
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cultural emplacements, including the ‘subversive’ ones, precoded into the 
ideological master structure? Is the body as linked to a particular subject 
position anything more than a local embodiment of ideology? Where has 
the potential for change gone? [...] How can the grid itself change? [...] 
The aim of the positionality model was to open a window on local 
resistance in the name of change. But the problem of change returned 
with a vengeance. Because every body-subject was so determinately 
local, it was boxed into its site on the culture map. Gridlock.57
Massumi is more explicitly critical than Guerlac of the overly digital aspects of 
cultural theory’s significatory and discursive frameworks. We can see how the 
critique of Zeno’s arrow influences Massumi’s claim that these frameworks are 
unable to account for bodily movement: ‘boxed in’ cultural theory, Massumi 
implies, can only add more positions or arrested movements to account for the 
body’s travels, which means that the body goes nowhere within this disciplinary 
domain. But Massumi’s insistence on the ‘local’ as a principal target of critique 
bears an alarming resemblance to Harvey’s exclusionary denunciation of place- 
bound embodiment, in a materially transformed existence where flexible 
movement is all that means and materializes.58 Indeed we can elaborate on this 
complicity, by highlighting Massumi’s claim that the positionality model’s
Parables, pp. 1, 2-3. Emphasis in original.
58 Massumi’s assertion of ‘proponents’ of digital positionality who, in resistance 
to ideology, ‘link body-sites into a geography of culture,’ is an impoverished 
generalization of critical theories of place. Massumi assumes that the only form 
of resistance offered by a cultural studies/positionality model is flexible 
resistance -  the form of utopian global socialism advocated in Harvey’s cultural 
geography -  which perpetuates the further assumption that, within culture, 
capitalism always dominates or wins due to its superior flexibility. Halberstam’s 
Queer and Gibson-Graham’s ‘Querying’ are very critical of the ‘geography of 
culture’ notion that Massumi uses to summarize all textual practice: both 
Halberstam and Gibson-Graham remain with a positionality model by alluding to 
the ongoing opportunities presented, within a flexible ‘geography’, to disrupt the 
flexible/rigid binary. Indeed, in a project dedicated to transformation, Massumi 
worryingly has nothing to say about how or whether his abstract, extra-terrestrial, 
gridless programme of change will work with those theoretical strategies that 
continue to offer important political (sexual, racial, gendered, and class-based) 
claims for subjects both (perhaps even simultaneously) immobilized and 
mobilized within the positionality model he denounces.
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emphasis on ‘local cultural differences’ provided a means of bringing bodily 
subjects ‘back down to earth’. Because for Massumi this earth-bound strategy 
has fostered a digitally reductive understanding of bodily movement, Massumi’s 
advocacy of qualitative analogue change amounts to an abstract call to other­
worldliness (‘How can the grid itself change?’). This is difficult to distinguish 
from Robert Bly’s call for bodily fluidity -  a call for (white, male, heterosexual) 
bodies to lose themselves, or divest themselves of an earthly existence in which 
‘culturally constructed significations’ (namely, for Bly, media portrayals of 
indecisive fathers and weak males) had momentarily (‘locally’) displaced their 
privileges.59 Thus a digital (that is, succession-bound) body animates Massumi’s 
rhetoric, even as Massumi argues against such a body’s existence.
59 The introductory chapter of Parables, from which this excerpt is taken, is titled 
‘Concrete Is as Concrete Doesn’t’ {Parables, p. 1). The title refers to a phrase 
from the song ‘Solidify’ by Sheryl Crow, and for Massumi aptly summarizes 
Bergson’s critique of Zeno’s arrow. For Massumi, a thing is -  in other words, the 
qualities and properties of something can be comprehended -  only when it is a 
‘concrete’ or indivisible singularity of movement. This concreteness is not the 
same as digital methods of stoppage or gridlock, Massumi implies, but is rather 
the means by which the analogue moves ahead of digitization. A thing is solid in 
its singularity, then, but the continuously variable movement of its singularity 
ensures that this thing will have solidified, many times over -  or, in other words, 
will have transformed -  into something other than that captured by the points of a 
digital trajectory, from the very moment that these points were plotted. The 
digital can never keep up with this dynamism, Massumi suggests, because digital 
representation tries to comprehend a thing by analysing it retrospectively (by 
trying to determine what this thing was ‘doing’). This critique informs 
Massumi’s claim that signification misses this dynamic quality of movement.
But as my reading of Bly suggests, the incitement to move past significatory 
struggle is not new, regardless of the intellectual rigour and original insights 
offered by Massumi’s project. The ‘hyperlink’ -  to borrow Massumi’s 
terminology -  from Bly to Massumi thus leads us to assert, against Massumi, that 
Concrete indeed does', that ‘concrete’, as signifier of the solidification of things, 
is implicated in a motivated and temporalizing logic, just as ‘iron’ is for Bly, 
despite Massumi’s claims for the undoing of things and despite Bly’s claims for 
a more flexible masculinity. This reveals a limitation in Massumi’s 
transformative theory of the analogue, by which we can playfully suggest that 
Iron John qualitatively transforms (fluidifies, only to solidify) into Concrete 
John.
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Massumi’s project assumes a revolutionary tone when it proposes the 
outmanoeuvring of significatory stasis by theories of qualitative change. As with 
Guerlac, this proposal to leave signification behind is coextensive with extolling 
the excitement and propulsion offered by science.60 Indeed, the cover description 
of Parables claims that Massumi offers ‘new paths for the wedding of scientific 
and cultural theory’. That Massumi’s mobile body of theory is described as being 
inaugurated by a wedding, however, leads me to undertake an avowedly textual 
critique of Massumi’s call to move past textuality. Describing Parables through 
the rhetoric of marriage invites an uncomfortable return to Revolutionary Road, 
which reveals the temporalizing logic underwriting Massumi’s belief that science 
moves us past digital stasis. In order to consider the textual implications of the 
wedding of science to the humanities, I want to explain the technological 
untimeliness that is produced by juxtaposing Parables and the screen adaptation 
of Revolutionary Road. Revolutionary Road was released after Massumi’s 
revolutionary rhetoric and depicts a technological time prior to Massumi. Both
60 Massumi provides the following call for science: ‘The point [...] is not to 
make the humanities scientific. The point is to borrow from science in order to 
make a difference in the humanities. [...] The fact of the matter is that the 
humanities need the sciences [...] a lot more than the sciences need the 
humanities’ (Parables, pp. 19-20). We can problematize this assertion by 
considering Jane Elliott’s assertion of the temporal logic that informs the rhetoric 
of scientific currency, which echoes my concerns over the automatic resistance to 
routine in post-Fordism: ‘we can now give science a chance because we’re tired 
of hearing that we shouldn’t, and science has until now been so far outside [a 
poststructuralist feminist] purview that it is refreshing rather than routine. While 
the turn to science may seem more like an abandonment of than a solution to the 
issues raised by poststructuralism, there may not ultimately be much of a 
difference between those two concepts’ (‘Currency’, p. 1698). Grosz differs from 
Massumi in that Travels incorporates poststructuralist theory and an argument for 
the critical significance of Darwinian models of evolution in light of Bergson.
But Grosz’s project cannot escape location within what Elliott calls ‘the 
temporalization of knowledge’ (‘Currency’, p. 1699) that frames this scientific 
turn: indeed for Grosz, a project dedicated to time and travel remains the 
occasion for claiming that science inaugurates a new direction, which is bound 
up with the call for analogue transformation.
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Parables and Revolutionary Road narrate the prospect of revolution in 
technologically affected lives, but after Massumi has asserted that the movement 
of bodies in new technology is coextensive with the moving on of our 
intelligibility of movement, Revolutionary Road links revolution and technology 
to the prospect of never reaching a technological time after Fordism.61
I emphasize this untimeliness to argue that Massumi’s wedding does not 
lead to revolution as such, but merely to a revolution, based on marriage, that 
revolves nowhere. My analysis of Revolutionary Road brings the realization that 
Massumi has been, as it were, beaten to the altar in the Fordist 1950s, by a union 
that testifies not to mobility but to the overbearing (im)patience that accompanies 
technoscientific change from Fordism to post-Fordism. The Wheelers’ decision 
to stay married, to make their marriage work -  to continue on the ‘revolutionary 
road’ of upward mobility that their marriage seemingly facilitates -  is 
simultaneously and crucially a decision to stay wedded to the notion of scientific 
and technological development. But as we see in the scene in which this 
coextensive decision is confirmed (Frank’s sketching of vacuum tubes to indicate 
his new job), the development from car to computer does not revolutionize 
bodily movement but violently reinforces bodily stasis, keeping bodies in place 
until atrophy appears the best way to make something happen. The ergonomic
61 Moreover, this movement from revolution to Revolution raises questions as to 
whether new media succeeds and supersedes traditional media. Revolutionary 
Road exemplifies the factory time that Benjamin asserts is immanent to film: the 
Wheelers’ homeostatic relationship is violent and aggressive, but it calmly 
(patiently) and adventurously moves us around the Fordist spaces that the film 
represents, or makes it possible to explore Fordism not simply as a restrictively 
normative time passed, but as a time whose restrictiveness or fixing of bodies in 
place can be appropriated in the present, as a way of critiquing the technological 
determinism of the Fordist-to-post-Fordist societal model. This remains the effect 
of Revolutionary Road regardless of whether it is viewed on a new media 
platform (on the World Wide ^ e b , as a downloaded file, on digital television, or 
on a digital versatile disc).
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principle boredom = entropy = atrophy is reworked in this analysis from a sign of 
meaninglessness into a critical nothingness in which the processes of 
heteronormativity are scrutinized, which in turn serves as a pointed reminder that 
important critiques persist in those critical modes that Massumi and Guerlac 
denounce as digitally dead to the body of theory. In short, a critical theory of 
place -  in which the opposition mobility/stasis is disrupted -  endures to show us 
that Massumi, in proposing an analogico-digital mandate of moving on, is 
anachronistically reinventing the Wheel(er).
Moved, to Believing in the Digital
I have argued that the digital has a problematic status in Brian Massumi’s 
analogico-digital theory of dynamically moving bodies. Massumi relies on the 
concept of the digital that he otherwise criticizes (namely, the switching off and 
supersession of critical modes which, in their emphasis on positionality, tell us 
nothing about how bodies move), which motivates his claim that digital positions 
of stoppage always accumulate unmotivated, qualitative (analogue) bodily 
transformations. In response to this problem, we can consider the work of Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank. Sedgwick and Frank’s essay ‘Shame in the 
Cybernetic Fold’ provides an analogico-digital theory that, although very similar 
to Massumi’s, arguably pays closer attention to (or has more time for) the digital 
aspects of stoppage, instead of theorizing stoppage solely as testament to a 
thing’s singular self-variation.62 In particular, Sedgwick and Frank provide an 
analogico-digital theory of the affect shame: the concept of moving bodies
62 Their essay was originally published in Critical Inquiry, 21:2 (1995), 496-522. 
Unlike Massumi and Grosz, Sedgwick and Frank do not use Bergson in their 
account of the analogico-digital, which perhaps accounts for this attention to 
stoppage.
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(which Massumi takes to reference the body’s constant, incomprehensible 
mobility) relates specifically here to bodies that have been moved -  that is, to 
bodies whose motivations are implicated in ‘the lowering of the eyelids, the 
lowering of the eyes, [and] the hanging of the head’.63
It is not immediately apparent from this description that Sedgwick and 
Frank differ from Massumi in a theoretical capacity. Indeed, that being moved 
testifies to a type of (non)movement which interrupts movement-as-motivation, 
appears to make this notion indistinguishable from Massumi’s Bergsonian claim 
that a body that has moved from one place to another (or an arrow that has been 
fired and has hit its target) attests to an indivisible continuum in excess of the 
motivations of trajectory analysis. But Sedgwick and Frank’s work on shame 
focuses on the ways in which this affect exemplifies the ‘layering [of] digital 
(on/off) with analog (graduated and/or multiply differentiated) representational 
models’.64 In emphasizing the ‘layering’ of the analogue and the digital, 
Sedgwick and Frank are more closely allied with Wilden’s framework of bodily 
function. To recap, this framework stresses the overlapping of analogue and 
digital communication at an intra-bodily level (the controlled neural release of 
‘more or less’ amounts of humoral transmission, and vice versa) and an inter- 
bodily level (signification facilitating a continuous relation between bodies and 
an environment, and changes in an environment requiring significatory 
control).65 While supporting the analogico-digital, Massumi certainly does not 
ally with Wilden to this extent, because Massumi argues that digital positions
63‘Shame’, p. 114.
64 ‘Shame’, p. 101. Sedgwick and Frank accordingly cite Wilden’s ‘Analog’ 
throughout their essay.
65 For more on humoral transmission -  the movement of fluids around the body -  
see Wilden, ‘Analog’, p. 156.
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accumulate the effects of a ‘superior’ analogue mode, superior because it opens 
the possibility of moving past signifying practices.
Shame, according to Sedgwick and Frank, should not be thought of as the 
negative prohibition of the body’s ability to enjoy and to be interested. Sedgwick 
and Frank instead theorize shame as that which is activated by interest-as- 
variable-continuum. In other words, there must already be the analogue 
transmission of interest for there to be shame: when interest (as a variable flow) 
reduces, shame is activated as a distinction within this continuum. Interest 
reduces to activate shame, but it does not reduce completely, because this 
positive transmission is the necessary condition of shame’s function, which is an 
interest-function: the determination of the degree to which one can be interested. 
Thus shame serves as a digital distinction within an analogue continuum, but 
only in that it maintains a continuous relationship with interest; shame can never 
decisively, digitally switch interest on or off: ‘[wjithout positive affect, there can 
be no shame: only a scene that offers you enjoyment or engages your interest can 
make you blush. Similarly, only something you thought might delight or satisfy 
can disgust. Both these affects produce bodily knowledges: [...] shame, as 
precarious hyperreflexivity of the surface of the body, can turn one inside out -  
or outside in’.66
Sedgwick and Frank invoke the term ‘outside in’ in reference to Wilden’s 
assertion that in ‘order for a [cybernetic] system to be open to an environment 
[...] the system must be capable of punctuating itself as distinct from that 
environment so as to select messages within it’. That is, a cybernetic system 
that distinguishes itself in order to communicate and control, does so not to
66‘Shame’, p. 116.
67 ‘Analog’, p. 174. Cited in ‘Shame’, p. 116.
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affirm an interior sense of identity but to continuously respond to environmental
factors ‘outside the body’s circulation’ (upon which the system’s intelligibility
depends), in Wiener’s terms. Sedgwick and Frank use Wilden’s assertions to
posit shame as an analogico-digital process of bodily intelligibility, in which
identity (a pure digital concept) is destabilized:
Shame is one of those affects whose digitalizing mechanism works to 
‘punctuat[e the system] as distinct’. Perhaps along with contempt and 
disgust, it can be a switch point for the individuation of imaging systems, 
of consciousnesses, of bodies, of theories, of selves -  an individuation 
that decides not necessarily an identity, but a figuration, distinction, or 
mark of punctuation. And unlike contempt or disgust, shame is 
characterized by its failure ever to renounce its object cathexis, its 
relation to the desire for pleasure as well as the need to avoid pain.68
Thus, because shame -  as a constitutive ‘switch point for the individuation of 
[...] bodies, [...] of selves’ -  never switches interest on or off, bodies and selves 
are always constituted through interest. But this form of interest, in being 
regulated by (and thus inextricably tied to) shame, leads bodies and selves to be 
continuously, variably stopped in their tracks by the painful and uncomfortable 
feelings that trigger ‘the lowering of the eyelids, the lowering of the eyes, [and] 
the hanging of the head’. In other words, these continual feelings of shame are 
not negative affects to be avoided in the (wrongly assumed) positive-affect 
processes of life-making, Sedgwick and Frank suggest. Rather, they are crucial to 
the openness by which one lives, where openness designates a receptivity to the 
certain qualities of (analogue, graduated) differences -  in this case, the qualities 
of different affects.69
68‘Shame’, pp. 116-117.
69 For more on shame and interest, see Elspeth Probyn, Blush: Faces o f Shame 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). Probyn 
underscores the significance of Sedgwick and Frank’s essay: ‘ [i]t is totally 
counter-intuitive to link shame (such a debased feeling) with interest [...] Shame 
[when paired with interest] illuminates our intense attachment to the world, our
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Sedgwick and Frank thus sophisticatedly argue that to be moving is 
coextensive with having been moved, or that to be mobile is to have been 
affected. Shame, which for the authors exemplifies this state, disrupts the 
distinction between being interested and being uninterested as it simultaneously 
disrupts the distinction between movement and stasis. It of course also troubles 
the distinction between analogue and digital, a subversion which the authors 
pursue in order importantly to critique the assumption that the analogue 
demarcates aspects of the living organism and that the digital demarcates aspects 
of the lifeless and machinic: ‘we must deprecate [...] the [...] homology that 
might identify the machine or computer with digital representation, and the 
biological organism with analogical representation’.70 This is a significant 
contestation of Massumi’s equation of the digital with lifeless ‘machinic habit’.
However, Sedgwick and Frank share Massumi’s strategy of using the 
analogico-digital to argue against theory’s digitization. Indeed, Sedgwick and 
Frank invoke the above homology in order to express their concern over the 
direction, or indeed lack of direction, that theory has taken: ‘The tacit homology 
machine : digital:: animal: analogical (and concomitant privileging of the 
machine/digital) is, we argue, a very powerful structuring presumption for
• * • 71current theory and emerges especially strongly as a reflexive antibiologism’. 
‘Reflexive antibiologism’ is Sedgwick and Frank’s term for describing how, in 
their view, critical theory ‘after Foucault [...], after Derrida, after feminism’
desire to be connected with others, and the knowledge that, as merely human, we 
will sometimes fail in our attempts to maintain those connections’ {Blush, pp. 14, 
15). I discuss bodily -  and failed bodily -  connections in the following chapter.
70‘Shame’, p. 101. '
71 ‘Shame’, p. 101.
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treats issues of the biological, the essential, and the natural too digitally.72 This is
an ‘after’ not in Guerlac’s sense of theories that have superseded
poststructuralism: ‘after’ instead refers to the way in which these critical modes -
by pervasively ‘span[ning] the humanities and extending] into history and
anthropology’ since the 1960s -  have naturalized a certain way of dismissing the
pre-discursivity of affects. Thus for Sedgwick and Frank, these critical modes
have left an enduring aftermath, namely the uncritical assumption that matters of
biology should always be subject to a digital on/off decision:
at this historical moment any definitional invocation of analogically 
conceived, qualitative differences [such as individual affects like shame, 
interest, anger, disgust, and so on], in the form offinitely many [...] 
values, does indeed run the risk of reproducing a biologizing essentialism. 
But that risk is far from being obviated by even the most scrupulous 
practice of digitalization. The essentialism that adheres to digital models 
is structured differently from the essentialism of the analog. But, at this 
moment, it is probably all the more dangerous for that -  precisely 
because, under the current routines of ‘theory’, it is not recognizable as an 
essentialism. Essence is displaced, under these routines, from the analogic 
possibility offinitely multiple qualitative differences to some prior place 
where an undifferentiated stream of originary matter or energy is being 
turned (infinitely) ON or OFF. To see the latter as a less ‘essentialist’ 
metaphorics than the former reflects, we argue, only the habitual 
privileging of digital models wrongly equated with the machine over 
analog models wrongly equated with the biological.73
Sedgwick and Frank make the valid argument that a theory based on the digital 
decision of unnaturalness is itself an effect of a naturalized, naturalizing schema. 
For Sedgwick and Frank, the digitally predictable routines of theory are only 
capable of invoking ‘Affect’: the authors capitalize the term to underscore the 
way in which, within these routine approaches, multiply different feelings -  
which are otherwise differently and complexly related to one another -  are 
grouped together into a singular, homogeneous mass of bodily potential, which
72‘Shame’, p. 93. v
73 ‘Shame’, pp. 111-112. Emphasis in original.
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awaits a digital decision for it to become constructed within language.74 Thus, 
when theory invokes affects in order to make the principal claim that affect is 
culturally constructed, all the properties within this affective realm are assumed 
to move or flow in the same direction, at the same time, and to and from the 
same places (namely, either in a place prior to representation and switched off, or 
in a linguistic system where they are switched on and made meaningful).75
This model is essentialist, argue Sedgwick and Frank, because it is based 
on the assumption that the communication of sensation is a purely digital 
function, by which the analogically natural is converted into the digitally 
cultural. From this perspective, the approach critiqued by Sedgwick and Frank 
perpetuates the ‘switchover’ logic that Wilden’s analogico-digital model 
persuasively argues against: the premise that bodies which sense and feel are 
inevitably taken over or superseded by a less natural or less biological system 
that signifies these feelings, and which is more technologically developed or 
essentially machinelike. Sedgwick and Frank admit that their analogico-digital 
account of shame is not at all immune from the charge of essentialism: any 
attempt to provide a more concretely bodily understanding of moving and feeling 
must contend with the distinct possibility that while all bodies experience affects, 
not all bodies experience affects in the same way or have done so 
transhistorically. But it is better, Sedgwick and Frank claim, to ‘risk’ essentialism 
-  to risk arriving at an essentialist position -  by positing bodily affects and 
sensations as analogically graduated, unpredictably related, and qualitatively
74 ‘Shame’, p. 111.
751 return to the issue of undifferentiated bodily movement and energy in the 
following chapter, when I discuss the body and the virtual.
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discrete, than to dismiss the individuation of bodily affects through a logic that is 
digitally/decidedly essentialist from the beginning.76
The authors also show a greater awareness than Guerlac and Massumi of 
theory’s implication within the processes of bodily intelligibility. Elsewhere in 
their essay, Sedgwick and Frank assert that this reductively digital, mistakenly 
mechanical schema of anti-essentialism ‘ round [s] up affect and herd[s] it into 
[...] what is already understood to constitute the body of Theory. The brand on 
that body is relentlessly legible: “theory” has become almost simply coextensive 
with the claim (you can’t say it enough) I t ’s not natural\ 77 However, I am 
concerned by Sedgwick and Frank’s unquestioned, seemingly self-evident use of 
the terms ‘routines’ and ‘habitual’ in their earlier discussion of essentialism 
(‘essence is displaced, under these routines [...] only the habitual privileging of 
digital models’), and by their further claim here that theory’s body is inscribed 
with repetition (‘you can’t say [It’s not natural] enough’). While they 
authoritatively argue that crudely digital models of criticism are themselves 
repeatedly essentialist, Sedgwick and Frank make only a brief reference to the 
important anti-essentialist or anti-foundationalist exposure of sites of oppression: 
‘We have no interest whatever in minimizing the continuing history of racist, 
sexist, homophobic, or otherwise abusive biologisms, or the urgency of the 
exposures of them [...]. At the same time, we fear, with the installation of an 
automatic anti-biologism as the unshifting central tenet of “theory”, the loss of 
conceptual access to an entire thought realm, the analogic realm of finitely many 
[...] values’.78 That is, Sedgwick and Frank identify an immobile (‘unshifting’)
76 ‘Shame’, p. 113.
77 V‘Shame’, p. 109. Emphasis in original.
78 ‘Shame’, p. 108. Emphasis in original.
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body (of ‘theory’) that does important but routinized work, and they allow this 
body to remain in stasis while they make analogic movements automatically 
more exciting and shifting. Thus a circularity is introduced into Sedgwick and 
Frank’s argument: anti-foundationalism should be critiqued because it is routine 
and immobile, but it is nonetheless important in its stasis and so will 
meaningfully remain in place. Yet because it meaningfully remains in place (as 
that which is criticized for preventing a more shifting thought realm), the critique 
of anti-foundationalism’s stasis is itself routine rather than revolutionary. This 
circularity affects Sedgwick and Frank’s theory of affects, whereby shame takes 
on the digital function that Sedgwick and Frank claim it eschews. Sedgwick and 
Frank assert that ‘insofar as they are [digitally] “theorized”, affects must turn into 
Affect’, but we can just as validly assert that shame here must turn into shaming 
-  the automatic shaming of anti-foundationalist routine, which Sedgwick and 
Frank’s brief praising of anti-foundationalism only helps to legitimate.79 Thus the
70 ‘Shame’, p. 111. Emphasis in original. Such (routine) shaming of the routine 
occurs in Sedgwick and Frank’s critique of a poststructuralist work on affect by 
gender and sexualities theorist Ann Cvetkovich. While Sedgwick and Frank 
praise Cvetkovich for the intelligent insights she offers in her account, 
Cvetkovich is shamed by the authors for ‘her rather minimal specification that 
affect is “discursively constructed” rather than “natural” [which] claim[s] the 
status of a theory’ (‘Shame’, p. 109). It is important to take heed of Sedgwick 
and Frank’s criticism, and Frank and Sedgwick themselves recognize and 
respond to critiques of their critique (‘Shame’, p. 120 n. 8). But Sedgwick and 
Frank fail to account for the possibility that their own method of critique is itself 
an effect of a certain temporalization whereby, in Jane Elliott’s terms, ‘the 
equation of the routine with the impoverished has an apparently self-evidential 
logic’ (‘Currency’, p. 1698). It must be noted that Sedgwick and Frank do not 
seek a new means of theorizing bodies. On the contrary, Sedgwick and Frank call 
for a return to structuralism (which they partly equate with the cybernetic fold) in 
order to complexify current theorizations of body-machines: ‘part of our aim is to 
describe structuralism, not as that mistaken thing that happened before 
poststructuralism but fortunately led directly to it, but rather as part of a rich 
intellectual ecology [...] that allowed it to mean more different and interesting 
things that have survived its sleek trajectory into poststructuralism’ (‘Shame’, p. 
105. Emphasis in original). I agree in general with this argument; indeed, it
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explication of bodily knowledges, which here is simultaneously a call for more 
bodily knowledges, remains bound up with the unexamined call for more 
mobility.
Across the rhetoric of Massumi, Grosz, Guerlac, and Sedgwick and 
Frank, the digital appears to be an exemplary source of incredulity. Either the 
digital is invoked by the critic as that which gives us a false belief in how bodies 
move(d) -  and on this basis the critic tells us not to believe in the digital -  or, in 
my critiques of these essays, the concept of the digital which the critic assumes 
to have moved beyond returns to undermine their assertions of bodily mobility, 
which causes us to disbelieve the critic’s logic of the analogue (or ana-logic). 
These critics inform us that, contrary to popular belief, bodies are not digital, 
bodies do not communicate digitally, and that any digital aspect of a body works 
only to facilitate a continuous analogue relationship (and I too believe in these 
resistances to full digitization, as a general principle against celebratory rhetoric 
of technologically determined ‘ages’). But the inherent incredulity attributed to 
the digital, whether animating or disrupting these critics’ rhetoric, arguably does 
nothing to challenge the binaries analogue/digital and continuous/discrete, which 
privileges the analogue/continuous on account of its greater mobility, and which 
subsequently accords it a privileged status in the analogico-digital. This always- 
already-secondary function of the digital prevents us from thinking the digital 
differently, not as the digital with more movement but as the digital rethought in
supports my assertion of cybernetic (im)patience. But Sedgwick and Frank’s 
failure to acknowledge their automatic resistance to routine makes this return to 
structuralism a means of going ‘back to the future’, so to speak: going back to 
structuralism is necessary to dislodge a routine present that (inexplicably) cannot 
stay routine (even if Sedg^vick and Frank are willing to leave anti- 
foundationalism in place), which is (again inexplicably) posited as a crucial 
move for theory’s future.
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its stasis and as a mode of positioning. What happens, then, when we do believe 
in the digital, in what the digital shows us? More specifically, what happens 
when we believe in a theory of the analogico-digital that accords the digital a 
more important role than that of the analogue’s catalyst? Addressing these 
questions will enable us to subvert the normative temporal frames that persist in 
the analogico-digital theories encountered thus far.
Deconstructionist critic Bernard Stiegler offers an important rethinking of 
the analogico-digital in his essay ‘The Discrete Image’.80 Stiegler considers the 
knowledges of movement produced in relation to ‘the three kinds of images that 
have appeared since the nineteenth century -  analog, digital, and analogico-
0 1
digital’. For Stiegler, the exemplary analogue images are those of photography 
and cinema; the digital image refers to ‘the computer-generated image [...]: a 
modelling of the real that can imitate reality quasi-perfectly’; and the analogico- 
digital image is exemplified by digital photography, and by computer imaging 
software that catalogues discrete aspects of image transmission.82 Because 
images are, Stiegler affirms, among ‘the material supports of the bulk of our 
beliefs' , the advent of each of these types of image both disrupts established
80 Bernard Stiegler, ‘The Discrete Image’, in Jacques Derrida and Bernard 
Stiegler, Echographies o f Television, trans. by Jennifer Bajorek (Massachusetts: 
Polity, 2002), pp. 145-163.
81 ‘Discrete’, p. 158.
82 ‘Discrete’, p. 156. Stiegler is the founder of the Institute for Research and 
Innovation (IRI) at the Centre Pompidou, Paris. The IRI has created Lignes du 
temps, an annotation and analysis software that uses a graphical interface to 
immediately reveal the discrete shots and sequences comprising ‘temporal 
objects’ (most notably film), and which ‘allows for a synchronized description 
and analysis’ of these discrete elements ‘through textual, audio and video 
comments, images and Internet links’. See
<http://www.iri.centrepompidou.fr/res/media/flyer_ldt_en.pdf> [accessed 19 
November 2009].
194
beliefs and imposes a new kind of belief, which may be a doubt or form of non-
• 83 •  •belief. Stiegler begins by discussing the analogue photographic image:
The rule is that every analog photo presupposes that what was 
photographed was (real). The image-object printed on photosensitive 
paper as this was, Barthes calls the spectrum. This spectre is produced by 
touch -  but by a type of touch that is very singular. Nadar took 
Baudelaire’s picture, and between Baudelaire and myself there is a chain, 
a contiguity o f  luminances', when I look at this portrait, I  know intimately 
that the luminances that come to touch my eye touched, that they really 
touched Baudelaire. [...] I know that I’m not going to be able to touch 
Baudelaire by putting my finger on his photographed face: he is dead and 
gone. And yet, the luminances that emanated from Baudelaire’s face at 
the moment Nadar’s camera captured and froze it forever still touch me, 
beyond the shadow o f  a doubt. This is moving [...] (it arouses, in me, a 
dull movement): the ghostly effect is, in this instance, the sentiment of an 
absolute irreversibility [...]: it touches me, I’m touched, but I’m not able 
to touch. I’m not able to be ‘touched’ and ‘toucher’ [...]. Continuity is the 
condition of possibility of the [...] this was: we must have a sense of 
continuity, of the continuity, not simply o f the chain o f luminances, but of 
what is seen as well. The grain must be effaced in order for the spectrum 
to create unity, in order for it to present itself as individual (indivisible 
singularity [...]), as this here (this was) in its unique character in its 
unique instant, and not to appear to be treatable [...] as such.84
In accordance with Massumi and Sedgwick and Frank, Stiegler is suggesting 
here that we must always refer to the analogue as the domain of the moving, 
implying not only irreversible movement, which supports Massumi’s theory of 
ongoing qualitative transformation, but also being moved or affected, which 
supports Sedgwick and Frank’s theory of shame’s interest-function. However, 
Stiegler’s analysis of touch alongside these aspects reveals the process whereby 
the analogue necessarily covers over its prior and inescapable digitization. The 
analogue image brings movement or rupture, Stiegler suggests, by generating a 
‘chain of luminances’ that irreversibly carries a materiality long dead (which 
therefore cannot be touched) but which, by virtue of this irreversible movement
83 ‘Discrete’, p. 149. Emphasis in original.
84 ‘Discrete’, pp. 152, 153. Epiphasis in original. Here Stiegler is invoking 
Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. by Richard 
Howard (London: Vintage, 2000), pp. 76-78.
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of light, persistently physically touches those bodies who come, successively, to 
view the image in the present, and moves these bodies with a ‘ghostly effect’ that 
alters belief.
But this untouchable analogue irreversibility, despite bringing rupture, 
retains a credulity in a mo(ve)ment that happened once as an ‘indivisible 
singularity’, a mo(ve)ment (‘this was’) at the origin of the analogue chain that 
was not and thus cannot be discretized, decomposed or ‘treat[ed]’ (treatment here 
implying critical analysis, or a critical touch). We find such credulity in Bergson 
and in Massumi’s neo-Bergsonism: both posit movement as an undivided 
singular continuum untouched or unable to be comprehended by positions plotted 
and analysed in retrospect. Indeed, we can use Stiegler’s discussion of the this 
was to formulate a general principle that compels Bergson and Massumi’s 
rhetoric: this was moving, but we are neither quick nor flexible enough to keep 
up with its singularity in our digital positions. Stiegler challenges this principle 
by arguing that the this was (moving/a moment) is not an indivisible reality, but 
is always a ‘reality-effect’ produced by effacing the discrete elements that 
constitute the analogue chain at its (non-)origin.85 Discrete ‘grains’ -  atomic 
silver halides -  constitute that which develops on the photosensitive paper and 
which will be carried irreversibly as the untouchable this was, but the 
photographic development process both conceals and prevents access to these 
grains in their discreteness.86 Furthermore, the analogue image is also constituted
85 ‘Discrete’, p. 155.
86 ‘ [T]he [analogue] photographer does not manipulate the grain that is printed 
on the paper as an effect of the luminances -  at least not in a discrete way. Of 
course, in developing, in “treatment”, etc., there is a certain manipulation of the 
grain, a certain treatment by the photographer. The art must pass through this. 
However, even if the grain can be massively enlarged or diminished, [...] one 
cannot separate different types of grains [...] [and] one does not have access to
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by discrete ‘framing operations and choices about depth of field’. ‘The continuity
of the analog image’, Stiegler affirms, ‘ought not to conceal the fact that the
analog image is always already discrete’: an indivisible singularity is always
already touched/treated by decomposition, irreversible movement by stoppage.87
For Stiegler, the analogico-digital image brings this archaic digitization to
light, insofar as the notion of light is rigorously deconstructed, and can no longer
serve as a support for belief in an unmediated taking-place:
What else are we afraid of in the analogico-digital? We are afraid of a 
night light. [...] The light of photography comes to us from the night of a 
past that I didn’t live, but once [...] this night was day [...]. It has 
irreversibly become night, this is what the past is [...]. But the day has to 
have touched the silver halides first. With analog light, the silver 
luminances still have to do with touch and with life -  with a past life. 
With the digital photo, this light, from out of the night, no longer comes 
entirely from the day, it doesn’t come from a past day that would simply 
have become night In the digital night, touch is blurred, the
chain becomes complicated. It [the chain of luminances] doesn’t 
completely disappear: we’re still looking at a photo. But something has 
intervened -  treatment as binary calculation -  which renders transmission 
uncertain. Digitization breaks the chain, it introduces manipulation even 
into the spectrum [...]. Photons become pixels that are in turn reduced to 
ones and zeros on which discrete calculations can be performed. 
Essentially indubitable when it is analog (whatever its accidental 
manipulability), the this was has becomes essentially doubtful when it is 
digital [...]. For the imprinting of luminances on the photosensitive 
support [...] the analogico-digital substitutes a deferred time: the time of 
storage as a calculation that decomposes [discretizes] the elements of the 
spectrum while waiting for the treatments that will end up in the 
imprinting of something else [...], the night in which, analyzed, ‘that 
which was’ becomes discontinuous.88
I find Stiegler’s assertions of a ‘deferred time [...] of storage’ and a 
computational ‘waiting’ time of discontinued mo(ve)ments particularly 
significant, because they imply a connection between the analogico-digital and 
metaphors of industrial obsolescence. As the previous chapter showed,
[...] all the elements which are differentiated therein in order to constitute the 
image’ (‘Discrete’, p. 154. Emphasis in original).
87 ‘Discrete’, p. 155. Emphasis in original.
88 ‘Discrete’, pp. 152-153. Emphasis in original.
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Taylorized Fordist spaces are crudely consigned to the nation’s past, ‘have 
become night’, in order to support a normative succession-logic of body-machine 
intelligibility: representations of empty factories or empty warehouses (storage 
spaces), discontinued products on discontinued assembly lines -  spaces where 
nothing happens -  underwrite the call for more and thus better mobility amid the 
discontinuation of entropic bodies fixed in position and place, bodies that store 
too much energy unavailable for conversion into proper function. This 
Forwardism extends into the work of Massumi, Sedgwick and Frank, and Grosz, 
in which the digital is the mistrusted component in an analogico-digital schema, 
mistrusted because without the analogue (and thus as pure positioning) it makes 
nothing happen for bodies: digital positions must ultimately be transcended as 
they enable an analogue chain of moving/moving on.
However, a close examination of Stiegler's analogico-digital reveals how 
a mistrusting of the digital is not superseded by a belief in the analogue. It is 
worth decomposing Stiegler's theorization in order to demonstrate my point. The 
analogue, Stiegler argues, is coextensive with credulity in movement (because it 
effects an uncritical assumption that imprinted movements and moments 'just 
were'); the digital introduces doubt into movement (because its operations of 
placing and positioning make it uncertain whether these imprinted moments and 
movements were true or false). But credulity and doubt are not opposed; in the 
analogico-digital, they intersect. From the intersection of the analogue and the 
digital emerges belief. Belief is the effect of the digital mediating the analogue. 
More specifically for Stiegler, belief is the foundation of an analogico-digital 
model of representation in which, with conviction, we ask questions of the 
apparently indivisible origin or source of credulity so crucial to the analogue,
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whilst still being affected by images that are transmitted digitally to us.
Therefore, Stiegler is not inverting (or, switching over) an analogue/digital 
binary; an archaic digital is not a pure digital: as Stiegler makes clear, in digital 
photography the analogue chain still remains in some capacity, because we are 
still looking at a photo. We are still touched by light that touched the materiality 
on display. However, in digitization this light has been made to wait, in storage 
(‘as photons become pixels that are [...] reduced to ones and zeros’), for 
information that marks its analogue transmission with deferral, alteration and
O Q
doubt. ‘Storage’ here does not signify the retarding and misunderstanding of an 
indivisible mo(ve)ment, or that which the analogue always moves past. Storage 
is rather the necessary condition of transmission, a transmission broken by 
questions regarding touch: it is uncertain whether ‘the analogico-digital 
luminances really touch[ed] the sensitive plate once [...] At the same time, I 
know this thing has to have touched, but I’m not sure: how much did it touch? To 
what pointV.90 These are the kinds of questions asked about the analogico- 
digital, at the intersection of credulity and doubt.
89 We can say that this activity is in many ways indistinguishable from the 
storage of data on a CD, for example. CD data are accessible after the marks 
imprinted or indented on the disc’s material form are read by a laser, and after 
the laser’s movement over these marks has been converted into binary code. 
Stiegler however focuses solely on the affective aspects of visual media: he is 
interested in the analogico-digital history of motion-capture and the properties of 
the images produced in this history.
90 ‘Discrete’, p. 154. Emphasis in original. Whereas Sedgwick and Frank argue 
that the digital negates or switches off an analogue (qualitatively different) 
engagement with shame, Stiegler calls for the digital to become ‘shameless’, to 
enable us to critically navigate through the differentiated aspects that constitute 
the image, a critical navigation prevented by the reality-effect of analogue 
movement: ‘We must effect a change in attitude in order to be able to see [these 
differentiated aspects or “multitude of discontinuities”]. They have an effect on 
us only insofar as we don’t  s^e them. The image is always discrete, but it is 
^ways discrete, as it were, as discreetly as possible. If it were discrete 
indiscreetly {shamelessly as it were), its discreteness would have no effect on us’
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In the doubtful transmission of the analogico-digital, light no longer 
grounds a credulity in the indivisible mo(ve)ment but is incompletely shut out, as 
it were, in storage, where it becomes one with a night that marks not what 
happened (from ‘a past day’) but that which possibly never happened, never took 
place as an intelligible mo(ve)ment. This analogico-digital Tight in the night’, as 
termed by Stiegler, transmitting that which (never) happened, attests to the fact 
that it ‘is always on the basis of the irreducibility of a non-knowledge that a 
knowledge is constituted’.91 Stiegler argues that because the analogue must 
always efface its own manipulation while (and as a means of) preserving belief 
in the this was, it carries the danger of exempting manipulation from criticism, 
denying critical access to discretization.92 Analogue belief (or, credulity) is 
politically damaging, Stiegler asserts, because it can engender a form of
QTuncritical doubt or ‘panic’. For Stiegler, panic emerges because manipulation 
must remain untouchable -  must be withheld from the viewer -  to enable 
successive analogue transmission, and thus prevents us from separating 
(discretizing or digitizing) reality from fiction, or from acknowledging the
(‘Discrete’, p. 156. Emphasis in original). For more on discreteness and storage 
(as memory), see Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. 
by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 
37. On the digital and touch, see Jacques Derrida, On Touching -  Jean-Luc 
Nancy, trans. by Christine Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 
pp. 123, 162, 179,300.
91‘Discrete’, pp. 154-155.
92 Stiegler’s key example of this danger is the ‘role of television in the 1989 
Romanian “revolution” [...], in which it was initially reported that 40,000 to 
60,000 people had been killed [by former communist dictator Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s security forces in Timisoara, on December 16, 1989]. Considerable 
evidence emerged, after the fact, suggesting that this and other massacres had 
been carefully staged, and, in some cases, simply invented, and that the so-called 
revolution was not a popular uprising but a coup’ (.Echographies, p. 172 n. 3).
93 ‘Discrete’, p. 151.
processes by which the two become blurred within the temporal objects of film, 
photography, and television.
This results not only in the viewer’s credulous reception of the sequence 
unfolding before them, but also in the inhibition of a critical mode for retrieving 
the very movements and moments that visual media transmits. This inhibition 
can be explained through reference to the production of panic at both a micro and 
a macro level. At a micro level, the discrete elements of digital media -  such as 
the pixels of a digital photograph or the individual frames of a digital movie -  are 
overlooked and left behind, because they are transmitted at such speed that one 
senses only the analogue effects of this media. At a macro level, the analogue or 
continuous way in which transmission is traditionally framed in terms of form 
and genre -  for example, 'rolling' or 'round-the-clock' digital news coverage, and 
broadcasts generally that organize their output to fit the rhythm of the calendar -  
has instilled in us a credulous investment in succession, whereby the 'next' 
transmitted movements and moments are expected to be truer (or more likely to 
lead us to the truth) than the previous ones. In this ana-logic, 'old news' 
irreversibly becomes night, in Stiegler's terms, making it impossible for us to 
engage with the discrete operations, actions, and techniques of positioning 
through which the transmissive chain is effected. My explication of these micro- 
and macro-productions thus highlights two aspects of the same claim against 
credulity in the analogico-digital. That is, as long as the analogue aspect of the 
analogico-digital continues to hold our interest, it will not feel right for us to 
believe that technological development should stop, break down/separate, and 
thus multiply the actions it has recorded -  a feeling that causes us to shut out
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completely in the present the (im)possibilities of past movement, and to panic 
about what is coming next.
In response to the threat of panic, Stiegler urges us to believe in the 
digital within the analogico-digital, in the irreducible non-knowledge that doubts 
and decomposes the indivisible analogue mo(ve)ment: 'A more knowing belief, 
and by the same token, a less insipid and credulous one: this is what the things 
we fear about the analogico-digital would also make possible' .94 By positing the 
analogico-digital as a diacritical storage of positions that defer moving on, 
Stiegler understands better than the neo-Bergsonists that politics (whether racial, 
gender, sexual, class) takes time, stays in place often overbearingly, boringly, 
while positions and counter-positions are repeatedly made for the recognition of 
those mo(ve)ments that have not registered as meaningful. After all, as Jane 
Elliot notes, ‘things may stay true longer than they stay interesting’.95 Insofar as 
the more knowing mode of the analogico-digital can offer a truth or a guiding 
fact, it is that things may stay doubtful longer than they stay interesting.
I will use the following chapter to identify the body-machine movements 
and moments that are discovered when we think of the digital as a philosophy of 
placed positionality rather than as a term for technological advancement. Digital 
movement in place, I will demonstrate, engages us with the above axes of 
oppression in ways that question what it means to live in post-Fordism. To 
uncover these activities, we will need to discuss at length a key argument that
94 ‘Discrete’, p. 152. Emphasis in original.
95 This assertion is part of Elliott’s argument against the ‘exciting’ scientific turn 
in feminist theory: ‘when we assume that familiar approaches can no longer 
serve as tools to dislodge the present, we demonstrate a continued affinity for the 
modem logic that equates the new, the interesting, and the valuable. In so doing, 
we sidestep the difficult realization that while intellectual work should be 
^citing, political work may be dull’ (‘Currency’, p. 1701).
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underlies Stiegler’s essay, to which I have thus far given only a cursory 
introduction. In short, chapter 4 explores the wider implications of Stiegler’s 
claim that in the digital, bodies move by touching and being touched back.
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4: Casting Bodies
Bodies have been casting for as long as there have been technological platforms 
for transmission, the most obvious of which are radio and television: casting here 
signifies the assertion of a presence over a wide area, made available (or 
‘broadcast’) for others to see and/or hear. The broadcasting of one’s self has of 
course been one of the main ways of using the Web for several years.1 In this 
final chapter, I will propose that bodies cast in a technologized existence. In the 
sense of broadcasting, though, casting has occurred long before the writing of 
this piece, through media that considerably predate the technologies of the 
Internet, mobile telephones, and the World Wide Web. My proposal to cast 
technologically certainly appears to be anachronistic in the light of this history. 
However, this is not how casting will be interpreted or, more specifically, argued 
for in this chapter: instead, I explore the various meanings of the term in order to 
address the questions raised by the previous chapter on bodies and the digital. 
Two principal questions remain after chapter 3: if the digital age is such a 
reductive notion, how can we make sense of the manifold digital technologies 
whose permeation of contemporary western societies cannot be denied? What are 
the alternatives to living flexibly in post-Fordism? Using the term ‘casting’ as the 
central theme of my response will lead us to bodies that are more hard working 
than flexible or flexibly present: bodies that work on, or work with, a certain 
permanence or immutable form in a time of disorganized workforces, mobile 
technologies, and immersive online worlds. Casting, I will demonstrate, names 
what (analogico-digital) bodies do in body-machine time when new technologies
* 1 Indeed, the tagline of the video networking site Youtube is ‘Broadcast 
Yourself. See <http://www.youtube.com> [accessed 19 November 2009].
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stop rather than transport, and when new technologies fix bodies in place instead 
of providing bodies with navigable space.
Keeping in Touch, or, Casting On and Off
I have outlined the ways in which we can, and the reasons why we should, 
believe in the digital within the analogico-digital. Stiegler explains that the 
analogico-digital engenders a new, less credulous form of belief, involving 
diacritical access to the discrete elements that constitute transmission (the 
transmission of images in the media). Key to this new form of belief is an 
uncertainty regarding touch. Stiegler does not want to question the analogue’s 
status as the domain of the moving: continuous movement (transmission) and the 
capacity to affect are the essential properties of the analogue and, Stiegler shows, 
remain important to any discussion of the body and technology. It is the 
particular credulity compelling this double sense of movement that concerns 
Stiegler, namely the credulity that light once touched the materiality displayed in 
the image. This materiality is carried forward in time as a night that once was 
light/alive, and takes on a ghostly quality as it continuously comes to touch -  via 
the light by which it was once touched -  those who successively look at the 
image. The transmission of analogue light is unsettling but, as Stiegler shows, it 
is also one-way: credulity in the singular touch of light supports the concomitant 
belief in the this was, a singular (that is, indivisible, untreated, untouchable) 
mo(ve)ment whose taking-place sets in motion a chain of luminances that 
continuously touches bodies in the present, but which prevents the this was from 
being touched back.
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Stiegler’s key point is that in the analogue image, we are continuously 
touched by that which has become night, but we do not keep in touch with that 
which has become night. To keep in touch with that which has become night is to 
have access to the discrete positions constituting the past mo(ve)ments that touch 
us in the present. In the analogico-digital, we cannot be certain that light once 
touched the materiality on display, because the light touching the materiality 
comes from a ‘digital night’ in which multiple types and degrees of touch have 
already occurred in the dark, as it were. Photons wait in digital storage to become 
pixels, which wait to become zeros and ones, which await discrete calculations 
and prearrayed quantifications. When we come to look at the ‘discrete image’ 
eventually imprinted by these treatments, we will be touched in the present by 
past mo(ve)ments that are kept discreet in order to allow a belief in an 
unmediated taking-place. In Stiegler’s words, these analogico-digital touches 
come from a Tight in the night [...] still deeper even than that of a past, the night 
of a past that was never present’.2 Analogico-digital touch is not one-sided but 
participatory, because it urges us to come into contact with unintelligible 
movements and ineligible histories, to have a critical awareness of the ways in 
which discrete positions are kept as discreet as possible when a continuum is 
posited. Keeping in touch thus transforms touch into a critical mode, or a ‘less
2 ‘Discrete’, pp. 154-155. Emphasis in original.
3 To clarify, I invoke ‘continuum’ here in accordance with Massumi’s theory of 
the analogue, where ‘continuum’ refers to continuously variable movement, in 
the coextensive sense of mobilizing and being moved/touched/affected. A 
continuum in this logic is not movement that is continuously the same: Massumi 
would undoubtedly see the latter as a continuum figured digitally (lifelessly, 
programmatically, in fixity). In Massumi’s analogue, a continuum is an 
undivided force that qualitatively changes as it moves from one medium into 
another. Although Massurqi’s notion of an analogue continuum differs from
*' Stiegler’s concept of irreversible analogue transmission, Stiegler does implicitly 
equate the analogue with continuously variable movement. The this was (once
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credulous’ form of belief: doubting analogue touch means touching more and to 
different extents, participating in a pervasive touching that complicates (while 
still believing in) the notion that the past continuously affects the present.4
But this critical mode of touch is not necessarily sustained by believing in 
the digital. The principal work discussed in this section believes in the digital, 
but at the expense of a diacritical/digital engagement with the multiple types, 
degrees, and meanings of touch that must be considered when touch is discussed 
within the context of technological change. The work to which I refer is 
technologies scholar Sadie Plant’s polemic Zeros + Ones: Digital Women + The 
New Technoculture, a seminal publication within the field of cybercultures that 
emerged in the 1990s.5 Zeros and Ones is a highly ambitious -  and significantly
light but has since become night), which is in continuous irreversible 
transmission via the chain of luminances, will move or touch variable viewing 
subjects variably positioned in variable time periods. Stiegler’s analogico-digital 
critique of the analogue is based on the argument that while there are many 
touches/movements in the analogue, these touches ultimately refer to a privileged 
and certain point: in the analogue we assume we know the point to which the this 
was was touched; once, by a light that has fixed the this was to a particular point 
in time by subsequently becoming night. It is thus possible to argue that for 
Stiegler, analogue touching is more a form of persistent prodding or poking from 
the past, which elicits responses from bodies in the present -  ‘dull movements]’, 
in Stiegler’s words (‘Discrete’, p. 152) -  but not the types of response that will 
question or digitally dissect the origin of continuous movement.
4 In their classic study of electronic media in the late 1960s, Marshall McLuhan 
and Quentin Fiore invoke ‘the extreme and pervasive tactility of the new 
electronic environment’, theorizing television and general-purpose computers as 
gateways to ‘a mesh of pervasive energy that penetrates our nervous system 
incessantly’. See Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, War and Peace in the 
Global Village (New York: Bantam, 1967), p. 77. While there are similarities 
between McLuhan and Fiore’s assertions and Stiegler’s call to touch/be touched 
more, in the course of this chapter it will become clear that touching in new 
media does not always equate to a pervasive sensory (tactile) environment.
5 Sadie Plant, Zeros + Ones: Digital Women + The New Technoculture (London: 
Fourth Estate, 1997). Cybercultures, or cyberstudies, is a huge interdisciplinary 
field, covering analyses of computer-networked societies, and body-machine 
interactions, in philosophy, cultural theory, popular science, science fiction, film,
* design and illustration, visual performance arts, and many other areas. It is 
impossible to provide a definitive bibliography of this field, but key
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flawed -  project that attempts to assert a continuum of female agency across a 
long history of technological innovation, while simultaneously introducing a 
technological theory of touch designed to challenge our conceptions of what it 
means to make contact and communicate. Because of the breadth and complexity 
of Zeros, we must extensively analyse and clarify Plant’s key arguments before 
considering the limitations of her work.
Plant argues that contemporary communication technologies, and 
contemporary workplaces and work practices, provide unprecedented 
opportunities for a female-centred mode of touch to subvert patriarchy’s 
historical harnessing of technological creativity. ‘Since the industrial revolution’, 
Plant claims, ‘and with every subsequent phase of technological change, it has 
been the case that the more sophisticated the machines, the more female the 
workforce becomes [...] and the fears of unemployment which have haunted 
modem discussions of technological innovation have always applied to male 
workers rather than their female peers’.6 Plant asserts that this female affinity 
with technological change and increasing automation has always been met by 
‘enormous resistance’, particularly within capitalist-historical narratives that
cybercultures texts include Manuel de Landa, War in the Age o f Intelligent 
Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1992); William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, 
The Difference Engine (London: Victor Golancz, 1992); George P. Landow, 
Hypertext: The Convergence o f Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); and Sherry Turkle, Life on 
the Screen: Identity in the Age o f the Internet (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1997). Plant is the principal feminist in the cybercultures area -  a cyberfeminist -  
along with Anne Balsamo and Donna Haraway, although Haraway has never 
written specifically on computers or computer networks as such. The defining 
cyberstudies anthologies emerged in the mid-1990s, namely Mike Featherstone 
and Roger Burrows’s Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk, and The Cyborg 
Handbook, ed. by Chris Hables Gray (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); 
these were followed in 2000 by The Cybercultures Reader, ed. by David Bell and 
Barbara M. Kennedy (Nefw York and London: Routledge, 2000).
& Zeros, p. 39.
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privilege a visually based sensory schema supported by a gendered logic of
‘hand-eye coordination’:
Manual work and man’s work have been more or less synonymous 
[within modem capitalism and its critiques], both for the workers -  hired 
hands required to work with their hands, hand tools, handles, and other 
hand-size components -  and the bosses -  the ones who manage and 
manipulate the manufactories, and assume it’s all in their hands. [...] two 
hands and two sides of a game which is supposed to be conducted by 
another single hand: the invisible hand of capital, perfectly integrated 
with the supervising eye of the state.7
Plant presents the workings of a masculinist history of technology based on 
control: industrial management and male manual labour are related hierarchically 
but also hand in hand, as it were, according to a single co-ordinative 
configuration. In Plant’s opinion, the notion of worker-management stmggle is 
bound up with metaphors of male hands harnessing machinery, preventing (or 
keeping at arm’s length) an understanding of the disruptive, unruly, female 
aspects that have always accompanied technological change.
For Plant, these unruly aspects operate at the sensory level of touch rather 
than hand-eye. Plant describes touch more specifically as a continuous process of
o  9
body-machine tactility, which we can understand in two interrelated ways. First, 
when technology changes, Plant explains, means of communicating recombine
7 Zeros, pp. 40, 75. The ‘invisible hand’ refers to economist Adam Smith’s 
theory of the self-regulatory nature of market capitalism, whereby the 
exchanging of goods and services is reproduced, and public interest is advanced, 
by the self-interests of each individual within the market economy. As Smith 
states, ‘every individual [...] intends only his own gain, and he is [...] led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention’. See Adam 
Smith, Wealth o f Nations, ed. by Kathryn Sutherland, 2nd edn (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 292. Mark Seltzer suggests that Taylorized 
Fordism instanced ‘the progressive replacement of the “invisible hand” of the 
market economy by [...] the “visible hand” of the managerial economy: the 
general achievement of standardization, programming, and processing of 
materials, persons, and information’ (Bodies and Machines, p. 156).
8 Plant’s conflation of touch and tactility is the major problem of her project, 
Ivhich I will explain in detail as this section proceeds. For now, however, I am 
only concerned with outlining Plant’s principal arguments.
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unpredictably, acquiring agency and dispersing along lines that exceed the
purposes the change was initially intended to serve. Plant argues that this
recombination-dispersal is immanent to all technological developments and types
of machine work: it is present in the earliest factories, Plant emphasizes, even in
forms of pre-factory work before the industrial revolution.9 Plant provides many
examples of technological change to support this argument, one of which is the
series of shifts towards automation within telephony from the late nineteenth to
the late twentieth century:
As early as 1889, almost as soon as the telephone network had started to 
run, a ‘girl-less [...]’ automatic switching system was devised by a 
Kansas undertaker, Almon B. Strowger, who had become convinced that 
the wife of one of his rival undertakers, herself a telephone operator, was 
diverting calls away from his business. But the explosion of telephony 
meant that Strowger’s system joined the women it had been intended to 
replace.10
For Plant this anecdote exemplifies the communicative redistribution that 
accompanies and undermines the gendered logic of advancement-through- 
change. A technological change or development occurs in that the automatic 
telephone exchange replaces the manual exchange, with the further intention of 
eliminating the (predominantly female) workforce operating the manual system. 
But the automatic system’s implementation enacted a set of body-machine 
relations from which women in particular benefited: the massive expansion of 
the American telephone network in the early twentieth century required the 
widespread installation of automatic exchange systems across a vast spatial 
expanse, but this in turn created a widely dispersed network of female operators 
because the first automatic exchanges were unable to connect calls made over
9 The main example Plant provides is that of pre-factory textiles production, 
Avhich I will discuss shortly.
™ Zeros, p. 122.
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long distances.11 Operators thus remained crucial to telephony’s development: 
automation, Plant claims, enacted not the elimination but the reticulation of 
female relations to work and technology.
Plant goes on to argue that this form of female connectivity accompanied 
telephony’s full automation, whereby ‘[rjecorded female voices became 
ubiquitous’ and, more significantly, the computerization of network operation 
introduced a standardization of procedure ensuring that (again predominantly 
female) service sector employees could be flexibly transferred from workplace to 
workplace:
[Standardized female service sector workers] weren’t only processing 
data for the boss. If they were pooled with their colleagues, their working 
environment was a hive of activity [...] and hospitable to a multiplicity of 
informal networks, grapevine gossip riding on the back of formal 
working life: birth and death, sex and disease, birthdays and bosses, 
cosmetics and clothes. [...] The content [of these informal networks] may 
have been trivial to him, but this was entirely beside the point. It is quite 
literally the point which is subsumed when means of communication 
begin to communicate with themselves. For these emergent systems of 
exchange, new lines and links are everything.12
The post-Fordist ‘multiplicity of informal networks’ is tactile for Plant because it 
is composed of communicative elements that communicate with one another: a 
telephone exchange connects with and is conducive to various woman-centred 
collectives (women’s ‘reading clubs [...] flower and vegetable gardens, and [...] 
athletic clubs’) that are produced from the exchanging of communicative content
11 For a detailed account of these changes in telephony and the ways in which 
they affected the workforce of female operators, see Elizabeth Faulkner Baker, 
Technology and Woman’s Work (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 
Plant cites and paraphrases Faulkner Baker throughout Zeros. We can see the 
principal argument that animates Zeros in Plant’s account of the early telephone 
network: technological changes give rise to an increasing connectivity and 
communicability that transmutes into a consciousness-raising tool for women on 
£ global scale.
12 Zeros, p. 123. Emphasis in original.
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13 •at work. This communicative content -  which Plant describes as flowing, loose 
network-building ‘gossip’ -  is irrelevant to the formal properties of working life, 
Plant argues; gossip is produced in the workplace but creates ways for women to 
network outside the workplace, exceeding management in the Taylorist sense. 
These communicative elements keep in touch, maintaining proximity without 
merging into an organized whole. The telephone exchange, Plant affirms, 
exemplifies the ways in which the increasing mobility and connectivity offered 
by flexible working conditions corresponds with a ‘meshwork of [...] women 
[...] and machines’ that is ‘dislocated and fragmented, scattered too wide for any 
form of union’.14 Female relations with post-Fordist workplace shifts are active, 
Plant maintains, but not in the sense of collective action: the ‘new lines and 
links’ produced by female-to-female contact in service sector economies tend 
towards disorganization, subverting capitalist-historical narratives that have 
taken the form of ‘a personal argument between the men: [...] a struggle between 
bosses and workers, firms and unions’.15
Plant argues that these informal, interconnected lines of communication 
are also tactile in that they bear the traces of female finger work from the 
industrial revolution to post-Fordism. The development of the typewriter in the 
nineteenth century, Plant asserts, provided the conditions for an immersive, fluid, 
female mode of touching and feeling to untidily connect female interactions with 
technology across time. For Plant, the gossiping or networking female employees
13 The invocation of ‘reading clubs’ is made by Faulkner Baker in Technology, p. 
70, and is cited in Zeros, p. 123.1 say ‘communicative content’ here rather than 
‘information’ to avoid confusing the commonsensical understanding of 
information with its meaning (or meaninglessness, as it were) in a cybernetic 
context. v
lA*Zeros, p. 120.
15 Zeros, p. 75.
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of post-Fordist office spaces, operating computer keyboards, have taken up and
are reworking communicative modes already established by the earliest typists.
Over a century ago, Plant emphasizes, the typewriter displaced handwriting as
the key means of information processing.16 This move towards automation
resulted in the creation of a huge female labour force, ‘new networks of women’
whose ‘fingers were finer and cheaper’ than those of the male handwriting clerks
who had formerly dominated the management of statistics.17 Her account is
worth quoting at length:
Several typewriters had competed for attention in the 1800s, [...] But the 
machine which caught on the most was [...] developed in 1867 by 
Christopher Latham Scholes. [...] Later perfected by Remington 
engineers, its impact was enormous and as fast as the speeds of writing it 
made possible. [...] If handwriting had been manual and male, 
typewriting was fingerprinting: fast, tactile, digital, and female. [...] Text 
was no longer in the grasp of hand and eye, but guided by contacts and 
keystrokes, a matter of touch sensitivity. An activity which had once been 
concentrated on a tight nexus of coordinated organs -  hand and eye -  and 
a single instrument -  the pen -  was now processed through a distributed 
digital machinery composed of fingers, keys, hammers, [...] levers, cogs, 
and wheels. The noisy tactility of typewriting destroyed the hushed and 
hallowed status of the written word. [...] In secretarial schools, women 
were taught to type in rhythmic patterns which had nothing to do with 
either the meaning or the sounds of words but was more akin to the
I Q
abstract beat of drumming and dance.
‘Digital’ here represents the discontinuous scales brought together by the activity 
of typing (including fingers on a human hand and teeth on a cog), and the female 
fingers or digits that caress machinery in such perpetuity and with such speed 
that a subject/object distinction becomes blurred. Women do not use the
16 Plant interprets handwriting as a technology of imposition, involving the 
controlled and co-ordinated hand-eye production of images on a passive surface. 
See Zeros, p. 117.
17 Zeros, p. 117.
18 Zeros, pp. 117, 118. It must be noted that in Plant’s counter-history this 
subversive tactility does not begin with the typewriter’s implementation. As I 
have already noted, Plant privileges another form of female machine work that in
*her opinion gives a greater historical perspective of ‘digital women’, to which I 
will turn shortly.
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typewriter for a predetermined purpose, Plant implies. They are instead drawn 
towards becoming integrated into a synthesis of non-hierarchical components 
that move with one another; a body-machine ‘dance’ orchestrated by a 
particularly female stroking and sensitivity.19 For Plant, women workers have left 
‘fingerprints’ across the industrialized West -  precedents of touching and feeling 
technological developments that have always instanced the outmanoeuvring of 
working time’s masculinist (hand-eye) imperatives and constraints.20
Zeros also attempts to complexify our understanding of the skin. Plant 
asserts the primacy of the skin within her tactile mode of keeping in touch, but 
more significantly argues that the skin is an intricate communicative system that 
cannot simply be described as the sense organ containing a discrete bodily unit. 
The skin is important to body-machine tactility, Plant argues, but only insofar as 
we acknowledge that skins are active, agential, dynamically moving (expanding 
and contracting) networks, composed of sensitive microscopic terminals that 
communicate independently of a fixed bodily identity. For Plant, skins are
19 ‘Female’ and ‘women’ are invoked interchangeably throughout Plant’s 
narrative, although it is possible to ascertain Plant’s indented use of these terms. 
In the above passage, we see that ‘women’ is a signifier of the collective 
groupings that form when male work is undermined (or ‘destroyed’) by 
technological innovation, whereas ‘female’ signifies the fluid, processual bodily 
attributes of those who comprise each of these collectives.
20 Plant’s intention is to connect or network these fingerprints with the 
manipulations of digital media that occur on a global scale in a post-Fordist 
existence. The world’s electronics assembly operatives -  a predominantly female 
workforce -  comprise ‘dispersed networks’ across ‘Silicon Valley, Silicon Glen, 
Bangalore, Jakarta, Seoul, and Taipei’, Plant affirms, ‘assemble[ing] the circuits, 
set[ting] up the keyboards and the screens’, and ‘mak[ing] the chips that make 
the chips that turn the computers on’ {Zeros, p. 74). Plant argues that while these 
jobs are Tow status, poorly paid, sometimes dangerous’, they are also agential if 
we see them as ‘the latest in the long and twisted line of microprocessors which 
emerge from a tangle of telephone lines, dials, operators, cables [...] and plugs; 
[and] the keys, carriages apd cases of typewriters’, helping us to realize that if
*' ‘she hasn’t had a hand in anything’ in the history of technological change, ‘her 
fingerprints are everywhere’ {Zeros, pp. 74-75).
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constantly open to new touches or contacts that modify the manner in which their 
terminals communicate with one another, and thus are fundamentally resistant to 
localization:
Touch is the feeling that nothing is safe. While sight is organized around 
the organs that see and the things that are seen, touch is not a localized 
sense. It is dispersed and distributed across the skin, every one hundred 
square millimetres of which is said to have some fifty sense receptors.
[...] The skin is both a border and a network of ports; a porous 
membrane, riddled with holes; perforated surfaces, intensities. [...] 
Porous, perforated, taut, and transmitting on their own frequencies, skins 
are continually in touch with the membranes and meshworks of the nets 
they compose. [...] Touch is the sense of communication in far more than 
a metaphorical sense. It is the sense of proximity, a nearness that never 
quite fuses touching elements into one new thing, but which literally puts 
them all in touch?1
In relating these assertions to Plant’s arguments for female networkers and
communication technologies that keep in touch, we must emphasize that Plant
does not mean to gender the skin as such. It is not that skin is necessarily more
female than male, Plant implies. Rather, Plant is claiming that the always
technologically affected representations of the skin’s function are bound up with
the ways in which women have always touched and moved with machines -
touches and movements that do not bind, or fuse ‘touching elements into one
new thing’.22
21 Zeros, pp. 186-188. Emphasis in original. Plant is clearly influenced here by 
McLuhan and Fiore’s claim that in a new media existence, human skin gives way 
to a synaesthetic milieu, in which bodies are penetrated and networked by 
continuously variable, transformative sensory movements: ‘touch is not skin but 
the interplay of the senses, and keeping in touch or getting in touch is a matter of 
a fruitful meeting of the senses, of sight translated into sound and sound into 
movement, and taste and smell’ {War, p. 71). Unlike McLuhan and Fiore, Plant 
does not dismiss the significance of the skin: indeed, it is one of her main areas 
of study. But both accounts share the notion that a fluid transformativity is 
enacted by the sensitive receptivity of bodily surfaces.
22 To fully understand Plant’s theory of tactile keeping in touch (as both 
communication/coming-intq-contact-with and touch-sensitivity/finger stroking), 
find to understand why Plant uses this schema to make claims for female agency, 
we must acknowledge previous works that have attempted to discuss touch,
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Plant’s critique offers a response to the problem I identified in chapter 2, 
whereby neo-Marxist narratives of post-Fordism foreclose the possibility of 
factory girls affecting feminism in the present. This foreclosure, I argued, results 
in the uncritical presentation of twentieth-century feminism as a constantly 
renewed energeticism. Plant’s belief in the digital is based on the implication that 
past factory (and pre-factory) girls always affect feminism in the present. This
tactility, and skin within a technological context. Zeros can be considered a 
feminist rewriting of physician Lawrence K. Frank’s classic essay ‘Tactile 
Communication’, in Communication and Culture, ed. by Alfred G. Smith (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 199-208. Written in the cybernetic 
fold of the late 1950s, Frank’s article argues for the importance of tactility in the 
healthy development of individuals and in the long-term sustenance of 
interpersonal relationships. Frank’s rhetoric is clearly informed by cybernetic 
concepts of homeostasis, information, and telecommunicative message 
transmission. Consider the following passage, in which Frank views touch- 
sensitivity as a foundational condition of courtship: ‘Grooming the skin, bathing 
of all kinds, anointing, oiling, perfuming the skin, plucking hair, shaving, are 
patterns for modifying communication by the skin, [...] relying upon visual cues 
to indicate tactual readiness for communication (actual or symbolic). [...] Here 
the skin serves like a carrier wave upon which the particular message is imposed 
as a modification or patterning of that wave, as in telephoning. Thus admiring 
glances, indicating approval of the individual’s clothing, body arts, and 
grooming, serve as surrogates for invitations to actual tactile contacts’ (‘Tactile’, 
p. 207). In this description vision becomes embroiled in a more pervasive mode 
of touching and feeling: the sensitivity of the individual’s skin to the individual’s 
touches -  prosthetically enacted by the razor, the brush, the chemical compounds 
of perfumes and oils, and so on -  is the precondition of eye contact with a 
prospective partner, in which visual cues (if decoded properly as messages of 
tactile significance) draw the individual and admirer into an intimate, tactile 
reciprocity. To this extent the critical positions of Frank and Plant are 
indistinguishable: Plant indeed cites a section of Frank’s description in her 
discussion of the skin (see Zeros, p. 187). However, Plant appropriates Frank’s 
theoretical model of tactility in order to demonstrate that it more aptly describes 
a form of female connectivity, in excess of the discourses of medical expertise 
and the male-led, heterosexual relationships that frame Frank’s account (although 
Plant fails to provide a detailed or sophisticated critique of sexuality). Plant is not 
the first scholar to draw significantly on Frank’s essay. Citing the ‘brilliance’ of 
Frank’s model of tactile communication, anthropologist Ashley Montagu argues 
for the skin as an ‘especially good electrical conductor’ that possesses a ‘mind’ 
of its own, by virtue of ‘the sensory capacities of the fingertips alone’. See 
* Ashley Montagu, Touching: The Human Significance o f the Skin, 3rd edn (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 172, 183, 186.
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occurs via a process that Plant calls ‘weaving’.23 Weaving refers primarily to the
sophisticated and elaborate techniques by which women have historically
produced textiles. Plant claims that these techniques can be traced to ancient
Egypt and China, and have provided the basis for women to technologically keep
in touch in the factory and beyond:
Textiles themselves are very literally the software linings of all 
technology. [...] the production of textiles always seems to put some kind 
of surplus in play. [...] There is an obsessive, addictive quality to the 
spinning of yam and the weaving of cloth; a temptation to get fixated and 
locked in to processes which run away with themselves and those drawn 
into them. [...] the introduction [via the industrial revolution] of 
technology to more primitive textiles techniques is both a break with the 
old ways and a continuation of the lines on which the women were 
already at work. [...] The weaving of complex designs demands far more 
than one pair of hands, and textiles production tends to be communal, 
sociable work allowing plenty of occasion for gossip and chat. Weaving 
was already multimedia: singing, [...] telling stories, dancing, and 
playing games as they work, spinsters, weavers, and needleworkers were 
literally networkers as well. [...] As the frantic activities of generations of 
[...] weaving women makes clear, nothing stops when a particular piece 
of work has been finished off. The only incentive to cast off seems to be 
the chance completion provides to start again, throw another shuttle, cast 
another spell.24
Plant introduces the term ‘cast’ to emphasize the processual quality that defines 
weaving. Casting is invoked here in the sense of throwing or projecting: the 
throwing or projecting of threads by woman-specific techniques -  threads into 
which the women workers themselves are thrown or projected by dint of the 
inability to distinguish ‘the process of weaving’ textiles from ‘the woven design’ 
of textiles 25 ‘Cloths persist’, Plant argues, ‘as records of the processes which fed 
into their production: how many women worked on them, the techniques they
23 Zeros, p. 65.
24 Zeros, pp. 61, 62, 64, 65, 67. A shuttle is a textiles storage device that holds a 
cylinder of wound thread, which is passed or ‘thrown’ through machine- 
separated lengths of fibre to weave cloth. See An Encyclopaedia o f the History o f
* Technology, ed. by Ian Mckeil (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 821-822.
25 Zeros, p. 66.
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used, the skills they employed’.26 In weaving, then, casting off is an indication 
not of stoppage but of the excitement of continuous movement-in-process and 
infinite communicability -  the ‘frantic’ renewal of connections between women 
whose touches guarantee immersive tactile communication, the addictive feeling 
of being in touch.
Plant points out that the historical privileging of visual arts in the West -  
art forms that involve writing on paper and painting on canvas, which ‘reduce the 
complexities of weaving to raw materials on which images and signs are 
imposed’ -  has hitherto disengaged us from the female agency absorbed and 
carried in woven materials that are meaningful prior to being used or imposed 
upon 27 But for Plant there are always opportunities for contemporary 
interactions between bodies and technologies to ‘reconnect with the tactile depth 
of woven cloth’.28 This is because weaving never casts off: in other words, 
textiles ‘persist’, are active and alive with the touches and movements of female 
fingers, and the conviviality of the open networks into which weaving factory 
(and pre-factory working) women were woven as a result of this finger work. 
Threads of the past, Plant suggests, are tactile communicative lines able to reach 
continually into the present, and the abundance of tactile technologies in post- 
Fordism presents a significant opportunity for a reticulation of unprecedented 
scale: a global, transhistorical network of working women enacted by the 
similarities between computer networks and fabric. In short, Plant foresees the
26 Ibid.
27 Zeros, p. 67.
28 Zeros, p. 69.
29 The stroking of keyboards is important to this project of reconnection, but for 
Plant the technology most ^ble to enact this reticulation is computer graphics
* software, because the coding and pixelation of images on computer screens 
replicates textiles production processes: ‘If the conventions of the visual arts had
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realization of a tactile/textile technoculture in which women are cast (dispersed, 
networked by a process that never stops) but are never cast (put into a fixed 
shape or form, solidified or moulded collectively or individually into a bodily 
identity).
Plant’s concept of weaving women certainly resists the ‘crisis’ rhetoric 
that frames the representations of post-industrialism in Harvey and Jameson. 
Weaving figures industrial decay as a feminist opportunity: a chance for service 
workers to take up past collective female movements that (contra Jameson) never 
suffered from burnout and which (contra Harvey) were vigorous before the 
decline of Fordism. But Plant’s description of weaving as casting leads to a 
questioning of the associations Plant makes between the digital, the human 
finger, and networking. To reiterate, Plant claims that weaving casts: the touch- 
led finger work (weaving) of females who comprise informal labour forces -  
whether this involves the production of textiles, typing on a keyboard, or the
activated artists and their tools and divided them from pacified matrices, 
digitization interweaves these elements again. On the computer monitor, any 
change to the image is also a change to the program; any change to the 
programming brings another image to the screen. This is the continuity of 
product and process at work in the textiles produced on the loom. [...] Digital 
fabrications can be endlessly copied without fading into inferiority; patterns can 
be pleated and repeat, replicated folds across a screen. Like all textiles, the new 
softwares have no essence, no authenticity’ {Zeros, p. 189). Plant’s assertions are 
technically incorrect, however. In computing, files referred to as ‘executables’ 
are digitally programmed or coded to make a computer carry out specific, 
predetermined tasks. Examples of executables include word processing 
applications such as Microsoft Word, and imaging software such as Apple 
iPhoto. Contrary to Plant, changing an image or a document using an editing tool 
does not change the executable application file: for example, editing an image in 
a relevant software package does not transform the way in which this software 
works or follows instructions. Also, access control or Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) technologies have been created since Plant’s time of writing. DRM uses 
methods of encryption in an attempt to limit the ways in which digital media 
applications and content can be used: in other words, DRM coding tries to 
determine the authenticity qf the digital. In both of these examples we see that 
tasking is a crucial aspect of computer language. I discuss Plant’s implication 
within ergonomics and the time of the task later in this chapter.
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assembly of microprocessors -  is simultaneous with the dispersal (casting) of 
tactile communication; a feel mg-proximate to (or a keeping in touch with) other 
finger workers past and present. This simultaneity is captured in Plant’s assertion 
that ‘touch is the sense of communication’, an assertion that contains a 
significant conflation: the conflation of touch and tactility. Before Plant relates 
touch and communication, Plant has already stated that ‘touch is the sense’.
Thus, Plant’s principal argument is based on the assumption that the action of 
touching or making contact with surfaces guarantees, or is simultaneous with, a 
tactile sensitivity to that action. The presence of this assumption is confirmed by 
Plant’s further assertions o f ‘touch sensitivity’ and o f ‘touch’ as ‘the feeling’.30 
Touch is always tactility, Plant implies, and because women touch more, women 
must necessarily be more sensitively receptive to contact. Moreover, this touch- 
sensitivity emerges from technological change, meaning that women in particular 
can benefit from -  and can more effectively cast in -  the decline of heavy 
industry and the proliferation of flexible, service sector employment.
This conflation of touch and tactility is found most significantly in Plant’s 
discussion of the skin. As we have seen, Plant invokes the skin as a metaphor for 
(and to an extent, a literal example of) electronic communication networks that 
operate informally and with agency. Key to the skin’s agency here is its 
sensitivity to modification. The touches the skin receives are simultaneous with 
the transformations that occur as a result of this contact: the skin changes each 
time its abundant ‘sense receptors’ are activated by touch, reconfiguring its 
communicative paths. Thus for Plant, sensitivity is transformative and the skin is
30 It will become clear in th^ is chapter, however, that tactile sensitivity is not 
♦necessarily the same as a moving feeling, or a feeling that transformatively 
transports a body.
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constantly sensitive. The skin’s tactile sensitivity to contact, then, provides a
seemingly self-evident physiological basis upon which Plant can make claims for
the ever-possible connectivity and communicability between touch-sensitive
female body-machines.31 Because of its acute tactility, Plant suggests, we cannot
rely on the skin to localize and formalize a bodily schema, but we can certainly
rely on the skin as a signifier of change.
However, Plant’s description of touch as a sense raises a fundamental
question about her work. If Plant’s theory of digital women is to rely on the skin
by way of asserting the skin’s self-evident physiological characteristics, then
Plant surely must acknowledge that skins are not always sensitive to touch. In a
recent article on touch and time, gender and sexualities scholar Iain Morland
draws attention to the configurations of action and sense negated by the
touch/tactility conflation:
Touch and tactility are not the same: the former is an action, whereas the 
latter is a sense. Hence a body can touch without tactility, for instance, if 
one’s hands are numb from exposure to cold weather. Likewise, a tactile 
body is not necessarily a body that is touched [...] Then again some 
bodies are indeed tactile, touching, and touched, all at once. My point is 
that touching and tactility are different, so they do not always coincide, 
although [...] for many bodies they do.32
31 To clarify, connectivity refers to the joining or proximate contact of surfaces 
(in Plant, bodies becoming networked by being technologically close to one 
another), whereas communicability signifies a sensate receptivity to this contact 
(in Plant, an awareness of technological contact, caused by sense receptors 
communicating with the central nervous system, which in turn communicates 
cultural transformation).
32 Iain Morland, ‘What Can Queer Theory Do For Intersex?’, GLQ, 15:2 (2009), 
285-312 (p.296). One of Morland’s principal examples of an untouched tactile 
body is the ‘stone butch’, the term for a strongly masculine-identified lesbian 
who pleases her feminine (‘femme’) partner sexually without seeking 
reciprocation, or without wanting to be touched back. The principal work on the 
stone butch and touch is Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 111-140. Halberstam argues that the 
stone butch does receive ‘genital manipulation’ in this contact, and remains
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It is precisely this type of diacritical encounter with touch and tactility that is 
absent from Plant’s project, an encounter not only with different types and 
degrees of touch -  which we can say Plant achieves, by discussing the rhythmic 
touching of keyboards, and skins touching and readjusting themselves -  but with 
touches of different degrees of tactility, ranging from simultaneous to non­
existent. Touch separated from tactility might indicate diminished tactility, but 
equally might index a localized tactility that, as tactility, does not require touch 
or, in Plant’s terms, an awareness of proximity. In any case, this scale of 
qualitative differences -  which is not unlike Sedgwick and Frank’s analogico- 
digital ‘shame-interest’ -  makes evident the problem of assuming the 
simultaneity of contact and a sensitivity to that contact. If, as Plant implies, 
touch-sensitivity is the condition of female agency in post-Fordism, then doubt 
emerges as to the reach of casting as a cyberfeminist movement.33 Plant
tactile through highly mediated forms of touch, including rubbing, friction, and 
dildo wearing (.Female, p. 124).
33 Morland proposes ‘reaching’ as a temporal frame that accommodates bodies 
excluded from a touch/tactility conflation (‘Intersex’, p. 287). But reaching does 
not solve the problems of touch-sensitivity in Plant’s work: contrary to Plant’s 
expectations, it is doubtful whether tactile cyberfeminism is able to reach all 
women, because it does not follow that the tactility of each of Plant’s intended 
subjects will be configured with touch in the way that Plant’s theory requires. 
There is also a significant problem with Plant’s claim that cyberfeminism, or a 
cyberfeminist technoculture, is inhabited by ‘digital women’. Within the context 
of the digital as the domain of discrete positionality and local place, Plant’s 
‘women’ are notably more analogue than digital, and not in the sense of the 
analogico-digital for which Massumi, Wilden, and Sedgwick and Frank so 
complexly argue. By committing to a logic of casting as continuous (analogue) 
inclusiveness -  a processual movement that never casts off and which produces 
no cast-offs, or which leaves no women behind -  Plant’s rhetoric deconstructs 
itself, because Plant’s notion of the digital in fact metaphorizes for an analogue 
mode that in no way accommodates the digital. From the perspectives of Wilden 
and Sedgwick and Frank, there are no digital punctuations in Plant’s continuum 
of casting/weaving, because for Plant weaving has never stopped or paused and 
is incapable of stopping oj: pausing. Plant assumes that a punctuation in 
* casting/weaving (‘casting o ff) will restrict the movement of female networkers 
by anchoring this movement in a fixed bodily identity. Any degree of stoppage,
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maintains that weavers disperse and persist in textiles, typewriters, keyboards, 
and general-purpose computers (in other words, they are cast), implying that it is 
possible for female body-machines from various, seemingly disjunctive, times 
and technologized societies to connect and communicate. But in fact Plant’s 
casting can only be enacted in a single temporal frame: the time of touch/tactility. 
Bodies belonging to other temporal registers, namely the time of touch and the 
time of tactility, must be both unfeminist and unintelligible according to Plant’s 
logic, because the touch and tactility of these bodies operates without the 
contact/sense that for Plant is productive of oppositional consciousness and 
cultural transformation.34 A significant question thus arises from Plant’s inability 
to make skins metaphorize for the global, consciousness-raising possibilities o f 
contemporary technology: how can digital women cast or keep in touch using an 
unreliable connection, or with means of contact never guaranteed to produce 
(tactile) communication?35
Plant implies, will arrest and give definite shape to fluidity, making a process 
‘passive’ and thus mappable within a hand/eye schema. But Sedgwick and 
Frank’s theory of shame demonstrates with acumen that non-fixed bodily 
knowledges are produced by a digital punctuation (shame) in an analogue 
continuum (interest). However, there is another aspect of Plant’s work that I want 
to interrogate: Plant’s assumption that solidification is passe, an unwanted 
remnant (cast-off) of fluid movements. In the course of this chapter, and in the 
conclusion to this thesis, I take issue with automatic rejections of bodily and 
identity fixity.
34 My phrase ‘the time of touch’ is inspired by Morland, who coins ‘The Time o f 
the Touch’ in ‘Intersex’, p. 285.
35 Feminist critic Stacy Gillis also questions the possibility of cyberfeminism, on 
the grounds that Plant’s ‘essentialist position’ contributes to a cybercultures 
study of ‘Internet as metaphor, not a materialist examination of the Internet’, 
which results in ‘an apolitical and dehistoricised cyberfeminist consciousness’.
See Stacy Gillis, ‘Neither Cyborg Nor Goddess: The (Im)Possibilities of 
Cyberfeminism’, in Third Wave Feminism: A Critical Exploration, ed. by Stacy 
Gillis, Gillian Howie and Rebecca Munford (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), pp. 185-198 (p. 188). I agree that Plant’s work is overly celebratory, but
* Gillis includes only a very brief citation of Plant before proceeding to dismiss 
cyberfeminism. Despite its flaws, Plant’s work is much more complex and
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Technologies theorist Cathryn Vasseleu addresses problems of contact
and communication in her important essay ‘Touch, Digital Communication and
the Ticklish’.36 ‘A criticism that must be directed towards Plant’s account’,
Vasseleu asserts, ‘is that it implies that touch is a sense that universally
guarantees women a hitherto unacknowledged technological advantage in the
digital domain’.37 Against Plant’s claims that a touch-sensitive mode of keeping
in contact enacts fluid, unmotivated and specifically feminist movement,
Vasseleu argues that the unmotivated movement of digital women does not
necessarily equate with agency, or with contact and communication that endures
over time. Vasseleu posits ticklishness as a ‘conceptual metaphor’ for exploring
these limitations of touch-sensitivity:
Rather than touching anything, tickling elicits the sensation of touch 
feeling or affecting itself uncontrollably [...] Instead of making 
meaningful contact with, or forming a lasting impression of, any thing, 
one is stirred or animated or convulsed by tickling. The perpetuation of 
this disruption taken to the extreme may result in such excessive 
convulsion that the person being tickled cannot draw breath and is in 
danger of being tickled to death. To tickle another can be an aggressive 
act, and those who are most commonly tickled are children and women. 
As well as being an innocent pleasure, tickling can end in hysteria and 
humiliation. To be ticklish is to be easily moved, easily affected. We can 
be tickled to the core of our being -  tickling is said to thrill the heart, 
lungs, blood, and spirits. By the same token, to be ticklish is to be 
uncertain, unreliable, delicately balanced, in unstable equilibrium. A 
ticklish condition or situation is one whose parameters are so labile as not 
to be depended on. If being in contact is the perception that one is in 
touch with someone or something, tickling is a touching that is out of
- j o
self-coordinatable control.
Here Vasseleu presents a more provocative account of tactility than that found in 
Plant’s representation of the skin. We cannot say that contact is made with
provocative than Gillis acknowledges, and must be paid greater attention to if a 
more critical cyberfeminism is to emerge.
36 Cathryn Vasseleu, ‘Touch, Digital Communication and the Ticklish’, 
Angelaki, 4:2 (1999), 153-162.
* 37 ‘Ticklish’, p. 154.
38 ‘Ticklish’, p. 158.
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another in tickling, Vasseleu suggests, because tickling references touch/tactility 
as ‘a perpetual auto-affective immediacy’: nothing of any lasting significance can 
be done with the touch/tactility of ticklishness, because ticklishness is the active 
‘doing’ of touch/tactility affecting or moving itself across different extremities 
instantly and with no co-ordination.39 A tickled body is too easily and too quickly 
moved between affective states -  from laughter to humiliation to fear of 
impending death to excitement -  to be relied upon to keep in touch with objects 
or things.40 Vasseleu’s key point is that while touch, tactility and transformation 
are simultaneous, it does not follow that this simultaneity provides the conditions 
for network building: the unreliability of movement through touch-sensitivity is 
at the same time a vulnerability, or an active passivity, to being 
touched/moved/affected ‘against one’s will’.41
For Vasseleu, tickling is ‘an appropriate way to explore the 
derangement/arrangement of touching in digital communication’, in that 
‘digitally manipulated currents flowing through contact points in electronic 
circuits become transmissions of excitement that can be taken to various
‘Ticklish’, p. 160. It appears for Vasseleu that tactility and affect are the same; 
a tactile sensitivity to the action of tickling produces a moving feeling, by which 
bodies are automatically affected/transported. I discuss the contentiousness of 
this theory in the closing stages of this chapter. For now, however, the 
simultaneity of touch and affective tactility remains a central theme of this 
chapter, because it is a structuring principle of much work on the body and new 
media. For more on the conflation of tactility and affect, see Morland, ‘Intersex’, 
p. 309 n. 52.
0 It is interesting to note the gendered significance Vasseleu attributes to 
ticklishness as an action-sense configuration. In the above passage, the claim that 
women are among ‘those who are most commonly tickled’ suggests that 
historical discourses of the overly sensitive female body position tickling as a 
predominantly male action, and ticklishness as a sensory environment with no 
boundaries, laws, or etiquette (a tactility produced by tactlessness), into which 
* female subjects are moved and permissibly harmed or humiliated.
41 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159.
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extremes of intensity’.42 We can understand Vasseleu’s assertion using the 
cybernetic concepts of analogue and digital communication. A continuous 
analogue flow of more or less electricity (‘excitement’), Vasseleu suggests, is not 
controlled -  in the cybernetic sense of regulation -  but is taken advantage of, as it 
were, by digital on/off commands that transport/affect (tickle) this flow to precise 
positions in its fluctuation. Here we see a combination of Wilden’s and Sedgwick 
and Frank’s accounts of cybernetic function, Stiegler’s notion of discrete 
touches/treatments affecting transmission, and Massumi’s theory of analogue 
transformation. In Vasseleu’s revision or tickling of the analogico-digital, 
analogue transmission is made more transformative when moving through digital 
points of contact, which runs contrary to Massumi’s claim that transformation 
occurs when the analogue moves ahead of digital positions initially given.43 
Vasseleu’s emphasis on transformation via digital manipulation counters Plant’s 
figuration of sensitive skin as communication technology. For Vasseleu, any 
claim for which the activity of the skin metaphorizes must acknowledge that
42 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159.
43 A crucial point implicit in this analysis is that the notions of transformation 
and change cannot be conterminous with the outmanoeuvring of control. 
Although control appears to be an inappropriate term for describing the 
ticklishness of a manipulated current that is moved too irregularly and too 
extremely to be in homeostasis, a current of electricity/excitability must 
nevertheless be given over to digital control commands for such uncontrollable 
movement to take place. Put simply, an order of ticklishness enacts ‘the 
uncontrollable tactility of a sentient body’. Vasseleu is acutely aware of this 
retention of control in ticklishness: ‘In place of an image of touching as an 
immediate and indefinable affection, touching in cyberspace is mediated by the 
controllable flows of electric circuits, the language of computer programmes, and 
screens which co-ordinate fingers and images. Here, in the oscillation between a 
lawless and a computational tele-contiguity, contact has come to mean touching 
without being touched, and touching what cannot be touched’ (‘Ticklish’, p.
159). Here auto-affection, being moved against one’s will, is enacted by the 
computer’s circuited tactility or liveness, which cannot be touched by an agential
* subject because this (analogico-digital) tactility determines the degree to which 
the subject is able to touch or make contact digitally.
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electronic, digital communication itself can ‘act as a perpetual reminder of the 
uncontrollable tactility of a sentient body’.44
Vasseleu uses the ticklishness of bodies and circuits to identify a 
fundamental ‘paradox of digital communication’, whereby the ‘institution of 
touch as an objective -  the objective of making contact or staying in touch -  
suggests that digital communication is as much a formalisation of touch, as an 
object in mind, as it is a being in touch’.45 This paradox has troubling 
consequences for Plant’s cyberfeminist project. As we have seen, Plant insists 
that the touch-sensitivity of female machine operatives is simultaneous with 
movement that is unmotivated and resistant to form, and which enables female 
subjects to make contact on the basis of shared experiences and appropriations of 
flexible working conditions. But as Vasseleu asserts, keeping in touch is not 
resistant to form: making contact is an objective motivation, in which touch 
becomes invested with predetermined goals. We can therefore say that weaving 
is ergonomic: while positing touch-sensitivity, Plant has in mind who will come 
into contact (women, particularly those who have worked closely with machines 
or computers) and the amount of time for which these subjects will remain in 
touch (long enough for this contact to communicate positive change for the 
subjects Plant represents). Vasseleu argues that due to its ticklishness, the skin 
will ultimately disappoint Plant’s ambitions: ‘an all too familiar contradiction 
resonating in the cyberfeminist move’, Vasseleu claims, ‘is that, even in claiming 
women’s close affinity with digital technology, it begs the need for women also 
to have the power to move beyond a perpetual auto-affective immediacy -  to be
* 44 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159.
45 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159. Emphasis in original.
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able to act in relation to digital technology’.46 In other words, the moment when 
touch/tactility is appropriated for a specific task, it loses its capacity to 
move/affect bodies (indeed, is no longer touch/tactility) and instead becomes as 
controlled and co-ordinated (handled) as the techno-sensory schemas Plant 
assumes to have subverted.
While Vasseleu importantly asserts the ticklish vulnerability of contacting 
and communicating digitally, her article perpetuates the assumption that touch is 
always simultaneous with tactility. Touch/tactility is unreliable for Vasseleu not 
because touch and tactility become separated, but because their simultaneity can 
affect a body to extreme states against one’s intentions and anticipations. 
Ticklishness troubles the time of touch/tactility by showing that bodies can be 
moved, or touched, much quicker and much more unpredictably in this temporal 
frame than Plant realizes. As Vasseleu states, ticklishness provides us with a 
more complex realization that ‘we no longer think of tangible presence in terms 
of interiorised sensations and temporal delays, but as presences of stimuli, 
intensities, and sensitised surfaces’, presences in which ‘we are singled out by 
touch as feeling beings, without requiring any consciousness of an overarching 
self.47 Ticklishness is thus the occasion for Vasseleu to valorize touch/tactility as 
the temporal frame in which change happens; indeed, this is an even greater 
valorization of touch/tactility/transformation than that given by Plant. Temporal 
delays, Vasseleu claims, are inadequate to describing change in a current time of 
instant sensitivity that is not simply transformative (as Plant maintains) but also 
often precariously and perilously so. Vasseleu is correct to argue that the 
‘combined productive/disruptive effect of contact mediated through digital
* 46 ‘Ticklish’, p. 160. Emphasis in original.
47 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159.
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communication suggests both uninhibited powers of transmission and a ticklish 
position of uncontrollable vulnerability in relation to it’, but I have shown that it 
is reductive to base a theory of the body and technology on a particular 
configuration of action and sense -  in this case, ticklishness as touch/tactility -  
that cannot account for all productions of bodily knowledges and experiences.48 
By privileging touch/tactility as the prevalent mode of bodily mobility, Vasseleu 
overlooks the agencies and vulnerabilities of bodies that in many different ways 
touch without tactility and are tactile without touch; bodies variously positionally 
(indeed, digitally or diacritically) distanced and delayed from a simultaneous 
touch/sense configuration, but which are equally important to an analysis of 
technosocieties and technocultures in the present day.49 Despite her criticisms of 
cyberfeminism, Vasseleu shares Plant’s belief in processual, fluid movement 
(casting) over hardening or putting into shape out of fluidity (casting). However, 
by holding the former meaning of casting alongside the latter, we gain an 
understanding of why Vasseleu’s notion of touch is equally open to critique. In a 
contemporary technologized existence, a number of subjects may indeed be cast 
‘from context to context without reference to a formal body’.50 But the theory of
48 ‘Ticklish’, p. 160.
49 A body does not have to be ticklish to be vulnerable or vulnerably affected, as 
Morland shows in his discussion of the effects of surgery on bodies bom with 
ambiguous genitalia: ‘The diminution of genital tactility [from surgery] is one 
way in which a historically specific event persists on the body’s surface. [...] I 
argue [...] that the body’s very capacity for sensation is shaped by the 
impressions of objects and others on its surfaces. One such object is the 
surgeon’s scalpel. It is not simply that we feel touches but that certain touches, 
depending on their force and durability, determine what we are able to feel. [...] 
Surgery’s effects show how tactility, far from being simultaneous with touching, 
always has a constitutive history’ (‘Intersex’, p. 301). In this example, bodies are 
vulnerable to decisions based on medicine’s normative standards of genital 
visibility, which lead to touches from a technological development -  the
* surgeon’s knife -  that determine the receptivity of one’s ‘sensitised surface’.
50 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159.
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digital ticklishness does not reliably account for body-machines because it must 
cast off those bodily forms not immediately proximate to touch as sense, which 
the logic of ticklishness renders too hard, fixed or permanent (cast) to qualify as 
properly feeling beings in order to assert auto-affectation as the technological- 
human condition.51 Thus, I say hardening or putting into shape out o f  fluidity in 
order to emphasize the fact that it is possible to leave the time of touch/tactility -  
the temporal frame in which fluidity speaks for all meaningful body-machines -  
in order to explore the movement of bodies in other temporal registers. In other 
words, while some bodies do cast (move/reticulate) in body-machine time, we 
need to understand that some bodies are cast (fixed, placed, shaped or intelligibly 
formed) in other temporal frames, which will prevent us from becoming fixed in 
the single time that constitutes the work of Plant and Vasseleu.
Filmmaker and sexualities scholar Nguyen Tan Hoang presents a 
compelling argument for this double meaning of casting.52 Hoang considers the 
use of the Internet by gay Asian American males, a minority group referred to as 
‘GAMs’ on ‘personal homepages, gay websites, chat rooms, personal ads, [and] 
sex cruising sites’. Hoang asserts that while GAMs ‘have been able to assert a
51 ‘Ticklish’, p. 159.
52 Nguyen Tan Hoang, ‘[GAM4GAM4SEX]’, Vectors: Journal o f Culture and 
Technology in a Dynamic Vernacular, 2:1 (2006),
<http://www.vectorsiournal.Org/issues/3/objectOfMediaStudies> [accessed 9 
June 2009].
53 ‘[GAM]’, para. 1 of 15. To clarify, a sex cruising site provides the opportunity 
for domain members to meet and arrange to have sex, whereas a gay website 
provides a more general platform for the online affirmation and exploration of 
gay identities, although there is no strict delimitation between the uses of these 
domains. I must justify the move I make here from cyberfeminism to cyberqueer 
-  a cyberstudy based on non-normative sexualities. This chapter could be 
criticized for explicating the inadequacies of a cause dedicated to identifying and 
subverting the oppressive gender relations that persist in new technologies, and
• then turning to the sexual activities of male Internet users as a research base for a 
more sophisticated study of bodies and new technologies. But as we will see in
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tactical presence’ in these new media domains -  using communicative lines to 
post ‘sexually-explicit “self-pics” advertising various body parts’ and to recite 
‘sexually-explicit scripts articulating preferred sexual practices and positions’ -  
the movement of GAM bodies in online spaces is restricted by a ‘regulatory 
homo-masculinity’ which denies GAMs full participation in communication 
technology, on account of the distance of GAMs from an idealized whiteness and 
a masculinist model of sexual transgression.54
Before we consider these means of exclusion in more detail, we must 
underscore the importance of the form of Internet use that dominates Hoang’s 
essay; namely, the Internet as a support for the practice of cruising, which I 
schematically defined in chapter 1 as the search for casual sex partners by car 
and on foot, predominantly in urban areas. The Internet’s importance to cruising 
is based on the notion of online chat rooms, and web sites, enabling more 
subjects to locate and arrange offline meetings with greater ease and safety. It is
what follows, this focus on cyberqueer is not an abandonment of feminism; a 
feminist critique is required in order to understand the ways in which the subjects 
of Hoang’s study are racially marked. I am also compelled to include a 
cyberqueer account of casting because sexuality is presented so reductively in 
Plant’s book. Plant claims that agential, disorganized female service workers are 
part of a ‘genderquake’, whereby in ‘the 1990s, Western cultures were suddenly 
struck by an extraordinary sense of volatility in all matters sexual: differences, 
relations, identities, definitions, roles, attributes, means, and ends’ {Zeros, p. 37). 
As well as empowering women, Plant asserts, the genderquake gave rise to 
conditions in which heterosexual ‘relations were losing their viability, queer 
connections were flourishing’, and in which ‘the carnival had begun for a vast 
range of paraphilias or so-called perversions [...] if there was more than one sex 
to have, there were also more than two to be’ (p. 43). This is a crude, simplistic 
reading of early-1990s poststructuralist feminism, made according to a particular 
temporal logic: for Plant, sexuality is a fluid multiplicity that supersedes gender 
once gender identity is revealed to be retrograde, slow, and place-bound. A 
subject bom female, for example, who strongly identifies as masculine (but never 
as male) clearly cannot be accommodated in Plant’s technoculture. For a critique 
of this temporal logic, see Biddy Martin, ‘Sexualities Without Genders and Other 
Queer Utopias’, in Coming Out o f Feminism?, ed. by Mandy Merck, Naomi 
* Segal, and Elizabeth Wrignt, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 11-35.
54 ‘[GAM]’, paras. 1 and 7 of 15.
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thus possible to say that Internet cruising attests to Plant’s notion of affective 
mobility without Vasseleu’s qualification of ticklishness. By touching the 
computer keyboard and mouse in order to get in touch with prospective partners, 
cruisers are efficiently transported from context to context: bodies in chat rooms, 
sensitive to the affective possibilities of digital technology, are moved to offline 
locales where they partake in a proliferation of sexual acts and positions. But 
Hoang warns against celebrating the Internet as a space of experimental self- 
fashioning, because for Hoang these celebrations incorrectly assume that the 
numerous affirmations of gay identity in cyberspace equate with political 
progress, a mass movement out of the metaphorical closet, whereby progress is 
premised on ‘visibility in the media’.55 ‘Even though it is often described as a 
space conducive for trying and exploring one’s gay identity’, Hoang states, 
‘online space, in fact, can be seen to institute yet another closet. “Coming out” in 
cyberspace can provide so much safety and affirmation that one no longer needs 
to come out in “real life.” [...] the overwhelming commercial success of gay web 
portals [...] in reaching untapped markets (that is, “discreet” consumers) depends 
precisely upon keeping the offline closet intact’.56 This assertion complicates 
Stiegler’s argument that the discrete becomes less discreet through new media. In 
Hoang’s example, discreteness refers to the compartmentalized persona that an 
Internet user creates online, broken down into separate images and written 
descriptions that denote specific bodily attributes (such as height, age, build, as 
well as the type of sexual contact sought) which the user makes available for 
others to see or browse; website members are able to access another member’s 
personal space in its discontinuousness. To this extent the discrete is not discreet.
* 55‘[GAM]’, para. 3 of 1$.
56‘[GAM]’, para. 3 of 15.
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However, while this online contact enables users to meet somewhere 
offline, it does not follow that this facilitates a continuous, undivided (analogue) 
movement from a private, closeted gay identity to a public gay identity: coming 
out online is discrete from coming out offline -  the indiscreet discreteness of 
being seen as a member of a gay website can provide the user with the narrative 
cohesion of a gay identity, without the user encountering the homophobia likely 
to attend this fashioning in public space. Thus, Hoang implies that online cruisers 
are able to use the Internet as a means of being accurate (surgically precise, in 
Stiegler’s terms) about selecting an offline meeting -  its exact location, its exact 
time, the amount of time for which it will last -  that keeps their gay identity as 
discreet as possible. This digital assuaging of risk takes on racial significance in 
the case of GAM activity, Hoang asserts: ‘For GAMs, as racial minorities 
socially and geographically marginalized from mainstream physical spaces, 
coming out in cyberqueer space potentially provides “refuge” from the 
homophobia of Asian communities and the racism of the white gay community, 
at the same time that it re-affirms their own atomized, private, and often secret 
identities cultivated and made visible online’.57 Going online in order to come
57 Ibid. Hoang’s essay can be read as a critique of media theorist Greg Young’s 
notion of ‘Mycasting’. See Greg Young, ‘From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting to 
Mycasting: A Newfound Celebrity in Queer Internet Communities’, Continuum, 
18:1 (2004), 43-62. Mycasting refers to the way in which one’s self-fashioning of 
a profile made visible online -  in order to meet others offline -  can be read as the 
‘emergence of online celebrity reinforced in offline everyday life’, which Young 
claims ‘may be part of a wider process where the Internet has become, in 
essence, the perfect vehicle for later capitalism’s obsession with reinvention and 
flexibility’ (‘Mycasting’, p. 56). For Young, mycasting succeeds the media eras 
of television and radio broadcasting, and satellite multi-channel ‘narrowcasting’, 
and has ‘grown out of the context of de-industrialization where working-class 
men, though not exclusively, experiencing displacement from those traditionally 
gendered hard industries have been placed in direct competition with women in 
i  the one sector that has tdken up that economic slack, the traditionally gendered 
feminine services sector’ (‘Mycasting’, p. 56). ‘The first explicit recognition’ of
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offline, as it were, is never straightforwardly transformative, particularly for
bodies not immediately proximate to privileged areas of physical activity.
Hoang importantly argues, though, that GAMs are oppressed even in the
imputed refuge of online space. To show how, Hoang suggests that the
online/offline movement of GAM bodies is explained not by the imputed
transformative sensitivity of skins, but in juxtaposition with ‘the material form of
latex condoms’ — technologies that have gained a new importance with the
emergence of gay online communities:
The common complaint by gay Asian men that they ‘feel invisible’ when 
out in gay bars and clubs can be productively juxtaposed with the 
(in)visibility of the condom in everyday sexual discourse. While they 
seldom figure in everyday sexual discourse, condoms become loaded in 
gay online space due to the categories of ‘HIV status’ and ‘safe sex only’ 
in online personal profiles. Like GAM bodies online and off, the visibility 
and tactility of condoms are continually disavowed. Condom 
manufacturers characterize their products as transparent, flesh-colored, 
sensitive, skinless skin, ultra-and micro-thin: the user is encouraged not to 
see through the condom but to feel through it. Conversely, colored, 
studded, ribbed, and ‘pleasure shaped’ condoms call attention to the 
material shape and surface of the rubber as compensation for the decrease 
in ‘feeling’ produced by the latex barrier. For some GAMs, competition 
in the online sexual marketplace involves strategically redeploying 
visible, tactile bodily traits deemed negative and stereotypical: smooth 
skin, small lean build, toned torso [...] Akin to the [...] recognition and 
denial of the materiality of latex in condom packaging, GAM bodies,
mycasting, Young claims, is the gay male website Gaydar, which for Young 
serves as proof that post-Fordist competitiveness has democratizing effects: as 
Gaydar grew in popularity, gaining significantly in member profiles, the site’s 
original insignia of an idealized, white ‘Greco-Roman like male has been 
replaced by a range of gay couples, with a different one appearing each time you 
return to the homepage. These include [...] the image of an older and younger 
male as a couple, [...] an Asian and Anglo male as a couple, and so on. The 
association with Gaydar and its star potential [...] is perhaps now more inclusive 
semiotically’ (‘Mycasting’, p. 46). In Hoang, however, we see that semiotics of 
Asianness in gay online space is likely to indicate neither a newfound celebrity 
nor a flexibly visible and available self, but instead the online/offline fashioning 
« of a gay identity that is ihtentionally inflexible, kept online and away from 
physical whiteness.
234
seen and seen through, are simultaneously acknowledged and made to
disappear: ‘Sorry, not into Asians. No offence. Just a preference’.58
As I interpret this passage, Hoang draws attention to the problems we encounter 
with theories of touch-sensitivity and movement-as-casting when we consider the 
latex condom as a cast taken of a sensitized surface. Hoang explains that 
condoms are commonly represented as mobile tactility rather than as rubber 
sheaths: here the condom’s material shape is secondary to the condom’s status as 
a replica of the skin’s sensitivity to touch. The condom does not cover anything, 
these representations imply; on the contrary, it exposes the skin’s sense 
receptors, invisibly confirming subjects’ capacities as ‘feeling beings’, to borrow 
Vasseleu’s words.59 The rhetoric of the shape and material properties of the latex 
is framed by this dominant order of tactility, Hoang argues. Recognition of the 
materiality of condoms is always compensatory, drawing upon visual cues of 
tactile significance to suggest that condoms can be made to effect touch-sensitive 
movement/feeling, while at the same time suggesting that the condom user’s 
access to this tactile-affective realm will be restricted by the presence of 
insensate rubber. For Hoang, these discourses of latex condoms, and the 
limitations placed on GAM movement in a gay new media culture not solely 
stationed at the computer screen, are two aspects the same cultural formation in 
which GAMs are marginalized. GAM bodies can enter online space, navigate to 
various sites, pages, and rooms, and assert an eligible presence in these domains 
by uploading self-pics and self-scripts that signify a tactile body awaiting 
contact. But as Hoang suggests, GAM movement often does not progress past
58 ‘[GAM]’, paras. 4 and 5 of 15.
59 The condom manufacturer Condomi, for example, markets its products as 
$ ‘Virtual Skinwear’. Seev<http://www.condomi-direct.co.uk> [accessed 06
August 2009]. I discuss the virtual in the latter stages of this chapter.
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these stages, because the regulatory masculinity monitoring the site racially
marks these movements, recognizing them as belonging to a (non-white)
materiality that is both seen and known, and then seen through or ignored, in the
realm of invisible (namely white) tactility. In Hoang’s example, to recognize a
materiality -  to see a body by drawing on the racial discourse through which
whiteness classifies or purports to ‘know’ Asianness -  is to mark that materiality
as insensate. Because the flexible tactility of online cruising space has a
monitoring effect, whereby it notices a (non-white) materiality and then denies
that materiality (‘not into Asians’), GAM bodies are made to feel invisible in the
online cruising community, on the basis that they cannot take part in the
uninterrupted or fluid (in)visibility/tactility required to freely move between
online and offline realms.60 In short, GAMs are determined as ineligible to
partake fully in an affective mode of feeling-through, in which bodies must go
unnoticed in order to move properly.
The condom’s prevalence in gay online space, Hoang demonstrates, is
resisted on websites dedicated to gay barebacking -  the practice of anal sex
without latex, whether skinless or pleasure shaped:
the insistent propagation of condom use in HIV/AIDS education to 
combat the ‘most transmission-enabling practice’ inadvertently re-centers 
anal sex as ‘real sex’, and by extension, as the most legitimate, masculine 
sex act. [...] Rejecting outright the use of a condom as an artificial 
barrier, [barebacking] practice privileges unprotected, uninhibited, and 
natural sex, the kind of sex ‘real’ masculine men engage in. 
Bareback.com’s ideal members are men ‘looking for raw, man-on-man 
action’ [...] To ‘Cum Inside’ (that is, to ‘Enter’ the site) and not ‘Pull
601 say fluid (in)visibility here because, as Hoang implies, the most popular 
profiles online are of course seen and approved for an offline meeting, but the 
whiteness of these bodies is never acknowledged -  ‘no whites’ is rarely a request 
online, Hoang implies -  and is thus not seen as an impediment to the promise of 
free movement and unlimited experimentation in digital media. Plant’s 
* privileging of touch/tactility over vision is therefore inadequate in the context of 
Hoang’s study.
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Out’, the user must not be a ‘wimp, wuss or pussy’ who is ‘too scared to 
get what [he wants] ’ .61
Hoang is careful to emphasize the very important and serious political claims gay
barebacking discourse makes against the condom’s use as a ‘homosexual
prophylactic’.62 Hoang’s point instead is that these online strategies rely on
casting off material objects (condoms) that can provide us with valuable insights
into what (and indeed who) takes place in subcultural networks. As Hoang
explains, Bareback.com's rejection of an apparently restrictive, feminizing, and
insensate materiality mirrors the ways in which in ‘the West, Asian men are
frequently seen as deficient in sexuality and masculinity, forever boyish and
never man enough’, meaning that within a new media context the ‘assertion of
GAMs as “active” sexual subjects in online gay space is met with incredulity and
dismissal, whereby feminine excess -  “fats” and “ferns” -  metonymically infects
“Asians’” .63 Hoang suggests that through the insensate materiality of the
61 ‘[GAM]’, para. 10 of 15. The expansion of the condom’s role ‘from a 
heterosexual prophylactic to a homosexual one’ took place in the advent of the 
post-Fordist age of AIDS, Hoang reminds us. While there are normative 
masculinist implications within barebacking rhetoric, Hoang argues, ‘in the place 
of a knee-jerk censure of this dalliance with sexual danger as another example of 
“homosexual irresponsibility”, it is possible to reassess the risk-taking here as an 
“attempt at self-care”, and not a simple case of self-destructiveness, especially 
when given the choice between contracting HIV and the risk of sacrificing 
pleasure, intimacy, and community’ (‘[GAM]’, para. 12 of 15).
‘[GAM]’, para. 12 of 15. Sexualities scholar Tim Dean provides an extensive 
study of barebacking communities, and the centrality of online activity to these 
communities, in his book Unlimited Intimacy: Reflections on the Subculture o f 
Barebacking (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
63 ‘[GAM]’, para. 12 of 15. A ‘fat’ is a Web user who often makes visible their 
overweight body in online profile sites. Fats are marked as asexual, or idly 
feminine, in Web domains where popularity is gauged by one’s proximity to an 
idealized musculature. ‘Fern’ references a feminine-looking male and, as Hoang 
points out, has historically been used as a racial slur against Asian males. 
Cybertheorist John Edward Campbell provides a detailed study of fats or ‘chubs’, 
as he terms them, as a distinct cyberculture in Getting It On Online: Cyberspace,
* Gay Male Sexuality, and Embodied Identity (New York: Haworth Press, 2004), 
pp. 126-134.
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discarded object we come metaphorically into contact with, or are able to 
interpret the marginalized activity of, bodies denied access to and thus judged to 
be distanced from cruising as touch-sensitive transportation.
By 4 attach [ing] the racialized bodies of GAMs to the material form of 
latex condoms’, Hoang is not arguing that there is a definitive shape by which 
GAM identity 4 can be easily identified and embodied online and off, neither is 
he suggesting that the material form of condoms always remains intact.64 
Condoms tear or break, Hoang states, just as GAMs continually break out of the 
4preconstituted’, menu-driven categories offered on websites by taking on a 
'proliferation of acts and identities’ via online/offline cruising.65 We may 
consider the tearing of the condom as simply another occasion for casting or 
throwing away a material object that in any case is discarded after use. Similarly, 
the proliferation of GAM acts and identities may attest to the new freedoms 
enjoyed by a minority group that webcasts: the taking on and discarding of 
fashioned personas one after another. But Hoang points out that the condom’s 
tearing causes us to examine, and thus stay with, its material form for longer than 
expected. In this encounter with the condom as touched/examined object instead 
of with the condom as invisible touch/tactility, we leam about the reality of
64‘[GAM]’, para. 8 of 15.
65 ‘[GAM]’, para. 8 of 15. To clarify, Hoang argues that cruising GAM bodies 
are transformatively transported from context to context in ways that exceed 4 a 
choice between 44safe” and 44bb[barebacker]”, o r44Asian” and 44white”, but that 
these movements are still racially marked and thus restricted in comparison to 
those bodily types deemed closer to the idealized form that determines 
participation in this activity. I borrow the term 4menu-driven’ from cybertheorist 
Lisa Nakamura, who argues that while race is certainly not fixed, racial 
stereotypes continue to shape interactions online (and often inform the design of 
Web interfaces), and that anonymous computer users are assumed to be white.
» See Lisa Nakamura, Cybertypes: Race, Ethnicity and Identity on the Internet 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 101-136 (p. 101).
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cybercultural life for GAMs, for whom the Web often represents an
unremarkable ‘extension of offline physical space’:
If the condom is the epitome of the throw-away object that serves a 
strictly utilitarian purpose, it exists beyond ephemera. Only in cases of 
misuse -  rips, tears, and slippages -  does it become a ‘throw-away not 
thrown away’, invested with intense and anxious affect. However, my 
close inspection of the condom [...] re-installs the condom’s ephemeral, 
souvenir status to help shed light on another foreign and exotic object: the 
GAM body in cyberqueer space. The ripped condom functions as 
material evidence for the ephemeral cyber-activity of GAM bodies 
logging on and getting off.66
Here Hoang importantly complexifies the meaning of ephemerality. In chapter 2
I argued that in the task temporality of post-Fordism, bodies move ephemerally
in the sense of a fleeting transience, remaining in place for a short span of time.
Hoang however locates ephemerality within a more stubborn temporal frame, in
which ‘ephemeral’ equates to ‘souvenir’ -  an object of such nominal value as to
be considered worthy of being discarded or thrown at any moment, but which, as
a token of remembrance or a ‘keepsake’, remains with us as a material portal to
forgotten places and experiences. Theorized in this way, the tom latex reminds us
that the condom’s (cast) materiality -  by being prone to breakage -  can place
restrictions on the condom’s ability to signify speed, flexibility, and remoulding
in digital communication.
66 ‘[GAM]’, paras. 3 and 14 of 15. Although I think he primarily accounts for the 
condom in a metaphorical sense, Hoang is not entirely clear on how the condom 
functions as material evidence. One of the main purposes of Hoang’s essay is to 
study new media by focusing on the material properties of objects that remain 
important to, but which are often ignored by, a new media practice that is often 
assumed to be immaterially mobile. To this extent we could assume that Hoang 
is writing anecdotally, referring to actual condoms that have been broken in 
specific sex acts (perhaps even to condoms that have been in his possession), and 
not just to the condom as metaphor. While Hoang does of course comment on the 
literal use of condoms in cyberqueer space, he still fails to explain the precise 
i  status of the condom in his essay, but I do not think that this evasiveness 
compromises Hoang’s important analyses.
239
As well as metaphorizing for the online treatment of GAMs, the used 
condom also literally evidences the offline bodily intimacies that the Internet is 
popularly used to facilitate. These intimacies take place on the condition that one 
expects to meet offline the body met online; as Hoang shows, one such 
expectation is the offline whiteness of the body initially contacted in the chat 
room or on the website.67 Ephemeral GAM bodies, determined as ‘exotic’ 
souvenirs in cruising sites, are ascribed a token Asianness that can at once 
devalue GAM status in these communities and keep GAMs online. In the 
competitive spaces of online cruising, keeping in touch, or staying in contact 
digitally, is not necessarily a sign of agency, nor is it an indication that agency 
follows from the indistinguishableness of casting on and casting off: bodies that 
remain continuously available online (casting on) are likely to be those that have 
been discarded (cast off) from online/offline activity experienced as freedom of 
movement. Tactility here is far from universally inclusive.
From Digital to Virtual
Hoang’s case study shows that greater attention needs to be paid to material 
objects in post-Fordism -  objects which, when afforded more time in a post- 
Fordist era marking the shortened lifespans of consumer products, remind us that 
new media does not always produce placelessness. I conclude this chapter by 
proposing a general theory of technology, time, and bodily movement based in
67 Hoang asserts that in ‘gay online cruising, GAMs who fail to declare their 
Asianness through photos or textual descriptions are considered to be “hiding” 
and/or “passing”. Yet, this view inadvertently re-centers whiteness as the default 
category’. Many GAMs conceal their faces in the pictures they upload, Hoang 
asserts, posting pictures of ‘headless torsos’ for members to view, which Hoang 
claims can be read alternatively as ‘a tactic that mobilizes exposure and
i  concealment to mount a critique’ of online whiteness and of ‘GAM legibility in 
cyberqueer space’ (‘[GAM]’, para. 13 of 15).
part on Hoang’s important insight. I call this theory ‘casting’, but to understand 
my interpretation of this term we must engage in detail with a notion that enables 
us to conceive technological place-fixity and inhibited movement as 
opportunities rather than the effects of a body’s oppression. I am referring to the 
notion of the virtual, which I have deliberately postponed discussing until this 
point for two reasons. First, I wish to emphasize that the virtual must not be 
confused with simulation or artificial environments (or even technological 
development), a confusion perpetuated by commonsensical ideas and discussions 
o f ‘virtual reality’. Using ‘virtual’ commonsensically in the previous chapter 
would undoubtedly have been distracting. My explication of the digital did not 
permit sufficient space to undertake a philosophical meditation on virtuality: the 
chapter could only have accommodated the former, simplistic meaning, where 
‘virtual’ would have had a vague, unspecified relation to digital computing, 
paradoxically supporting the logic of exciting computer-mediated escapism that 
my theory of discrete positionality resists.68
The second reason why I have postponed a discussion of the virtual is 
that my research is located problematically in relation to the philosophies of the 
virtual I discuss. My call to believe in the digital within the analogico-digital is 
simultaneously a call to doubt the founding logic of continuous analogue 
movement and transformation. But as we will see, continuous movement and 
transformation is a primary component of the theory of virtuality that I will 
advocate. I do not want us to doubt the virtual. Instead, I will argue that moving 
from digital to virtual involves moving towards a way of life in which creative
68 Hoang is indeed guilty -  along with the majority of cybertheorists -  of 
invoking ‘virtual’ without explanation or clarification, and of using ‘digital’ and 
‘virtual’ interchangeably. The reasons for arguing against this conflation will 
become clear in the course of this section.
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movement inheres in relations between place-bound bodies and durable things.
Virtuality, I will demonstrate, describes the space to which we are transported as
a result of making contact with technological objects, at the moment that these
objects do not work in the ways that we would normally expect and require. I
will begin by explicating key philosophical meditations on the virtual, which
theorize virtuality as a space occupied by bodies that never occupy any fixed
places. Against these theorizations, I will argue that bodies do inhabit places in
virtuality, and that our ability to locate these places depends on our willingness to
notice the meaningful relationships that emerge between bodies and
technological objects when touch and tactility do not coincide.
A key contemporary work on virtuality is Pierre Levy’s Becoming
Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age.69 Levy begins by juxtaposing the virtual with
the related philosophical concepts of the actual, the possible, and the real:
The virtual tends towards actualization, without undergoing any form of 
effective or formal concretization. [...] Strictly speaking, the virtual 
should not be compared with the real but the actual, for virtuality and 
actuality are merely two different ways of being. [...] The possible is 
already fully constituted, but exists in a state of limbo. It can be realized 
without any change occurring either in its determination or nature. It is a 
phantom reality, something latent. The possible is exactly like the real, 
the only thing missing being existence. The realization of a possible is not 
an act of creation in the fullest sense of the word, for creation implies the 
innovative production of an idea or form. [...] Unlike the possible, which 
is static and already constituted, the virtual is a kind of problematic 
complex, the knot of tendencies or forces that accompanies a situation, 
event, object, or entity, and which invokes a process of resolution: 
actualization. [...] The virtualities inherent in a being, [...] the knot of 
tensions, constraints, and projects that animate it, the questions that move 
it forward, are an essential element of its determination. Actualization 
thus appears as the solution to a problem, a solution not previously
« 69 Pierre Levy, Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age, trans. by Robert 
Bononno (New York and London: Plenum Trade, 1998).
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contained in its formulation. It is the creation, the invention of a form on 
the basis of a dynamic configuration of forces and finalities.70
Actualization is thus the movement inspired by the virtual: the virtual is the 
dimension of existence that marks every taking-place as a problem, a question, a 
restriction, and a single, tenuous stage of an unfinished process.71 Actualization 
captures the double sense of casting as processual movement and taking shape 
for which I have argued. Actualization is a movement to take shape (create form) 
in response to a virtuality it in no way resembles: as Levy argues, it is inaccurate 
to claim that the virtual is realized by the actual, because actualization produces 
‘new qualities’ in order to solve problems of constraint.72 The virtual is thus a 
key component of reality, providing the conditions for all that is creatively
70 Becoming, pp. 23-25. Emphasis in original. Here Levy is drawing on a key 
philosopher of the virtual, Gilles Deleuze. In his book-length study of Henri 
Bergson, Deleuze elaborates on the conceptual pairs virtual/actual and 
possible/real: ‘The real is supposed to resemble [the possible]. That is to say, we 
give ourselves a real that is ready-made, preformed, pre-existent to itself, and 
that will pass into existence according to an order of successive limitations. [...] 
If the real is said to resemble the possible, is this not in fact because the real was 
expected to come about by its own means, to “project backward” a fictitious 
image of it, and to claim that it was possible at any time, before it happened? In 
fact, it is not the real that resembles the possible, it is the possible that resembles 
the real, because it has been abstracted from the real once made, arbitrarily 
extracted from the real like a sterile double’ (Bergsonism, p. 98). By contrast, 
actualization for Deleuze represents an innovative movement forward according 
to difference and creation. Actualization is an undivided multiplicity produced 
from a problematic virtual unity; the virtual does not resemble the actual, but 
instead provides the conditions for a movement completely other to it, thus 
breaking the linear, seamless trajectory from possible to real. See also Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), pp. 211-212, and Grosz, Travels, pp. 108-109.
71 Levy’s principal examples of actualization from the virtual include that of the
growth process of a tree from a seed: ‘The tree is virtually present in the seed.
[...] The seed’s problem [...] is the growth of a tree. The seed is this problem,
even if it is something more than this. This does not signify that the seed knows
exactly what the shape of the tree will be, which will one day burst into bloom
and spread its leaves above it. Based on its internal limitations, the seed will have
to invent the tree, coproduce it together with the circumstances it encounters’
* (Becoming, pp. 23-24. Emphasis in original).
79 Becoming, p. 25.
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forward moving in life. This cannot be said of the possible/real dichotomy, which
involves giving existence to (or realizing) any number of possibilities that have
been determined in advance, concretizing these combinations in a
straightforward, uncomplicated trajectory. Levy intervenes in these philosophies,
however, by considering the virtual not merely as a catalysing dimension of
being but as a movement itself, a ‘virtualization’:
Virtualization can be defined as the movement of actualization in reverse. 
It consists in the transition from the actual to the virtual, an 
exponentiation of the entity under consideration. Virtualization is not a 
derealization (the transformation of a reality into a collection of 
possibles) but a change of identity, a displacement of the center of 
ontological gravity of the object considered. Rather than being defined 
principally through its actuality (a solution), the entity now finds its 
essential consistency within a problematic field. The virtualization of a 
given entity consists in determining the general question to which it 
responds, in mutating the entity in the direction of this question and 
redefining the initial actuality as the response to a specific question. [...] 
Actualization proceeds from problem to solution, virtualization from a 
given solution to a (different) problem. [Virtualization] implies as great a 
sense of irreversibility in its effects, indeterminacy in its processes, and 
creativity in its striving, as actualization.73
Virtualization is as forward moving as actualization, Levy claims. Because it 
moves from actual solution to virtual problem/constraint -  a problem/constraint 
never carried into the actual by actualization -  virtualization implies that every 
new creation of form catalyses a movement towards a problem/constraint 
completely other to this form: Levy indeed calls this process ‘becoming other’.74 
Owing to the nature of the virtual, this different problem inspires another creative 
act, but the virtual/actual dialectic now occurs at the level of ‘embracing’ 
differences arrived at out of problem solving, instead of solving problems (as a 
means of getting) out of a field of different forces, constraints, and questions.75 In
73 Becoming, pp. 26-27.
* 74 Becoming, p. 34.
75 Ibid.
short, Levy posits virtualization to argue that creative solutions are discrete acts -  
answers to specific questions -  within a more general condition of rapid change 
or upheaval. Levy describes the ‘virtualization of the body’ as a prime example 
of this exponentiation, making reference to a theme that has been central to this 
chapter: skins and sensitized surfaces. Medical imaging technologies such as X- 
rays and scanners respond to the problems and constraints of surgery, Levy 
claims, ‘enabling] us to see inside the body without breaking its sensitive 
surface’, creating form by ‘bring[ing] to light other skins, buried epidermises, 
unsuspected surfaces that rise up from within the organism’.76 But this 
creation/response in turn ‘ virtualize[s] the surface of the body’, by means of 
which the skin nonetheless ‘becomes permeable’: ‘Each new device adds another 
type of skin, another visible body to our actual body. The organism is turned 
inside out like a glove. The interior appears on the outside, while remaining 
within. For the skin is also the boundary between the self and the external world. 
[...] the center of the body teems with layer upon layer of film. [...] visible, 
audible, and sensible bodies are multiplied and dispersed outside us. [...] a crowd 
of skins or dermatoid specters’.77 Virtualization is thus a communalization 
according to Levy, in which individual bodies are ‘temporary actualization^] of
78an enormous hybrid, social, and technobiological hyperbody’.
While advocating virtualization as a problematic heterogeneity to be 
embraced, Levy stresses that virtualization is also capable of ‘exclusion’ and
76 Becoming, pp. 39-40.
77 Becoming, p. 40.
78 Becoming, p. 44. Levy’s assertion echoes Massumi’s Bergsonist phrase 
‘concrete is as concrete doesn’t’. In virtualization, a body is concretely (actually) 
a body insofar as it is redriented towards a more abstract, volatile field of forces
in which it is transformed or differed from itself.
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‘confiscation’.79 Creative acts can lose significance or can be ‘disqualified]’, 
Levy claims, if on every occasion they instance a movement towards a much 
wider, more abstract, and more heterogeneous ‘act-generating structure’.80 In 
other words, virtualization’s tendency towards ‘getting away’ can lead to a taking 
away: the multiplication of bodily types outside of ourselves to an immeasurable, 
shared complex of indeterminacies denies specific, local claims to ‘skills’, 
‘identity’, and ‘homeland’.81 Levy argues that these denials of agency are 
increasingly likely in contemporary technologized societies, where advancements 
in transport and electronic communications have granted virtualization greater
82 r-r-<‘speed and force’. To address these threats, Levy argues that virtualization can 
be conceived cybemetically, as a creative movement regulated through its co­
ordination with other transformations, namely the movements from the possible 
to the real (realization) and from the real to the possible, which Levy calls
7Q
Becoming, p. 186. 
m Becoming, pp. 186, 174.
81 Becoming, p. 186.
82 Ibid. One of Levy’s main examples of technological change is the impact of 
telecommunications on bodies at work, which he claims has enacted ‘the 
virtualization of the company’ or, put simply, a movement away from place- 
bound Taylorist arrangements: ‘The conventional organization gathers its 
employees in one building or a group of buildings. Each employee occupies a 
precisely defined physical position, and his schedule indicates the hours he will 
work. A virtual corporation, on the other hand, makes extensive use of 
telecommuting. In place of the physical presence of its employees in a single 
location, it substitutes their participation in an electronic communications 
network and the use of software resources that promote cooperation. The 
virtualization of the cooperation consists primarily in transforming the 
spatiotemporal coordinates of work into a continuously renewed problem rather 
than a stable solution’ (Becoming, p. 26). Levy, as we can see, is enthusiastic 
about the fluidity afforded by this reorganization, but he is also wary of the ways 
in which contemporary industries such as ‘technoscience, finance, and the media’
-  ‘the most virtualized and virtualizing communities of the contemporary world’
-  are structuring ‘our social reality with the greatest force, perhaps even the 
greatest violence’ {Becoming, p. 30). In light of these observations of the 
contemporary workplace, we can perhaps posit Levy as the successor to Kroemer 
and Grandjean in the time of ergonomics.
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‘potentialization’. For Levy, actualization and virtualization cannot occur without
the entropy and homeostasis that these extra movements produce:
realization [...] supplies a preexisting form with matter [...] [and] 
embodies a linear temporality, one that is mechanical, deterministic. By 
irreversibly dissipating potential energy or any available resources, 
realization follows the second law of thermodynamics, according to 
which the increase of entropy in a closed system is inevitable. [...] 
Through its transition from the real to the possible, potentialization, or 
formal cause, can be compared to an increase in the flow of entropy. 
Potentialization produces order and information, it replenishes resources 
and energy reserves. [...] If I were to analyze a concrete phenomenon 
[...] it would become apparent that [...] the four modes of being, the four 
transitions from one mode to another, are inextricably bound up with one 
another. If we block virtualization, we create alienation, ends can no 
longer be reformulated, heterogenesis fails; living, open machinations in 
the process of becoming are suddenly transformed into lifeless 
mechanisms. If we cut off actualization, then ideas, ends, and problems 
become sterile, incapable of resulting in inventive action. The inhibition 
of potentialization inevitably leads to the stifling, exhaustion, and 
extinction of living processes. Finally, if we suppress realization, 
processes lose their footing, their substrate, their point of support, and 
become disembodied. All transformations are necessary and complement 
one another.83
Here Levy is arguing that, while actualization and virtualization are movements 
away from a replenishment of resources and a return to a predetermined form 
(potentialization), living processes must remain in homeostasis -  must survive by 
maintaining energy levels, in other words -  otherwise there is no life for 
actualization and virtualization to creatively transform. Equally, actualization and 
virtualization are more creative transformations than realization, which is 
analogous to an entropic increase or burnout of a system; realization wastes 
energy, because it chooses ‘among possibles’ and gives material existence to 
these choices in a linear fashion, leaving behind or ‘dropping’ the potential in 
which these selections were included.84 But, as Levy asserts, the forward-moving 
creativity of virtualization is not a process of bodily ‘disappearance or
83 Becoming, pp. 173, 175.
84 Becoming, pp. 174, 175.
dematerialization’ b u t4 a re-creation, a reincarnation, a multiplication, 
vectorization, and heterogenesis of the human’: realization — the process by 
which matter is supplied or conferred -  must therefore occur as a condition of 
these (and all) material transformations.85 Levy’s key point is that we must not 
confuse virtualization with the valorization of a single mode of change. Arguing 
for virtualization over other types of movement, Levy suggests, contributes to the 
misunderstanding that becoming virtual is a predominantly harmful vector, 
because this argument implies that virtualization marks the destruction of 
potentialization and realization.
However, while I do not contest Levy’s intellectual grasp of virtuality, I 
take issue with his cybernetic approach to virtuality. Levy understandably wants 
to show virtuality co-ordinating with other modes of being and with other 
transformations -  as a component of what Levy terms an 'ontological four-speed 
motor’ -  so that we can engage with and understand the virtual, rather than fear it
o z
as a disembodying and life-negating aspect of contemporary society. But I 
think that Levy detracts from the complexity of the virtual when he invokes 
homeostasis to argue that virtualization is chaotic, but not so chaotic as to be of 
no worth to human subjects. Indeed, for Levy, incorporating virtualization into 
cybernetic systems of control presents a solution to the problems inherent in 
moving towards the virtual, an argument which surely undermines his primary 
intention of emphasizing virtualization as a movement from solution to a 
problem that differs, or that is far removed, from that individual solution. Put 
differently, virtualization is meant to show the virtual as an inhabitable space that 
resists sameness, but for Levy every movement towards the virtual carries the
85 Becoming, p. 44. v
86 Becoming, p. 176.
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same problem of potentially destroying place specificity and local claims to 
bodily identity. This cybernetic theory of virtuality is circular rather than 
progressive: virtualization does not exponentiate the actual, because every 
movement toward the virtual requires the same act of subjectively monitoring or 
judging this movement.
Using my notion of cybernetic (im)patience, I demonstrated in the 
previous chapter that cybernetics cannot be relied upon to solve anything in a 
technologized existence: the critical significance of cybernetic control comes 
from waiting in homeostasis, indefinitely, with a type of body-machine 
intelligibility that dies if attached to a trajectory of actual computational 
invention, innovation or development. Cybernetic (im)patience affects Levy’s 
project without Levy’s comprehension. We can understand this using the 
metaphors of automobility that enabled us, in the previous chapter, to see the 
continued relevance of the cybernetic fold in restricting the impact of new, 
technologically-attuned conceptions of bodily movement. Levy’s four-speed 
motor is intended to drive us forward in our conceptions of virtuality, enabling us 
to live with a creative force that has taken on a new significance amid the 
proliferation of digital technologies that permeate and multiply bodies. But this 
motor in fact oscillates between (same) problem and (same) solution in such 
perpetuity that Levy’s project takes us no further in our understanding of how 
virtuality works: virtualization becomes entropic, losing its capacity to move 
creatively.
This does not mean that cybernetics destroys virtuality, however. Levy is 
correct in turning to a theory of order and control as a means of understanding 
the virtual. Levy’s mistake, rather, is in using this theory as a means of doing
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something with virtuality: in other words, Levy assumes that virtuality is a purely 
analogue variability to which subjects must respond with care and consideration 
-  subjects can either make controlled judgements about this chaotic force (by 
placing it in relation to other ways of being), or leave it to unpredictably 
virtualize in ways that may prove harmful. As we will see in what follows, it is 
not a question of doing something with virtuality: Levy fails to acknowledge a 
certain order of virtuality that works prior to a singular, powerful force 
generative of creative acts.
Philosopher Wojciech Kalaga presents an alternative account of the 
virtual and the actual, one less concerned with a problem-solution trajectory.87 
For Kalaga, the virtual is not only an act-generating structure but also the 
‘relations’ that are the ‘possibility and basis of any structure at all’.88 The 
relations to which Kalaga refers are those that exist prior to an act or taking- 
place, in a spatial expanse in which no places are definitively occupied. Kalaga’s 
most vivid example of this complex formulation is diaspora: a diaspora, Kalaga 
states, ‘consists of material bodies of its members, their vicinities and 
topographical places they occupy, but its true make up is based on the relations 
among those members. [...] In this sense its real place is nowhere, or better, in 
the virtual space created by relations’.89 In other words, members of a diaspora 
move to and inhabit a number of places, but these acts do not locate and define 
this group as a diaspora. These multiple, differentiated acts, rather, must exist in 
some order -  must relate to one another -  for them to comprise a particular 
dispersal: this order of multiplicity cannot be said to exist anywhere in particular;
87 Wojciech Kalaga, ‘The Trouble with the Virtual’, Symploke, 11:1-2 (2003), 
96-103.
88 ‘Trouble’, p. 96. v
89 ‘Trouble’, p. 99.
it is a spatial non-place, and the bodies that inhabit this space are potentially 
everywhere and nowhere simultaneously. Thus Diaspora, Kalaga implies, is 
meaningful at a more basic (virtually relational) level than that of the (actual) 
movements made in response to (virtual) problems of constraint. The virtual is 
real/has reality here, in that diaspora is ‘accessible to cognition’ only in this 
unactualized state.90
We can apply this notion of virtual relation to my previous discussion of 
touch without tactility. When a touch occurs without tactility, the act of touching 
has certainly taken place. But the impression left by this act does not engender 
actualization: because a touch, in this case, is not simultaneous with the 
movement/affect that follows from a (tactile) surface having been touched, the 
implications of this touch are virtual rather than actual, indeed virtual primary to 
a virtuality that tends or moves towards the actual. Touch is meaningful here -  
contact or relation has been established -  in ways that trouble place and time. An 
insensate touch defies location: we cannot precisely locate where, when, and the 
degree to which contact was made with a surface. But instead of disqualifying 
this action on the basis of a missing simultaneity with tactility, we should 
consider the ways in which touch without tactility remains everywhere as touch, 
as a virtuality or subsisting relation that places limits on the supersession of 
touch by a transformative sensitivity.91
90 ‘Trouble’, p. 98.
91 For more on unactualized touch, see cultural theorist Laurent Milesi’s essay 
‘Taste, Tastare, Tact: A Deconstructive Touch of Digital Theory’, University o f  
Bucharest Review: A Journal o f  Literary and Cultural Studies, 7:3 (2005), 41-57. 
Milesi explores ‘an act of touching’ that ‘may well have happened but’ whose 
‘implications should’ be ‘construed as belonging to the realm of unactualized 
possibility, rather than the actual [...] or [...] the virtual (or relational) as 
opposed to the actual (or material)’ (‘Taste’, p. 41). This type of touch subsists, 
Milesi argues, when ‘one should not feel “touched” by a touch, that is when a
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In the same way that I allude to the various distances of bodies from the
time of touch/tactility — the temporal frame of creativity, according to Plant —
Kalaga s virtuality complexifies Levy’s claim that movements toward the actual
are creative movements forward. Kalaga draws attention to the differentiated
components constituting virtuality, components that are not uniformly actualized:
even a cursory look at actuality [...] shows us that it may have stronger 
and weaker forms, depending also on what kind of criterion we adopt, for 
example stability, materiality, or durability: a stone and a thought in the 
mind are both actual, but for a stone actuality is the primary way of being, 
while a thought only passes through actuality on its way to the virtual 
past. So if actuality displays some diversity, that diversity is multiplied 
within the realm of the virtual. If we agree with Deleuze and Levy [sic] 
that the virtual always, by its nature, tends — or more strongly — 
necessarily gravitates towards actuality, the distance of different regions 
or entities within the virtual space from actuality will certainly differ. In 
other words [...] while a part of the virtual spectrum may indeed press 
towards actualization, another part may gladly (and passively) enjoy its 
status quo. [...] rather than a homogeneous black hole encompassing all 
things non-actual, virtuality should be considered as a spectrum of 
potentialities with various distance to actuality[.]92
The virtual/actual dichotomy does not simply involve moving from one 
‘undifferentiated realm’ to another, Kalaga argues.93 A stone and a thought are
touch is not a touch but a tact which should register an “interdiction” of touch’ 
(ibid).
92 ‘Trouble’, p. 102. Emphasis in original. Kalaga invokes potential in a slightly 
different sense than Levy’s cybernetic theorization of the term. Kalaga draws on 
Aristotle’s theory of potentiality, in which the actual is the ultimate, immutable 
(cast) shape or form that something works/functions to become; and potential is 
matter, the passive or latent force required to effect this becoming. See Aristotle, 
The Metaphysics, trans. by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 
2004), pp. 283-314, and also Richard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, and Politics, 
ed. by Michael A. Peters and Paulo Ghiraldelli, Jr. (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002), p. 55. From this perspective we can call Kalaga’s theory of the 
virtual potentiality-virtuality, because Kalaga is arguing for that which passively 
remains in virtuality as a power or potency prior to supplying a formation (or 
creation of form).
93 Ibid. Levy’s virtualization indeed reverses the movement from virtual to 
actual, but virtualization still occurs at the level of a taking-place. Virtualization 
follows an act -  something that was seamlessly actual is moved forward into a 
field that is seamlessly^ virtual -  and it thus appears for Levy that these domains 
do not contain elements that are separated by their respective proximities to, and
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both creations of form — are both actual — but they do not remain actual for the 
same amount of time. A stone’s form is ‘stronger’, because it is supplied with a 
durable materiality that maintains its position within the realm of actuality. 
Kalaga implies that while we cannot comprehend this actual materiality in a pre- 
discursive capacity — as I have argued in different contexts throughout this thesis, 
to posit a materiality prior to representation is still to represent that materiality -  
we can nevertheless claim that the stone is, according to specific criteria, 
‘ontologically independent (exists independently)’ from our interpretations of it, 
or that it is more actual than virtual. A thought, however, is only briefly actual -  
formed in the mind of a material body — before it moves into the past. The past is 
virtual for Kalaga because it is a space of interpretation or, more specifically, a 
space formed by ‘chains of interpretive relations’ -  the potentially infinite, 
relational movement from sign to sign by which the past becomes interpretable 
or comprehensible to us. Like diaspora, this interpretive space occupies no 
particular place.94 Thus, virtuality and actuality overlap; a thought in the mind,
distances from, virtuality and actuality. For Kalaga, however, the virtual does 
contain these elements, and the virtual and actual cross one another to a much 
greater extent than Levy assumes.
‘Trouble’, p. 101. We can understand Kalaga’s theorizations as the 
intervention of textuality into virtuality: indeed, Kalaga’s assertion o f ‘chains of 
interpretive relations’ refers to a textual virtual. Kalaga is primarily citing the 
work of semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce when discussing relations. See The 
Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1912), ed. by 
The Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). In the 
previous chapter I showed the importance of discreteness and relation to 
poststructuralist theories of discourse and textuality. Although Kalaga generally 
refers to Peirce, I argue that Kalaga’s virtuality is also exemplified by the 
Derridean notion of the trace, whereby signs are determined by the 
traces/differential movements of that which is forever absent. Thus, we interpret 
texts that are always simultaneously ‘not-there’ and ‘not-that’, in a virtual space 
produced by the difference between discrete linguistic units (Grammatology, p. 
xvii). (Indeed, the digital and the virtual are bound up with one another in this 
instance.) Kalaga himself alludes to this exemplification, stating that ‘infinite 
semiosis may be considered to be the epitome of virtuality’ (‘Trouble’, p. 100).
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for example, primarily exists in virtuality having already been actualized. Owing
to its greater expansiveness, the virtual contains more of these diverse positions
than the actual. It is therefore reductive to represent virtuality as a space of
identically non-actual components, Kalaga asserts; instead, the virtual is a range
of parts variously closer to or further away from actuality. None of these virtual
parts can be called non-actual: each part is alternatively actual, whether it
proceeds towards and remains in actuality or whether it remains virtual (prior to
actualization) following actualization. One such part of the virtual spectrum can
describe the primary way of being for a body distanced from the time of
touch/tactility, given that this body has actually been touched but, due to the
virtual-relational subsistence of this touch, is not simply gravitated towards a
homogeneous time and space of transformation. In short, Kalaga digitalizes the
virtual, invoking the discrete elements that prevent virtuality from functioning as
a singular continuum of change.
For Kalaga, material objects are crucial for transporting us to this virtual
space of interpretation:
Access to virtuality is through the most actual of actualities -  the physical 
object. Objects are portals opening for us the realm of the virtual. A series
Virtuality here does not mean that which compliments reality; it is rather the 
constitutive possibility of the text’s intelligibility in real space. Elizabeth Grosz 
makes a similar claim in her research on virtuality: ‘we must realize that since 
there has been writing, writing in the Derridean sense of the trace [...] there has 
been some idea of the virtual. The text we read may be in real space, but insofar 
as it is comprehensible to us, it also exists in a state of virtuality’ (Travels, p. 
105). These theorizations are significant because they enable us to realize that 
virtuality has a textual ‘infrastructure’, as Kalaga claims (‘Trouble’, p. 96), 
composed of relations (or an order of elements moving in relation to one another) 
that occur prior to actualization’s creative leap forward from a generative virtual. 
Laurent Milesi posits a textual virtual that underscores this significance, which 
he calls ‘possibility-virtuality’, referencing a ‘more primordial, archaic virtual as 
the utmost generalizable trace of the (im)possible event before a taking-place,
[...] from which the couple act/power or actuality/potentiality would itself be 
derived’ (‘Taste’, p. 45).
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of relations may be infinite in its capabilities of forming virtual entities, 
but eventually, it has to be anchored [...] in something accessible to the 
senses [...] in other words, it has to be anchored in a (physical) object. 
Especially exemplary here are objects invested -  by individuals or 
communities -  with chains of interpretive relations: monuments, museum 
objects, souvenirs (with respect to that sphere of virtuality we call 
memory), or material vehicles of information: print, digital records, 
celluloid tape [...]. What we thus participate in every day is a criss­
crossing of virtual and actual spaces: virtuality is inchoatively ‘present’ in 
actuality [...]. Objects partake in both types of relations: material and 
interpretive, i.e., they partake in both actuality and virtuality. Rather than 
being mere densities of matter, objects have memory and imagination 
(this imagination/memory of objects is virtuality).95
The material or physical object, existing in actuality (as matter supplied to form), 
is also a site of memory, in that it takes on cultural significance as physical 
evidence of a taking-place. Thus the physical object is not merely form supplied 
with matter: it is matter supplied with memory and imagination, a live ‘portal’ to 
an elsewhere or a space without place. Kalaga’s assertion of the memory, 
imagination, or virtuality of (actual) souvenir objects enables us to elaborate on 
Hoang’s study of the latex condom in cyberspace. Hoang, we recall, considers 
the tom, used condom as an unexpected souvenir of the GAM body’s souvenir 
status, or racialized position, on Internet cruising sites. However, Hoang’s 
invocation of virtuality differs markedly from Kalaga’s. At separate points in his 
essay, Hoang refers to the regulatory masculinity in gay online space as a ‘virtual 
whiteness’, and describes GAMs as being ‘engaged in virtual, de-realized 
relationships’ as a consequence of staying online.96 While these adequately 
describe the assumptions and expectations of online/offline communities that 
constrain GAM participation, Hoang here reduces the virtual to that which is not 
real; a simulated space made accessible by advances in computing. Hoang thus 
opposes the virtual to what is really taking place in a technologized existence:
95‘Trouble’, pp. 101-102.
96‘[GAM]’, para. 10 of 15.
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virtuality, Hoang implies, either prevents us from seeing who really participates 
in queer online space (which is to say that an idealized or ‘virtual’ whiteness 
masks the true proliferation of user identities), or describes the frequent inability 
of GAMs to embrace the real (online/offline) purpose of cruising sites. Hoang 
therefore argues against the virtual on the premise that it is a technologically 
determined denial of agency, or a technologically determined condition of 
obfuscation and removal from important political issues.
But had Hoang considered the virtual in its more complex philosophical 
sense, he would have understood that the basis of his argument against ‘de- 
realization’ is precisely an example of virtuality, namely, the accessing of 
memories through material objects -  in Hoang’s case, the latex condom’s 
memories of GAM bodies logging on and getting off. Virtuality does not ‘de- 
realize’ here: on the contrary, the virtual becomes real via the used, tom, and 
kept condom, because the condom creates an ‘open link’, in Kalaga’s terms, to a 
virtual space (memory) that discloses the reality of life in a particular techno­
subculture.97 The reality, as Hoang so compellingly reveals, is that despite 
various restrictions across racial, gendered, and sexual lines, GAMs do partake in 
the online/offline movements of Internet cmising, by creatively negotiating these 
exclusionary implications of fluid, flexible touch-sensitivity. Hoang shows that 
the latex condom (a physical object) has as much memory as a computer 
supplied with RAM, which constitutes an important claim against technological 
determinism: we dot have to study computers to know what happens online. But 
it is crucial that we conceive of this object — and any other object — as having 
virtuality, in order to avoid the equally deterministic, and severely mistaken,
97 ‘Trouble’, p. 100.
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conflation of the virtual and new media technology’s prohibitive or emancipatory 
aspects.
While Kalaga establishes that ‘virtuality has always been here, accessible 
through its material portals and mediated by the memory and imagination of 
objects’, he does not reject an association between new technology and the
• 98virtual. New technology is not the same as virtuality, Kalaga insists, but 
‘technology has immensely enhanced access to virtuality’, ‘calling [...] for anew 
kind of deterritorialized cybertextual subject, occupying no place, but capable of 
being everywhere’.99 I agree with this statement: the World Wide Web, for 
example, draws participants into browsing or wandering between reticulated 
links whose addresses are transitory.100 The real location of the Web surfer, then,
98 ‘Trouble’, p. 103.
99 Ibid. Deterritorialization is a Deleuzian term, describing the chaotic 
movements that are immanent to all (territorialized, or territorially placed) 
constitutions of identity and establishments of homeland. Thus, an identity is 
actually constituted, but because it is actualized -  that is, because it involves 
creative, new, forward movement -  this identity is never inert, its territory is 
always unstable or deterritorialized. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, trans. by Brian Massumi, 5 edn (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 147, 193-198.
100 Kalaga makes the important point that while technology enhances access to 
virtuality, we must not confuse this accessibility with the (mistakenly) imputed 
‘virtuality’ of computer-simulated worlds: ‘what is today called virtual reality -  
i.e., the event we participate in via the computer — is not virtuality at all, but an 
already actualized fast-food imagination [...]; an actual simulacrum in progress 
with the participating subject immersed in an actual process. [...] a better name 
for it would be simulated reality rather than VR’ (‘Trouble’, p. 102). We can 
apply this argument to Second Life, the currently popular Web-based, interactive 
3D environment that advertises itself as a ‘virtual world’. Second Life may 
indeed have virtual effects -  that is, it positions a group of subjects in a 
collective, spatial non-place, just as a souvenir or a monument does -  but the 
Second Life software itself, its design, graphics, avatars, and so on, is actual, a 
created simulation of societal acts operated by its users. From this critical 
perspective, we can say that there is nothing particularly virtual about this 
process. On this point Kalaga converges with Massumi: Kalaga implies that the 
content of computer-based environments is not crucial to getting to virtuality, 
and Massumi argues that the content of websites is not important (or is always 
secondary) to the transformative analogue effects of clicking and moving through
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is in an abstract space of relations or links resistant to place specificity. Given the 
increasing accessibility and use of this medium in technologized nations, Kalaga 
is correct to argue that technological development potentially nullifies the 
question o f ‘entering’ virtuality.
However, there is an important possibility of the object as portal that 
Kalaga has not considered, which informs my reluctance to join Kalaga’s call for 
a new cybertextuality. It is possible, I argue, for relations to subsist while the 
object does not work properly as a portal. We must not overlook the fact that Tan 
Hoang’s condom was broken, and that this tearing was necessary for the 
interpretation of GAM movement. The damaged condom/object still acts as a 
portal -  transporting us to a virtual space of textuality, where the condom 
interpretively relates to whiteness, Asianness, AIDS, the body and new media, 
and so on -  but another relation emerges as a result of its souvenir ephemerality: 
put simply, the subject moves through the condom but at the same time lives with 
a useless piece of latex. Hoang’s study evokes subjects placed beside throwaway 
objects not thrown away, becoming acquainted with densities of matter that 
should not ‘be-there’, as it were, remaining in a particular locale. Hoang’s 
condom, then, not only tells us about wider social, historical, cultural, and racial 
implications: it also simply tells us that it is material form.
Cultural critic Bill Brown captures this double sense of relation, in his 
important distinction between the object and the thing:
hyperlinks. While I think Kalaga is correct to warn against the conflation of 
virtuality and simulation, I find his use of the term ‘fast food’ to describe 
computer simulated spaces overly dismissive, because it implies that all 
computer simulated worlds are disposable and that they can never coincide with 
virtuality in the philosophical sense. For an account that tries to reconcile the 
philosophical virtual and simulated reality, see Tom Boellstorff, Coming o f Age 
in Second Life: An Anthropologist Explores the Virtually Human (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2008).
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As they circulate through our lives, we look through objects (to see what 
they disclose about history, society, nature, or culture -  above all, what 
they disclose about us), but we only catch a glimpse of things. We look 
through objects because there are codes by which our interpretive 
attention makes them meaningful, because there is a discourse of 
objectivity that allows us to use them as facts. A thing, in contrast, can 
hardly function as a window. We begin to confront the thingness of 
objects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the 
car stalls, when the window gets filthy, when their flow within the 
circuits of production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, has 
been arrested, however momentarily. The story of objects asserting 
themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed relation to the human 
subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an object 
than a particular subject-object relation.1
Brown’s analysis of objects echoes Kalaga’s theory of objects as portals: objects,
Brown explains, enact through-movements to the constructed codes or
significations of cultural formations, which we draw upon to link the object to a
commentary on (or decoding of) culture.102 The thingness of objects, however,
does not imply a departure from virtuality: as Brown states, we glimpse things
only when objects break and momentarily occupy a place outside flexible
accumulation, before they are either thrown away or resuscitated. The thing is
not entirely within actuality; primarily it has (actual) physical or material
existence, but more significantly it reorients the way in which the human subject
interprets objects (in virtuality). The thing produces a relation of greater
reciprocity, in which the object does not merely confirm the subject’s capacity
for forming interpretative links. Thingness enables the object to address itself to
the subject: the object has agency in this instance; it asserts itself as a thing,
initiates a conversation. A moving car stalls and asserts itself as insensate rubber,
101 Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, Critical Inquiry, 28:1 (2001), 1-22 (p. 4). 
Emphasis in original.
102 An ideological nexus is Kalaga’s other principal example of virtuality, and 
Kalaga qualifies his notion of diaspora with the claim that it virtually subsists 
through ideological as well as material relations: ‘What also -  and decisively -  
maintains the intensity of diaspora is ideology, i.e., relations to and among ideas 
shared by its members’ (‘Trouble’, p. 99).
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steel, aluminium, plastic. The flexible, touch-sensitive condom tears, detaching 
itself from a sensitized surface to face the anxious subject, ephemerally 
commanding attention as something that temporarily will not move (that is, will 
not be instantly thrown away, and will affect the subject enough to hold the 
subject’s attention for a time, ensuring that the subject’s body does not 
immediately move on to more activity following its contact with the condom).103 
We can suggest that by glimpsing the thing, friendships emerge between physical 
objects and subjects, creations premised not on open links to an elsewhere or 
becoming-other, but on a getting-to-know or spending-time-with in the present.
Kalaga claims that ‘technological wiring’ makes cybertextuality possible. 
However, Kalaga looks through the wire in making this statement, envisioning 
bodies moving dynamically in an expansive non-place facilitated by the 
properties the wire carries: electricity and signals. My resistance to Kalaga’s 
proposal should not be interpreted as a gesture of sabotage or Ludditism. Instead,
i m  • •These relations are not decontextualized, naive formalisms or reifications -  
what Levy calls the ‘enemy sister’ of creation, ‘a reduction to the thing’
(.Becoming, p. 34). The appearance of the thing reduces nothing but an 
inattention to the material thingness of objects: as we see in Hoang’s case study, 
the tom and detached condom communicates a history of AIDS and technology 
and a discourse of Asianness: however it does so not as a condom in the strict 
sense but as something else — an inertial piece of rubber with no necessary 
connection to the uninhibited movement or re-moulding of bodily identities in 
post-Fordism. I am thus arguing for a theory of technology that proceeds from 
material objects themselves. One essay in particular has achieved this; see 
Raiford Guins, ‘An Elegy for the Undead’, Vectors, 2:1 (2006), 
<http://www.vectorsjournal.Org/issues/3/objectOfMediaStudies> [accessed 28 
July 2009]. Guins searches for material remnants of the 1980s arcade game Ms. 
Pac Man, which primarily take the form of worn, inertial wooden arcade cabinets 
in the wake the game’s obsolescence or emulation within newer technologies: 
‘our interest in video games exceeds their code, immersive [...] worlds, play, and 
photorealistic moving-images on screen’, Guins argues. ‘The marginal material 
form of the media be it cartridge, console, computer, cabinet, disc, handheld, 
wearable, is afforded prolonged cultural value. The material form is a “thing” of 
cultural history that continues to circulate despite its dead media content’ (para. 2 
of 22).
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I want to form a critical discipline that is prepared to notice the everyday failures 
that affect the condition of technological movement/affect: for every image of 
wired cybertextual placelessness, there is the more mundane, humorous, although 
I think equally engaging, image of the cybertextual subject left stationary with 
cables, placed by a slowed or faulty connection that will not allow this subject to 
‘get away’ in Levy’s terms. These moments spent with plastic, polymer, and 
alloy are not meaningless technologically: the computer may be less responsive 
when it stops working properly, but its diminished tactility invites a different 
type of contact between computer and a body-machine. When we touch the 
computer for example -  for example, press a button or click a mouse -  only to 
realize that it cannot feel our actions, a previously unexamined materiality of this 
object is made meaningful, in ways that question new media’s ability to depart 
bodies from the here and now.104
In the context of my research, then, the time of touch includes not only 
insensate skins, but also an unresponsive computer and an aggressive, 
exasperated computer user, who deliberately mistreats the machine -  is 
deliberately awkward or tactless with it, we could say -  in light of its
104 Glimpsing the wire as a thing provides a compelling means of interpreting 
David Simon’s The Wire, one of the most intricate television series of recent 
times. Set in post-industrial, early-twenty-first-century Baltimore, The Wire 
follows simultaneously the public and private lives of the city’s drug dealers, 
politicians, homeless, and the police team attempting to disband the drugs empire 
by intercepting (or ‘getting a wire up on’) the mobile phones and pagers of the 
empire’s hierarchy. A recurring theme of The Wire is that, due to harsh economic 
constraints, political corruption, inept policing, and the meticulously coded 
movements of the drug dealers, the wiretap never quite enables the police to 
evidence the precise locations, identities, activities, and communicative 
exchanges within the virtual telecommunicative space that relates each member 
of the drug gang. The wiretap is subsequently disconnected, or shut down, on 
many occasions, leaving equipment inactive in a disused office: the 
plastic/polymer cable becomes as much a discrete character of the drama as a 
component of technological wiring. (The Wire. Prod, by David Simon, Robert F. 
Colesberry, Nina Kostroff Noble. Warner Bros. HBO Home Video.)
261
unresponsiveness. A ‘timed out’ or significantly slowed Internet connection, for 
example, can lead us to forcefully, unrhythmically prod the buttons of a keyboard 
and mouse — the action colloquially known as ‘button bashing’ — in the 
knowledge that these actions are not likely to re-establish the simultaneity with 
electronic commands that would normally move us through the Web. This 
encounter is far different to any found in Zeros, ‘Ticklish’, and ‘Trouble’: Plant 
clearly had high expectations of a free-flowing, universally high-speed 
communications network to appear in the years following her book’s publication, 
and both Vasseleu and Kalaga assume that technological wiring will always 
displace us as long as we make contact with it.105 Button bashing draws our 
attention not only to the time of touch but also to the separate temporal frame of 
tactility, because it demonstrates that tactility can subsist without auto-affective 
movement. Theories of technological touch-sensitivity equate tactility with 
uninhibited mobility. In the body-machine encounter between unresponsive 
computer and exasperated user, though, the networked computer remains 
electronically powered or live, and the user has a sensate awareness of bashing 
buttons, but these separated tactilities are not conducive to vagueness -  the 
affectively compulsive, transformative, and unmotivated movement fostered by
105 Joanna Zylinska argues that ‘[w]ith mobile phones, iPods, wireless Internet 
connections, immersive game environments, and the convergence of different 
media forms and contents, [...] [t]he human is positioned much more ostensibly 
as an element in the information system, a nodal point for the flow of data, rather 
than a skin-bound, self-contained rational moral agent’ (.Bioethics, p. 61). I 
support Zylinska’s formulation, because it echoes the idea of body-machines (or, 
as Zylinska proposes, ‘humachines’) that underpins my thesis, whereby the 
human body’s relation to its environment is always already mediated by a 
technological-co-ordinative complex of which the human is both an effect and a 
contact point or terminal (ibid). My notion of casting, however, focuses on the 
discordant types of relation that can form and subsist within the systemic 
synthesis of skin and data, in which the skin that touches things technological 
does not always give way to a transformative flow or liveness.
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clicking through the Web’s reticulated links. These body-machine relations or 
acquaintances, in other words, are cybertextual — virtuality bound up with 
technology -  prior to a cybertextuality premised on technological advancement.
‘Casting’ is a suitable term for these acquaintances/friendships. To 
understand why, and to relate my theorizations in this chapter to my overarching 
discussion of post-Fordism, we can examine the role of these friendships within a 
way of life that critic Lauren Berlant calls ‘post-Fordist affect’.106 Berlant 
analyses the plight of subjects disenfranchised by flexible accumulation, positing 
post-Fordism as ‘a scene in which the lower you are on economic scales, and the 
less formal your relation to the economy, the more alone you are in the project of 
maintaining and reproducing life’.107 The ‘constant movement of people and 
things, through national boundaries, temporary homes’, and informal workplaces 
and economic conditions, has compressed time and space into an ‘eternal 
present’, Berlant claims, where the less economically privileged work the most 
flexibly (that is, move through jobs which are the most temporary) without 
progressing through ‘contemporary class society’.108 Berlant calls this ‘stuck in 
[...] the time of [...] not-stopping\ 109
For Berlant, those who bear the exclusionary consequences of post- 
Fordism are constantly ‘flinging themselves at life’, but not in an attempt at 
upward class mobility: mobility for these subjects does not represent the 
meaningful (flexible) way of joining a trajectory towards a normative way of
106 Lauren Berlant, ‘Nearly Utopian, Nearly Normal: Post-Fordist Affect in La 
Promesse and Rosetta\ Public Culture, 19:2 (2007), 273-301.
107 ‘Nearly’, p. 280.
108‘Nearly’, p. 292. v
109 ‘Nearly’, p. 279. Emphasis in original.
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living. Berlant argues that to understand the lives cultivated at the post-Fordist
bottom, ‘we need to think about normativity as an evolving and incoherent
cluster of hegemonic promises about the present and future experience of social
belonging that can be entered into in a number of ways’, rather than as ‘a
congealed space of aspiration toward privilege’.111 In the ‘fundamentally
stressful’ lives that Berlant documents, movement towards privilege does not
exist, is not an option.112 To avoid their entropic burnout within this overbearing
present, Berlant claims, these subjects form transitory relationships with others in
immediate proximity (whoever or whatever is at hand, as it were), and, in the
moments that they last, experience these relationships as the possibility of ‘the
good life’, or of stable and enduring bonds established over time by eligibly
working bodies, in order to gain a sense of the privileges awarded to those others
who do live flexibility as upward mobility.113 In other words, these subjects
move to ‘feel normal’, as a means of deferring the flexibility that exhausts
them.114 Movement and sensation are indistinguishable here, but this affective
mode temporarily brings bodies to a standstill to facilitate life-making. Places
and things are crucial to these movements toward feeling normal:
What’s striking in the temporal imaginary of both the citizen and the 
migrant workers [of post-Fordism] is the ways they look forward to a 
condition of stasis, of being able to be somewhere and make a life, 
exercising existence as a fact, not a project. In other words, in this version 
of transnational class fantasy, mobility is a nightmare, not a dream, and 
property and propriety signify having something and keeping it, and 
being able to return to it. [...] The desire for a less-bad life involves
110‘Nearly’, p. 277.
111 ‘Nearly’, p. 298.
112 Ibid.
113 ‘Nearly’, p. 275.
114 ‘Nearly’, p. 281. Elsewhere Berlant has written on thermodynamics and 
entropy, in relation to the ‘physical wearing out’ of present-day populations, 
particularly those suffering from obesity. See Lauren Berlant, ‘Slow Death’, 
Critical Inquiry, 33 (2007), 754-780 (p. 754).
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finding resting places [...] bargaining with what is overwhelming about 
the present.1
Berlant s assertions of property and propriety link compellingly to my argument 
for friendships with object-things. Post-Fordist affect denotes casting, in the 
sense of bodies unmotivatedly throwing or ‘flinging’ themselves until they make 
an attachment with something. It also denotes casting in the sense of bodies 
making this thing endure somewhere, endowing it with a hardness or permanence 
so that it can be kept, not owned (ownership implying upward mobility); 
ensuring this thing does not change shape, is not looked through as a portal to 
capitalistic gain, so that it may be returned to in the form in which it was first 
cast. This hope of returning to the same thing provides those cast off by post- 
Fordism with a feeling of relation, intimacy, and social belonging -  those 
elements falsely promised by flexibility to exist in a utopic space that everybody 
can inhabit in the future. A key implication of these affective processes is that 
feeling does not have to be reciprocated between body and object-thing: the 
notion of quickly grabbing hold of something without thinking, and keeping it in 
place, carries the distinct possibility of this thing not feeling the same way, 
indeed the possibility of this thing not feeling anything.116 This insensateness of
115 ‘Nearly’, p. 291. Emphasis in original.
116 The first half of Pixar’s animated film Wall-E -  which can be considered a 
post-Fordist version of Chaplin’s Modern Times — captures this relational or, 
indeed, insensately reciprocal non-reciprocity between body-machines in post­
industrial time. The obsolete industrial worker/refuse compressor robot WALL-E 
falls in love with the technologically advanced, sleekly designed EVE, a probing 
device sent from a spaceship to find evidence of life in a decayed and (but for 
WALL-E) uninhabited Earth in the year 2805. The machines establish a 
friendship initially based on tactlessness. WALL-E wants to show EVE his 
favourite objects that he found and kept from his rubbish compression duties, but 
EVE is physically more powerful than WALL-E and often breaks these objects 
by handling them with too much force or pressure. EVE is also built for great 
speed and freedom of 'movement, and cannot navigate through WALL-E’s small 
home or place without damaging its contents and structure. Just as the two are
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the keepsake is the necessary condition for relations to subsist in lives where one 
has neither the time nor the space to network for upward mobility. Contra 
Berlant, I prefer not to read these relations as the lonely actions of subjects burnt 
out and defeated by late capitalism. In Berlant’s rhetoric, the thing of which one 
keeps hold is the digitally dead component of an analogue, affective tie in which 
the subject feels alone. In my view, an opportunity arises when the thingness of 
objects is glimpsed in contemporary technologized society: casting is attributable 
to post-Fordism but casting also produces a queer Fordism, Fordism made 
strange, where technological objects have longer lives not as products -  as they 
did in the Fordist era -  but as agential companions, helping us imagine a new 
politics of place and the local.
I have shown that casting is much more than a means of surviving against 
capitalist domination. It can equally apply to a subject (mis)using a computer, the 
(mis)use/non-use of a condom, any type of relation with an object-thing, and 
bodily contacts established apart from the time of touch/tactility. To this extent 
casting is flexible, insofar as it yields many different examples of the same 
principle: place is important in ways that have yet to be acknowledged in 
analyses of mobile virtuality and new technology. In the thesis conclusion, I 
draw out the implications of casting in relation to the key issues of previous
becoming closer, EVE’s sensory devices detect a nascent plant form, which 
triggers EVE to collect the plant and enter a ‘standby’ or ‘sleep’ mode while she 
awaits collection by the ship. WALL-E continues to accompany and care for 
EVE in the time leading up to her collection, even though the dynamics of the 
relationship have changed: WALL-E can see that EVE remains tactile — a soft 
light flashes on her exterior — and he takes advantage of EVE’s tactility by 
moving closer to her than before, perhaps closer than EVE would have permitted. 
WALL-E moves to hold EVE’s hand, but EVE’s induced 
unresponsiveness/rigidity forces her arm to abruptly close back into place. This 
leaves WALL-E at once happy to have touched/made contact and uncertain 
whether EVE’s tactility is simultaneous with his contact and emotions (Wall-E. 
Dir. by Andrew Stanton. Walt Disney Pictures. 2008).
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chapters, and I outline future directions of research that can emerge from casting 
and the queer Fordism it produces.
* V
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Conclusion: Queer Fordism
Queer Fordism is the time of touching technological things continuously and 
repetitively without response, the time of technological tactility or liveness that is 
not simultaneous with touches, and the time in which a body casts — stays in 
place with a technological development that is momentarily deprived of its 
touch-sensitive capacities, creating new relations and gaining critical insight by 
getting to know this artefact for its stubborn materiality. A body feels more 
Fordist than post-Fordist in these times, because a body is affected in a way that 
moves it to a Fordism of other possibilities. Queer Fordism is thus the critical 
presence and continued relevance of the Taylorized Fordist qualities of rigidity, 
hardness, and order within flexibility as a social dominant. The queer Fordist 
temporal frame is very similar to Benjamin’s alternative Fordism of tactile 
appropriation, multiplied places, and adventurous travel, but in queer Fordism 
tactility is deconstructed as just one possibility of an asynchronous action-sense 
configuration.
Echoing the theories of Plant and Vasseleu, Benjamin’s appropriation of 
tactility does not separate tactility from touch. For Benjamin, a body’s contact 
with a Fordist artefact is simultaneous with a tactile shock the body receives in 
response to the speed-up and automation of the Fordist system. I take inspiration 
from Benjamin’s association of tactility with bodies that are not up-to-speed with 
innovations in technology. However, my research complexifies Benjamin’s 
theorization, by showing that bodily contact with a technological object implies 
different types of touch and different types of tactility, which cannot be 
incorporated homogeneously under ‘tactility’ as a single critical mode. The time
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of touch and the time of tactility frame different orders of relation, and our 
engagement with these frames multiplies the possibilities for action and sense. 
Such a multiplication reveals that tactility and touch are too divisible and too 
separable to serve as the basis for mass, co-ordinated movement. In other words,
I have shown that tactility and touch locate bodies moving at too many different 
speeds in too many different places for ‘tactility’ to incorporate all bodies that 
touch technologically. This distinguishes my approach from Benjamin’s, which 
multiplies the possibilities of Fordism so that Fordist technologies can move the 
masses towards a better future. To summarize, then, Benjamin invokes tactility 
as that which appropriates Fordism for revolutionary criticism, whereas I have 
invoked tactility (and touch) to demonstrate the difficulties of basing revolution 
on technological advancement.
Part of the reason why I argue for queer Fordism -  over Fordism and 
post-Fordism -  is to stress that we must never allow the periodization of societal 
systems to periodize movements in critical theory. I have demonstrated how the 
textual paradigm of poststructuralism in particular is threatened by obsolescence 
within this periodization, and have argued that it is both politically dangerous 
and theoretically and philosophically erroneous for textuality to be threatened in 
this way. To recap, the textual paradigm breaks down movement into a system of 
discrete elements. This approach meticulously studies the differential relations 
between these elements, which mark the movement of the most discrete trace of 
what the system necessarily excludes in order to function. I have shown that this 
strategy can be used to articulate the counter-movement and struggle of bodies 
marginalized by the function of the post-Fordist system. The periodizing 
imperative, however, denounces textuality for creating repetition in the body of
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the critic and boredom in the body of the reader, movements that mirror the 
movements of a past societal system that today’s bodies no longer live. The 
implication here is that textual processes of breaking down have no effect on the 
reality of a Fordist-to-post-Fordist succession that is essentially indivisible — a 
temporal truth incapable of being put into discreteness and into question.
Future Directions of Casting
The ‘queer’ in queer Fordism also references non-normative sexual relations, 
which I argue can be formed in the types of technological encounter I 
emphasized in chapter 4 .1 A key example of the friendships and relations in the
1 The formulation ‘queer Fordism’ is my own, but attempts have been made
already to relate the term ‘queer’ to the possibility of living Fordism differently.
See Bill Maurer, ‘Redecorating the International Economy: Keynes, Grant, and 
the Queering of Bretton Woods’, in Queer Globalizations: Citizenship and the 
Afterlife o f  Colonialism, ed. by Amaldo Cruz-Malave and Martin F. Manalansan
IV (New York and London: New York University Press, 2002), pp. 100-133. 
Maurer argues against flexible accumulation by theorizing an alternative 
capitalist system, which is based on the socioeconomic principles held by gay 
economist and modernist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes’s economic policies of 
stabilized commodity prices and equally balanced wages were the driving forces 
behind Fordism’s post-war boom or golden age. Maurer re-reads Keynes’s 
principles as effects of Keynes’s membership of the Bloomsbury Group, the 
early-twentieth-century union of writers and intellectuals whose cosmopolitan 
pursuit of the arts, and intra-group (and non-heteronormative) sexual relations, 
comprised a critique of unnecessary state convention and intervention. A more 
explicit connection between Keynesian economics and Bloomsbury etiquette, 
Maurer argues, may have ensured the continued function of a socioeconomic 
system that moved (and moved bodies) in a Fordist way but without the 
constraint and oppression with which Fordism was traditionally associated, thus 
forestalling the epoch of flexible or global domination and exploitation. Mandy 
Merck draws out the significance of Maurer’s essay in ‘Sexuality, Subjectivity 
and ... Economics?’, New Formations, 52 (2004), 82-93. While Maurer and I 
share a general commitment to learn from and understand in the present the 
significance of Fordist qualities, our critical approaches diverge: Maurer’s queer 
Fordism is produced by movements that are ‘elegantly regulated’, as Merck 
states (‘Sexuality’, p. 93), whereas the queer Fordism I espouse is enacted by an 
order of tactlessness, in which bodies and object-things are stabilized or placed 
together through failure, unresponsiveness, ignorance, indifference, exasperation, 
anger, and hitting-in-stasis.
queer Fordism of casting — and a potential study to follow from this thesis -  is 
the recently documented, and heavily sensationalized, practice of ‘objectum 
sexuality’, whereby one forms intimate relationships and/or long-term 
friendships with inanimate objects. According to ‘Objectum Sexuality 
Internationale’, the website and support network established by the individuals 
who have formed a community around the practice, ‘if one sees objects as 
inanimate, then objectum-sexual love and our relationships would undeniably be 
scrutinized. Indeed, there are cases of love being one-sided [...], but in general 
we do feel love in return [...] Our objects are NOT human so sex [between 
subject and object] cannot be defined the same way. Intimacy may simply be 
touching or more or less for some’.2 My theory of casting is significantly less 
saccharine than these descriptions of objectum sexuality. In my research, subject 
and object-thing are often brought together as a result of the mistreatment of, or 
heavy-handedness with, the object when it fails or becomes unresponsive, but 
there may nonetheless be affective intersections between the two.
The notion of casting that I propose, which stresses the importance of 
place in technological space, provides an opportunity for technologies scholars, 
and cultural theorists in general, to directly engage with a present reality that I 
think has been significantly under-theorized to date. I am referring to the fact that 
in a so-called digital nation, the speed with which a body is transported via a 
broadband Internet connection varies drastically depending on a body’s location 
within that nation. In Britain, only fifty per cent of households have access to the 
fastest broadband.3 We can understand this current situation with recourse to the
2 See <http://www.objectum-sexuality.org/> [accessed 28 July 2009].
3 See The Department for Culture, Media, and Sport’s paper ‘Digital Britain: 
Final Report’, 2009,
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philosophical digital: ‘digital nation’ signifies not only a networked territorial 
whole but also a vast multiplicity of discrete regions, each of which has its own 
times of contact and communication.4 We should ask questions about what takes 
place in these regions, instead of simply anticipating an eventual nation-wide 
speed-up of broadband technology that will provide all citizens with equal access 
to the optimum number of megabits per second. How, for example, do the 
inhabitants of these discrete places get to virtuality? I propose that we ignore the 
hyperbole of the ‘digital revolution’, and instead study the interpretative 
relations, or the virtual spaces, into which bodies are being moved by their 
contact with wiring that is likely to let down fifty per cent of the time.
Within these spaces, we find that technological developments are 
meaningful as contact points for failure, anger, stupidity, and boredom -  affects 
that exceed the excitable/electric positivity of auto-affectation and the touch- 
tactility on which auto-affectation is premised. Auto-affectation/touch-tactility 
privileges a commonsensical assumption of digital communication technology’s 
reliability and efficiency, implying that digital technology’s failings mark the
<http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/broadcasting/6216> [accessed 05 
January 2010], p. 8.
4 By invoking regionality, I do not simply mean that there are different speeds of 
broadband in different areas of a nation -  parts of counties, parts of towns and 
cities, and so on. There are discrete regions within these areas: connection and 
navigation speeds can vary between neighbouring buildings, and can vary within 
the partitioned areas of a single building, if the hardware and software used in 
each of these places are not of the same age and specification, and if one place 
has more hardware connected to the network than another. It can be argued, then, 
that Britain is more digital (discrete) without the ‘digital revolution’, which 
promises to create a perpetually high-speed, continuous, distinctly analogue 
communicative flow through all territories. Commenting on the pervasive use of 
credit and debit cards in Britain, the ‘Digital Britain’ report claims that ‘plastic 
[...] depends on wired and wireless communications to work’ (‘Britain’, p. 7). 
My examples of button bashing and computer mistreatment demonstrate that 
plastic can indeed work -  can be live and can move/affect a body -  without the 
proper (touch/tactile) function of technological wiring.
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moments in which this technology is not eligible for use. Judith Halberstam has 
recently attempted to ‘expose the logic of the binary formulation that damns 
certain [negative or “bad”] forms of knowing to the realms of negation, absence 
and passivity and elevates others to the status of common sense’.5 Halberstam 
calls for this binary logic to be disrupted by an ‘anti-social turn in queer theory’, 
which requires queer subjects — those whose lives are not tied to reproduction 
and futurity — to embrace the negativity by which they are stigmatized in 
heteronormative society.6 The anti-social turn also involves using the clumsy or 
tactless aspects of negativity to resist the canonization of negativity studies by 
famously stylish and/or ‘camp’ writers, artists, and entertainers.7 Halberstam 
argues that to bring about this turn, ‘we must be willing to turn away from the 
comfort zone of polite exchange [or tact] to embrace a truly political negativity, 
one that promises, this time, to fail, to make a mess, to fuck shit up, [...] to bash
o
back’. The button bashing that takes place in queer Fordism could be made to 
support Halberstam’s project. As I have demonstrated, the mistreatment of 
computers is coextensive with the user making contact with nothing but hard, 
insensate plastic, and perhaps this practice can be appropriated for what can be
5 Judith Halberstam et al., ‘The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Theory’, PMLA, 121:3 
(2006), 819-833 (p. 823). See also Halberstam, ‘Dude, Where’s My Gender? or, 
Is there Life on Uranus?’, GLQ, 10:2 (2004), 308-312.
6 ‘Anti-Social’, p. 824. For more on anti-social queer theory, see Lee Edelman, 
No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2004).
7 ‘Anti-Social’, p. 823. Halberstam criticizes Edelman for his ‘narrow vision of 
an archive of negativity’, which consists solely of epigraphs by highly 
accomplished figures in the arts and humanities who espouse a ‘neat, clever, 
chiasmic, punning emphasis on style and stylistic order’ (‘Anti-Social’, pp. 824, 
825). For Halberstam, this vision ‘cast[s] material political concerns as crude and 
pedestrian’ by ignoring the moments of violent and destructive physical force 
that link negativity to protest and other actions of the oppressed (‘Anti-Social’, p.
t  824). v
8 ‘Anti-Social’, p. 824.
273
called anti-social networking -  a political stance taken by those (such as GAMs) 
who are excluded by celebratory notions of online community-building. 
Stielger’s assertion of the technological/(analogico-)digital body’s irreducible 
non-knowledge provides another way of bringing Halberstam’s negated forms of 
knowing into a technologies studies domain. Stiegler’s claim that a body spends 
more time touching technological developments in a digitally technologized 
society, becoming less credulous about the (analogue) reliability of these 
developments as a result of this increased contact, potentially enables qualities 
and activities such as stupidity, tactlessness, technophobia and neo-Ludditism to 
be taken seriously as epistemologies.
My research can also be used to comment on the current turn towards 
motion-sensitivity in videogaming. The leading motion-sensitive games console 
is Nintendo’s Wii, which is operated via wireless remote controls that use light 
and acceleration sensors to detect their position -  or the position of whoever 
holds the remote control -  in three-dimensional space, in relation to a portable 
‘sensor bar’ that emits multiply placed points of infrared from its position above 
or below the television screen.9 Thus, the premise of the Wii is that it instantly 
and accurately transports the user’s movements into the game being played, by 
creating a space of acute sensitivity to specific physical gestures. The Wii has 
certainly changed the experience of mainstream gaming, but it has been affected 
by casting since its release. Touching, holding, and moving with the plastic Wii 
remote — which is encased in a flexible silicone skin or ‘jacket’ to prevent 
scratches and breakage -  is often not simultaneous with the console’s sensitivity
9 See <http://www.nintendo.eom/wii/what/controllers#remote> [accessed 02 
January 2010]. For an analysis of motion- and touch-sensitivity in personal 
computers rather than games consoles, see Laurent Milesi, ‘Taste’, pp. 50-54.
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to action/motion. First-generation Wiis were widely criticized for their slow 
responsiveness, and to address these disappointments Nintendo released a 
‘Motion Plus’ add-on device — a longer silicone cast encasing an extra 
acceleration sensor, which fits over and plugs into the original remote control.10
Although the Motion Plus does make the console alert to a wider, flexible 
range of movement, bodily contact with this more tactile, touch-sensitive device 
can paradoxically restrict and make tactless the gamer’s actions. The elongated 
silicone and accompanying sensor adds more rubber, increased weight and 
length, and greater density to the Wii remote, making it more unwieldy than at 
any previous stage of its development. By trying to point and manoeuvre a 
sometimes clumsy, excessively cast object around an area that is now too 
sensitive in proportion to this extra materiality, the gamer is likely to miss their 
cues to move as required by the console (or even accidentally to navigate outside 
of the designated space of motion-sensitivity), meaning that the Motion Plus has 
not eradicated the possibility of untimeliness in the gaming experience. There are 
clear parallels between these aspects of the Wii remote and Hoang’s analysis of 
the condom. In Hoang, the condom’s role as a contact point for uninhibited 
tactile communication is put into question by the material reality of tearing or 
breaking that frequently results from this contact, and similarly the Wii remote is 
overlaid with rubber to facilitate uninterrupted or breakage-free touch-sensitivity, 
only to create an action-sense configuration that results in many broken infrared 
connections. The intermittently sensate remote control does not have the political 
significance of the broken condom. However, my analysis of the Wii is important 
for showing that bodies are being moved outside the time of touch/tactility by the
10 See <http://www.nintendo.com/wii/what/accessories/wiimotionplus>
[accessed 02 January 2010].
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most popular, mass-produced, benign and apparently user-friendly of artefacts. 
This is crucial to my neo-Benjaminian position: Wii playing highlights the 
participatory possibilities of casting, in that we do not need technical experts, 
technophiles, or highly sophisticated machines to take us to places in which 
technology can be critiqued in alternative (non-touch/tactile) ways.
There are other devices, however, whose design and creation appears to 
be coextensive with attempts to safeguard against accidental casting. At the time 
of writing, much hype surrounds Microsoft’s plans to supersede the Wii with 
Project Natal, a ‘controller-free’ online games console that senses a flexible 
range of bodily movements and facial expressions without the user having to 
touch cast rubber and plastic.11 We can argue that this innovation posits the hand­
held controller as a cumbersome material form, whose contact with fingers and 
hands is likely to produce a material reaction, such as sweating, which threatens 
to enact the controller’s release from the user’s grasp, and thus make the 
controller act against the wishes of gamer and console. Similar implications 
underlie the function of Apple’s iPhone 3GS, which has an oleophobic (oil- 
repellent) touch screen that apparently cannot be marked by the user’s 
fingerprints.12 This screen is significant for the way that it both invites constant 
touches from the user and tries to eliminate the material residues and traces of 
these touches that may impede its sensitivity, speed, and reliability. We may 
indeed be living in a time of touch-sensitive technologies, but it is important to 
understand how this epoch is severely restricting the time of touch and the time 
of tactility by trying to reach completely trouble-free communication.
11 See <http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live/projectnatal/> [accessed 02 January 
2010].
12 See <http://www.apple.com/uk/iphone/specs.html> [accessed 02 January 
2010].
Finally, I am very interested in using my theory of casting to explore the 
condition known medically as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). OCD has 
many symptoms and levels of severity, but commonly OCD is characterized by 
sufferers touching things more times than they should, in a single place for far
j ^  #
too long. This time-consuming ritual partly satisfies sufferers but also leaves 
them frustrated — often distressingly so — at not being able to navigate space 
quickly, and at never quite being simultaneous with the locations and actions of 
others. OCD is tied to shame and discreetness: sufferers can spend as much time 
trying to hide their self-fashioned routines as they do obsessively and 
compulsively performing them.14 OCD can be felt especially when using 
technology, in particular those devices whose software and live function requires 
a subject’s quick reflexes and hand-eye co-ordination. Examples include sending 
a text message on a mobile phone (whereby one is distracted by a compulsion to 
rhythmically touch the phone’s plastic buttons, thus deferring mobile contact and 
communication); playing a game on a console or PC (one often loses a single­
player game or loses to an opponent, or lets down team mates, as a result of 
pressing buttons or moving a joystick in an order not required by the media, 
making the sufferer aware of holding a cast plastic keypad and therefore not 
immersed in the same way as the average gaming body); Web surfing (one 
cannot proceed to the next link until the mouse has been sufficiently repetitively 
clicked -  actions that often set the user back or forward by too many links 
depending on where the cursor is positioned, or which provide the browser with 
so many simultaneous commands that it crashes); and — quite dangerously —
13 See I. Hayman, D. Mataix-Cols, and N.A Fineberg, ‘Clinical Review: 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder’, British Medical Journal, 333 (2006), 424-429.
14 ‘Obsessive’, pp. 424-425.
driving (one is compelled to touch or tap the steering wheel instead of moving 
the wheel simultaneously with the unfolding shape of the road). While taking 
seriously the pain and distress it causes, in future research I want to resist 
pathologizing OCD as a contemporary mental illness, by emphasizing the 
importance of viewing OCD as a Fordist-to-post-Fordist bodily condition -  more 
specifically as a bodily condition of casting that disrupts such a temporal 
transition. OCD is fascinating for its deconstruction of the binaries between 
flexible (post-Fordist) and rigid (Fordist) and between disorder (post-Fordist) and 
order (Fordist): an OCD sufferer’s most meticulously ordered practices are felt as 
disorders, causing the sufferer to feel out of place for remaining in place. 
Underscoring the critical significance of OCD as a condition of delay -  that is, a 
condition that delays bodies, and, as medical experts have argued, a condition 
whose diagnosis and treatment is often delayed because of the ‘shame and 
secrecy associated with it, as well as lack of recognition of its characteristic 
symptoms’ - 1 will devote a substantial amount of future research towards 
theorizing OCD as the lifelong cultivation of relations not reducible to post- 
Fordism’s disorganized, fluid touch-sensitivity.15
 ■— *-
15 ‘Obsessive’, p. 424.
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